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THE BASMACHI: ORIGIN, ESSENCE, COLLAPSE

by

A.I. Zevelev et al

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ANNOTATION

[Text] This book deals with the heroic struggle of the toilers of Central Asia against the basmachi -- enemies of the revolution and progress and hirelings of international reaction. The authors trace the stages of this struggle, reveal the sociopolitical roots of the basmachi, their antipopular essence, and show that defeat of the basmachi bands constituted a convincing demonstration of the the triumph of Lenin's nationalities policy and promoted further strengthening of friendship among the peoples of the Soviet Union.

INTRODUCTION

The words "basmach" and "basmachestvo" have become historical terms for the peoples of our country. But people of the older generation, particularly those living in Central Asia, recall years when these words were repeated with pain and anger, with hatred and indignation. Contained in these words are years of difficult struggle against a vicious, dangerous and cruel foe. Contained in these words are the ashes of villages burned to the ground, trampled fields, the crackle of machinegun bursts, and rifle shots, thousands of people killed and tortured, hunger, death, and ruined lives.

The word "basmach" derives from the Turkic verb "basmak," which means to pressure, to oppres , to coerce. For the peoples of Central Asia the term "basmach" signifies brigand, bandit, robber, oppressor. For centuries people who have chosen the raiding of trade caravans, brigandage and murder as their "profession" were called basmachi.

After the October Revolution, when the Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Kirghiz, Kazakh, and Kara-Kalpak working people took power into their own hands, with the assistance of their Russian brothers, and proceeded to build a new life, the term "basmachestvo" acquired a quite specific social and political content. Basmachestvo became one of the most acute forms of class struggle by the overthrown exploiters against the victorious revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, against the power of the working people.

The feudal and clan-tribal elite, the reactionary segment of the Muslim clergy, and the emerging national bourgeoisie in Central Asia organized and guided the actions of the basmachi. Basmachi leaders espoused openly counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet slogans, setting as their goal the overthrow of Soviet rule, restoration in Central Asia of the supremacy of the exploiters, and detachment of Central Asia from Soviet Russia. The cause espoused by the basmachi was of a clearly-marked nationalist character, inciting hatred toward Russians and everything Russian. At the same time they promoted discord among the various peoples of Central Asia. Nationalistic propaganda was interwoven with extensive utilization of religious prejudices.

The basmachi inevitably joined forces with the Russian counterrevolutionaries; basmachi detachments established contacts with and conducted joint actions with Russian White Guardists.

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As enemies of the revolution, socialism, and progress, the basmachi enjoyed the full support of international imperialism and reactionary elements in neighboring countries. Camel caravans crossed the border and made their way across mountain passes and sun-scorched deserts, laden with heavy bales containing rifles, machine guns, and cases of ammunition.

British and American agents, operating on the territory of Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Turkey, supplied the basmachi with weapons, ammunition, and money. They took direct part in organizing and forming basmachi detachments. Basmachi bands, when defeated in combat, would withdraw across the border and, after resting and recouperating, would once again invade Soviet soil.

The actions of the basmachi were accompanied by savage acts of terrorism, which assumed extremely cruel forms. The basmachi bands left behind them a trail of mass reprisals against the civilian population and savage acts of execution. Thousands of Communists and Komsomol members, rural and urban activists, girls who had dared to cast aside the paranja, and youths who had resolved to learn to read and write died a martyr's death at the hands of the basmachi.

Burning industrial enterprises and warehouses to the ground, barbaric destruction of railroad stations, peaceful villages and irrigation works, looting and driving off livestock -- all this led to a catastrophic decline of productive resources in Central Asia.

The struggle against the basmachi, which was a part of the civil war -- dramatic, savage and intense -- demanded considerable efforts and sacrifices on the part of the Soviet people. This struggle is fully entitled to be included among the heroic pages of our history. It contains a great many examples of courage, staunchness and military valor on the part of Soviet officers and men, self-sacrifice and dedication to the ideas of the revolution on the part of ordinary people of all nationalities, who were selflessly defending a righteous cause.

Success in the struggle against the basmachi depended not only on victory in combat but also on the daily activities of the working people of Central Asia, led and guided by Communists, in building and consolidating Soviet national statehood, consistent implementation of revolutionary socioeconomic measures and a Leninist nationalities policy, rebuilding and development of the economy, and a rise in the cultural level of the people.

The activeness of the worker masses of Central Asia, which were overcoming age-old backwardness, were becoming liberated from the opiate of religion, were rejecting the nationalistic slogans of the bai [property owners in Central Asia] and their minions, constituted the decisive factor in the ultimate defeat of the basmachi. The historical experience of the peoples of Central Asia confirms the correctness of Lenin's thesis that "that people will never be defeated in which the majority of workers and peasants have recognized, felt and seen that they are defending their own, Soviet rule -- the rule of the working people, that they are defending that cause the victory of which will secure for them and their children the opportunity to make use of all the benefits of culture, all that which has been created by man's labor."[1]

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Standing in opposition to the obscurantism and wild fanaticism of the basmachi was dedication to the high ideals of socialism and progress; political consciousness stood in contrast to intellectual darkness and ignorance; countering violence and cruelty was socialist humanism, which included a desire to assist the wavering and the erring, as well as proletarian firmness toward implacable enemies.

The friendship of peoples and their fraternal mutual assistance prevailed over the endeavor to fan the flames of nationalistic passions and to evoke hatred among working people. The defeat of the basmachi signified total victory of the ideas of proletarian internationalism.

The struggle against the basmachi constitutes a lengthy historical epic. It lasted about 15 years, sometimes dying down, and then again flaring up with renewed force. Beginning in 1917, immediately following the victorious October Revolution, and reaching a high point during the civil war and the first postwar years, basmachi activities subsided in the first half of the 1920's. Remnants of basmachi bands, taking refuge abroad, temporarily ceased their activities.

At the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's, however, basmachi detachments, penetrating our country from abroad and directed by international imperialism, once again disturbed peaceful labor in a number of areas of Central Asia.

The history of the struggle against the basmachi thus encompasses a considerable chronological period and includes a large group of problems which are inseparably linked with the history of consolidation of the socialist revolution, socioeconomic and cultural reforms in the republics of Central Asia.

To this we must add the following: the enormous diversity of geographic, economic, historical and other conditions in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khiva led to a situation where the cause of the basmachi, while containing common counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet aims, at the same time was manifested in a number of localized events, each of which contained a great many specific features.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the social-class nature of the basmachi movement, to reveal its true inspirers and organizers, to present the heroic history of the struggle with the basmachi by the Red Army and the working people of Central Asia, inspired and unified by the Communist Party, and to present the principal events in the history of the defeat of the basmachi. The authors, basing their presentation on the achievements of Soviet historiography in this problem area, have sought to reflect the general patterns and features of the class struggle, the distinctive features of its manifestation in the specific conditions of Central Asia, and to show the fact that the basmachi were historically doomed and the inevitability of their final defeat.

For a long period of time the basmachi seemed to represent a specific phenomenon, characteristic of the special conditions of development of the socialist revolution in Central Asia. The experience of the 1960's and 1970's, however, has shown that phenomena similar to those of the basmachi have occurred in a number of developing countries of Asia and Africa in which progressive reforms were being carried out. Just as the basmachi of the 1920's, inspired and supported by international imperialism, they represented desperate opposition on the part of reactionary feudal

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and clan-tribal elements to any and all progressive measures -- from agrarian reform to a literacy movement. In spite of all the differences of circumstances of time and place, one can easily detect that same support on the part of international reaction, those same social roots, that same exploitation of backwardness and ignorance, that same religious fanaticism, that same hatred of everything new, those same savage, barbaric forms of struggle against an activist defending the new system of government, with the peasant who has proceeded to till the landowner's soil, with the teacher and the actor, and with the woman who has dared expose her face contrary to age-old prohibitions....

The struggle of the united forces of international imperialism, Chinese hegemonism and domestic counterrevolution against progressive reforms in Afghanistan has become the most vivid manifestation of reactionary activities analogous to those of the basmachi. It is not surprising that the Afghan counterrevolutionary bandits, armed with Chinese assault rifles and U.S.-made chemical grenades, are often called basmachi in the press.

* * *

Examining the history of the struggle against the basmachi, the authors drew on numerous assessments, conclusions, instructions and theses on Central Asia, contained in the works of V. I. Lenin, his companions-in-arms, and in documents of the CPSU and the Soviet State.

The Leninist scientific concept of history of the USSR, one component part of which is the history of the peoples of Central Asia, theses on the logical nature of the victory of the socialist revolution in the eastern part of our country and on the paths of transition by the working people of Central Asia from feudalism to socialism, bypassing the stage of capitalism, the strategy and tactics of the struggle for consolidation of Soviet rule in the former colonial outlying regions of Russia, as well as a Leninist description of the civil war in the USSR, its essence, stages, character and social significance, as well as the distribution of class forces in that war, constitute the methodological foundation for investigating the history of the basmachi.

Lenin's appraisals of prerevolutionary Turkestan are also extremely important for understanding the essence and class nature of the basmachi. V. I. Lenin scientifically defined the place and position of Turkestan in the structure of czarist Russia. On the basis of synthesis of a vast amount of factual material, he came to the conclusion that Turkestan, just as the southern part and the southeastern part of European Russia, as well as the Caucasus, had been transformed by imperialism into a colony of Russian capitalism, that the vassal states of Bukhara and Khiva were "also akin to colonies."[2]

V. I. Lenin did not, however, limit himself to this conclusion alone. A study of numerous materials (literary, statistical, demographic, and others) led him to conclude that Turkestan stood at the precapitalist stage in its level of development, that feudal-patriarchal relations prevailed in the life and affairs of the peoples of Central Asia.[3] At the Second Comintern Congress he stated that the most important characteristic feature of Turkestan was the fact that "precapitalist relations still predominate there."[4]

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V. I. Lenin analyzed the class structure of Turkestan society, which proceeded from precapitalist production relations. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the economy of Central Asia, V. I. Lenin concluded that the toiling peasantry comprised the principal worker masses in that region.[5] It followed from this that the main thrust of the struggle in Central Asia would not be against capital but against the influence of the feudal-patriarchal legacy, against feudal oppression, and against carryovers from medieval times.[6] This did not mean that Lenin had failed to note a deep-lying process of "diversion of the population from agriculture to industry" and the birth of a national proletariat in that region. Of important theoretical and methodological significance in this regard is V. I. Lenin's conclusion on the inevitability of class differentiation of the Turkestan kishlak [village].[7] These ideas were of decisive significance for investigating the preconditions for revolution in Central Asia and for studying the history of the emergence and ultimate defeat of the basmachi.

Following the victory of the socialist revolution, V. I. Lenin commented in a letter entitled "To the Communist Comrades of Turkestan," which contained fundamental instructions on ways to implement party policy in the unique conditions of Central Asia, that the establishment of correct mutual relations between the Russian people and the former oppressed peoples of that outlying region would be of enormous importance for all Asia and all the colonies of the world, for billions of people.[8] Establishment and consolidation of an alliance between the Russian worker class and the working people of local nationalities were to play a most important role in connection with this. V. I. Lenin discussed this in detail at a meeting of the delegates to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East.

No less important in the conditions of postrevolutionary Turkestan was liquidation of the patriarchal-feudal legacy preserved in the social relations of the local population. In order to achieve more successful accomplishment of this task, V. I. Lenin recommended employing "/indirect/ ways, techniques, means, and methods... for a transition from /precapitalist/ relations to socialism,"[9] finding special ways and forms of approaching the masses, and including them in the mainstream of building socialism. Lenin's ideas on the possibility of bypassing the capitalist stage of development for the backward former colonial outlying regions of the Russian empire and the entire colonial East, on transition by their peoples from feudal-patriarchal relations to socialism, and on the forms and methods of building socialism in the Soviet East exerted enormous influence on the course of societal development. These ideas were advanced by V. I. Lenin in his reports at the 8th Congress of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, on the commission on the national and colonial questions at the Second Congress of the Communist International, in his article entitled "On Our Revolution," and in other writings.

Further developing the idea of K. Marx and F. Engels on the possibility of certain peoples bypassing the capitalist stage of development and synthesizing the experience of the first years of Soviet contruction in the national republics, V. I. Lenin pointed out that "with the assistance of the proletariat of leading countries, backward countries can pass to a Soviet system and, via certain stages of development -- to communism."[10] We should particularly stress that Lenin invested broad

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meaning in the statement "assistance of the proletariat of leading countries," and particularly the existence of nations and even one nation of dictatorship of the proletariat capable of rendering support to underdeveloped peoples.

V. I. Lenin did not limit himself to theoretical elaboration of the possibility of building socialism by the peoples of the East. He pointed to political and economic ways and means of accomplishing this task.

In order to bypass capitalism in making the transition from feudalism to socialism, it is necessary to overthrow the rule of the exploiters, to establish worker-peasant rule, and to secure the assistance of the proletariat to those countries which are building socialism, in the economic and cultural advance of their peoples, and particularly in the building of centers of industry, forming of indigenous proletarian cadres, cooperative agriculture among the peasantry, and implementation of a socialist cultural revolution. V. I. Lenin pointed out that in backward countries there is no need to develop capitalism in order subsequently to liquidate it.

The movement of backward countries toward socialism along this path constitutes an objective law and pattern of societal development dictated by the era of proletarian revolutions and the liberation of colonies and semicolonies from the yoke of imperialism. The problem of transition by peoples backward in their development from precapitalist relations to socialism is a component part of Leninist theory of proletarian revolution and the building of socialism.

V. I. Lenin advanced the idea of peasant Soviets, adapted to the precapitalist structure of society. In his report at the Second Comintern Congress (July-August 1920) V. I. Lenin came to the ingenious conclusion that the peoples of Central Asia, just as other backward peoples, consisting in their majority of peasants, "can excellently assimilate the idea of Soviet organization and implement it in a practical manner." "The idea of a Soviet organization," he continued, "is simple and can be applicable not only to proletarian but also to peasant feudal and semifeudal relations."[11] V. I. Lenin concretized these ideas at the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (December 1920). Discussing the establishment of new Soviet republics -- Bukhara, Azerbaijan, and Armenian, he noted: "These republics are proof and confirmation of the fact that the ideas and principles of Soviet rule are easily understood and are immediately implementable not only in industrially developed countries, not only in countries with such a social supporting force as the proletariat, but also with such a foundation as the peasantry."[12] Lenin called the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic a peasant-soviet republic.[13]

Of particular importance for understanding the history of the successes of the Soviet Government in the struggle against the basmachi were V. I. Lenin's ideas on the necesstiy of finding "transition stages," special paths and forms of approach to previously oppressed masses, of including them in the mainstream of building socialism, of convincing with methods which are understandable and acceptable for them. He emphasized that one should carefully take into account all the specific features of development of a given people, the unique traits of a people's way of life, religion, and customs, that it is necessary to proceed in such a manner that each and every toiler, even the most backward, perceives socialist tasks as his own vital concern. In 1921 Lenin reminded the Turkestan Communists of an important

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obligation -- to show regular and maximum concern "for the Muslim poor, their organization and enlightenment."[14]

Also meriting particular attention is another instruction given by V. I. Lenin to the Communists of Turkestan in 1919 at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East. He recommended that they be guided "by general Communist theory and practice" and "apply this theory and practice" to the unique conditions of Central Asia.[15] Further developing these ideas, in 1921 V. I. Lenin called upon the Communists of the republics of the Soviet East not blindly to copy the tactics employed in the conditions of the RSFSR but independently to study the reasons for and uniqueness of these tactics and "to modify them in a thoughtful manner applicable to different concrete conditions,"[16] "to apply not the letter but the spirit, the sense, the lessons of the experience of 1917-1921."[17]

Lenin's legacy contains exceptionally valuable theses on activities of the party and soviet authorities in Central Asia, which are of fundamental significance for understanding the forms and methods of class struggle which developed in the new historical conditions. Having substantiated the thesis that replacement of precapitalist with socialist production relations is a difficult process, that it is connected with the maturing of requisite objective and subjective preconditions, V. I. Lenin advanced a most important thesis, the essence of which is the fact that there will occur in the republics of the Soviet East at the initial stage "a slower, more cautious, more systematic transition to socialism."[18] Warning the Communists of Turkestan about the complexity, difficulty and responsibility of the tasks facing them,[19] in a letter to representatives of the party Central Committee in Turkestan V. I. Lenin developed his ideas on the specific features of implementation of the new economic policy in conditions of Turkestan, a policy aimed at strengthening the alliance between the worker class and the toiling peasantry, and at revival of the region's economy.[20]

V. I. Lenin, having laid down the foundation for Marxist investigation of history of the civil war in Central Asia, showed how one should approach study of the history of the struggle against the basmachi.

Leninism contains a classic definition of the essence and aims of civil war, the distribution of opposing class forces in civil war, the forms and methods of struggle. V. I. Lenin repeatedly addressed the question. In "The Russian Revolution and Civil War" (September 1917) he pointed out that civil war "is the most acute form of class struggle."[21] In the course of the class struggle economic and political battles, repeating, accumulating, expanding, becoming more acute, reach the point of "transformation of these clashes into a struggle with weapon in hand by one class against another class."[22]

V. I. Lenin appraised the civil war in Central Asia as a component part of the civil war throughout the country. He stated in a speech at a combined meeting of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], Moscow Soviet, Moscow factory-plant committees and trade unions on 29 June 1918: "Murmansk in the North, the Czechoslovak Front in the East, Turkestan, Baku and Astrakhan' in the Southeast -- we see that almost all the links in the ring forged by Anglo-French imperialism are interconnected."[23]

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Proceeding from his general conception of imperialist intervention,[24] V. I. Lenin emphasized that the undisguised British intervention in Turkestan was also a component part of the overall imperialist plans to dismember Russia and that imperialist conflicts were clashing in Central Asia just as elsewhere. He wrote: "The hypocritical phrases of Wilson and the Wilsonists about 'democracy' and 'alliance of peoples' are laid bare with amazing rapidity when we witness seizure of the left bank of the Rhine by the French bourgeoisie, the seizure of Turkey (Syria, Mesopotamia) and part of Russia (Siberia, Arkhangel'sk, Baku, Krasnovodsk, Ashkhabad, etc) by the French, British and American capitalists -- when we see the steadily growing animosity over division of plundered booty between Italy and France, between France and Great Britain, between Great Britain and America, and between America and Japan."[25]

V. I. Lenin linked the struggle in Turkestan with the overall aims of the interventionists and domestic counterrevolution to strangle Soviet rule throughout our country. He exposed the attempts by international imperialism to transform Turkestan into a colony, to detach its peoples from the peoples of the land of the Soviets.

V. I. Lenin substantiated in a scientific manner the causative factors behind the victory of the working people of the land of the Soviets in the civil war. Lenin stated at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East: "Revolutionary war, when it genuinely involves and interests the oppressed worker masses, when it makes them conscious of the fact that they are struggling against the exploiters... such a revolutionary war generates energy and the ability to work wonders."[26] V. I. Lenin pointed out that convincing the masses through their own experience of the correctness and viability of party policy is of enormous significance for victory in war. He believed that one of the decisive causative factors in victory over external and domestic counterrevolution in the former colonial outlying regions was implementation of the principles of proletarian internationalism and practical implementation of the party's nationalities policy. In connection with this V. I. Lenin stated: "It is particularly necessary to be cautious in regard to various nations, for there is nothing worse than a nation's distrust."[27] Appealing directly to the Communists of Turkestan and to the officials of the RKP(b) Central Committee Turkburo in connection with discussion of the Turkestan question in the party Central Committee in 1921, V. I. Lenin stated: "...It is extremely important /to earn/ the trust of the indigenous population; to earn it 3 and 4 times over; /to prove/ that we are /not/ imperialists, that we shall /not/ tolerate a /deviation/ in that direction."[28] V. I. Lenin emphasized that a correct nationalities policy in Turkestan "is a question of worldwide importance, worldwide without any exaggeration," and that it would have enormous significance for our "Weltpolitik."[29]

Of great importance for understanding the content of the party's campaign to resolve the nationalities question in Central Asia are the RSFSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] decree dated 8 October 1919 on establishment of the Turkestan Commission, signed by V. I. Lenin, and his letter "To the Communist Comrades of Turkestan." Of great theoretical and methodological interest is an RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo draft decree, signed by V. I. Lenin on 22 June 1920, on the tasks of the Communist Party in Turkestan. Nine days prior to this, on 13 June, V. I. Lenin had made frank and firm comments on the draft decree, prepared by a Central Committee

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commission. They are grounded on the idea of broadening the rights and obligations of Turkestan soviet and party agencies and all-out enlistment of the worker masses of local nationalities in building a Soviet State.[30] In particular, the draft decree provided for equalizing land ownership by Russian settlers and the working people of local nationalities by expropriating unlawfully seized land from the kulak-colonialists and expelling colonialist-counterrevolutionaries from the republic.[31] V. I. Lenin specified that the activities of the Communist Party of Turkestan should be directed toward liquidating the colonial and patriarchal-feudal legacy.

On 29 June 1920 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo adopted on the basis of Lenin's draft decree four decrees on the tasks of the RKP(b) in Turkestan.

V. I. Lenin stressed the enormous international significance of victory in the civil war in Central Asia. At the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, he stated: "I believe that the fact that the Red Army has emerged victorious, its struggle and the history of its victory will be of immense, worldwide significance for all the peoples of the East."[32]

Lenin's ideas pertaining to Central Asia provide a methodological foundation for studying the history of the defeat of the basmachi. Lenin's approach to analysis of Central Asian realities is an example of rigorous historicity, an objective and party approach in investigating the history of the class struggle in Central Asia.

In 1921 V. I. Lenin specifically addressed the question of the basmachi and the fronts in the Fergana. It is evident from the letter to A. A. Ioffe that he was requesting detailed materials on the basmachi and the fronts in the Fergana, emphasizing that he needed "facts and the precise decisions of the TurkTsIK [Turkestan Central Executive Committee]" on these matters.[33] Lenin linked handling the matter of the basmachi with unswerving practical implementation of the party's nationalities policy; measures pertaining to further struggle with the basmachi were to be grounded on thoroughly studied facts and materials.

V. I. Lenin's attention toward the basmachi question in a period when the civil war had already ended in the country's principal regions attests to the fact that the party and government leader was maintaining an attention focus on this unique phenomenon of the class struggle and was taking part in elaboration of measures aimed at crushing the basmachi.

* * *

Lenin's scientific conception of the class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as the nationalities question is embodied and further developed in the proceedings of Communist Party congresses and conferences, and in the writings of CPSU leaders.

Documents of the 7th (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks)], the 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th party congresses are particularly valuable in examining the problem of defeating the basmachi.

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The 7th (April) All-Russian Conference of the RSDRP in 1917 adopted a resolution written by Lenin, containing the following points of party nationalities policy: on the right of nations to separation and the advisability of such separation at a given moment, on regional autonomy and establishment of unified proletarian organizations in Russia. The conference pointed out that the advisability of separation of individual parts of Russia would be determined "completely independently in each individual case, from the standpoint of the interests of societal development as a whole and the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism."[34] "The interests of the worker class," stated the conference resolutions, "demand merging of the workers of all the nationalities of Russia in unified proletarian organizations, political, occupational, cooperative-educational, etc. Only such a merging in unified organizations by the workers of the various nationalities enables the proletariat to wage a victorious struggle against international capital and bourgeois nationalism."[35]

The conference resolutions are fundamental in examining matters connected with the struggle against the "Kokand Autonomy" and in settling the question of the party's struggle against nationalist-deviationists, for ideological-organizational consolidation of its ranks, and for establishment of a unified Turkestan Communist Party.

The 8th RKP(b) Congress, which adopted the second party program, demanded the following in the area of national relations: "In order to overcome the distrust on the part of the worker masses in oppressed countries toward the proletariat of the nations which had been oppressing these countries, it is essential to end any and all privileges of any ethnic group, to achieve full equality of nations, and to acknowledge the right of separate statehood to colonies and unequal nations...."[36] The resolutions of the 8th RKP(b) Congress indicated that correct resolution of the peasant and nationalities questions played a primary role in the struggle against the class enemies in the predominantly peasant outlying regions with a multinational population.

Proclaiming, on the basis of the congress resolutions, firm implementation of a policy of a strong alliance between the proletariat and the middle peasants, the Turkestan Communist Party sought to draw the middle-peasant masses of the multinational peasantry over to the side of the Soviet authorities and to detach from the basmachi and the counterrevolutionary Cossacks that segment of the middle peasantry which had been provoked and incited to turn against the Soviet authorities.

Of great importance for the Turkestan Communist Party, just as for the entire party, was the resolution of the 8th Congress on the military question. In the specific conditions of the initial phase of the civil war in Turkestan, where elements of a guerrilla movement were particularly strong, and where in some units the election of command and political personnel was still being practiced, this congress resolution signified intensification of the struggle to establish a disciplined regular army, capable of crushing the interventionists and domestic counterrevolution.

The resolution of the 10th Congress of the RKP(b) entitled "On Current Party Tasks in the Nationalities Question"[37] and the 12th Congress resolution entitled "On the Nationalities Question"[38] have direct application to the history of Central Asia.

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Of particular importance is that part of the resolution of the 10th RKP(b) Congress which deals with the degree of capitalist development of the peoples of Central Asia, the significance of the experience of the socialist revolution for these peoples, and dealing with federation, and where the congress formulates the party's current tasks regarding the nationalities question. The 10th Party Congress stressed that the great achievements of the October Revolution had undermined the old ethnic hostility, had given the Russian workers the trust of their brothers of different nationalities, and had "brought this trust to an enthusiasm, to a willingness to fight for the common cause."[39]

The 12th RKP(b) Congress demonstrated the great importance of the military alliance of peoples which had been established during the years of the civil war: "The victory of the Soviets and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat constitute that base, that foundation on which fraternal cooperation of peoples in a common political union can be built."[40]

The resolutions of the 10th and 11th party congresses contain a Marxist definition of the essence of deviations toward great-power chauvinism and local bourgeois nationalism.

V. I. Lenin's letter entitled "On the Question of Nationalities or on 'Autonomization'," sent to the Politburo, was read to the delegations to the 12th Party Congress. Pursuant to Lenin's instructions, a number of fundamentally important changes and addenda were incorporated into the draft congress resolution on the nationalities question. Advancing and substantiating the idea of establishment of the USSR, Lenin appealed for a determined struggle against nationalism and pointed out that genuine internationalism is tested by how resolutely actual inequality of peoples is liquidated.

Thus the resolutions of the 10th and 12th party congresses, which took place after the civil war ended, arm the historian with fundamental theses on root questions pertaining to the course and results of the civil war.

Frank and firm assessments of the problems with which this book deals are contained in documents of the Communist parties of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm, and of party executive agencies of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. The tasks of the struggle against the basmachi at various historical stages were specified in accountability reports to party congresses and in special reports (for example, at the Sixth Congress of the KPT [Communist Party of Turkestan]).

* * *

The history of the civil war in Central Asia is dealt with in the writings of V. V. Kuybyshev, Ya. E. Rudzutak, I. V. Stalin, M. V. Frunze, D. A. Kunayev, and Sh. R. Rashidov.

Articles by I. V. Stalin entitled "A Current Task," "To the Soviets and Party Organizations of Turkestan," "Our Tasks in the East," plus certain others, written at the behest of the RKP(b) Central Committee and RSFSR Narkomnats [People's Commissariat for Nationalities Affairs], specifically formulated party tasks which during the civil war years were carried out by local party and soviet organizations in Turkestan.

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Guided by the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee and V. I. Lenin on the necessity of developing special methods for the campaign to consolidate Soviet power in the East, I. V. Stalin specifies three main tasks: the struggle against vestiges of colonialism and local bourgeois nationalism, implementation of the principles of Soviet autonomy, and organizational-ideological strengthening of the Turkestan Communist Party.[41]

When they were in Turkestan, M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, and Ya. E. Rudzutak[42] frequently presented reports and gave speeches at meetings of party activists, conferences, and at gatherings of the republic's working people. In addition, they jointly wrote a number of appeals to the peoples of Central Asia and the servicemen of Turkestan, which are of considerable interest for understanding the essence of the basmachi.[43]

Clearly expressed in the writings of M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev and Ya. E. Rudzutak dealing with Central Asia is the idea that ideological-organizational strengthening of the Turkestan Communist Party can be achieved only in an uncompromising struggle against great-power chauvinism and local bourgeois nationalism. The most important task of Turkestan's Bolsheviks in the process of this struggle should be liquidation of all manifestations of ethnic inequality and extensive recruitment of the working people of local nationalities to active participation in all areas of governmental and cultural-political affairs.

The Red Army came to Central Asia to assist the peoples of Turkestan in their struggle against the united forces of the White Guardists, basmachi and British interventionists. It would be able to accomplish its liberation mission if representatives of the working people of the indigenous nationalities of Central Asia, which czarism had in the past not trusted with arms, are recruited into its ranks. In a report presented at the Fifth Regional Party Conference (January 1920), V. V. Kuybyshev pointed out that recruitment of working people of the indigenous nationalities into the Red Army was directly linked with the question of national self-determination. Exposing the great-power chauvinists and local bourgeois nationalists, M. V. Frunze and V. V. Kuybyshev upheld the internationalist principles of building armed forces in Turkestan.

The struggle against the basmachi could be successful only on the basis of unity and combining combat operations by Red Army units with political work among the Uzbeks and other indigenous nationalities, aimed at enlisting them into the active struggle against the basmachi bands. These ideas were clearly formulated by M. V. Frunze in his appeal to the working people of the Fergana Valley.[44]

A most important task of Turkestan's economy was reestablishment of the devastated cotton growing industry. M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, and especially Ya. E. Rudzutak linked the restoration of cotton growing with the necessity of providing raw cotton to the textile industry of the RSFSR and of raising the living standards of the peasants. Ya. E. Rudzutak substantiated Turkestan economic policy in the war years in his report at the Fifth Regional Party Conference and in several other speeches.

Key problems of the history of the peoples of Central Asia are discussed in the writings of L. I. Brezhnev. The most important questions pertaining to building a

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nation and state in the USSR and the forming of a new social and international community -- the Soviet people -- are stated and resolved in his reports, speeches and articles. L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that in our country the nationalities question, in the form in which we inherited it from the prerevolutionary past, has been settled completely, finally and irrevocably.[45] Vital theoretical problems of proletarian and socialist internationalism and problems of strengthening the friendship among the peoples of the USSR are elaborated in the books of D. A. Kunayev and Sh. R. Rashidov.[46] Their writings also define the directions of development of historical research in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

The works of prominent party leaders not only contain valuable factual material but also methodologically arm the investigator in interpreting fundamental questions pertaining to history of the civil war in Central Asia.

The historical experience of the struggle against the basmachi is discussed in speeches and writings of party and government officials of Central Asia: K. Atabayev, Yu. Akhunbabayev, I. A. Zalenskiy, A. Ikramov, T. Ryskulov, N. Tyurakulov, F. Khodzayev, and others.[47]

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"FORMER SLAVES BECAME FREE"

A Land Where Lawlessness Ruled

Central Asia stretches thousands of kilometers -- from the Caspian Sea to Lake Issyk-Kul', from the Aral and the Kazakh steppes to the Pamirs. On the East it borders with China, and on the South with Iran and Afghanistan.

Central Asia contains an amazing diversity of natural, ethnographic, socioeconomic, and historical conditions. Sandy deserts stretching thousands of versts, and majestic ranges of lofty mountains crowned by glaciers.... Lifeless takyrs[1] and oases which astound the visitor with a fabulous wealth of flora and fauna.... Swiftly flowing rivers and the mirrored surface of salt lakes.... The whimsical, intricately-patterned tiles of the beautiful buildings of Samarkand, Bukhara, and Khiva, and the monotony of squat duvals, adobe dwellings and impoverished kishlaks [villages]....

Before the Great October Socialist Revolution the greater part of Central Asia was encompassed within Turkestanskiy Kray,[2] with a population of approximately 5.25 million.[3] Turkestan covered an area of approximately 1.8 million square versts, equal to two thirds of the territory of European Russia. The territory of Turkestan was larger than that of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy and France combined.

This was a multinational region. Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Tajiks, and Kara-Kalpaks lived in this region, but no nationality comprised an overwhelming majority. Russians, Ukrainians, and representatives of other peoples of European Russia began settling in Turkestan in the latter half of the 19th century, chiefly in the cities. By 1917 they comprised approximately 4 percent of the region's population.

The lands of the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate were situated in the Amu Darya basin, from the Afghan border to the Aral Sea. While Turkestanskiy Kray was a component of the Russian empire, Bukhara and Khiva were vassal states, which maintained relative independence in their internal affairs.

Census counts were not taken in Bukhara and Khiva. It was believed that on the eve of the revolution approximately 3 million persons were living under the rule of the emir of Bukhara, while the Khiva khan had 600-900 thousand subjects.[4]

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At the beginning of the present century Central Asia's industrial centers, which were few in number, had as neighbors areas in which a clan-tribal system prevailed, and cities a thousand years old contained newly-built railway stations. Densely-populated valleys alternated with uninhabited mountain ranges, and centers of ancient agriculture with an elaborate system of irrigation works alternated with barren steppes across which nomadic herdsmen wandered.

Turkestan was a backward region. The overwhelming majority of the population engaged in agriculture. Factory industry was of a typical colonial character. It was represented chiefly by small enterprises engaged in the primary processing of agricultural raw materials (cotton ginning, oilseed processing, leather tanning, etc).[5] Railroad shops and enginehouses began to be built in connection with railway construction.

Dekhkan peasant farmers, who comprised the majority of the region's population, were the victims of double oppression -- by the local bai and the czarist colonialists. By 1917 64.5 percent of settled farmers owned 2 desyatinas [d= 1.09254 ha] or less, that is, fell within the poor-peasant category. Approximately 15 percent of the dekhkans had no tillable land at all, and 35.5 percent had no working livestock. The peasants were becoming impoverished and falling into servitude to the bai and the usurers.

The overwhelming majority of nomadic herdsmen (almost 34 percent of all households) were also living in great penury: 11.2 percent of the nomads possessed no livestock at all. At the same time the feudal-bai elite (slightly more than 3 percent of households) owned 30-40 percent of the stock.

The lot of the emerging Central Asian proletariat was not an easy one. Except for the skilled-labor segment of the railway workers, the majority of workers were toiling for pennies and working in the most difficult conditions.[6] The majority of the railway workers were Russians, while in industry there were 70 representatives of local nationalities (chiefly Uzbeks and Tajiks) for every 100 Russians.

Working conditions were truly barbaric. Here are two examples. V. V. Zaorskaya and K. A. Aleksander, who made a special study of factory-type enterprises in Turkestan, wrote that the length of the workday was virtually unspecified, that people worked from dawn to dusk.[7] In December 1909 the newspaper TURKESTANSKIY KUR'YER described a cotton ginning mill as follows: "In the mill building, in the ginning department, there is always an incredible amount of dust in the air; there are 3-4 hanging-type lanterns with candle stubs for the entire mill building, and this is considered illumination; as a consequence workers are forced to grope their way through the darkness throughout practically the entire mill, holding a bit of cotton wadding in their teeth to filter the dusty air as they breathe in.... Every week there occurs a worker accident at practically every one of the mills, resulting in serious injury and sometimes death."[8]

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The population of Turkestanskiy Kray lacked elementary political rights. Czarist officials treated representatives of local nationalities as "aliens," as "second-class citizens," and burdened them with unbearable taxes.

The cultural backwardness of the population was staggering. The people were illiterate almost to a man. In the few schools which did exist, classes were taught primarily in Russian, while Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Turkmens, and Kazakhs comprised an infinitesimal percentage of those enrolled in school.

There was not even the faintest semblance of a modern health care system in the region. Doctors practiced only in the cities, while in the kishlaks there was absolutely no medical care in the modern sense of the word. It is not surprising that the common diseases of man were widespread -- trachoma, scabies, malaria, tuberculosis, guinea worms, and favus. Occasionally epidemics of typhus, smallpox and dysentery would break out.

The despotic medieval states -- the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate -- were even more backward in all respects. Time seemed to have come to a standstill here. Social and societal relations were of a stagnant feudal character. In the Bukhara emirate more than 85 percent of land under cultivation belonged to secular and ecclesiastical feudal lords and emir officials. In the Khiva khanate almost 95 percent of irrigated land was in their hands. The dekhkan toiled under the burden of feudal exploitation. He surrendered a large part of his harvest to the emir or khan as a feudal tax, and he bore the burdens of corvée labor and numerous other obligations. In Bukhara more than 50 different types of levies and taxes were exacted from the peasants.

Bureaucrats did not receive a regular salary. All officials -- from provincial governors (khakims and beks) to the lowliest copy clerk (mirza) -- lived off the general public. Coercion, despotism, extortion and bribery reached enormous dimensions under such a system. This barbaric system was based on the despotic rule of the emir and khan, a rule of frightening and ruthless power.

People were subjected to public execution in the cruelest forms for the slightest offense, not to mention disobedience: offenders would be cast down from high minarets onto stone slabs, or hung on hooks. Thousands of prisoners languished in underground prisons -- zindans -- swarming with poisonous snakes and scorpions. Cutting off the tongue was a common punishment.

Outstanding Soviet writer and scholar Sadriddin Ayni, who spent his youth in Bukhara, portrays a public punishment on Bukhara's Registan. He relates how courtiers of the emir cantered out onto the crowded square by the Palace of the Emirs. "The horsemen were all asparkle in their silken, gold-cloth and satin gowns, belts studded with gold and silver disks and coins. Daggers in gold or silver sheaths swayed from their belts." Grooms running alongside the stirrups pushed aside the common people in their threadbare gowns and drove back the beggars. "Covered with favus scabs and ashes from head to foot," the beggars were without trousers or shirts -- "a rope girdled their waist, holding a tattered rag in place of a frontpiece, while a dirty, torn gown hung from their shoulders...."

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The commander of the guard -- "prince of the night" -- called for the "executors of the emir's wrath" -- the executioners. A prisoner was led out. His hands were tied behind his back. The executioners ripped off the prisoner's gown and proceeded to beat his bare back with cornel-wood sticks. "At each blow skin would adhere to the stick, and blood would spatter out from the wound in all directions. After the 75th lash... the persons holding the prisoner flung his battered body onto the ground...."

The condemned man's hands were bound in front of him. The prisoner was led up to a pit in the ground. "One of the executioners, brandishing a small cudgel, approached him in a leisurely and businesslike manner. Swinging his cudgel, he struck the prisoner in the shins. The prioner fell face down into the black clay. The executioner grabbed him by the beard and forced his head into the clay. The second executioner drew from a sheath a shortish knife with a narrow blade. After dispatching the prisoner, he wiped the blade clean on the condemned man's gown and returned it to its sheath."

Standing behind the glass door of the Ark (palace), the emir was observing the execution.[9]

The peoples of Central Asia had no national statehood. They were administratively disunited. A portion of the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens were residents of Turkestanskiy Kray, others were subjectsof the Bukhara emirate, and still others -- of the Khiva khanate.

The czarist government preserved and promoted disunification of the peoples of Central Asia and sought to keep them in darkness and ignorance. The Muslim clergy was enormously influential. Religious traditions and medieval customs, passed on from generation to generation, had taken deep root in the masses. Women were relegated to the status of slaves and had no rights whatsoever. The paranja -- a black robe which fully covered the face -- was a symbol of the status of women in those years. A Muslim woman not wearing the paranja was unthinkable in prerevolutionary times....

Dawn of a New Life

Double oppression -- national and social -- made life unbearable for the working people of Central Asia. Conditions in the region were becoming ripe for a revolutionary, liberation struggle.

There was only one road to national and social liberation. This was the road of socialist revolution, under the guidance of Russia's worker class and its party, the Communist Party. But the Russian proletariat could carry out its historic mission, overthrow the rule of czarism and the bourgeoisie, only in alliance with the toiling peasantry and the multimillion masses of oppressed nationalities. In such a country as Russia, revolution inevitably had to involve the working people of all nationalities. Without this it could not count on success.

Therefore V. I. Lenin, preparing the party for a determined assault on capitalism, tirelessly stressed the necessity of an alliance between the revolutionary

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proletariat and enslaved peoples. "...We must /link/ the revolutionary struggle for socialism with a revolutionary program on the nationalities question,"[10] he wrote in 1915.

The situation in Turkestan worsened sharply during the years of World War I. From 1915 through 1917 land under crops shrank by almost a million desyatinas. In 1917 the gross harvested cotton crop totaled 7,845,000 poods as compared with 14,900,000 in 1916 and 20,518,000 in 1915.[11] Prices on manufactured goods and foodstuffs jumped sharply.

When the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia took place in February 1917 and the stronghold of the autocracy fell, the Communist Party appealed to all working people to continue the struggle. The workers of Russia, heeding Lenin's appeal and setting a course toward socialist revolution, were strengthening the alliance with the oppressed peoples of the outlying regions, who were beginning to realize that theirs was a common path with the Russian workers and peasants -- the path of struggle, both against the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and against "their own" counterrevolution.

A great many facts attested to the growing unity of the working people of the various nationalities throughout the country, a unity under the red banner. This process also enveloped Central Asia.

Here are some examples. We are in Tashkent, on 1 May 1917. The working people are celebrating their holiday. Throughout the city work comes to a halt, commercial establishments close down, and streetcars grind to a halt. Demonstrators -- Russian workers -- take to the streets. But they are not alone. The Uzbek working people have also joined the May Day demonstration! The columns of demonstrators merge, marching together through the city; joint political rallies are held, at which both Russians and Uzbeks speak.

A revolutionary political rally is held in the Kazakh village of Merke, in Auliye-Atinskiy Uyezd. A person who was present at that rally relates: "...A throng of Muslims appeared in the distance... led by red flags bearing freedom slogans.... The Russian populace proceeded toward them and, when both groups came to a halt, the scene was so moving that tears of joy poured from the eyes of many; freedom songs rang out on both sides, after which their (the participants in the demonstration) aspirations were proclaimed with shouts of 'hurrah'."[12]

The Provisional Government -- a worthy successor to czarism -- refused the peoples equality. The names of the administrative agencies in Turkestan changed, but the working people did not receive any rights. The Turkestan Committee, an agency of the Provisional Government which replaced the governor general's administration, continued a policy of national oppression.

The masses saw as the only answer an increasingly more vigorous struggle against national-colonial oppression, for freedom and equality.

The national bourgeoisie stood as an obstacle on the path of the liberation movement of peoples. Bourgeois nationalists sought to seize control of the

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movement. They wanted peoples to be isolated and set apart; they greatly feared establishment of unity between "their" working people and the Russian proletariat. Seeking to perpetuate the exploiter system, they hated the revolution. This hatred was leading them to form a de facto alliance with the great-power Russian bourgeoisie and was nudging them toward a deal with it.

The Central Council in the Ukraine, "Shura-i-Islam" and "Shura-i-Ulema" in Central Asia, "Alash" in Kazakhstan, the Dashnaks, followers of the Musavat, and Georgian Mensheviks, under the cover of the "national flag," fought desperately against the revolution and betrayed the interests of their peoples. They claimed to support national equality, however, and made every effort to demonstrate their allegiance to the ideas of freedom and equality. At first the bourgeois nationalists succeeded in gaining the support of a certain part of the population in the national regions, including in Central Asia.

The Bolsheviks of Russia stepped up their activities among the oppressed peoples, uniting them under the slogan of proletarian internationalism, and arousing them to struggle against the Russian and local exploiters, for national and social liberation.

The struggle of Russia's worker class was crowned with a great victory. Power went into the hands of the working people on 25 October (7 November) 1917.

The Great October Socialist Revolution became a revolution for all the peoples of Russia. Participants at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which proclaimed Soviet rule, included representatives of the overwhelming majority of gubernias and cities, as well as envoys of the principal national regions. Delegates from the Ukraine and Belorussia, Revel and Dvinsk, Baku and Tiflis, Tashkent and Kazan', Izhevsk and Saransk, together with delegates from Petrograd, Moscow, the Urals, and Siberia, convening in the white-columned hall at Smol'nyy, in free declaration of their wishes, ushered in a new era in the history of mankind.

The storm of revolution smashed the chains which had fettered the peoples of Russia. The immortal lines of the Peace Decree and the Land Decree were followed by the moving words of the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia. The liberation of the peoples of Russia from bondage "shall be carried out resolutely and irrevocably," the declaration stated. Four terse points in the declaration embodied the dreams of peoples:

"1) Equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.

2) The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, including separation and formation of an independent state.

3) Abolition of any and all national and ethnic-religious limitations and restrictions.

4) Free development of the national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia."[13]

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Millions of people who until recently had been deprived of all rights appeared before the world as fighters and builders, inspired by the Bolshevik truth, awakened to a new life, realizing that national equality is inseparably linked with social liberation. Ruling nations and oppressed nations had ceased to exist in Russia.

The socialist revolution gained victory comparatively rapidly in the majority of areas of Central Asia.

Following the example of the Petrograd workers, revolutionary sailors and soldiers, the working people of Central Asia, led by the Bolsheviks, took power into their own hands. At dawn on 28 October 1917, whistles blowing at Tashkent's railway shops announced the beginning of an armed uprising against the Provisional Government. The counterrevolutionary troops of General Korovichenko were defeated after four days of pitched battle. Soviet rule was proclaimed in the main city of Turkestanskiy Kray -- Tashkent.

The Soviets seized power almost simultaneously in a number of other towns -- Kushka, Krasnovodsk, Termez, etc. In the course of the next few weeks Soviet power gained victory in Dzhizak and Samarkand, Merv and Charjui, and subsequently in the cities and towns of the Fergana Valley.

Russians and Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks, Kazakhs and Kirghiz worked shoulder to shoulder in the struggle for establishment of Soviet rule. Uzbeks -- railway workers, tramway workers, etc -- fought selflessly against the counterrevolution in Tashkent. "The workers of Tashtram, Russians and Uzbeks," recalled Shamurza Khalmukhamedov, a participant in the uprising, who was working at the time as a streetcar conductor, "rose up as one against the bourgeois Provisional Government."[14] At the decisive moment in the Tashkent armed uprising, armed Uzbek volunteers fought their way out of the old city and came to the aid of the workers who were fighting off fierce enemy attacks on the railway shops.

The thoughts and feelings of the working people were expressed by a resolution issued by the workers of an industrial enterprise, adopted in December 1917. "We, Muslim workers at the Khodzhayev Plant," the resolution stated, "have unanimously resolved to support by all the means in our possession the worker government -- the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workers' Deputies -- and we extend to it a fraternal calloused hand which has been exploited for more than 50 years by the kulaks, bai and government officials -- henchmen of Nicholas II. We extend a hand to the Russian proletariat, whom we benighted Muslims view as the true defender of the worker and toiler class, which has liberated us from the government official's whip and the bai's fist. We march shoulder to shoulder with the Russian proletariat and protest against attempts by the bourgeoisie to disunite us.... We understand quite well who is our friend, and who is our foe, and we shall not swallow the bait offered by the servitors of the old regime."[15]

By the spring of 1918 the red banner of Soviet rule was waving over the principal areas of Central Asia -- from Kushka to the Aral Sea, from the Fergana to the Caspian.

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The exploiters were still in power, however, in the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate. The masses there were not yet adequately prepared to assault the old regime. They finally achieved victory in 1920.

The dawn of a new life was beginning on the territory of Soviet Turkestan. In November 1917 the 3d Regional Congress of Soviets elected a Turkestan regional council of people's commissars. Soviets began gradually appearing in rural localities as well -- volost', kishlak, and aul soviets. Historic documents of Soviet power were published in the local press -- Lenin's peace and land decrees, the declaration of rights of the peoples of Russia, and the appeal "To All Muslim Toilers* of Russia and the East." The Turkestan Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] endeavored to be guided in its activities by these documents. It informed Petrograd that it was setting for itself the task of implementing the decrees of the Soviet Government.

The Fifth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan (20 April-1 May 1918) proclaimed an autonomous Soviet republic.

"1. The territory of Turkestanskiy Kray," stated the document adopted at the Congress, "is hereby declared to be the Turkestan Soviet Republic of the Russian Soviet Federation. The Turkestan Republic shall include the entire land of Turkestan within its geographic boundaries, excluding Khiva and Bukhara....

2. The Turkestan Soviet Federative Republic, while governing itself autonomously, recognizes and shall coordinate its actions with the central government of the Russian Soviet Federation."[16]

Soviet authorities in Turkestan nationalized industrial enterprises, establishing a socialist structure within the economic system. An 8-hour workday was immediately adopted. New laws were promulgated in the area of social insurance and labor protection, new courts were established, and measures were taken to organize free medical care and establish a system of public education.

Work began on building up productive resources and developing the economy. On 17 May 1918 V. I. Lenin signed the RSFSR Sovnarkom decree entitled "On Allocation of 50 Million Rubles for Irrigation Projects in Turkestan and Organization of These Projects."[17]

Socialist construction was taking place more and more extensive in the cities, towns, communities, and kishlaks of Central Asia, involving millions of working people. A bright future lay ahead for these masses, who had until quite recently been downtrodden and deprived of rights. For the first time in history they had the opportunity to build a new life, to build with their own hands, to build for themselves.

* [used here and henceforth to render the Russian term trudyashchiyesya, which extends to peasants and other "workers" to whom the term rabochiy, "worker," does not apply.]

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Following the October Revolution V. I. Lenin advanced the task of "raising up the lowest strata of society to take part in a historic building process."[18] This task was being successfully accomplished throughout the country, including in Central Asia.

The "lowest strata" -- toiling Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks -- proceeded with building a new life, shoulder to shoulder with the workers and peasants of the entire country. They boldly joined the tanks of fighters for socialism and welcomed the victorious revolution.

Their mood was expressed by Sadriddin Ayni in the famous "Freedom March":

> O slaves! Rise up from the dust,
> Illuminating the world with the Red Banner!
> Cast down the yoke of submissiveness and fear --
> The dawn of freedom has broken.
> We shall scatter dejection and grief,
> We shall dissipate falsehood as smoke,
> Through the boundless expanses of the entire world
> We shall establish justice forever.[19]

His words were seconded in the far-off Pamirs by one of the few inhabitants who knew how to read and write, Mukhabbat Shakh-zade, in a poem dedicated to the establishment of Soviet rule in mountainous Badakhshan:

> ...Former slaves have become free,
> The weary have straightened their shoulders,
> The traces of sorrow are filling with dust.[20]

The socialist revolution in Turkestan was a component part of the socialist revolution in Russia. The Communist Party was able to create an alliance of working people (for the most part peasants) of different nationalities with the Russian worker class. New opportunities, unprecedented in history, opened up for the peoples of Central Asia -- to transition to socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development.

Due to a number of historical and economic conditions, however, the socialist revolution and the building of socialism encountered additional, specific difficulties in Central Asia.

The camp which was hostile to Soviet rule contained, alongside Russian factory owners and bankers, local exploiter strata: feudal lords, bai, the bourgeoisie, the reactionary Muslim clergy and their nationalistic counterrevolutionary parties ("Shura-i-Islam," "Alash," and others). Soviet rule was opposed by representatives of the kulak-colonialist elite and the colonial administrative edifice. The officer and kulak stratum within the Cossacks (Semirech'ye, Orenburg, Aral) also sought to destroy the achievements of the revolution. The former exploiter classes -- Russian and local indigenous -- proceeded to form a united alliance, in spite of the fact of certain conflicts between them.

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Although Soviet rule had removed the underpinnings of ethnic hostility, czarism and the Great-Russian bourgeoisie had left in Turkestan "a darkness of animosity toward and distrust of the Great Russians."[21] This distrust, which had been taking root for decades and which had been rekindled by nationalists after the October Revolution, could not be eliminated immediately. Counter-revolutionaries made use of it for the struggle against Soviet rule.

One must also bear in mind the fact that the leftist Socialist Revolutionary Party, which shared agencies of Soviet authority in the Turkestan Republic on a parity basis with the Bolsheviks, utilized for their own purposes the inadequate ideological and organizational conditioning of the Bolshevik organizations of Turkestan.

While in the central parts of the country the left Socialist Revolutionaries remained in executive Soviet agencies only up to the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, in Turkestan, as a consequence of their influence on a certain segment of the workers, not to mention the petit-bourgeois strata of the population, they participated in the activities of the Soviets during the entire year 1918 and at the beginning of 1919. The left Socialist Revolutionaries, sometimes openly, but for the most part covertly, assisted the class enemy in the struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The dominance of feudal and patriarchal-clan relations impeded class differentiation and growth of class consciousness on the part of the working people. To this was added the economic backwardness of the region, the small numbers and weakness of the national proletariat, the dominance of the Muslim religion, and enormous cultural backwardness.

It was more difficult to establish an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry of other nationalities than with the peasantry of the same nationality. It was more difficult for backward peoples, which had not gone through the stage of capitalist development, to proceed toward socialism than for developed peoples.

All this could not halt the advance of the revolution, but it made the struggle for victory more lengthy, complex, and intense.

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IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION AND CIVIL WAR

Counterrevolutionaries and Interventionists Unleash War

The socialist revolution took place with the support and active participation of the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia. But the classes and social strata which had previously been in power proceeded to engage in a tenacious struggle against the victorious revolution. These were landowners and capitalists, as well as a substantial segment of czarist officialdom and the officer corps.

Over the course of a century czarism created unique, privileged military cadres -- Cossack troops. Very large in number, they settled over a vast territory (on the Don, in the Northern Caucasus, Southern Urals, in Semirech'ye, in Siberia and the Far East). Of course a sharp sociopolitical stratification was also taking place among the Cossacks -- the toiling Cossacks took the side of the revolution, but the Cossack leadership elite initially succeeded in leading a certain segment of the toiling Cossacks against Soviet rule.

The higher clergy opposed the revolution -- Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim -- as did the feudal and semifeudal circles in the national outlying regions.

Finally, the rural bourgeoisie -- the kulaks -- also took an openly anti-Soviet position.

The Second Congress of Soviets had barely ended when fighting began on the approaches to the revolutionary capital. Former premier Kerensky, fleeing Petrograd, fomented an insurrection. Together with General Krasnov, he gathered together several military units and proceeded to march, with the objective of "pacifying" the victorious workers and peasants. The troops of Kerenski and Krasnov got as far as the close approaches to Petrograd, but they were defeated and thrown back by revolutionary workers, sailors, and soldiers.

During the first half of 1918 numerous counterrevolutionary underground organizations plotted conspiracies, insurrections, sabotage, terrorist acts, and engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda. The enemies of the Soviet Republic were working energetically to form military forces. The so-called Volunteer Army was organized in the Northern Caucasus, made up of officers supporting the monarchy. It was headed by czarist generals M. V. Alekseyev, L. G. Kornilov, and

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A. I. Denikin. Anti-Soviet detachments were formed in Cossack-settlement areas.

Swift crushing of the first attempts by the counterrevolution to unleash a civil war (the rout of Kerensky-Krasnov at Petrograd, Dutov in the Southern Urals, and Kaledin on the Don) convincingly demonstrated that the Soviet authorities, supported by the overwhelming majority of the population, possessed immeasurable superiority over the forces of counterrevolution.

Nevertheless armed resistance by counterrevolutionaries did not cease. This was due to the fact that the capitalist nations, engaging in an anti-Soviet intervention, were opposing the Soviet Republic. The Kingdom of Romania occupied Bessarabia. British, Japanese, and U.S. interventionist troops were put ashore in the Soviet North (Murmansk, Arkhangel'sk) and in the Far East (Vladivostok). At the end of May 1918 the Czechoslovak corps mutinied on the Middle Volga and in Siberia. Operating jointly with Russian counterrevolutionary forces, the White Czechs captured a number of cities and towns along the Volga and in Siberia, overthrowing Soviet rule there.

The interventionists established a regime of terror in the occupied regions. Communists, Soviet and trade union officials were thrown into jails, concentration camps, and shot.

Fourteen nations of Europe, North America and Asia took part in the anti-Soviet intervention. A principal role was played by the major capitalist powers -- the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan. And although during the year following the October Revolution the capitalist world was split by the continuing war between the Entente on the one hand and Germany and its allies on the other, the groupings of belligerents were warring against the Soviet Republic. German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of vast areas of Russia interwove with the Anglo-French-Japanese-American intervention.

All land and sea lines of communication between Russia and the outside world were cut. The imperialists established an almost total blockade of the Soviet Republic. The interventionists united with the White Guardist counterrevolutionary forces. They supplied them with money and arms and conducted joint military operations.

By the middle of 1918, when the intervention by the Entente and White Guard actions began to be conducted on a large scale, the brief respite period of peace received after the Treaty of Brest Litovsk came to an end. The Soviet Republic found itself drawn into a war against a foreign invasion and domestic counterrevolution. The fate of the peoples of Russia depended on whether the Soviet Government would be able to fight off the onslaught of its enemies and defend the cause of the revolution.

The flames of the war forced upon us by the imperialists blazed throughout the country. A fierce struggle against the interventionists and White Guardists was raging in the North and South, in the West and East.

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In the summer and fall of 1918 the "Volunteer" Army seized a large part of the Northern Caucasus. Generals Krasnov and Mamontov fomented a Cossack insurrection, occupied Donskaya Oblast, and proceeded to advance on Tsaritsyn and Voronezh. The Czechoslovak mutineers and White Guardists occupied the whole of Siberia and a number of cities along the Volga -- Samara, Simbirsk, and Kazan'. The young republic was surrounded by a flaming ring of battle fronts. The red banner of the Soviets now flew only over the comparatively small territory of Central Russia.

The Soviet State was being put to a severe test. "The greatest honor and greatest difficulty of being the first socialist detachment in the struggle against world imperialism fell to our lot,"[1] stated V. I. Lenin in July 1918.

The situation in Turkestan was particularly difficult. That region's economic backwardness and the specific features of the sociopolitical conditions, which have been discussed above, made the resistance of the exploiters extremely fierce.

Anglo-American imperialism dearly wished to see the overthrow of Soviet rule in Turkestan.

Central Asia attracted the foreign imperialists for the same reason that any colonialist casts a covetous eye on foreign soil -- minerals and agricultural raw materials (primarily cotton), cheap labor, the region's strategic position, etc.

To understand the role of the Anglo-American imperialists in unleashing civil war in Central Asia and in organizing the basmachi, we might draw attention to certain facts from the history of their penetration into this region. This penetration followed the classic scheme. First there appeared in Central Asia "specialists" in "study" of the culture, ways and customs of the "natives," instructors in processing of cotton, development of livestock raising, consultants in geological prospecting and railway route surveying, archeology, etc, as well as journalists and tourists. They would collect and process information of an economic, political and military character and would send the collected data on to their masters, who were generously financing their cultural-educational and philanthropic cover activities.

In addition to "Kulturtraeger," Turkestan attracted businessmen and entrepreneurs, as well as diplomatic officials, who sought to establish extensive contacts with the colonial administrative authorities, the owners of cotton plantations and cotton ginning mills, and the owners of coal mines and oil wells. It was they who sounded out the ground for obtaining oil concessions, contracts for building railroads, constructing irrigation projects, etc. And finally, at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present century, the first foreign commercial and industrial firms began to appear in Central Asia.

U.S. and British capital sought with particular persistence to get a foothold in the pearl of the region -- the Fergana Valley. American and British companies obtained stock in the principal business activities in the Fergana

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Valley. In 1909, for example, the Hoover and Urquhart oil companies purchased the Maylisay oilfield from Russian entrepreneurs and established the "Fergana Oil Company."

An American by the name of William May, who settled in Andizhan in 1912, was involved in the Fergana "Turkestan Trade-Industrial Company." At his initiative the company established direct contacts with U.S. industrialists;[2] the U.S.-owned Vacuum Oil Company established a warehouse in Kokand; the Santo Petroleum and Trade Company, established in 1898 in Ferganskaya Oblast, was financed by the Russian General Petroleum Corporation, established in London and operating under British laws; the Chimion Petroleum and Mining Company, established in 1905, was also connected with British capital. Two thirds of the fixed capital of the Central Asian Kyzyl-Kiya Coal Company belonged to the Saint Petersburg International Commercial Bank, which had ties with British, French, and German capital.[4]

Shortly before World War I, a branch of the Singer Company was opened in Russia, with 50 million rubles of stock capital. This company maintained representatives, warehouses and stores in almost all the cities and towns of Turkestan. The conclusion that "the Singer Company's entire vast agent network in Turkestan did not deal so much in selling sewing machines as in espionage activities: the company's agents collected information on the type of occupations of the population, on the condition of the roads, on the size of crops and livestock herds, on industry and trade"[5] is quite valid.

Establishment of an extensive network of banks in underdeveloped countries played a special role in the economic expansionism of the U.S. imperialists. One of the largest banks in Central Asia -- the Russo-Asian Bank (established in 1910, a successor to the former Russo-Chinese Bank, established in 1896), was closely linked with U.S. financial capital (especially with (Vanderlip) and Hoover); branches were opened in Tashkent, Samarkand, Kokand, Andizhan, Margilan, Namangan, Bukhara, Novyy Urgench, Ashkhabad, Merv, and Kerki. These branch banks controlled the activities of practically all the cotton plantation owners. The bank acquired a large part of the stock of the Kokand-Namangan and Tokmak railroads, the Russian Petroleum Company, the Kokand Electric Company, and the Central Asian Oil Company.[6] It was also involved in railroad construction, in particular construction of the Andizhan-Osh line. Construction of the Fergana Railroad, which took place during World War I, was subsidized to a considerable degree by U.S. capital.

Following the victory of the October Revolution, the imperialists refused to abandon their plans of colonial enslavement of Central Asia. They were aware of Turkestan's strategic and geographic position. The fact that the region adjoined Afghanistan, Persia, China, and India as well as its revolutionizing influence on the peoples of these countries could not help but concern the Anglo-American colonialists. Closely contiguous to the enslaved East and containing potential resources for the struggle against imperialism, Turkestan was a bridge, as it were, linking Soviet Russia to the colonial countries. It was awakening and calling on oppressed peoples to engage in a resolute struggle against colonialism, and through its own experience confirmed the necessity and possibility of destroying this scourge of mankind.

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The imperialists' anxiety increased in connection with the first successes achieved by the young Turkestan Republic in building socialism and commencement of accomplishing the tasks, advanced by the Communist Party, of transforming Turkestan into a model republic, into a beacon of socialism in the East. The consolidation of Soviet power was a deadly threat to the domination of imperialism in Asia. The imperialists were hoping that, by strangling Soviet rule in Turkestan, they would protect their colonies from Russia's revolutionizing influence.

In conditions of the commencing civil war Turkestan was also needed by the imperialists as a bridgehead enabling them to establish a continuous front of intervention and counterrevolution in the southern, southeastern, and eastern parts of Russia. They figured that armed opposition activities in Turkestan would force the Soviet Government to deploy considerable military forces into the region, thus weakening the decisive fronts of the Soviet Republic. The close proximity of the nation's borders enabled the imperialist forces to carry out a direct armed incursion, to conduct aggressive subversive activities, and to offer every assistance to the counterrevolution.

The basmachi became the shock force of the counterrevolution in the anti-Soviet struggle which developed in Turkestan.

Near the end of November 1917 Central Asian counterrevolutionaries -- Russian and local capitalists, merchants, usurers, feudal lords, the Muslim clergy, and and nationalist politicians -- proclaimed Turkestan's "autonomy" and formed their own "government." The town of Kokand, situated in the Fergana Valley, became the seat of this "government." Kokand was one of the region's commercial and industrial centers and a stronghold of the Muslim clergy (it contained 382 mosques and 42 medreses [Muslim secondary and higher schools]; there were approximately 6000 ministers of the Muslim religion in Kokand); the leading forces of Turkestan counterrevolution made their way to Kokand after the victorious October Revolution.

The program of the Kokand "government" called for reestablishment of the Kokand khanate and organization of a Central Asian caliphate. It also called for restoration of all types of feudal and capitalist ownership, stripping women of their rights, reestablishment of the shariah courts, as well as the laws promulgated by Russia's bourgeois Provisional Government.

Advancing the slogan of "Turkestan autonomy," the exploiter classes were seeking to use for their own purposes the aspiration of the masses toward national independence. They advocated autonomy only because this was advantageous to them, because the struggle against the power of the toiler masses could be concealed behind national garb.

The Kokand "autonomists" were supported by the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate, the Turkestan Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, the members of the local "Union of the Russian People," Turkestan Zionist organizations, and former officials of the Provisional Government. They also established connections with the Kazakh and Bashkir nationalists and with the Ukrainian Rada [Council], which recognized their "government" as the sole legitimate authority in Turkestan.

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The "autonomists" also worked in close alliance with other counterrevolutionary forces, including with czarist Cossack atamans such as A. I. Dutov,[7] and with White Guardist generals -- the bitterest enemies of any autonomy for the peoples of Russia.

All this convincingly characterizes the class nature and political thrust of the "Kokand Autonomy." The "Kokand Autonomy" was created not to defend the national interests of the peoples of Central Asia but for struggle against Soviet rule, rule of the toiling people.

British and U.S. military-diplomatic circles very actively supported the Kokand "autonomists." On 15/28 January 1918 the British Government sent to the U.S. Government a memorandum on the need for intervention against Soviet Russia and on supporting White Guardist organizations and "governments in the southern and southeastern parts of Russia."[8]

Colonel House, a friend of Wilson, explained in commenting on the sixth of the "14 Points" that one of the reasons for occupation of the Siberian Railroad by U.S. troops was to support "autonomous governments in Russia's Southeast," including, as is evident from the text, the "Kokand Autonomy."[9]

U.S. President Wilson drafted a program for bringing an end to Soviet rule, for territorial dismemberment of Russia and enslavement of the toilers, in which a certain role was also assigned to Central Asia. In Wilson's "14 Points" and in commentary on them by House and Lippmann, Central Asia is viewed as a future U.S. colony. We read in the sixth point: "There is no information which would enable one to form an opinion on a correct policy toward Muslim Russia, that is, in short, toward Central Asia. It is quite possible that it will be necessary to grant to some power a limited mandate to govern on the basis of a protectorate."[10] This point was confirmed in an expanded variation of this document, approved by Wilson as an official program for the U.S. delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.[11]

The vague wording "government on the basis of a protectorate" in actual fact meant an attempt to turn Central Asia into a U.S. colony. Addressing the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 on the question of a mandate system, Wilson explained that a mandate system would apply to "German colonies, territories of the Turkish empire, plus other territories." When asked what he meant by "other territories," Wilson replied: "The former Russian empire," or more precisely -- the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other regions.[12] On a geographic map prepared by the State Department for the U.S. delegation, the regions which were proposed to be detached from Russia included Central Asia, which came within the U.S. zone.[13]

Great Britain showed particular interest in overthrowing Soviet rule in Central Asia. First of all this was due to fears on the part of British imperialism over the fate of its vast colonial possessions and its desire to incorporate Turkestan into the British empire. General Dunsterville, leader of the British interventionist mission to Baku and Transcaucasia, acknowledged that by seizing the territory of Turkestan and Baku, the British were attempting to close the door to Central Asia.[14] On 4 March 1918 A. J. Balfour, Britain's

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foreign minister, stated that the British Government was devoting considerable attention to Asiatic Russia.[15]

During the holding of the Paris Peace Conference, British agents in Turkestan were attempting to put together a delegation of bourgeois-nationalist elements and the reactionary Muslim clergy for a trip to France, in order to advance demands "for liberation of Turkestan from the Bolshevik yoke." British ruling circles were also ready drawing up a presentation for the "Turkestan delegation" in Paris. It included the demand of recognition of the "national self-determination" of Turkestan on the basis of the principles laid out by Wilson. The British Government promised to support these demands.[16] Concealed behind all this was the idea of turning Turkestan into a colony. In case this plan failed, the British imperialists were planning to set up a kingdom in Central Asia, headed by the emir of Bukhara, Seyid Alim-khan.

The British Government was planning on using in Central Asia its considerable military forces stationed in the Near and Middle East. At the beginning of 1918 a British general stated: "We must consider the possibility that it will be necessary for British soldiers to stand security duty in the oases of Merv and Samarkand."[17]

The British consulate in Kashgar (initially D. McCartney was serving as consul, and subsequently Lt Col P. Etherton) was sending agents, arms and money to Fergana. Representatives of the British military command also arrived there from Meshhed (Iran).

The struggle against the "Kokand Autonomy" became one of the first pages of the civil war in Central Asia. It was here that the basmachi entered the scene as an active force of Central Asian counterrevolution. Irgash, a former criminal, who had gathered together a substantial band (up to 1500 men) of déclassé elements, became chief of militia in Kokand. One of the leaders of the "autonomy," Mustafa Chokayev, commented that Irgash's detachments comprised the military support of the Kokand "government."

A book by J. Castagné entitled "Les basmachis" was published in Paris in 1925. In 1918 its author had been engaged in archeological excavations in Turkestan. This was not his principal activity, however. Therefore his book contains a great deal of information on the Turkestan counterrevolution, and particularly on the basmachi. "The Kokand Autonomous Government," writes Castagné, "fearing the threat of the Bolsheviks, began negotiations with the basmachi and invited them to enter its service.... Irgash was the first to respond to this appeal: this highwayman and convicted criminal had gathered together an impressive band made up of professional thieves."

Later (in 1919) Ataman Dutov sent a personal message to Irgash. In this message the leader of this band of cutthroats was called a "valiant leader of glorious Fergana dzhigits [young men, skilled horsemen]." Dutov appointed Irgash to the rank of sotnik [Cossack lieutenant] and appealed to "Allah and his great prophet Muhammad" to come to the aid of "the true protector of the interests of Russia in the Fergana."[18]

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No less colorful a figure was another leader of the basmachi -- kurbashi Makhkam-khodzha. A notorious criminal, who had been sentenced in 1913 to 12 years at hard labor for robbery and murder, he was distinguished by a highly refined cruelty.

The bands of Makhkam, Akhundzhan and other kurbashi, while performing the political function of supporting the Kokand "Government," were at the same time robbing nearby villages. As the struggle became more intense, the basmachi proceeded to engage in purposeful acts of terror. In the environs of Kokand they began mass annihilation of supporters of Soviet rule, particularly those who refused to obey the "government's" decree ordering mobilization into the army of "autonomists," those who had not surrendered to the basmachi their horses, food, etc.

At the beginning of February 1918 the "government" decided to consolidate its position. To accomplish this it was necessary to seize the Kokand fortress, the telegraph office, and to destroy the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. During the night of 12 February "autonomist" forces -- for the most part basmachi -- moved on the fortress. The Red Guard, however, repulsed the assault. The basmachi fanned out through the town. Blood poured in the streets and in the homes: everybody suspected of pro-Soviet sympathies was ruthlessly annihilated.

On 1/14 February 1918 the Turkestan Sovnarkom declared martial law in Ferganskaya Oblast and declared the railroad in a state of siege.

In organizing the struggle against the basmachi, the Soviet authorities were supported by the workers and the dekhkans.

In December 1917 mass meetings, political rallies and congresses of workers and toilers of the old city were held in Tashkent, Samarkand, and in Kokand. At these meetings it was declared that the "autonomous government" consisted of representatives of the exploiter classes and therefore should not be supported. At the Samarkandskaya Oblast Congress of Soviets, delegates from Khodzhent (now Leninabad, in the Tajik SSR), Dzhizak, Ura-Tyube and Kattakurgan reported that the toilers in the localities "do not recognize the autonomous government and trust only the Soviet authorities."[19]

In December 1917 a congress of Uzbek proletarian organizations of Syrdar'inskaya, Ferganskaya, and Samarkandskaya oblasts convened in Tashkent. The congress voiced a protest against establishment of the "Kokand Autonomy."

At the beginning of February 1918 Red Guard detachments from Skobelev (now Fergana), Perovsk (now Kzyl-Orda), and Andizhan came to the assistance of the Kokand Military Revolutionary Committee. Of particular significance was the arrival in Kokand of a Red Guard detachment from Tashkent and detachments previously sent against the White Cossacks.

The Military Revolutionary Committee formed in the new town of Kokand, made up of representatives of the Kokand Soviet and railroad workers, headed by Bolshevik Yefim Adrianovich Babushkin, was accomplishing an enormous amount of

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work.[20] Mumindzhan Shakirov was a member of this committee, delegated from the Muslim trade unions.

The Kokand "Union of Muslim Toilers," headed by Yusup Povur Shamsutdinov, Tashpulat Urazbayev and others joined in the struggle against the autonomists, under Bolshevik guidance. Ya. R. Gililov, who had been sent from Turkestan in October 1917 by V. I. Lenin personally to "agitate among the local population," was also in Kokand.[21]

Repeated attempts by the Irgash detachment to capture the fortress encountered the unbending staunchness of its defenders, headed by Ye. A. Babushkin.

At this time Pavel Gerasimovich Poltoratskiy, one of the top officials of the Turkestan Communist Party, arrived in Kokand. At the Turkestan Congress of Muslim workers, convened in Kokand at the end of December 1917, he stated: "We are not against autonomy for the poor, but we are against bai autonomy.... We seized power from the Russian bourgeoisie not in order to hand it over to the Muslim bourgeoisie. We seized power for the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. We have worked and are continuing to work to recruit the support of the Muslim toilers."[22]

Disagreements arose among the "autonomists." Representatives of the "Ulema" -- an extremely reactionary nationalist organization -- gained the upper hand. The "Ulemists" removed the former leaders of the "autonomy" -- Chokayev and Chanyshev. On 18 February Irgash was appointed head of the "government." A basmachi cutthroat -- head of "government"! The actions of the counterrevolution had truly become a tragicomic farce.

Irgash, who also appointed himself "commander in chief," once again attempted to take the offensive, but again without success. The Red Guard took the offensive on 20 February. Street fighting lasted more than four days. The basmachi host failed to save the antipopular "Kokand Autonomy": Irgash was soundly defeated and his detachments scattered. Irgash fled with a small group. He was followed by other kurbashi.

A resolution adopted on 3 March 1918 at a general meeting of Uzbek workers and toilers of Kokand, held following the rout of the "autonomists," stated: "...We Muslim toilers and workers curse all autonomous adventurists and recognize the Russian Worker-Peasant Socialist Republic, and submit to the authority of the Soviets of Worker, Soldier, Peasant, Dekhkan and Muslim Worker Deputies."[23]

One of the participants in the February fighting recalls that "following the liquidation of the Kokand 'autonomists,' the prestige and authority of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies increased to an even greater degree, and the Muslim toilers ranked themselves even more solidly behind it."[24]

The Basmachi played a unique role in the Khiva khanate.

Dzhunaid Kurban Mamed, known later under the name Dzhunaid-khan, began basmachi activities here long before the revolution. Cruel, greedy, cunning and ambitious, Dzhunaid and his detachment made bandit raids on neighboring tribes

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and robbed Uzbeks and Kara-Kalpaks. In 1911 he murdered his own brother and appropriated his property. He succeeded in uniting several Turkmen tribes under his authority and in establishing an armed detachment which was quite large by Khiva standards.

In 1915-1916 Dzhunaid made several raids on Khiva, attempting to seize power and at the same time robbing the populace. At that time Russian troops assisted the khan of Khiva. Dzhunaid was defeated, withdrew into the sands of the Kara Kum and subsequently made his way to Iran.

The situation changed considerably after the revolution. Counterrevolutionary circles saw in Dzhunaid a suitable ally for the struggle against the toilers, against Soviet power which had emerged victorious in Turkestan. Colonel Zaytsev, who commanded Cossack units in Khiva and who was an active White Guardist, established contact with Dzhunaid.

In January 1918 1600 armed horsemen under the command of Dzhunaid-khan entered Khiva. Isfendiar, khan of Khiva, submitted to Dzhunaid and nominally remained on the throne.[25] Dzhunaid became dictator of Khiva.

Thus the basmachi were elevated to the rank of governmental authority. Establishment of the Dzhunaid-khan dictatorship strengthened and activated counterrevolutionary forces. Soon the Khiva khan-basmachi counterrevolution became a military offensive.

In the meantime the flames of civil war were burning increasingly more strongly in Turkestan. For an extended period of time Turkestan was cut off from the central regions of Russia by the blazing battle fronts.

The Orenburg Front arose on the northwestern avenues of approach to Turkestan. It was formed in July 1918 as a result of an insurrection against Soviet authority by the Orenburg White Cossacks, led by Dutov, their seizure of Orenburg and the withdrawal of Red Army detachments under the command of G. V. Zinov'yev in the direction of Tashkent. Turkestan's link with the central part of the country by the only rail line at that time to Central Russia, running east of the Aral Sea, via Aktyubinsk and Orenburg to the Volga (through Samara), was cut. Another route -- via Krasnovodsk and the Caspian Sea to Baku -- was also closed.

In July 1918 anti-Soviet insurrections flared up in the towns of Zakaspiyskaya Oblast in Turkestanskiy Kray. The Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Turkmen nationalists seized power in Ashkhabad, Kizyl-Arvat, Merv, and Krasnovodsk. Soviet Government officials -- fearless commissars P. Poltoratskiy, Ya. Zhitnikov, V. Teliya, S. Molibozhko and others -- were shot. Thus the Transcaspian Front was formed.

On 12 August a column of military vehicles painted in camouflage colors crossed the border at Artyk Station. British troops had entered Soviet soil. The interventionists (under the command of General W. Malleson) occupied Ashkhabad and other towns in the Transcaspian.

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The undisguised British intervention in Turkestan was a component part of the overall interventionist plan of struggle against Soviet Russia drawn up by the Entente. After the fall of the Soviet Government in Baku at the end of July 1918 and the appearance of British occupation troops there early in August, the hostile chain encircling the Soviet Republic remained unlinked only in one place -- in Turkestan. With the beginning of British intervention in the Transcaspian the chain girdling Russia closed, as it were.

The White Guardist newspaper GOLOS SREDNEY AZII stated on 17 August 1918 that the interventionists would not be satisfied with seizure of the Caspian: "They assuredly have more extensive missions. Our common task is to wipe out the Tashkent nest and remove anything blocking the Samara-Krasnovodsk line. The strategic importance of this great rail line is immense. It closes the British Baghdad front with the Volga, Czechoslovak, and Ural fronts." That same newspaper also openly discussed U.S. plans for intervention in Turkestan, utilizing the Vladivostok-Samara and Samara-Krasnovodsk rail lines. W. Churchill wrote that anti-Bolshevik governments protected by Allied troops had become established in Russia's outlying regions.[26]

In the Semirech'ye (territory of the present Kazakh SSR) the officer elite in the Cossack villages of Kopal, Sarkand, Topolevskaya, Abakumovskaya, Arasanovskaya, and others had mutinied. They were given assistance by the White Guardist troops of the "Provisional Siberian Government." A Semirech'ye Front was formed.

The four Turkestan fronts were not isolated combat sectors. Both their emergence and the ultimate objectives pursued by their organizers attested to the fact that they were not only interlinked but also were being guided by a single director.

Domestic counterrevolution had merged with the imperialist intervention.

On 29 July 1918 V. I. Lenin, analyzing the country's military situation in mid-1918, defined the Turkestan situation as follows: "...Some of the cities in Central Asia are in the grips of a counterrevolutionary insurgency with the obvious participation of the British, who have consolidated their position in India and who, having seized total control of Afghanistan, have long since established for themselves a base for expanding their colonial possessions, for strangling other nations, and for attacks on Soviet Russia."[27] The "Turkestan Alliance of Struggle Against Bolshevism" (this counterrevolutionary organization is called the "Turkestan Military Organization" -- TVO -- in many books), established in the spring of 1918 and uniting White Guard officers and czarist officials, was operating in an alliance with local bourgeois nationalists.

The interventionists and White Guard were laying siege on Red Turkestan from all sides. They were greatly assisted by armed basmachi detachments, which were active in many areas.

The civil war in Turkestan was a component part of the civil war which was raging through the Soviet Republic. The course and outcome of the armed

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conflict here would be determined by the overall military-political situation of the Soviet Republic and by the development of the combat operations of the main forces of the Red Army on the decisive fronts.

During the years of civil war Soviet Turkestan was like a besieged fortress. The courage and heroism of the worker class and the toiling dekhkans of Turkestan, displayed in combat against their enemies, earned the recognition of all the peoples of the Soviet Republic.

The fact that Soviet Turkestan, cut off from the central regions and fighting under extremely difficult conditions against the united forces of the interventionists, White Guard and nationalist counterrevolutionaries stood its ground and fought off the onslaught of its enemies, says a great deal. It attests to the vital strength of the Soviet system and the deep bond between the Soviet Government, the Communist Party and the masses. How far from reality are the claims of bourgeois falsifiers that Soviet government was imposed upon Central Asia from the outside and was not supported by the toilers! It is inconceivable that Soviet power in Turkestan, if it lacked a bond with the the people, could have emerged victorious in such incredibly difficult conditions. Even manifest enemies of Soviet rule were forced to acknowledge the steadfastness of the toilers of the Turkestan Republic. For example, in an anti-Soviet emigré volume entitled "Smena vekh" [Change of Landmarks], published in Prague in July 1921, we read: "...Suffice it to point to the fact of existence of the Turkestan Soviet Republic in 1918-1920, a fact which has been given little thought up to this time. Totally cut off from Moscow, surrounded on all sides by the forces of Kolchak, Dutov, Denikin, and British occupation troops, and lacking transportation, fuel and bread, the Bolsheviks in Turkestan succeeded in holding power to the very end, for a period of a year and a half."[28]

Fighting Turkestan

The heroic struggle of the Soviet people, led by the party, against the invasion by interventionist troops and the White Guard counterrevolutionaries went on for more than 3 years.

The interventionists and White Guards were advancing from all sides. There were months when three fourths of the country's territory was in the hands of enemy troops. The Far East, Siberia, the Urals, a large part of the Volga, Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Don, and a number of gubernias in Central Russia experienced the burden of foreign and White Guard occupation. The hostile armies were threatening the capital of the republic, Moscow, and had drawn close to the cradle of the revolution -- Red Petrograd. Holding Soviet Russia in the ring of a blockade, the imperialists were endeavoring to strangle it with the bony hand of hunger.

But no difficulties could crush the will of the Soviet people. Workers and peasants from all parts of Russia rose up in a patriotic war against the interventionists and White Guard. The party transformed the country into an armed camp. It directed the battle front and the home front of the Soviet Republic, built a heroic army and a reliable, solid home front.

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The toilers of multinational Central Asia made a large contribution to the common cause of victory over the enemy. For a large part of 1918 and 1919 Turkestan was entirely cut off from the central areas of Soviet Russia. The Turkestan Republic was fighting off the onslaught of its enemies on several fronts. In the North, along the rail line linking Turkestan with the Central Region (north of the Aral Sea), the White Cossacks and Kolchak forces were advancing. In the Northeast (east of Lake Balkhash), fighting was in progress on the Semirech'ye Front. In the Southwest (west of the Amu Darya), the Red fighting men of the Transcaspian Front were battling the British interventionists and White Guard, who had seized a large part of Zakaspiyskaya Oblast.

The rulers of the Bukhara emirate and Khiva khanate were active participants in the anti-Soviet struggle. They turned their territories into counterrevolutionary bridgeheads and on several occasions undertook undisguised armed forays against Soviet Turkestan.

The actions of the counterrevolutionary forces in Central Asia were coordinated and guided by imperialist circles.

At a British cabinet meeting held on 13 November 1918, Lord Milner, representing the war ministry, stated that the interests of the British empire demanded that Bolshevism be wiped out "in areas east of the Black Sea." He explained that he was referring to "the Caucasus, the Don, and Turkestan."[29] Several bases were established on the territory of Iran, Afghanistan, and China, from which all counterrevolutionary activities against Soviet Turkestan were directed. Particularly notable among these nests of counterrevolution were Meshhed (Iran) and Kashgar (Western China). The headquarters of General W. Malleson's British forces which were occupying the Transcaspian became one of the centers of organization, support and supply of the Central Asian counterrevolution. The plan for combating Soviet rule in Turkestan drawn up by Malleson called for mounting a number of successive attacks by British troops and basmachi detachments, as well as organization of uprisings by local nationalists and Russian White Guardists in the major cities of the Turkestan Republic. According to this plan, anti-Soviet insurrections were to be organized in Tashkent, Samarkand, and in the towns of the Fergana Valley; the Fergana basmachi were tasked with capturing Tashkent and other towns in Turkestan.[30]

British and American agents were sent into Turkestan. U.S. Consul Roger Treadwell arrived in Tashkent in May 1918, bearing credentials signed by U.S. President Wilson. Treadwell immediately commenced vigorous anti-Soviet activities. He united around himself all foreign missions and representations in Turkestan; at his instructions, they stepped up espionage and subversive activities directed against the Soviet authorities. F. Kolesov, chairman of the Sovnarkom of the Turkestan Republic, noted in a telegram to the RSFSR Sovnarkom that "Turkestan is being flooded with ambassadors and consuls of the various powers."[31]

In the spring of 1918 a special group was formed in Delhi to conduct subversive activities in Turkestan. It included Major (according to other sources --

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Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel) F. M. Bailey, Captain (according to other sources -- Major) L. W. S. Blacker, and former British Consul in Kashgar D. McCartney. They arrived in Tashkent in August 1918 as an official British mission.

The "mission" soon established close contacts with Treadwell and, under his direction, begun conducting subversive activities against Soviet rule through many channels. Subsequently Treadwell recalled this in a lecture presented in Hongkong in 1928. He stated that "in 1918 I was in contact with British Colonel Bailey, who had been sent from India via Kashgar to Tashkent to gather intelligence."[32] In Bailey's book "Mission to Tashkent," published in London in 1946, the author discusses in detail Treadwell's leadership role in subversive anti-Soviet activities.

The true objectives of the "mission," as Lieutenant Zaytsev, who had been in contact with it, later stated, consisted in "preparing for and organizing an armed uprising in Turkestan against Soviet rule and in supplying the insurgent detachments with money and arms from British bases close to Turkestan (Meshhed, Kashgar, Afghanistan). The mission was invested with broad powers and authority in regard to performing these missions."[33]

At the end of the 1960's Soviet historians working in the Indian National Archives (in previously closed-access files of the British colonial authorities) discovered a classified report by Bailey on his espionage activities in Soviet Turkestan in 1918-1920. This report contains many facts on Bailey's contacts with the basmachi, Irgash in particular.[34] Bailey wrote: "Soon after my arrival (in Tashkent -- Auth.) I made contact with whom I believe was the head of several anti-Bolshevik organizations."[35] He was evidently referring to the head of the "Turkestan Alliance for the Struggle Against Bolshevism." The members of the "mission" agreed to provide the "Alliance" with guns, rifles and considerable financial assistance. The "Alliance" in turn immediately made contact with the Fergana basmachi leaders.

People from the "Turkestan Alliance for the Struggle Against Bolshevism" -- Colonel Zaytsev and Colonel Kornilov (the brother of General L. G. Kornilov) went to the basmachi with a group of military instructors, with the intention of undertaking reorganization of the basmachi bands, in order to consolidate them into a 10,000-man mounted cavalry corps consisting of 2 divisions (8 regiments) with 2 mountain horse artillery batteries. In addition, they proposed to form infantry rifle units. The basmachi army was to total approximately 25,000 men. Organization and training of the basmachi were to follow the model of Cossack units.[36] The basmachi were assured that Great Britain would supply them with everything they needed to fight the Soviet authorities. The Bailey "mission" pledged on behalf of their government to furnish the basmachi with arms: "a) from Chitral-Gilgit across Mustagh Pass to Kashgar, and from there via Irkeshtam and Osh; b) from Peshawar through the Khyber Pass, and on through Afghanistan and Bukhara."[37] The British representatives gave assurances that everything would be "shipped as needed and in sufficient quantity."[38]

The basmachi army was assigned the mission of participation, together with other counterrevolutionary forces in Turkestan, in a combined plan to

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overthrow Soviet rule. The basmachi were to make their way to Tashkent through the Kendyr-Davan Pass in the Turkestan range; across the Murza-Rabat Steppe, bypassing the mountains, and then on to Chinaz and across the Syr Darya. This information is confirmed by materials contained in Bailey's report.[39]

Arriving in Fergana, at the beginning of October Zaytsev held a meeting with the basmachi kurbashi, who gave full approval of the British imperialists' plan. A unified basmachi army was not established, however. This was due primarily to the fact that plans to enlist the toiler masses in the basmachi bands failed to pan out. Colonel Zaytsev himself subsequently wrote about this in a frank manner: "Talk to the effect that the grateful local populace was offering material support to the basmachi bands proved to be an outright lie."[40]

Nevertheless assistance given by imperialist agents and the White Guards enabled the basmachi to consolidate and subsequently to step up their activities.

In the meantime the basmachi detachments of the Khiva dictator Dzhunaid-khan, who was working in close collaboration with the interventionists and White Guard, had begun open military actions against Soviet Turkestan. Lieutenant Khodzhakuli-khan paid a visit to Dzhunaid-khan on the instructions of the British command authorities and the Transcaspian White Guard. He brought with him from Ashkhabad 3000 rifles and a large quantity of ammunition.

Between mid-September 1918 and the end of March 1919, Khiva detachments mounted a number of raids into the territory of the Amudar'inskiy Division (an area of the Turkestan ASSR situated on the border with the Khiva khanate).

Late one November night in 1918, Dzhunaid's basmachi crossed over onto the right bank of the Amu Darya and laid siege to the administrative center of the Amudar'inskiy Department, Petro-Aleksandrovsk (now Turtkul').

Dzhunaid issued the ultimatum that if the town did not surrender, the entire population, including infants, would be massacred. The basmachi plundered villages in the vicinity, drove off horses, camels and sheep, hauled off grain, cruelly tortured prisoners, and murdered peasants and artisans. The small Turtkul' garrison, however, assisted by armed workers and volunteers -- Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks -- fought off the attacks of the basmachi. Participants in the heroic defense recall: "Only women, children and the elderly remained in town; everyone capable of using a weapon had gone out to defend Turtkul'."[41]

Sustaining heavy casualties, at the beginning of December Dzhunaid-khan withdrew.

As already noted, for many reasons the struggle with the interventionists and White Guard assumed a particularly difficult and intense character in Central Asia. An extremely unfavorable strategic situation -- a protracted lack of direct communication with the country's central regions and the impossibility of obtaining military and economic assistance from there -- placed Turkestan

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in an exceptionally difficult predicament. An acute shortage of manufactured goods and foodstuffs was felt in the region. All available resources were utilized for the defense effort. Turkestan's few workers were fighting on the various fronts.

There was a shortage of cadres in the localities for extensive party and Soviet activities aimed at consolidating Soviet rule. Some local officials, lacking adequate political maturity, experience and knowledge, made mistakes.

But our enemies -- imperialist agents, White Guardists, feudal-clan strata, the reactionary clergy, and nationalists -- were stepping up their activities, exploiting economic difficulties, the backwardness and ignorance of the masses of the indigenous population. Growth of the basmachi became possible under these conditions, creating in a number of areas of Central Asia a serious threat to the rule of the toiling people.

On 15 January 1919 the Turkestan Republic's representation in Moscow, acting on instructions from Tashkent, reported to V. I. Lenin the situation in Turkestan and requested that he take immediate measures "on the Orenburg Front in order to link up with the Turkestan troops as quickly as possible."[42]

At this time counterrevolutionary forces were organizing insurgencies and conspiracies in the cities and towns of Turkestan, with the aim of preventing unification with Central Russia. On 19 January 1919 an anti-Soviet insurrection broke out in Tashkent, during which 14 Turkestan commissars were brutally murdered -- Turkestan Communist Party and republic government leaders, including V. D. Votintsev, chairman of TurkTsIK, V. D. Figel'skiy, chairman of the Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars], N. V. Shumilov, chairman of the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, V. N. Finkel'shteyn, A. Ya. Pershin, and M. S. Kachuriner. The insurrection was put down thanks to the staunchness and courage of Tashkent's worker class.

On 22 January 1919, carrying out V. I. Lenin's instructions, Red Army divisions, advancing from the direction of Samara and with the active participation of the armed forces of the Turkestan Republic, captured Orenburg. The first enemy encirclement of Turkestan was brought to an end, and Turkestan was linked up with Soviet Russia.

In spite of the brief duration of Turkestan's linkup with Central Russia (from January to April 1919), the government of the RSFSR and the RKP(b) Central Committee gave Soviet Turkestan enormous assistance in soviet and party organizational development and in organizing defeat of the counterrevolution.

On the instructions of Ya. M. Sverdlov, on 25 January 1919 a group of party and Soviet officials was dispatched to Turkestan.[43] On 1 February 1919 Ya. M. Sverdlov sent off to Tashkent a telegram containing the message that on the instructions of the Central Committee, another group of Soviet and party workers was leaving for Turkestan. It also stated that the party Central Committee and the Sovnarkom were taking "measures to strengthen Soviet rule (in Turkestan -- Auth.) and to increase the army's combat effectiveness."[44]

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On 12 February 1919 a Special (Temporary) Commission on Turkestan Affairs was created by decree of the RSFSR SNK. Commission members included Sh. Z. Eliava (chairman), A. S. Kiselev, and P. A. Kobozev.

The RKP(b) Central Committee and Soviet Government also gave Turkestan considerable economic assistance at the beginning of 1919.

The situation in Turkestan took a sharp turn for the worse in the spring of 1919 in connection with Kolchak's offensive.

On 11 April the White Cossack Army of Ataman Dutov captured Aktyubinsk. Kandagach and Mugodzharskaya stations were abandoned.... Soviet troops were withdrawing to Aral'skoye More Station. Once again Turkestan was encircled by its enemies.[45]

In the latter half of 1919 Turkestan's military-political situation changed radically. By that time the Red Army had routed Kolchak and was pushing the enemy eastward. In August 1919, at the initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Eastern Front was divided into two fronts -- the Eastern and Turkestan.[46]

The Turkestan Front was established on 14 August 1919. Outstanding Soviet military leader M. V. Frunze assumed command of the front. P. I. Baranov, Sh. Z. Eliava, and (somewhat later) V. V. Kuybyshev were named members of the Revolutionary Military Council. In the latter half of August and at the beginning of September 1919 the front's troops launched an attack on Kolchak's Southern Army. At 1435 hours on 13 September, at Mugodzharskaya Railway Station, located between Orenburg and the Aral Sea, troops advancing from the north linked up with units of the Aktyubinsk Front which were defending the approaches to Soviet Turkestan. Military telegraph operators tapped out the words of a priority message sent by M. V. Frunze and Sh. Z. Eliva to V. I. Lenin in Moscow: "The troops of the Turkestan Front congratulate you and the Republic on this joyous news."[47]

The blockade of Turkestan had come to an end. The link between this country's central regions and Turkestan was permanently restored.

Units of the Turkestan Front completed liberation of the Transcaspian (Krasnovodsk, last stronghold of the White Guard, fell in February 1920) and wiped out (at the beginning of April 1920) White Guard forces in the Semirech'ye.

After the railroad was restored to service, trains set out for Tashkent carrying the goods needed by Turkestan. Soviet Russia, itself in the clutches of hunger and in critical need of manufactured goods, unselfishly shared its meager reserves with Red Turkestan. The toilers of Turkestan in turn dispatched to the proletarian center trains loaded with cotton and freightcars filled with dried fruits. On 11 October 1919 M. V. Frunze joyously reported to V. I. Lenin that track repairs were completed and that the first train loaded with cotton had arrived in Orenburg.[48]

To assist Turkestan in consolidating the Soviet system and to ensure correct implementation of nationalities policy, the RKP(b) Central Committee and

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Soviet Government formed a Commission on Turkestan Affairs (Turkkomissiya) and dispatched it to Central Asia. On 8 October 1919 V. I. Lenin signed a pertinent VTsIK and RSFSR SNK decree. The party Central Committee instructed the Turkkomissiya to exercise "top-level party oversight and supervision in Turkestan on behalf of the RKP(b) Central Committee."[49] The Turkkomissiya, consisting of Sh. Z. Eliava (chairman), M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, Ya. E. Rudzutak, G. I. Bokiy, and F. I. Goloshchekin, proceeded to engage in diversified activities promoting consolidation of the Soviet system in Central Asia.

In November 1919 V. I. Lenin addressed a letter to "Comrade Communists of Turkestan." "Establishment of correct relations with the peoples of Turkestan," wrote V. I. Lenin, "is now, one can state without exaggeration, of enormous, world-historic significance for the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

"The position of the Soviet Workers' and Peasants' Republic toward weak, formerly oppressed peoples will have practical meaning for all of Asia and all colonies throughout the world, for billions of people."[50]

V. I. Lenin called upon local Russian Communists to make every effort to establish friendly relations with the peoples of Turkestan and to prove by deeds the sincerity of their motives and their desire to eradicate all traces of colonialism in the interests of the struggle against world imperialism. V. I. Lenin pointed out that such a policy should be a model for the entire East.

Lenin's letter played an important role in uniting the broad masses of the indigenous nationalities behind Soviet rule and the Communist Party. V. I. Lenin's instructions played an enormous role in organizing the struggle against the basmachi.

Of enormous significance for the entire subsequent life of the peoples of Central Asia and the entire Soviet East was Lenin's report at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, presented soon after dispatch of the letter to Turkestan (22 November 1919). The leader of the proletarian revolution explained how the theses of Marxism should be applied to the unique conditions of the East, where the main enemy is carryovers from medieval times, and where the peasantry comprises the principal toiler masses.[51] It was essential to accomplish all-out strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat by combining overall class interests with the specific national features of the peoples of Central Asia.

This was the general situation in Central Asia in 1918-1920. Without knowledge of this situation it is impossible to understand the history of the struggle against the basmachi during the civil war years, its specific features and stages.

The Basmachi Fergana Front

The Fergana Valley.... One of the most ancient centers of civilization in Central Asia and one of its most fertile and densely-populated regions. This vast (covering an area of approximately 20,000 square kilometers) basin,

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situated along the middle course of the Syr Darya, is surrounded practically on all sides by mountain ranges: the Chatkal on the north, the Fergana on the east, and the Alay and Turkestan on the south. Swiftly-flowing rivers, running out of these ranges, provide water to orchards and crops, pastures, groves of walnut and cherry plum trees. The Fergana is also rich in commercial minerals.

As a result of enemy actions, for a number of years this fertile region was the arena of savage, bloody, ruinous fighting.

Let us examine some of the socioeconomic and political factors and geographic conditions of Ferganskaya Oblast.

Following the annexation of Central Asia to Russia, Ferganskaya Oblast[52] by right became Turkestan's number one cotton growing region.[53] Intensive development of cotton growing led to radical changes in the economy and social composition of the population of this region. An important result of the development of commercial cotton raising was the fact that the economy in kind was drawn into money-exchange relations. As a result of this the process of differentiation among the dekhkans became intensified, and a substantial portion of the peasants were dispossessed of their land. All this attested to emerging capitalism.

Tables prepared by Uzbekistan economists on the basis of figures from the survey materials of Senator Palen indicate that in the volosts of Ferganskaya Oblast included in his survey 38.5 percent of households had less than one desyatina of land, and 24.4 percent of these households averaged 0.24 desyatina. The above enumerated households occupied 4.8 percent of the total land acreage. Half of all the land was concentrated in the hands of the bai, who comprised not more than 10 percent of all landowners.[54]

On the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution the process of dispossession of the toiling dekhkans from the land additionally intensified. This is persuasively attested by figures from the 1917 census. According to these figures, land ownership in Ferganskaya Oblast was as follows:[55]

Grouping of Households by Landholding, Desyatinas	Average Landholding, desyatinas	Total Quantity, %	
		Households	Land
Up to 1	0.42	51.0	9.8
From 1 to 3	1.71	30.1	23.4
From 3 to 5	3.65	9.1	15.2
From 5 to 10	7.0	6.3	20.3
From 10 to 20	13.4	2.5	15.3
20 and more	34.7	1.0	16.0

Figures on individual uyezds in Ferganskaya Oblast present an even more graphic picture. In Andizhanskiy Uyezd, for example, 145 large bai landholdings totaled 7224 desyatinas, while 9008 dekhkan household possessed only 3042 desyatinas. In this uyezd 90.5 percent of households were chayriker [sharecropper] landholdings averaging half a desyatina, the owners of which were forced to work for the bai for one fourth of the harvest.[56] In

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Namanganskiy Uyezd 68.1 percent of the dekhkan households owned from 0.5 to 1.5 desyatinas of land, while each bai landholding was at least 25 desyatinas.[57]

From the above figures one can conclude that in Ferganskaya Oblast a large group of bai owned the bulk of the land.

Together with this, there was particularly noticeable here a process of coalescence of the Russian merchant-usurer bourgeoisie with that group of bai which was engaged in cotton trading and usury. A local urban commercial and industrial bourgeoisie was also beginning to appear. In Andizhanskiy Uyezd, for example, Mirkamil' Muminbayev owned 5000 desyatinas of land as well as a number of industrial enterprises; his wealth was estimated at 14-17 million rubles.[58]

The Muslim clergy wielded enormous influence in the Fergana. Suffice it to say that there was a mosque for every 325 persons, while for Central Asia as a whole each mosque served 700-1000 persons, and in prerevolutionary Russia a parish served a population of 10-12 thousand. There were 15,000 ministers of religion in the Fergana. The reactionary Muslim clergy, extensively utilizing Islam, made every effort to arouse the basmachi.

One should also bear in mind the consequences of settlement policy in the Fergana. The czarist government, in establishing Russian settlements, pursued the objective of obtaining support for the struggle against the toilers of indigenous nationalities. It figured that each settlement should replace a battalion of Russian troops.[59] The first party of immigrants arrived in the Fergana in 1891, and the first Russian settlement was established at the Kurshab urochishche [an isolated terrain feature]. By 1914 there were 50 such settlements. A considerable amount of irrigated land had been taken away from the indigenous population. A powerful kulak stratum -- a base of support for the autocracy in Central Asia -- was established in the Russian settlements thanks to the czarist authorities.

Thus an analysis of just a few aspects of the economy of Ferganskaya Oblast and the social makeup of its population indicates that on the eve of the victorious October Revolution there existed a particularly strong element of the exploiter classes there. The wealthiest among these (Mirkamil' Muminbayev, Temirbekov, Abdumansur Mangbashi, Usman Kari Umarov, Kudrat Khozrat, and others) were among the organizers of the basmachi and offered them material and other assistance.

Ferganskaya Oblast, the most populous in the Turkestan ASSR, was the center of the cotton ginning, coal mining and petroleum industry of all Central Asia.[60]

At the same time Russian capitalism was making every effort to impede the growth of industrial production in the Fergana. Therefore the process of proletarianization of peasants experiencing financial ruin dragged on in the Fergana, while pauperization of the peasants was proceeding rapidly.

In 1913 there were more than 15,000 industrial workers in the Fergana Valley, including 3517 Russians, 9247 Uzbeks, 519 Kirghiz, 845 Tajiks, and 1252

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representatives of other nationalities.[61] In addition, 35,000 workers were employed at industrial-commercial establishments, in cottage industry and handicraft activities, and in storage and warehousing activities.

Interethnic relations were extremely complex in the Fergana. As many as 20 different nationalities were living in the valley: Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Russians, Ukrainians, Uigurs, Tatars, Armenians, Bukhara Jews, etc. The colonial policy of czarism also left a sad legacy in the area of ethnic interrelations, aggravated by the fact that the peoples living in the Fergana, just as throughout Turkestan, either were still living in the Middle Ages or had recently embarked upon the road of capitalist development. The organizers of the basmachi also took advantage of all these factors.

The process of establishment of Soviet rule in Ferganskaya Oblast dragged on. In the Fergana power was not taken over by the Soviets from the agencies of the Provisional Government until 6 December 1917, while in Tashkent and other areas of Turkestan Soviet power was victorious in November 1917, and the Third Regional Congress of Soviets (15-22 November 1917) proclaimed transfer of power to the Soviets throughout the region.[62]

Five days before the convening of the Third Regional Congress of Soviets, on 10 November 1917, the Ferganskaya Oblast Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, headed by rightist Socialist Revolutionaries, came out against establishment of Soviet rule, declaring that questions involving the region as a whole should be settled prior to convocation of a Constituent Assembly by the region union of municipal and zemstvo administrations.[63] The leader of the Fergana Mensheviks and editor of the oblast newspaper ZNAMYA SVOBODY, Pavlyuchenko, spoke out at the congress against establishment of Soviet rule in the Fergana and throughout Turkestan.

At the oblast congress of soviets which was convened at the beginning of December 1917, a bitter fight erupted with the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks on the question of recognition of the Turkestanskiy Kray Sovnarkom and on transfer of all power in the localities to the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.[64]

In the cities and towns of Ferganskaya Oblast all authority was not transferred over to the Soviets until the end of December 1917 and beginning of 1918; in Kokand on 25 December, in Namangan on 7 January, in Skobelev at the beginning of January, etc. Soviet rule was established much later in the majority of kishlaks in the Fergana.

The oblast Sovdep [Soviet of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies] elected in December 1917 following establishment of Soviet rule in the Fergana proved incapable of operating, as a result of sabotage by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries. In March 1918 Ye. A. Babushkin, leader of the Kokand Bolsheviks, sent a telegraph message to the Sovnarkom of the Turkestan Republic that the oblast Sovdep "is not doing its job and should be dissolved in short order."[65]

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The oblast congress of Soviets which was convened in March 1918 voiced opposition to organization of an oblast Sovdep on the grounds that the uyezd Sovdeps were allegedly sufficient.[66]

In the localities the old volost administrations frequently functioned in parallel with the Sovdeps. In some cities the municipal dumas and the so-called public safety committees were not disbanded.[67] On the eve of the October Revolution the public safety committees were merged into the Namangan and Osh Soviets, as a result of which the soviets were cluttered with czarist bureaucrats, nationalists and other hostile elements.

An oblast Sovdep was finally elected on 8 October 1918. It adopted a decision not to establish soviet executive committees in the localities, but to organize committees of the poor.[68] Establishment both of Sovdeps and committees of the poor, however, proceeded very slowly.

Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, Dashnaks,[69] White Guards and bourgeois nationalists, who had here and there managed to make their way into important positions, made every effort to wreck the work being done by agencies of Soviet authority in the Fergana. In September 1918 the Fergana Bolsheviks reported to V. D. Figel'skiy, chairman of the Turkestan Republic Sovnarkom, about the destructive efforts of the "leftist" Socialist Revolutionaries against Soviet authority.[70] A report on the situation in the Fergana presented at a meeting of TurkTsIK on 15 May 1918 stated: "Mensheviks and rightist Socialist Revolutionaries, who have become ensconced in the Skobelev Soviet, are undermining Soviet authority like worms. The soviet is passing a great many enactments which are destroying the authority of the Soviet Government.... Total anarchy is reigning in the volost. There are no soviet organizations. Volost administrative officials are instituting shariat judicial rule.... Bolshevik-Communists are being most foully persecuted. The facts about declaration of regional autonomy are being distorted."[71]

Not only socioeconomic and political factors led to the situation where Ferganskaya Oblast became a basmachi center during the years of civil war. An important role was played by the fact that the "Kokand Autonomy" was established in the Fergana, in the old part of Kokand, at the end of November 1917. It is not surprising that the first basmachi bands, headed by Irgash, one of the "rulers of the autonomy," and a former common criminal, emerged from the bosom of the "Kokand Autonomy." In addition, the "government" of the "Kokand Autonomy" proclaimed in one of its declarations that all armed elements on the territory of Turkestan, including common criminals, were given amnesty and invited to join the ranks of the "national army."[72]

The following fact is also of certain interest: at the time of the collapse of the "Kokand Autonomy," certain leftist Socialist Revolutionaries, who were in command of Red Guard units and other detachments, allowed a substantial portion of the "autonomists" to escape into hiding, in spite of the fact that they had considerable military force at their disposal. One of the participants in the struggle against the "autonomists," Bolshevik P. Yeliseyev, wrote about this in his memoirs: "Due to shortsightedness, and perhaps criminal action as well (by the leftist Socialist Revolutionaries -- Auth.), the bands

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were permitted to escape.... With such force (on the side of the Soviet authorities -- Auth.), I was sure that not one autonomist would be able to get away."[73]

Gathering together his basmachi band and seeking to enlist Uzbek toilers into the ranks of the basmachi, Irgash exploited mistakes regarding the nationalities question, which had been made chiefly by the Dashnaks and leftist Socialist Revolutionaries when crushing the "autonomy."

Finally, the fact that Ferganskaya Oblast was situated on the frontier enabled the basmachi bands to obtain weapons and ammunition from China, Afghanistan, and Bukhara, and to escape into hiding following their defeat.

Irgash fled into China soon after collapse of the "Kokand Autonomy" and the first clashes with Soviet troops. Some time later he returned to the Fergana Valley with a band of 500 men. The band had obtained weapons and equipment from reactionary circles in Afghanistan and from the emir of Bukhara. Seven small gangs joined Irgash in the Fergana, including Khal-khodzha's band, which consisted for the most part of common criminals who had been convicted at various times for murder and robbery. It is not surprising that Khal-khodzha's basmachi were distinguished by particular savageness. In one kishlak Khal-khodzha's band brutally tortured a dekhkan who had decided to speak the truth about the basmachi. They severed his tongue, ears and nose. The basmachi punished another dekhkan, who had dared go to prayers without a chalma [turban], by fashioning a mold of dough on his head and filling it with boiling oil.

Since basmachi bands had begun to unite behind Irgash, and since he had experience in forming more or less regular detachments, Fergana counterrevolutionaries were placing their hopes primarily on him. Several defeats, however, inflicted on Irgash by volunteer and militia detachments, undermined his reputation. Madamin Akhmetbekov (Madamin-bek) became the favorite of the Fergana counterrevolutionaries. At an underground meeting he was named chief of all the basmachi of the Fergana Valley.

Madamin-bek, just as Irgash, was sentenced in 1913 to 14 years at hard labor for criminal offenses. During the days of the "Kokand Autonomy" he served as chief of the Margilan militia and, with the assistance of the Socialist Revolutionaries, remained in this position for some time afterwards. Madamin-bek put together a fairly large band and undertook aggressive actions against the Soviet authorities. He also enlisted into his detachment Russian White Guard officers, who served as military instructors. Soon eight rather large bands joined up with Madamin-bek. He undertook a considerable effort to gain control over the bands of Irgash and Islamkul. Madamin was not sparing with promises, offering Irgash honorable positions. But Irgash and Islamkul themselves dreamed of leading the Fergana basmachi. Madamin called himself "ruler of the Fergana," and commander in chief of the Muslim armed forces -- "amir al'-muslimin." The clergy of Bukhara and the Fergana surrounded him and his myrmidons with the aureole of "fighters for Islam" and defenders of the impoverished.[74]

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The basmachi terrorized the population and murdered party and soviet officials. They nurtured particular hatred for the industrial workers -- Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kirghiz, who were uniting the toiler masses. In a short period of time in the first half of 1919 the basmachi murdered 100 Uzbek Communists from the Andizhan old-town party organization.[75] Half of the Kuvinskiy [Kuvasay] party organization were killed.[76] The kurbashi Khal-khodzha massacred almost all the members of the trade union formed in Osh in 1918.[77] At the end of 1919 Irgash killed in Chust 200 poor dekhkans and workers who were actively supporting measures instituted by the Soviet authorities.

Mass murders of workers and Communists of local nationalities comprised an important part of basmachi terrorist activities.

The basmachi ravaged towns and villages and robbed the innocent inhabitants of towns and auls.[78] In addition to outright robbery, basmachi kurbashi imposed taxes on the civilian population in the form of bread, rice, and horses,[79] and demanded women for their dzhigits. According to the figures of Fergana Front Headquarters, the taxes extracted b y the basmachi from the civilian population exceeded by 25 times the taxes paid under the czarist regime.[80] The basmachi blockaded industrial centers and other cities, making it difficult for them to obtain food and water.

The basmachi also sought to disrupt rail transport operations, on which the vital activities of the Turkestan Republic so much depended. They were hoping that the destruction of rail lines would create insurmountable obstacles to the shipping of cotton, which was needed by the country's entire textile industry. Attacks on the railroad began to be carried out on practically a daily basis.

Basmachi bands would frequently attack industrial enterprises, especially cotton ginning mills. They demolished irrigation systems and hindered farm work. Hunger and destitution raged in the fertile Fergana Valley.

Alarming reports traveled one after the other from the Fergana to Tashkent. "The band of the notorious robber Irgash is operating in Kokandskiy Uyezd. The population is terrorized,"[81] telegraphed oblast military commissar P. Buravlev on 30 July 1918. "Basmachi have attacked Sharkov kishlak...";[82] Madamin has entered Old Margilan...";[83] "Basmachi have attacked the town of Chust"; "A band has attacked Grunch-Mazar Station";[84] "Battle with basmachi by Dordok kishlak. Enemy lost 58 men";[85] "We encountered a frightful scene in Sharikhan: bodies of Russians littered the streets, 24 in all, homes and shops had been looted, with all goods of value taken, such as cloth, wheat, flour, rice, livestock, as well as various household goods...,"[86] D. Ye. Konovalov, commander of railway detachments, wrote in his report to main operations headquarters.

The Red Army's first engagements with the basmachi (in July 1918, for example, against detachments of Irgash in Kokandskiy Uyezd) ended in failure,[87] which was due to unskillful organization of military operations. Small (100-150 men) detachments operated against the basmachi, without a unified plan or common command. The discipline and combat training of some detachments was poor.

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The basmachi movement in the Fergana had picked up steam by the end of 1918. The basmachi were displaying particular activeness in Kokandskiy, Namanganskiy, and Andizhanskiy uyezds. In September they engaged Red Army units in more or less large skirmishes at Gorchakovo Station and in the Old Margilan area.[88]

Top authorities of the Turkestan Republic mobilized all resources to overcome the basmachi threat. The Supreme Military Board for Defense of the Republic headed by V. D. Figel'skiy, chairman of the Turkestan Republic Sovnarkom, arrived in Fergana in December 1918, in order to take effective measures on the spot to combat the basmachi.

An Operations Staff for Direction of the Struggle Against the Basmachi was elected at an oblast Red Army congress in Fergana on 7 December 1918.[89] Uyezd operations staffs were also formed.[90] The Communist Party was supported first and foremost by the workers of the Fergana. Those areas of Ferganskaya Oblast where large detachments of the proletariat were concentrated -- Kyzyl-Kiya, Sulyukta, Chimion, Fedchenko, and Kokand -- marched in the vanguard of the struggle against the basmachi.

The Kyzyl-Kiya Bolshevik organization, which contained 250 persons in its ranks at the end of 1918,[91] divided the workers into three relief units, one of which was in position at all times in trenches dug around the mines. As a rule the miners kept their rifles with them at all times, even when going down into the mines on a work shift. A cavalry detachment was organized at the mine, which protected the residents of neighboring kishlaks. Detachments of Kyzyl-Kiya miners were detailed to assist the garrisons of uyezd towns in the Fergana. V. D. Figel'skiy wrote of the Kyzyl-Kiya people that they "are ready at all times to swing into action at the request of the Soviet authorities."[92] "The Kyzyl-Kiya mines," the newspaper IZVESTIYA, organ of TurkTsIK and the Turkestan Communist Party, stated on 6 December 1919, "are in truth an armed camp."

A 200-man worker detachment to combat the basmachi was formed in Chimion at the beginning of 1918.[93]

The proletarian detachments designated to fight the basmachi contained Uzbek, Kirghiz, and Tajik workers. They were particularly numerous in the Kyzyl-Kiya, Chimion, and Sulyukta detachments. The number of workers of local nationalities increased in the course of struggle against the basmachi bands.

The participation of toilers of the indigenous nationalities in the struggle against the basmachi fostered strengthening of friendship among peoples. From the miners they acquired revolutionary ideas, a spirit of collectivism, and proletarian internationalism. All this was of decisive significance not only for defeating the basmachi but also for consolidating Soviet power in Central Asia.

Former prisoners of war also fought alongside Russians, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz and Kazakhs in the Fergana proletarian detachments. One of the organizers of the former prisoners of war was Hungarian worker Emil Baku, a Chimion oilfield worker. In Chimion he joined the ranks of the Communist Party and was elected deputy to the workers' Soviet.[94]

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Red Guard detachments from the major cities of the Fergana also took part in the struggle against the basmachi. Notable among these detachments was the Kokand detachment. It contained Kokand railway workers, workers from cotton ginning mills and members of the Union of Muslim Toilers. According to the figures of the Kokand Soviet, more than half of the detachment members were Uzbeks, Kirghiz, and Tajiks. All Communists able to bear arms were assigned to the Kokand Red Guard detachment and party druzhina [detachment]. At the request of the Bolsheviks, the Kokand Soviet established a military-political headquarters for Kokandskiy Uyezd, which directed the struggle against the basmachi.[95]

The Andizhan detachment was commanded by Georgiy Mikhaylovich Bil'din, leader of the city's Communists and former worker at the Namangan Machinery Plant. At the end of 1918 a detachment was formed in Margilan of workers from the cotton ginning mills (487 men).[96] A Red Guard detachment was operating actively in Alty-Arykskaya Volost, made up of Uzbek and Tajik volunteers. They were commanded by Abdurakhman Mad'yarov, chairman of the volost revolutionary committee.

Party druzhinas, formed in many cities of the republic, were a solid support to Soviet power in the struggle against the basmachi. In addition to Russian Communists, they included Uzbek Communists and representatives of other local nationalities. In Kokand and certain other cities of the Fergana, party druzhinas were formed exclusively of Communists of local nationalities.

In addition to the Fergana units, detachments from other oblasts and cities of the republic, chiefly from Tashkent, took part in the struggle against the basmachi.

The basmachi movement gained strength following the crushing of the counter-revolutionary insurrection in Tashkent in January 1919. The imperialists and domestic counterrevolutionaries from this point forward began placing their main hopes on the basmachi.

By the beginning of 1919 two principal basmachi centers had become defined: 1) the grouping headed by Madamin-bek (Skobelevskiy, Andizhanskiy, and Namanganskiy uyezds),[97] and 2) the grouping headed by Irgash (Kokandskiy Uyezd).[98]

In the spring of 1919 basmachi mounted bandit raids in the Osh, Dzhalal-Abad, Namangan, and a number of other areas of the Fergana Valley. The bands of Madamin-bek, Irgash, Kurshirmat, and Aman-Palvan were active in the Fergana. By the end of March 1919 their total numbers exceeded 7000 men.

The fighting for Namangan went on for 7 days. The bands of Madamin, Kurshirmat, Rakhmankul, Aman-Palvan, and Akhundzhan were attacking the city from four different directions. Basmachi dismantled the tracks on the rail line linking Namangan with Kokand. They captured the old city, looting and perpetrating acts of violence. Namangan armed workers and Red Army detachments which had arrived from Skobelev, Kokand, and Samarkand dislodged the basmachi.

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Substantial basmachi forces had massed in Oshskiy Uyezd. From here they mounted mounted raids into the Dzhalal-Abad and Andizhan areas. Two volosts -- Naukatskaya and Kapchagayskaya -- were entirely in basmachi hands.

In connection with growth of basmachi numbers, TurkTsIK, pursuant to party regional committee instructions, at the beginning of February 19 decided to send into the Fergana an Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Against the Counterrevolution in the Fergana. The commission's mandate stated that it was authorized to take extraordinary measures to wipe out the basmachi, to reorganize the Fergana operations headquarters and military units, to introduce a field court martial, and to suspend the operations of administrative agencies.[99]

On 24 February the commission published an appeal "To Red Armymen and Red Guardsmen on the Territory of the Fergana," calling upon them to carry the Red Banner with honor and pride and to fight courageously against the basmachi. The appeal stressed that there should be "no acts of coercion or insult toward the poor Muslims, who are comrades of us Europeans. On the contrary, the Muslim should be given comprehensive material and moral support."[100]

In connection with the fact that the Oblast Operations Headquarters was unable properly to direct the struggle against the basmachi, which was becoming increasingly more complicated with each passing day, on 3 February 1919, at a combined meeting of Fergana party, soviet and military agencies, it was decided to establish a new headquarters of the Fergana Front, headed by the commander of the front, M. V. Safonov. On 5 February the commission ratified this decision. Two front command groups were formed: the Osh-Andizhan, and the Kokand-Namangan.

The Fergana proletariat armed themselves both for the purpose of defending their enterprises and mines and to take part in military operations against the basmachi. A report from the Extraordinary Commission to TurkTsIK stated: "The entire Fergana is an armed camp."[101] The 22 March 1919 issue of the newspaper NASHA GAZETA stated: "In many localities factories have shut down, since the workers and employees have been mobilized to arms." The struggle against the basmachi in the Fergana was gradually becoming a struggle of all the people.

Emergency measures to mobilize forces against the basmachi were urgently needed, since at the beginning of 1919 there occurred increased coordination of the operations of all counterrevolutionary forces opposing Soviet power in Central Asia.

The basmachi received extensive financing from abroad. In February 1919 the British consul in Kashgar handed over 100,000 rubles to the former czarist consul to pass on to the basmachi kurbashi. Russian merchants residing in Kashgar and White Guard elements who had fled there from Turkestan allocated 155,000 rubles for the basmachi, on the advice of that same British consul.[102] The basmachi were supplied with weapons and ammunition, and intensified pan-Islamic propaganda was conducted among the basmachi.[103]

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In the spring of 1919 the Turkestan Communist Party undertook a number of actions to expose imperialist agents who had been infiltrated into the republic. Of great importance was disclosure of the true countenance of Treadwell and Bailey. When the Turkestan Cheka [Extraordinary Commission] obtained substantiated information that these persons were the principal directors of anti-Soviet actions by basmachi bands which were being organized in the republic,[104] Treadwell was placed under house arrest by decision of the RSFSR Narkomindel [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs]. In March 1919 the U.S. Government ordered him recalled from Turkestan.[105] Bailey, however, went underground. Bailey discussed this move with Treadwell, devoting particular attention to the possibility of establishing direct contact with the basmachi.[106] He remained in Central Asia until the end of 1919-beginning of 1920.[107]

By the beginning of April 1919 Soviet forces in Turkestan, inspired by the overall success of the campaign against Kolchak, won a decisive victory over the British interventionists, forcing them to abandon the Transcaspian region. Withdrawing, the interventionists took with them cotton, oil, livestock, costly Turkmen rugs and other valuables which they had plundered during their almost 12-month stay in Central Asia.

The struggle against the colonialists by the toiler masses played a decisive role in the collapse of plans to enslave the peoples of Central Asia. The Narkomindel's representative in the Turkestan Republic, Bravin, wrote in his report for March 1919 that the local toiler population trusted the Soviet authorities and that they had no desire to come under the yoke of the British. "They know the British well," he noted, "from what has happened in Afghanistan, Persia, and India. They are even less pleased at prospects of coming under the control of any of the local khans."

Failure of the British intervention in Turkestan was promoted in large measure by the situation prevailing in Afghanistan at the beginning of 1919. The emir Khabibulla, a henchman of the British, was killed there on 20 February. The new emir, Amanulla, declared Afghanistan an independent state. In April 1919 he sent a delegation of emissaries to Soviet Russia to conduct talks with V. I. Lenin. The events in Afghanistan could not help but cause concern on the part of the British imperialists over the state of affairs in neighboring India, and influenced their decision to withdraw from Turkestan.

From this point on, British imperialism devoted even greater attention to the basmachi. British military personnel were observed on the Soviet-Chinese border, in Kashgar (in the vicinity of Tashkurgan). Military installations were being constructed here under their supervision.[109]

The counterrevolution was attaching prime importance to further expansion of basmachi actions. This is attested by the fact that a special mission consisting of two generals and two British officers was sent from Kolchak's headquarters to the Fergana,[110] and the fact that Madamin-bek was conferred the rank of colonel.[111] Thus the basmachi were being given de jure recognition as a component part of the overall Russian counterrevolution. The tasks of this mission were revealed in a letter written by the chief of Kolchak's general staff to the former consuls in Kul'dzha and Chuguchak dated 8 October 1919.

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"The military mission," the letter stated, "has been assigned the task of establishing close contacts and relations with representatives of friendly powers in order that, with material support on their part... partisan detachments can be organized of the inhabitants of some of the areas of Turkestan to combat the local Bolsheviks."[112]

April 1919 was marked by large-scale basmachi operations, which were a component part of the campaign of the Entente which was launched in the spring, the main role in which was played by Kolchak's army. These operations were coordinated with counterrevolutionary uprisings in Turkestan aimed at overthrowing Soviet rule.

The complicated situation in the Fergana demanded that emergency measures be taken. D. Ye. Konovalov, deputy commander of the Fergana Front, traveled to the Osh sector to organize the struggle against the basmachi there. Lacking large forces but actively supported by the population, he was able to conduct a number of large-scale operations, in the course of which he inflicted appreciable blows on the basmachi in the area of Osh and Dzhalal-Abad.

In April the basmachi suffered defeats in Andizhanskiy and Skobelevskiy uyezds.

A detachment formed by Yuldash Akhunbabayev, deputy chairman of the Dzhoy-Bazar Sel'sovet [Village Soviet] in Skobelevskiy Uyezd, distinguished itself in the fighting. This 34-year-old poor dekhanin, for whom the October Revolution opened up a new life, fought with weapon in hand for the happiness of his people against their enemies -- the basmachi. Subsequently Yuldash Akhunbabayev became "all-union elder" [vseuzbekskiy starosta]--chairman of the Uzbek SSR Central Executive Committee.

On 11 April 1919 the forces of Madamin and Osipov were surrounded and defeated between Kokand and Serovo Station. Only 63 men from Osipov's bands managed to escape and fled to Bukhara with their leader. Madamin-bek's forces were also badly mauled. Many kurbashi (Akhundzhan, Tuychi, and others) stated that they were surrendering to the Soviet authorities. They went over to the side of the Red Army. An important role was played by the amnesty offered to basmachi who would surrender, announced by TurkTsIK on 7 May 1919.

On 9 May 1919 TurkTsIK, the republic Sovnarkom and Narkomnats issued a proclamation entitled "To the Toiling Muslim Population of the Fergana", explaining the substance of the amnesty.[113] The TurkTsIK and Sovnarkom Special Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle Against the Basmachi, under the chairmanship of K. Ye. Sorokin, one of the leaders of the Turkestan Republic, traveled to the Fergana. The commission was instructed to implement the act of amnesty.[114]

The purpose of the amnesty was not only to isolate from the basmachi that segment of the toiling population which supported them but also to reestablish agencies of Soviet authority wherever they had been destroyed by the basmachi.

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In June 1919 a decision was made immediately to arm party members and establish new fighting druzhinas. Not only Communists but also non-party, poor dekhkans were enlisted in these druzhinas. Uzbeks, Russians, Kirghiz, Tajiks, and Kazakhs -- representatives of all the peoples inhabiting the Fergana Valley -- fought shoulder to shoulder in the druzhinas.

The mood prevailing in Turkestan at that time was precisely expressed by representatives of the kishlaks of Urmitan and Revat in Fal'garskaya Volost, Samarkandskaya Oblast. They stated the following in a resolution on fighting the basmachi (June 1919): "Expressing complete willingness and desire to assist in the struggle against the bandits not only by supplying foodstuffs but also with weapon in hand, we earnestly request (from the Soviet authorities -- Auth.) that you issue whatever weapons possible, both firearms and cold steel. If there are not enough weapons to go around, we shall accompany the detachment carrying stones, in order in some way to help smash the robber bands."[115]

Toward summer's end fighting in the Fergana again heated up. Contributing to this was uniting of the basmachi with other counterrevolutionary forces. In particular, a deal was reached between Madamin-bek and the leaders of the counterrevolutionary "Peasant Army."[116] This "army" was formed in the course of the struggle between the Russian peasant settlers and the basmachi, chiefly in the Kugart Valley. Command positions in the "Peasant Army" were seized, however, by counterrevolutionary elements. Soon its military council became entirely kulak, and former czarist general A. A. Mukhanov was named chief of staff. Cossacks from the Semirech'ye joined the ranks of the "Peasant Army."

On 1 September Monstrov, the "army's leader," and Madamin-bek signed an agreement calling for joint actions against the Soviet authorities. Unification of the basmachi and the "Peasant Army" resulted in establishment of a united front of the Muslim bai and clergy on the one hand and Russian kulaks and White Guard on the other.

The question of joint actions by the "Peasant Army" and the basmachi against Soviet rule cannot be viewed as an isolated episode of the civil war in Turkestan. Archival documents indicate that counterrevolutionary forces within Turkestan attached great importance to this unification and that it was organized with the objective of engineering an overthrow of Soviet rule throughout Turkestan at the moment the Red Army was approaching the borders of the Turkestan Republic, in order to divert to the Turkestan front substantial forces from the decisive fronts. This is indicated by the date of this unification (September 1919), the methods and forms of struggle against Soviet rule.

The united basmachi and kulak forces totaled 20,000 men[117] and were armed with two cannon, 13 medium and 11 light machineguns. White Guard officers proceeded to reorganize the basmachi bands.

Toward the end of the summer of 1919, on the eve of unification of Turkestan with the central regions of the country, the Fergana basmachi had become stronger and presented an even more serious threat to the Soviet authorities.

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By mid-August 1919 the main forces of the basmachi had massed in the Andizhan sector.

Party and soviet agencies, jointly with the command authorities and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Turkestan ASSR, took additional measures to organize resistance to the basmachi. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Fergana Front (Bolshevik D. I. Spasibov, chairman) was formed in August 1919. This council carried out a number of important measures in a short period of time. First and foremost, it consolidated scattered small detachments into a single striking force, forming two regiments (a cavalry and an infantry regiment) and an artillery battery.

The Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council] of the Fergana Front, however, lacked the time to form large combined units. The city of Osh, against which the enemy was planning to mount a first concentrated attack, contained a garrison of 300 bayonets and the small Pamir border guard detachment.

On 1 September bands surrounded Osh and presented an ultimatum to its defenders. Rejecting the ultimatum, the garrison held off the basmachi in 48 hours of continuous fighting.

Seeing that the city was not yielding, the White Guard and basmachi decided to flood it by diverting mountain streams into town. The situation was as follows, as the defenders described it: "The fort was half flooded with water.... The water caused part of the wall to crack, and it was about to collapse. In order to reduce the pressure of the water, we were forced to work in the water, building dikes and opening breaches in the fortress wall. Taking no time out to rest or sleep, personnel manned the firing ports in the fortress walls."[118] The Osh fortress fell on the third day. Only a few commanders and men succeeded in making their way to Andizhan.

Occupying the city, the basmachi and White Guards immediately proceeded to rob the civilian population. Ten million rubles and precious stones were removed from the national bank.[119]

Several days later the basmachi succeeded in capturing Dzhalal-Abad. The fall of Osh and Dzhalal-Abad greatly complicated the situation in the Fergana Valley.

Following the capture of Osh, the enemy proceeded to advance in the direction of Andizhan, Skobelev, and Namangan.

On 15 September 1919 a meeting of basmachi leaders was held in Old Margilan, headed by Madamin-Bek, Russian White Guardists, and local bai. They discussed preparations in Ferganskaya Oblast for a general uprising, which was to merge with the basmachi offensive against the oblast's major cities. At the meeting it was decided to seal off the Fergana from the rest of Turkestan, chiefly by destroying rail, telephone and telegraph lines.[120]

The offensive was conducted chiefly against the oblast's large cities. The basmachi organizers and leaders apparently realized that they could not bring an end to Soviet rule as long as Soviet authority was preserved in the cities

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and as long as the worker class exerted guiding influence on the dekhkans. The attempt by the basmachi to mount an offensive on the cities of the oblast was also aimed at undermining the strengthening alliance between the worker class and the dekhkan toilers.

In addition to military operations on the basis of the decision adopted in Margilan on 15 September, Madamin-bek and Monstrov began disseminating through the Fergana all kinds of leaflets and proclamations directed against Soviet authority. In one of these proclamations they called for the convening of a Constituent Assembly, at which they promised that half of the seats would be given to Muslims.[121]

The Fergana Bolsheviks mobilized all resources to crush the counterrevolution. Political rallies and meetings were held in all the oblast's towns and garrisons, at which resolutions were adopted expressing readiness and willingness to defend Soviet rule.

On 7 September the following resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Skobelev garrison: "Having heard a report by the commander of the Fergana Front and having discussed in detail the status of the Fergana in connection with the Dzhalal-Abad events, we Red Armymen of the Skobelev garrison declare that headquarters of the 'Peasant Army,' entering into an alliance with the bandit bands of Madamin-bek, is seeking to stir up the toiling peasantry of Dzhalal-Abad. But we Red Armymen refuse to respond to this act of provocation and call upon the toiling peasantry of Dzhalal-Abad to march shoulder to shoulder with us, for truth is on our side, for we are not replacing the rule of labor with the rule of capital."[122]

The worker class of the Fergana and the overwhelming majority of the toiling dekhkans joined with the Red Army in the fight against the united forces of the basmachi and the White Guard. On the instructions of the Ferganskaya Oblast Party Committee, the Revvoyensovet of the Fergana Front decreed that all Red Guardsmen in the oblast were to be entered onto the rolls of the Red Army.[123] On 11 September 1919 the command authorities of the Fergana Front reported the following to Tashkent: "...Practically all work has come to a halt; everybody's efforts are focused on defense of the republic."[124]

The heroic defense of Andizhan began in mid-September. The enemy's forces exceeded by fourfold the strength of the Andizhan garrison. On 17 September 1919 the basmachi commenced an assault on the city.

On one of the first days of the defense a city-wide emergency party meeting was called in the park of former mill owner Ruzi-Akhun. The following item stood on the agenda: "Defense of the city against the attack of the White Guards, kulak bandits and basmachi." The adopted resolution stated that all Communists were to be declared mobilized and placed on full fighting status.[125]

The Andizhan party organization[126] also mobilized the non-party toilers of the new and old city. New fighting druzhinas and Red Guard detachments were formed of workers from the Besh-Bosh Mill, railway workers, and workers from the oilseed mills. Instructors S. K. Kuzy-Akhmedov,[127] Abdul-Aziz Khusanbayev, and others gave military training to the Communists of the old

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city. A defense headquarters was established, headed by one of the leaders of Andizhan's Red Guard units, V. N. Sidorov, and V. A. Skuba, a battalion commander of the 2d Fergana Regiment.[128]

Barricades fashioned of bales of cotton were being constructed in the town, and stores of water were being accumulated. Several wells were dug, since the basmachi had cut off all the main aryks [irrigation ditch, canal] which had supplied the city with water. Trenches were dug around the city beginning on the first days of September.

During the days of the siege, the Andizhan Cheka discovered and neutralized an underground counterrevolutionary organization linked to the basmachi and the White Guards. The basmachi had been hoping that they would be able, with the assistance of members of the underground and counterrevolutionary propaganda, to provoke an uprising against the Soviet authorities, especially in the old part of Andizhan.[129] These plans came to naught. The old town, together with the new town, became a unified fortress.

The defense of Andizhan was taking place in extremely difficult conditions: the city was acutely short of food, drinking water, arms and ammunition. Mirzo-Kasym Akhmedov recalls: "Our daily ration was 200-300 grams of bread and 2-3 spoonfuls of buckwheat porridge."[130] Another participant in the defense of the city also describes the extremely difficult conditions of daily life for the city's defenders.[131]

The Andizhan party organization undertook a number of measures to disintegrate the enemy's ranks. Agitators were dispatched to the enemy's camp, who worked both among the basmachi and among the "Peasant Army." Peasants from the villages of Ivanovskoye and Mikhaylovskoye left the Andizhan siege forces as a result of Bolshevik agitation.[132]

The defense of the city was directed by the party organization, headed by G. M. Bil'din, chairman of the Andizhan Uyezd-city party committee. Detachments formed of townspeople fought bravely shoulder to shoulder with the Red Armymen. The fighting men of the Communist druzhina were placed in the most difficult sectors. Townspeople who lacked weapons evacuated wounded and brought ammunition and food. G. M. Bil'din died a hero's death in one of the skirmishes.

The Andizhan garrison and the townspeople held off the enemy onslaught for 6 days and nights. Their courage and steadfastness were rewarded. On 22 September the Kazan' Composite Regiment imeni Gintsburg, under the command of A. P. Sokolov, M. V. Safonov's detachment, and the mounted detachment imeni Third International, under the command of party member E. F. Kuzhelo, arrived to aid besieged Andizhan. The arriving units attacked the basmachi without a pause. The fighting raged on for 48 hours unabated. The resistance of the basmachi was broken on the third day. Their thinned bands proceeded to withdraw from Andizhan in disarray. Red Army units and volunteer detachments organized pursuit of the retreating enemy. D. I. Spasibov, chairman of the Revvoyensovet of the Fergana Front, was killed in action on 24 September. On

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26 September the basmachi abandoned Osh, and on 30 September -- Dzhalal-Abad. Madamin-bek and Monstrov took refuge in the Gul'cha mountains.

Thus when Turkestan became linked up to the central regions of the country, a serious defeat had been inflicted on the basmachi through the heroic efforts of the Red Army, the worker class and toilers of the indigenous nationalities, and a new plan to overthrow Soviet rule in Turkestan had been thwarted.

The basmachi continued the struggle, however. They decided to disrupt celebration of the second anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in the worker communities, cities and towns. On 7 November 1919 basmachi attacked many communities. Particularly stubborn fighting took place in the Chimion oilfield.[133]

In the fall of 1919 the organizers of the counterrevolution undertook emergency measures to step up basmachi activities, since at this time Denikin was advancing on Moscow and needed the support of all counterrevolutionary forces. They decided to hold a secret meeting of leaders of the basmachi and the routed "Peasant Army," with the participation of representatives of the reactionary Muslim clergy and the nationalist bourgeoisie. In October 1919 former czarist consul in China Uspenskiy, a henchman of the British, entered Soviet territory from Kashgar. A meeting of basmachi kurbashi and White Guardists was held on 22 October in the border village of Irkeshtam. A "Provisional Fergana Government" headed by Madamin-bek was formed for the purpose of uniting counterrevolutionary forces. White Guardist Monstrov was named commander in chief, and former czarist general Mukhanov was designated his deputy. An attorney by the name of Nansberg, who was a British spy, cotton trader Khakim Azizkhanov, and other political adventurists were named to the "government."

Ties between the British imperialists and the basmachi became even stronger following formation of the "Provisional Government." British intelligence offered every possible support and assistance to the puppet government. Weapons and ammunition were sent from Kashgar to Fergana via Colonel Etherton.[134]

At the end of October (or beginning of November) 1919 an Anglo-Afghan delegation consisting of British intelligence officers and Afghan feudal lords traveled clandestinely to the village of Kara-Tepe (Ferganskaya Oblast) to meet with Madamin-bek. First they visited several basmachi detachments. The delegation provided money to the basmachi. Basmachi prisoners and defectors testified that following the "arrival of the Afghans entire detachments were formed of the sons of bai, well dressed and with the finest mounts."[135]

Following the Irkeshtam meeting the "Provisional Fergana Government," with the assistance of Russian White Guardists and British officers, attempted to gain the allegiance of all basmachi leaders, to end the personal discord existing among them, and to draw up a common plan of struggle against Soviet rule.

On the last days of October 1919 all the important basmachi kurbashi congregated in the kishlak of Aim for a unique kurultay (congress).[136] Also in

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attendance were representatives of Great Britain, the Bukhara emirate, and Turkestan bourgeois-nationalist groups. Pursuant to the decisions reached at the kurultay, the approximately 150 bands which were operating in the Fergana at that time were consolidated into four large combined units under the command of Madamin, Irgash, Khal-khodzha, and Kurshirmat.

Following unification, the basmachi again commenced mounting attacks on Osh and Dzhalal-Abad, on nearby kishlaks and Russian settlements, robbing and terrorizing the dekhkans. At the end of November 1919 approximately 5000 basmachi surrounded a detachment of the Kazan' Regiment which totaled only 122 Red Army-men. Some of the soldiers were killed in the savage fighting, while the basmachi brutally tortured the survivors. They threw the mutilated corpses into the Karadarya River.

But resistance to the bands was growing. Chimion oilfield workers, together with the garrison, repulsed a basmachi attack. On 22 November 1919 the united forces of Madamin-bek and Khal-khodzha, totaling 1400 men, moved on Dzhalal-Abad and neighboring Russian communities. The local residents met the first basmachi attack. Having repulsed it, they launched a counterattack together with a small Red Army detachment which had arrived on the scene. Eighty basmachi remained on the battlefield.

Following the final joining of Turkestan with the country's central regions, a new stage began in the struggle against the basmachi. By year's end from 40 to 50 relatively large basmachi bands were operating in the Fergana Valley, each of which contained from 100 to 200 men. There were also several larger basmachi bands. In addition, dozens of smaller detachments were rampaging throughout the valley. All these bands were in constant movement, shifting from one uyezd to another.

Prior to the arrival in Turkestan of representatives of the RKP(b) Central Committee, the RSFSR Sovnarkom and the VTsIK (Turkkomissiya), "there was no war as such being fought on the Fergana Front... Only a chase after an elusive adversary,"[137] wrote the chief of staff of the 2d Turkestan Division in November 1919.

The Fergana Valley, to use the expression of one of its prominent investigators, Academician Middendorf, was a "trough among surrounding mountain masses."[138] Mountains ringed the valley, leaving only a narrow gateway, 10 versts wide, at the western end near the Makhram fort. At the other end difficult, rugged mountain trails led into the valley.

The few cities of the Fergana were situated for the most part in the middle of the valley. The valley was intersected along its entire extent by numerous says (rivers), aryks, marshy paddy fields, and planted tree stands.

The encircling mountains, which separate the valley from the other regions of Turkestan, a high population density and highly-dissected terrain created favorable conditions for the basmachi and made combat operations difficult for Red Army regular units. Actually there was no continuous front in the Fergana Valley; engagements would occur unexpectedly at various locations and would be of brief duration.

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Upon studying the situation in the Fergana Valley, the Turkkomissiya reached the the conclusion that it was necessary radically to alter the tactics of combat against the basmachi.

At the same time it adopted the decision to make every effort to step up mass political-explanatory work among the inhabitants of the kishlaks and auls of Turkestan -- explanation of the essence and reactionary schemes of the basmachi, the goals and tasks of the Soviet authorities. It is not mere happenstance that M. V. Frunze stressed in one of his first orders: "The difficulty lies not in overcoming the enemy militarily -- that is not very difficult for us -- the difficulty lies in ensuring that the entire multinational Muslim toiler population understand that the basmachi are also their enemy and that struggle against the basmachi is the sacred task of the toiling people."[139]

Henceforth the political, economic and military measures of the Soviet authorities were tied into a single, coordinated unit. Considerable attention was focused on correcting mistakes made by local authorities, who did not always take into consideration the specific features of the economic system and customs of the peoples of Central Asia. Party agencies intensified scrutiny to ensure strict observance of Leninist principles of nationalities policy, directed local authorities to treat the religious feelings of the population in a deferential manner, etc. In addition to political rallies and meetings in the cities, towns and kishlaks, as well as discussions in chaykhana [teahouses], the Turkkomissiya recommended employing such a form of agitation as conducting discussions with elderly Muslims and honored residents of kishlaks and the old sections of towns and cities.[140]

The Turkkomissiya also strengthened the party organizations of Ferganskaya Oblast. Reregistration of all members of the oblast party organization was conducted, and its ranks were purged of alien and hanger-on elements.

Party organizations proceeded to work actively among young people. Komsomol ranks grew rapidly. By January 1920 Turkestan Komsomol had a membership of 6000, most of whom were young men; 25 percent of the Komsomol members were young people of indigenous nationalities.

Alongside extensive agitation work, the Turkkomissiya, pursuant to the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee, undertook vigorous measures to strengthen agencies of Soviet authority in the Fergana and to achieve extensive enlistment of toilers of the indigenous nationalities into the building of a Soviet society.

Since the basmachi leaders were operating for the most part in rural areas, a course of policy was adopted which aimed at creating solid support among the dekhkans. Also of great importance was correct implementation of food policy and offering of material assistance to the toiling dekhkans.

On the instructions of the regional committee of the Turkestan Communist Party and the Turkestan Republic Sovnarkom, detachments were formed in all cities, towns and large kishlaks situated in areas of basmachi operations, the detachments being formed of party, Komsomol and trade union members to protect their city, town or village.

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Prominent Communists distinguished themselves in the struggle against the basmachi, including B. Usmankhodzhayev, A. Mad'yarov, S. Arifbayev, K. Muradov, A. Isayev, and I. Alimkulov. Many Communists (Khodzha Palvan, Khasan Saib, Khodzha Mamadzhan, etc) gave their lives in this struggle.

New tactics in the military struggle against the basmachi consisted in the following: Red Army units, upon occupying localities of operational and economic importance, would form highly mobile detachments in these localities, which would mount raid actions against the basmachi, who lacked operational and food supply bases, forcing the enemy to accept open combat at locations where it was easier to wipe out the enemy with the aid of mobile reserves.

Revolutionary committees were established in large communities in which Soviet garrisons remained. The public, feeling the support of the garrisons behind them, began taking more active part in the struggle against the basmachi. The Ferganskaya Oblast Revolutionary Committee noted in its report for November 1919 that the majority of the indigenous population had a favorable attitude toward the Soviet authorities and were willing to support them.[141] Therefore the basmachi were deprived of the possibility of cutting the cities and towns off from the kishlaks and of disrupting food supply to the cities; strengthening of bonds between the cities and kishlaks was leading to increased influence by the urban proletariat on the dekhkan masses.

Soviet troops did not limit themselves to mounting a single attack but continued pursuit of the enemy, cutting off his avenues of retreat. Larger military forces were being massed in the Fergana Valley with this objective.

By the beginning of 1920 the 2d Rifle Division (N. A. Verevkin-Rokhal'skiy -- subsequently lieutenant general -- served as division commander), 12,340 men strong, with 52 machineguns, was deployed in the Fergana. Of particular importance was arrival in the Fergana at the beginning of 1920 of the 1st Volga Tatar Brigade (brigade commander Yu. Ibragimov, later A. A. Tal'kovskiy), which had been formed in Kazan' by decision of the RSFSR Narkomnats and which had distinguished itself in combat on the Eastern Front. The Tatar brigade was sent to Turkestan on the personal instructions of V. I. Lenin. The Turkkomissiya recommended that all Fergana party organizations make use of the arrival of the Tatar brigade to conduct a large-scale political campaign directed toward explaining to the local toilers the nationalities policy of the Soviet authorities and for all-out conduct of agigation and propaganda work with the aid of brigade political personnel.[142]

The Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet and the Turkkomissiya formed a brigade military council, giving it broad authorities. Ya. Chanyshev, the Tatar brigade's military commissar, was named council chairman, with Rakhim Rakhimbabayev, chairman of the Andizhan Revolutionary Committee, party uyezd committee secretary Gumerov, and R. Islamov, TurkTsIK representative, named as members.

Highly-mobile detachments were formed of Communists and personnel from the Tatar brigade, and also contained representatives of local party organizations and progressive youth. These detachments traveled practically throughout the entire Fergana Valley; many political rallies, meetings and conferences were

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held, at which the nationalities policy of the Soviet authorities, the ideas and goals of the Communist Party were explained to the toilers.

Preparing for aggressive operations against the basmachi, party and soviet agencies did a great deal of work in the area of forming ethnic units. As a result, three ethnic cavalry regiments and several other units, representing a total strength of 4500 men, were deployed on the Fergana Front. The Independent International Cavalry Brigade, made up of former prisoners of war, also took part in the struggle against the basmachi as a Red Army unit on the Fergana Front. The brigade was commanded by E. F. Kuzhelo. It mounted attacks on the basmachi in the Kokand, Namangan, Andizhan, and Osh areas.

Combat operations against the basmachi were directed by M. V. Frunze. V. V. Kuybyshev arrived in the Fergana in February 1920 to handle direct organization of the struggle against the basmachi bands.

The initiative on the Fergana Front was firmly shifting over to the Red Army. During the first months of 1920 (from January through March) several operations were successfully conducted, ending in the defeat in detail of a number of large bands.

At the beginning of January 1920 the main forces of the Red Army and volunteer detachments were put into action against Irgash's band, which had dug in at its base fortress of Bachkyr. But the ancient walls failed to save the basmachi. Red Army units and volunteer detachments took the fortress by storm.

At the same time an attack was launched against Kurshirmat in the Gul'cha-Irkeshtam sector. Kurshirmat sustained heavy casualties, but succeeded in withdrawing with remanants of his band into the high-mountain Alay Valley, which contained avenues of egress to the border.

The rout of the Irgash and Kurshirmat bands threw the ranks of the Fergana Valley basmachi into disarray. Some bands, cornered by advancing Red Army units and volunteer detachments, opted for capture over total rout. The 500-man Khamdam band, the 450-man Makhkam-khodzha band, and the 600-man Akbarali band surrendered together with their leaders.

Disintegration began in the bands which continued to resist. Many disenchanted dekhkans deserted from the basmachi bands and surrendered to the Soviet authorities. More than 900 men gave themselves up just between 20 January and 2 February 1920; many of these joined volunteeer detachments. Madamin-bek, attempting to improve the situation, again commenced aggressive actions, but was routed by the Tatar brigade. Having lost 200 horsemen, he fled across the Syr Darya.

The leader of the Fergana basmachi began truce talks with the Soviet authorities. At the same time he was attempting to take advantage of the lull in the fighting to move the remaining bands into the mountains. The Fergana Front Revvoyensovet, while entering into talks with Madamin-bek, did not cease organizing pursuit of the enemy. Madamin-bek was forced to capitulate. On 6 March 1920 he signed an agreement with the Red Army command authorities which

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specified his total submission to Soviet authority. On 12 March 1920 Madamin-bek's 1200 mounted warriors ceased resistance.

The successful campaign against the basmachi in the early months of 1920 coincided with brilliant victories won during that same period by the Red Army on the main fronts of the civil war -- on the Southern Front over the army of Denikin, and on the Eastern Front over the remnants of Kolchak's forces.

In order to consolidate the successes achieved in the struggle against the basmachi, the Turkkomissiya, jointly with the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet and the Soviet Government of Turkestan, proceeded to rebuild factories and mills in the Fergana, began construction on a rail spur from the Kyzyl-Kiya mines, began utilization of neglected land, began cleaning out the aryks, shipping cotton to the Center [central region of the European part of the RSFSR], etc.

The dekhkan toilers of the Fergana, just as throughout Turkestan, saw with their own eyes that the Soviet authorities were unswervingly implementing a nationalities and agrarian policy aimed at improving their situation.

The most important of the political measures carried out at that time was re-establishment in the kishlaks, under the supervision of the party regional and oblast committees, of the agencies of authority which had been destroyed by the basmachi.[143]

At the end of March 1920 elections to local soviets were held in a number of localities in Ferganskaya Oblast.

On 2 April 1920 the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet issued a decree ordering indemnification of the public for losses sustained as a consequence of requisitioning of property for the needs of the war effort (horses, camels, wagons, etc).[144] Extensive assistance began to be given to the public, which had suffered from the basmachi raids. A fund of 50 million rubles was established for this purpose. A network of tea and food relief stations, shelters, medical care facilities, and hostels for persons without shelter was organized throughout the Fergana.

Peace in the Fergana did not last long, however. A new basmachi wave erupted there in the summer of 1920. M. V. Frunze characterized it as "rebirth of the basmachi front."[145] The revival of the basamchi was due to the fact that the basic conditions which had engendered the class struggle, which assumed the form of armed combat, could not yet be entirely eliminated by this time. In particular, the exploiter classes of Central Asia and the reactionary Muslim clergy attempted to use any pretexts to keep the basmachi flame from becoming extinguished. In addition, the imperialists of the Entente were making preparations for a new anti-Soviet campaign. Placing its principal hopes on White Poland and Wrangel's army, the Entente was at the same time attempting to organize against Soviet rule combined actions by all counterrevolutionary forces in the outlying regions of the Soviet Republic. The Central Asian basmachi comprised one of these forces.

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In the Fergana the plans of the agents of imperialism were connected with the name of Kurshirmat, a former aide of Madamin-bek. Following the surrender of Madamin-bek, beginning in April 1920, Kurbashi who were continuing the struggle against the Red Army began to gather around Kurshirmat.[146]

The counterrevolution was continuously seeking to unify the basmachi forces under the direction of a single leader. As soon as any one of the chiefs advanced to a "leader" position, he would immediately be given every possible support and assistance. Such was the case this time as well. Kurshirmat received financial assistance, plus a magnificent title to enhance his "authority." At a meeting of Fergana kurbashi in July 1920 he was named, as Irgash before him, "amir al'-muslimin" [commander of the Muslims].

In mid-May 1920 the Fergana once again became the arena of savage struggle.

Attempts to persuade the kurbashi to surrender voluntarily were unsuccessful. Concentrated in their bands were the most reactionary elements and common criminals, veterans of numerous murders and robberies. Nevertheless the Soviet authorities continued in their efforts to end the bloodshed. In May 1920 with the assistance of Madamin-bek, they succeeded in getting a truce envoy from Kurshirmat's camp to meet for peace talks. At the same time a delegation was sent to Kurshirmat, consisting of regimental commissar S. L. Sukhov and Madamin-bek. But Kurshirmat refused to engage in peace talks and handed over S. L. Sukhov and Madamin-bek to the tender mercies of his myrmidons. On 14 May 1920 they were beheaded in the Tamasha urochishche. The kurbashi Akhundzhan and Parpi, who had previously surrendered, once again came over to the side of the basmachi.

By midsummer of 1920 approximately 30,000 basmachi had massed in the Fergana. They included many dekhkans who had been deceived or forced to join the bands by threats. This category of basmachi would seek to leave the bands at the first opportunity.

The large scale of basmachi operations in the Fergana Valley once again made this region an arena of acute class struggle. Following Kurshirmat's brutal execution of Sukhov and Madamin-bek, naturally all peace talks were halted. A TurkTsIK decree placed the entirety of Ferganskaya Oblast under martial law.

M. V. Frunze and Sh. Z. Eliava arrived in the Fergana in mid-May 1920 to take over direct supervision of the struggle against the basmachi.[147] An enlarged session of the party oblast committee was held immediately after this, at which matters of stepping up party work in the oblast as well as the struggle against the basmachi were discussed.[148]

After receiving an on-the-spot briefing on the situation, M. V. Frunze telegraphed V. I. Lenin: "...Firm and decisive measures are essential; otherwise the Fergana will be lost for an extended period of time."[149] He reported to V. I. Lenin that the main forces of the Turkestan Front had been sent into the Fergana.[150] It is true that these were not very large forces but, operating in a close link with the masses and in solidarity with volunteer detachments, the Red Army comprised a cementing nucleus of the people's armed struggle against the basmachi.

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M. V. Frunze visited all the principal areas of the Fergana where the struggle against the basmachi was being conducted. Talking with commanders and men, the toiler population, party and soviet officials, and addressing numerous political rallies and meetings of workers and dekhkans, he inspired them for the struggle against the basmachi. Acquainting himself in detail with party-soviet work, he gave assistance to local organizations with his advice, corrected their mistakes, and guided their activities.

During M. V. Frunze's stay in the Fergana, preparations began for executing the order issued by the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet which called for mobilizing toilers of indigenous nationalities into the Red Army.

It was decided to issue an appeal to the toilers of the Fergana to become actively involved in the struggle against the basmachi. V. I. Lenin pointed out that when a threat to the republic arose, the party considered it to be "its duty to appeal to the worker-peasant masses and to describe to them the difficult situation which has developed. We appealed to them and indicated on whom the salvation of Soviet Russia depends and what exertion of energy is essential in order to focus all resources on one specific task."[151]

An appeal entitled "To the Muslim Population of Ferganskaya Oblast," signed by M. V. Frunze, was made public on 24 May. "Comrade Muslims!" the appeal stated. "We, representatives of Soviet authority, appeal to you, the residents of the cities, towns and auls of the devastated, blood-soaked Fergana.... You must come en masse to the assistance of the authorities in wiping out the basmachi.... Hasten your gathering into a harmonious fraternal family under the Red Banner of Soviet rule."[152]

The appeal, printed in the local languages, was widely disseminated (more than 20,000 copies).

Frunze summoned to the Fergana an agitation train operated by the political directorate of the Turkestan Front. At his suggestion, agitation-organizer courses of instruction were set up in the Fergana for representatives of the kishlaks; persons enrolled in these courses "should very shortly become bearers of the ideas of Soviet rule among the kishlak population."[153]

At the beginning of June a special politprosvetotryad [political education detachment] was formed in the Fergana, to work among the people of the kishlaks. The men of the politprosvetotryad, among whom was pioneer of Soviet Uzbek poetry Khamza Khakim-zade, an ardent orator extolling Soviet rule, assisted the Red Army not only with words: they frequently took direct part in combat actions.

In May 1920 the regional Komsomol committee issued an appeal to young people to become actively involved in the struggle against the basmachi. "All organizations have responded to the appeal of the RKSM [Russian Young Communist League] regional committee calling for mobilization for the Fergana Front," reported the newspaper IZVESTIYA. "Many comrades are requesting to be sent to the front. Volunteers are coming from the most remote localities."[154]

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Ye. N. Ulmasbayev, M. I. Nazarov, and M. Yu. Yuldashev were among the leaders of the Kokand Komsomol and organizers of the struggle against the basmachi. Kokand Komsomol member Abdulla Nabiyev, who organized a scout detachment of Uzbek Komsomol members and who performed important tasks for the Red Army command authorities, displayed a model of selflessness.

As a result of the mobilization appeal, instead of 9350, 11,475 toilers of indigenous nationalities reported to the induction stations of Ferganskaya Oblast.

Taking into consideration experience to date in combating large basmachi bands, on 15 May 1920 M. V. Frunze ordered commencement of military operations on a wide front. The main forces concentrated in the area of the principal basmachi bases in the Alay Valley. A composite group operated here, consisting of two regiments and an ethnic Kirghiz battalion. The composite group was commanded by E. F. Kuzhelo. A mobile detachment was formed in the Fergana Valley proper.

All party and soviet agencies were mobilized for the struggle against the basmachi. In the interests of more precise coordination of operations, administrative functions in Ferganskaya Oblast were temporarily turned over to the military command authorities.

The Red Army units had the task of pursuing the bands until they were completely destroyed, even if it became necessary to operate outside of their assigned area.

E. F. Kuzhelo's composite group operated in the most difficult and critical sector. On 25 May 1920 the group departed from Osh and headed into the mountains. The first engagement with the basmachi took place on a mountain pass. The bandits had taken up positions there in advance and had fortified them. But they were unable to withstand the onslaught of the Red Armymen and retreated up a gorge leading to the Alay Valley, into the Sufi-Kurgan area. On the morning of 29 May, however, when the detachment's advance guard appeared at Sufi-Kurgan, the basmachi would not accept battle and hastily withdrew toward the Alay Valley. The basmachi leaders considered this area inaccessible to Red Army units. The rarefied air required special training for adaptation. One would tire rapidly. Tenacity, persistence, stamina and belief in victory, however, gave the commanders and men additional energy. For two weeks the Red cavalrymen relentlessly pursued the basmachi. Neither the accustomed conditions nor the difficult passes and gorges saved the enemy. Part of the basmachi forces was defeated in detail in the Alay Valley, while part escaped across snowy passes into other areas.

A composite detachment under the command of P. M. Paramonov, setting out from Kokand on 30 May, conducted several successful operations against the basmachi bands of Sali-Maksum, Aman-Palvan, and Atakuza.

The successes of the Soviet troops greatly influenced the attitude of the local populace. The dekhkans gradually lost the fear caused by the basmachi acts of terrorism and came out increasingly actively against the bandits. The basmachi

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did not feel secure even in the most remote areas of the Pamirs. Unhappy with the constant requisitions and coercion, the toilers themselves were making preparations to put an end to the basmachi bands. On 26 June 1920 the dekhkans of mountain kishlaks held a clandestine meeting. The following day a volunteer detachment made up of local villagers attacked a stronghold containing a bandit base and seized stores of weapons and ammunition.

In July 1920 Kurshirmat attempted to launch an offensive. He came down out of the Alay Valley, intending to cut the Kokand-Fergana and Andizhan-Namangan rail lines. This raid was a failure, however. In four large operations (in the Gorbua-Yaz"yavan, Angichek-Bulak-Bashi, Shaarikhan-Zarkent, and Yaz"yavan-Minbulak areas), Soviet troops, with the support of the local population, dealt the basmachi decisive blows. Remnants of the basmachi detachments fled in the direction of Balykchi-Chinabad.

Thus within a short period of time the Turkestan Commission of the VTsIK and the RSFSR SNK, the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party, and the Revvoyensovet of the Turkestan Front, with the direct participation of party, government and military leaders (V. V. Kuybyshev, M. V. Frunze, Sh. Z. Eliava, etc), succeeded in mobilizing the toiler masses, uniting their efforts with the operations of the Red Army, and thwarting attempts by the basmachi to launch an offensive.

In August 1920 party and soviet organizations elaborated new measures for wiping out the basmachi bands. It was decided to establish a military council in the Fergana, transferring to it all civil administration.[155] On 12 August the question of combating the basmachi was also discussed at an oblast congress of the Fergana party organization. The necessity of stepping up the struggle against remnants of the basmachi bands was also incorporated in the resolutions of the Fifth Andizhan Uyezd-City Party Conference, which was held at this time. In August TurkTsIK and the Revvoyensovet of the Turkestan Front granted the Ferganskaya Oblast Military Council emergency powers to combat the basmachi.[156]

Carrying out its assigned task, the Fergana Military Council proceeded to implement special measures. In addition to stepping up political education efforts among the toilers, it introduced, in particular, a system of hostages -- bai, mullahs, and relatives of basmachi still at large.

At the same time the famed brigade of Red Communards and ethnic volunteer units of Kirghiz and Kazakhs, which had arrived from the Center, were sent into the Fergana.

Basmachi activity did not diminish however. Their actions at the end of 1920 contained a specific feature, expressed in the fact that they were aimed at undermining economic life in the Turkestan Republic. Precisely at this time, when Turkestan's economic relations with the country's central regions were developing and growing stronger, the organizers of the basmachi were endeavoring to inflict maximum damage on the economy, in order to impede the economic recovery of Turkestan and thus to weaken the economy of the country as a

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whole. The basmachi were assigned the mission of depriving Russia's textile industry of cotton and of leaving Turkestan without coal, oil and foodstuffs.

For this reason their efforts were directed chiefly toward the destruction of industrial enterprises, mines, oilfields, rail lines, telephone and telegraph lines, irrigation works, cotton and foodstuffs storage facilities.

In the past acts of arson by basmachi bands on cotton ginning mills, destruction of rail lines and attacks on oilfields and mines had as a rule been sporadic, from occasion to occasion, while now acts of sabotage were assuming a massive character and were being carried out according to a plan conceived and worked out in advance.

The following table contains a summary of basmachi raids on the Fergana Railroad and cotton ginning mill burnings in July-October 1920:

	Number of Raids	Length of Demolished Tracks and Telegraph Lines	Number of Cotton Mills Burned
July	...	...	14
August	11	32 versts	9
September	17	31 versts	15
October	5	...	2

Sources: Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Fund 110, List 3, File 522, sheets 16-18; USSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution, Fund 130, List 4, File 786, Sheet 37.

At the beginning of August, according to incomplete figures, the basmachi burned up 100,000 poods of cotton, 33,000 poods of raw cotton, and 12,000 poods of seed grain just in Andizhanskiy Rayon.[157]

In October raids were mounted simultaneously on the Shurab coal mines and on the Chimion oilfield.[158] At the beginning of November six basmachi bands attacked the Sulyukta coal mines, the republic's second most important, located in the southern part of the Fergana Valley. Basmachi also surrounded the Pos'yetovka area, where a cotton wool mill was under construction,[159] and attacked the Santo oilfield.[160] In mid-November basmachi attacked the ozokerite fields near Mel'nikovo Station, as a result of which operations in these fields were shut down.[161] Significantly, at this same time basmachi operating in the Turkmen and Kara-Kalpak areas mounted an attack on the fisheries on the Muynak Peninsula in the Aral Sea. This once again confirms that basmachi operations were being directed from a single central headquarters and were being carried out according to a unified plan. We could also cite a number of other examples. All of them indicate that during those days when the White armies were defeated, counterrevolutionary forces were undertaking attempts to retard or thwart our country's movement onto the path of building socialism.

Having analyzed information on acts of economic sabotage, the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet undertook a number of measures to protect industrial installations and rail lines. The party kraykom [regional committee] instructed

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local organizations to organize, with the assistance of command and political personnel of military units, party druzhinas and territorial battalions to aid the Red Army. Such units were formed in Kokand, Andizhan, Namangan, and other cities.[162]

At the beginning of September 1920 M. V. Frunze stated in a conversation with V. V. Kuybyshev: "I consider it essential... to place under arms the entire worker and white-collar population of this oblast, with the exception of those performing vitally essential functions. This measure, providing assistance to the military in the form of workers acquainted with the enemy's tactics, will in my opinion make it possible to achieve results in short order."[163] M. V. Frunze's instructions were carried out. Mills, oilfields and railways, protected by Red Army detachments, party druzhinas and other worker class security units, began operating more or less normally.

An important role in mobilizing all manpower and resources to defeat the basmachi was played by the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party and the 9th All-Turkestan Congress of Soviets. Of particular importance were congress resolutions pertaining to continued enlistment of representatives of toilers of indigenous nationalities into agencies of governmental authority.

Following these congresses, important measures in the area of the nationalities question were carried out in Turkestan, promoting defeat of the basmachi. These included the following: nativization of the edifice of government, extensive enlistment of representatives of local nationalities into the government structure, adoption of teaching in the mother tongue of the pupils and students in the schools, and use of the languages of the nationalities of Central Asia (alongside the Russian language) in commercial office and administrative activities. A report by M. S. Iseyev, secretary of the Ferganskaya Oblast Committee of the KPT, dated 12 February 1921, noted that "a number of political campaigns have been conducted since the 9th and 5th congresses, resulting in the fact that the basmachi are gradually beginning to disintegrate."[164] In addition, the 9th All-Turkestan Congress of Soviets decided to send 10 percent of the congress delegates into the struggle against the basmachi, while the 5th Congress of the KPT mobilized a number of delegates for political work in the Fergana. Following mobilization of the KPT Central Committee, 100 Communists, representatives of local nationalities, left for the Fergana Front.

In October 1920 the Turkbyuro [Turkestan Bureau] of the RKP(b) Central Committee decided to send into the Fergana half of all party workers who had come to Turkestan from the Center, including at least 20 graduates of the Communist University imeni A. M. Sverdlov, who had been sent to Turkestan by the RKP(b) Central Committee.[165] On 20 October 1920 the Orgbyuro [Organization Bureau] of the RKP(b) Central Commitee decided to send party officials to the Fergana for permanent-assignment party work.[166]

The activities of party organizations produced appreciable results: the local toiler population began joining people's militia detachments and militia assistance detachments which were being formed at this time. These detachments became quite active in 1921.

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In his address at the Fourth Conference of Gubernia Chekas on 6 February 1920, V. I. Lenin stated that "A substantial majority of workers and peasants in those outlying localities which were under the yoke of the White Guard, the greater their numbers, the more firmly they have come over to our side."[167] These words apply in full measure not only to the workers but also to the dekhkans of Turkestan. The Oblast Congress of Soviets of the Fergana, held in August 1920, affirming the participation of the local population in the struggle against the basmachi and in the local soviets, informed V. I. Lenin of these facts, which were important for the Fergana and for all of Turkestan.

The "Koshchi" [poor peasant] unions, established on the basis of the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the KPT, began playing a significant role at this time in the struggle against the basmachi. Their members actively participated in self-defense detachments and in volunteer militia units.

The struggle against the basmachi in the Fergana was alleviated at the end of 1920 by two most important circumstances: by the victory over the main forces of the interventionists and White Guards (the rout of Wrangel' and the armistice with Poland) and by the victory of the people's revolution in Bukhara (September 1920).

Our enemies refused to capitulate, however. The nationalist counterrevolution and the basmachi leaders worked out a plan of establishment of a coalition of all counterrevolutionary Muslim elements in the East to combat Soviet power. On 7 November 1920 Kurshirmat, who called himself "the chief kurbashi of the Fergana Islamic army," the Bashkir nationalist Il'darkhan Mukani, and the Kazakh nationalist Dzhunazakov appealed to Dutov[168] to join this bloc and to begin supplying the basmachi with arms, ammunition and instructors for the purpose of organizing a new basmachi army.[169] This counterrevolutionary venture, however, proved to be just as unsuccessful as its predecessors.

An end to fighting on the civil war fronts made it possible to redeploy additional military units to the Fergana. By the end of 1920 several rifle brigades and cavalry regiments arrived there from the Semirech'ye and the former Bukhara Front. At the same time the Fergana Army Group was established, under the command of G. V. Zinov'yev, and subsequently of P. I. Baranov, member of the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet.[170] It saw action in the Namangan, Fergana, Kokand, Andizhan, and Osh combat sectors.[171]

Fierce engagements were fought with the basmachi in the Namangan, Andizhan, and Osh areas. Basmachi bands in the Andizhan-Osh area totaled approximately 1500 men. The 15th Independent Dungan Cavalry Regiment was operating against this force. The band lost 150 basmachi killed in an engagement on 30 November 1920 and fled into the Bulak-Bashi and Gorbua areas.

Combat operations against basmachi bands were also conducted in the vicinity of Kokand. There were more than 1000 basmachi in this area. In two engagements the bands lost approximately 120 men. The remainder, unable to withstand the onslaught of the Red Armymen and volunteers, dispersed into small groups.

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A battle raged for four days and nights at the Dzhalal-Abad railway station. Enjoying a substantial superiority in numbers, the basmachi surrounded the station. The handful of Red Armymen were in an exceptionally difficult plight. Food and water supplies ran out. They were running extremely short of ammunition. On the fourth day the enemy began launching continuous assaults. At that moment when the Red Armymen had run out of ammunition and the basmachi were attacking from all sides, an armored train appeared on the horizon. It scattered the band with artillery and machinegun fire.

Armed clashes with basmachi bands continued in the Fergana Valley throughout the entire month of October 1920. The bandit units were disintegrating under the attacks by the Red Army and volunteer detachments. Faced with this situation, the basmachi kurbashi of the Fergana Valley, with the participation of agents of foreign intelligence services, held a 2-day conference, in hopes of uniting their forces and jointly finding a way out of the predicament. At the cost of great efforts, success was achieved in reconciling the two basmachi leaders of the Fergana -- Kurshirmat and Muetdin -- at this meeting.

Red Army units and volunteer detachments continued pressing the bands in the Fergana Valley. In October-December 1920 practically the entire territory of Ferganskaya Oblast was cleared of basmachi. Remnants of the shattered bands took refuge in the Alay Valley.

The Turkestan Communist Party realized that the successes against the basmachi on the battlefield had to be consolidated by carrying out economic measures.

An important role in the struggle against the basmachi was played by a TurkTsIK decision, adopted at the initiative of the Turkkomissiya, to abolish the food monopoly in Ferganskaya Oblast and to open bazaars for free trade.[172]

On 25 December 1920 an oblast conference of dekhkans was convened in the Fergana, at which reports on the following topics were presented and discussed: 1) the current situation; 2) land reform; 3) tasks of food commissars; 4) tasks of public education in the village; 5) the struggle against the basmachi; 6) economic development; 7) organization of a union of toiling dekhkans.[173] The resolutions of this conference and their implementation fostered mobilization of the dekhkans for the struggle against the counter-revolution.

In the summer of 1920 the government of the RSFSR allocated substantial funds to the purpose of boosting the Fergana economy. Turkestan was allocated 150 million rubles for rebuilding the irrigation system of the Fergana, which had been demolished by the basmachi, and for restoration of cotton growing. In addition, money was allocated for the purchase of 5000 poods of seed grain and for purchase abroad, primarily in China, of livestock for distribution to the dekhkans. Another important measure was opening up of the border with China for unrestricted import of grain and livestock into the Fergana.

The government of the Turkestan Republic in turn substantially reduced government taxation of the dekhkans, while those kishlaks which had suffered

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heavily were fully exempted from payment of taxes. The toilers of the Fergana were given large-scale assistance in supply of foodstuffs and manufactured goods.

The military-political measures taken by the Turkestan Communist Party and the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet in the summer and fall of 1920 resulted in the total defeat and scattering of many basmachi bands; this made it possible for the front command authorities to make part of their forces available for the Western Front and thus to contribute to the defeat of the White Poles.

The situation of the basmachi who were operating in mountain areas worsened with the onset of winter. The Red Army, with the active support of the population, prevented the bands from remaining long in kishlaks. The kurbashi undertook attempts to penetrate into populated localities but, encountering resistance, would once again withdraw into the mountains. On 24 November 1920 Red Army detachments launched another attack on the forces of Kurshirmat and Aliyar, which were attempting to break through into settled areas. As a result the basmachi fled in the direction of Sokh, where they were again overtaken on 25 November and scattered into small groups.

In November 1920 more than 1200 basmachi, who had been taking refuge in the southern part of Kirghizia, concentrated in Narynskaya Volost, with the intention of living off the local population. On this occasion as well, however, they were unable to carry out their plans. A Red Army detachment arrived in Narynskaya Volost to protect the local population. It hit the basmachi encampment with a surprise attack. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which the basmachi suffered heavy casualties.

In the first half of December 1920, following several successful operations, two bands were destroyed and the Parpi band, which totaled more than 2000 men, was thoroughly mauled. Ya. A. Mel'kumov's 9th Brigade routed Kazakbay's band and inflicted a defeat on the band of Aman-Palvan. Kurshirmat's force withdrew into the Alay Valley, closer to the border.

By the end of 1920 basmachi numbers had been sharply reduced in comparison with the beginning of the year. They roved about the Fergana Valley, for the most part in the adjacent mountain ranges. Driven out of the densely-populated areas, they were deprived of their principal bases of food supply. The inhabitants of the kishlaks and auls refused to provide the bands with feed and foodstuffs. Increasingly less frequently were the basmachi successful in taking food supplies by force. They were hindered in this endeavor not only by the Red Army and the volunteer detachments, but also by the dekhkans themselves. Frequently the inhabitants of kishlaki and auls united at their own initiative and offered resistance to the basmachi.

In the kishlak of Mayli-Say the weaponless peasants invited basmachi into their homes, and then on signal disarmed them one by one, seizing 37 rifles and 32 horses. Such examples are not isolated. But the principal form of struggle by the population against the bands was their participation in volunteer druzhinas, militia and self-defense detachments. By the end of 1920 they contained more than 15,000 residents of Ferganskaya Oblast.

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At the end of 1920-beginning of 1921 the Soviet nation, having defeated the main forces of the interventionists and White Guard, began shifting over to peacetime construction.

The long-awaited peace did not yet ensue, however, in the Fergana Valley. Inspired by external reactionary forces, the chieftains of the basmachi bands refused to lay down their arms. Years of difficult struggle against the basmachi still lay ahead for the Fergana.

Areas of Basmachi Concentration: Ablyk, "Matchinskoye Bekstvo"

In addition to the Fergana Valley, in 1918-1920 basmachi detachments were operating in the Angren River valley near Tashkent and in Samarkandskaya Oblast.

In the Angren River valley, an important grain and rice producing area, which played an important role in the economy of the Turkestan Republic, the basmachi bands of Ashurmat and Rakhmankul appeared in the villages of Ablyk, Pengaz, and Ashava, located 80 versts southeast of Tashkent, presenting a direct threat to Tashkent, the republic's political and military-administrative center. Seizing the Kul'davan and Kendyr-Davan passes, which link Tashkent with Ferganskaya Oblast, the basmachi secured their rear and obtained freedom of maneuver.

Local party units assumed the brunt of the struggle against the basmachi. Party druzhinas of Communists from nearby communities in Tashkentskiy Uyezd: Pskent, Buki, Muratali, Telyau, and Ablyk, as well as detachments of Tashkent Communists and workers were dispatched to the area.

Another dangerous focal point of basmachi activity developed along the upper reaches of the Zeravshan, in a rugged mountain area, beyond the Oburdon pass, among the sheer cliffs of the Zeravshan and Turkestan ranges, in the northwestern part of contemporary Tajikistan. The reactionary clergy and bai were particularly strongly entrenched in this area, skillfully exploiting the ignorance of the population, clan-tribal traditions and ties. The entire area bore the name Matchinskoye bekstvo (the Zeravshan is called the Matcha along its upper reaches; the area's administrative center, a large kishlak, bore the same name). In November 1918 the bai in this area, headed by the local bek [feudal ruler], massacred a small Red Army detachment and established their own rule. Counterrevolutionary elements planned to turn the Matchinskoye bekstvo [Matcha beydom] into an "independent state."

Although the scale of activities of the Matcha insurgents was small,[174] Matcha was of enormous importance to the counterrevolution, for it played the role of binding link between the Fergana basmachi and the Bukhara emir, who was backed by the British imperialists. In addition, the Fergana basmachi utilized the Matcha area as a place to regroup their bands and as an avenue of withdrawal into Bukhara territory during an offensive by large Red Army forces.

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Having seized power in the Matchinskoye bekstvo, at the beginning of 1919 the basmachi leaders attempted to gain control over the neighboring kishlaks. The basmachi proceeded to raid them and rob the local populace.

A small Red Army detachment was dispatched to Matchinskaya Volost. Its actions were little effective, however, since it was able to hold back the basmachi onslaught only in certain sectors. Appeals issued by the Red Army command and local authorities to the basmachi to stop the bloodletting were unsuccessful. The Matcha basmachi became more aggressive. Dekhkans were fleeing to Samarkand and Pendzhikent to escape from these terrorist activities.

The Samarkandskaya Oblast party committee mobilized Communists to fight the basmachi in the Matcha. An international detachment was formed in the first half of 1919. In May 1919 Muslim bureaus were established in all uyezd and city party committees in Samarkandskaya Oblast, which proceeded to conduct extensive political work among the masses.

In the meantime the basmachi kurbashi announced the establishment of an independent state, called the "Matchinskoye bekstvo." This venture -- the creation of a "state" consisting of remote mountain kishlaks with a population totaling several tens of thousands -- pursued two objectives: to enhance the authority and prestige of the chieftains and to obtain material assistance from reactionaries abroad.

In addition, the basmachi leaders declared that their bekstvo was "popular" (an experienced stage manager's hand could be discerned in their actions), and in order to show evidence of this they staged "voting" by the population when various decisions were made. Employing the threat of arms, the basmachi herded the dekhkans to assembly points, where the "balloting" took place. A delegation which was to be sent to England for "counsel" and "assistance" was also elected in this manner.

British authorities held talks with the delegation, figuring to obtain a bridgehead for aggression in Central Asia. They gave approval of creation of the "Matchinskoye bekstvo" and promised generous aid. In the summer of 1919 the delegation returned to the Matcha. The promised support went to the heads of the basmachi leaders. Operating from their refuge beyond the rugged mountain passes, the basmachi mounted raids and robbed the population in the surrounding areas. The residents of the kishlaks in Fal'garskaya Volost were particularly frequently raided.

In September 1919 the Matcha basmachi launched an offensive toward the city of Pendzhikent. Taking advantage of the fact that the main Soviet military forces were in other areas of Central Asia. they captured 13 kishlaks. A 150-man Red Army detachment arrived from Samarkand to assist the toiler population on the upper reaches of the Zeravshan. The Samarkandskaya Oblast party committee issued arms and ammunition to the people of the kishlaks which were frequently subjected to attacks by the basmachi bands, and also sent instructors. The detachment and local dekhkans liberated a number of kishlaks.

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At the same time measures were taken to defend the kishlaks of Ura-Tyubinskiy and Khodzhentskiy uyezds. Small military garrisons and volunteer detachments covered the passes leading to the Zeravshan Valley.

At the same time the Red Army command authorities and local agencies of Soviet authority, seeking to avoid further bloodshed, made one more attempt to eliminate the basmachi base in the Matcha by peaceful means. Following negotiations, the Matcha leaders agreed to disarm and pledged to stop raiding the surrounding areas, but they failed to keep their promises.

In January 1920 the basmachi again proceeded to conduct offensive operations. Following engagements which had variable success, they withdrew beyond the mountain passes.

Once again truce talks began. Finally on 12 July 1920 a peace agreement was signed between the Red Army command authorities and the Matcha bek. But the truce again proved fragile. The basmachi particularly stepped up their activities in September 1920, when the population of the Bukhara emirate rose up in rebellion. The victory of the popular revolution in Bukhara foreordained the defeat of the basmachi in the Matchinskoye bekstvo. A special new detachment under the command of one of the heroes of the civil war, P. M. Paramonov, was formed in Samarkand. The Samarkandskaya Oblast Executive Committee declared Ura-Tyubinskiy Uyezd, where the kurbashi Kholbuta, notorious for his ferocity, was on the rampage, to be under martial law. A total of about 20 bands were operating in the areas of Samarkandskaya Oblast, each of which contained from 70 to 700 basmachi.

At the end of September 1920 Red Army units fought in the Matcha for a period of 20 days, hitting the basmachi hard. The basmachi were not completely wiped out in the Matcha, however, until 1923.

Basmachi of Bukhara and Khorezm

The rulers of Bukhara and Khiva were able to hold on to their thrones for some time following the victory of the October Revolution. In the conditions of the civil war and foreign intervention, the Bukhara emirate and the Khiva khanate became hotbeds of counterrevolution and an interventionist bridgehead.

As already noted, the Fergana, Matcha and other basmachi received enormous assistance from the ruling circles of the Bukhara emirate. Bukhara sent the basmachi arms and money, and offered refuge following defeat. Dzhunaid-khan, the dictator of Khiva, repeatedly attacked the towns of Petro-Aleksandrovsk and Nukus, which were situated in the Amudar'yinskiy Division of the Turkestan ASSR.[175]

The anti-Soviet activities of the rulers of Khiva and Bukhara hastened the collapse of their despotic regimes. The masses rose up to overthrow the basmachi dictator Dzhunaid and the emir of Bukhara, henchman of the British imperialists. In this struggle the toilers of Khiva and Bukhara, led by Communists, relied on fraternal help from the Russian people and the assistance of Soviet Russia.

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The toilers of Khiva were the first to achieve victory. In November 1919 there began a popular uprising against the dictatorship of Dzhunaid-khan. The insurgents appealed to the Soviet Government for support. A delegation of Khiva insurgents arrived in Petro-Aleksandrovsk. On 4 November the Soviet of Workers' and Dekhkan Deputies telegraphed an appeal to Tashkent, addressed to the TurkTsIK and the Revvoyensovet: "The proletariat of Khiva has risen against Dzhunaid-khan; fighting is in progress everywhere. A delegation from the people has come to us asking for assistance. Request your permission to send a detachment to assist the insurgent people of Khiva."[176]

The united forces of the Khiva revolutionary detachment and Red Army units inflicted a number of defeats on Dzhunaid-khan, who was being actively assisted by remnants of the White Cossack forces.

At the end of January 1920 Dzhunaid was defeated and fled into the desert. Bedirkent, his official residence, fell on 23 January. Revolutionary detachments entered the khan's capital on 1 February.

The victory of the revolution in Khiva was, to quote V. V. Kuybyshev, "the first link in a chain of revolutions and uprisings in the East which will inevitably bring all the countries of the East which are today oppressed and enslaved by British imperialism to complete liberation from bondage.... Heroic little Khiva was the first to embark upon the path of struggle. It was the first to rise up in rebellion. It was the first to gain liberation from despotism."[177]

The First All-Khorezm Kurultay of People's Representatives convened in Khiva on 26 April 1920. It proclaimed the establishment of a people's Soviet Republic and adopted its first constitution.

The "Preamble" to the constitution stated that it was solely due to the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia that the Khivan people had been able to gain their freedom and independence. "...The Russian workers and peasants," it stated further, "who have helped liberate the people of Khiva and the proletariat of the entire world... are the very best friends of the entire Khivan people." The Khorezm People's Soviet Republic (KPSR) arose on the ruins of the despotic Khiva regime.

Immediate following Khiva, the revolution was victorious in Bukhara as well. Fearing the growing discontent of the people, the emir stepped up repressive measures and was more and more obviously turning the country into an anti-Soviet bridgehead. He was operating in close contact with the British military command in Mashhad. Dozens of British and White Guard officers were acting as instructors training the emir's troops. As V. V. Kuybyshev stated, the Bukhara emirate had once and for all become a caravanserai for counter-revolutionaries, White Guardists, and world imperialism.[178]

In the meantime the resentment of the toilers, who had been suffering from poverty and the arbitrary rule of the emirate authorities, reached the boiling point. On 28 August an uprising erupted in Charjui. This was followed by actions by revolutionary forces in other parts of the emirate. "On 28 August

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1920," M. V. Frunze later wrote, "the Bukhara abscess finally burst." M. V. Frunze further noted that the Soviet authorities were faced with a dilemma: "Either to assist the insurgent Bukharan people and help them cast off the age-old chains of bondage and denial of civil rights or to remain spectators to the incipient struggle and allow the emir to extinguish the gleams of freedom in Bukhara. The Red troops of Turkestan marched shoulder to shoulder with the people of Bukhara against their oppressor."[179]

Red Army units, together with Bukharan revolutionary forces, crushed the resistance of the emir's troops. Bukhara was liberated on 2 September following a fierce battle. M. V. Frunze telegraphed V. I. Lenin: "The last stronghold of Bukharan obscurantism and reactionary extremism has fallen. The Red Banner of the world revolution is waving victoriously over the Registan."[180] Emir Seyid Alim-khan and most of his dignitaries fled into Eastern Bukhara.

On 5 October 1920 the summer palace of the emir witnessed an unprecedented event. Within its walls gathered the 1950 delegates to the First All-Bukhara Kurultay of People's Representatives. The Kurultay proclaimed establishment of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (BPSR).

The revolutions in Khorezm and Bukhara were of great historic significance. Having destroyed the last refuges of obscurantism and despotism, they brought the toiler masses onto the path of socialist development.

The revolutions in Khorezm and Bukhara were not socialist revolutions. The economic and social backwardness of Khorezm and Bukhara demanded particular flexibility and gradualism in effecting revolutionary reforms and in accomplishing first of all tasks of an antifeudal and antiimperialist character. Therefore the Khorezm and Bukhara republics did not arise as socialist but rather as people's Soviet republics. Subsequently, as the Soviet system became consolidated, Khorezm (in 1923) and Bukhara (in 1924) were transformed into Soviet socialist republics. The KPSR and the BPSR entered into a fraternal union with Soviet Russia, which had given them comprehensive assistance.

The building of a new life began in Bukhara and Khorezm. The masses had been liberated. Radical socioeconomic and sociopolitical reforms were being carried out.

The onward march of the revolution, however, encountered fierce resistance on the part of reactionary elements. Feudal-bai elements gave a hostile reception to every progressive measure. At first there were many bourgeois nationalists occupying high posts in the young republics.

The basmachi became the main instrument of counterrevolution in Khorezm and Bukhara.

A tenacious, protracted struggle against the basmachi of Dzhunaid-khan was taking place in Khorezm. The dictator, stripped of his authority, gathered together substantial forces with the generous and active assistance of British intelligence. Dzhunaid's army was made up for the most part of members of the

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families of feudal lords, former functionaries of the Khiva khanate, reactionary clergy, and diehard White Guardists. The bands of Dzhunaid-khan totaled up to 10,000 men.[181]

Combat operations by Red Army units in August 1920 were unsuccessful as a result of treachery on the part of the Khivan Jadids.[182]

On 27 October Dzhunaid-khan captured Kungrad and exacted savage reprisals on party and Soviet activists. Liquidating agencies of popular rule, he placed the former bek Balabiy in charge of the occupied city.

There was no limit to the atrocities perpetrated by Dzhunaid-khan. Bakir Belousov, former military commissar of the 1st Volga-Tatar Brigade, who had come to Khorezm, was murdered. The men of the Turkmen volunteer detachments were villainously put to death.

At the end of 1920 Nukus was surrounded by basmachi. Fighting at the city walls continued unabated for 14 days. As frequently occurred in those years, there was only a few days supply of food and ammunition. It was necessary to husband each and every cartridge, every gram of bread. But the men of the garrison and the people's volunteers withstood the siege. When supplies were running out, Red Armyman P. Ruzmetov volunteered to take a message to the Red Army command authorities in Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Under cover of darkness he stealthily evaded the basmachi patrols, made his way past the ring of encirclement, and reached Petro-Aleksandrovsk. A Red Army detachment speedily came to the rescue. The basmachi withdrew.

An RSFSR plenipotentiary delegation headed by M. V. Safonov arrived in Khorezm and went to work. It was able to expose the counterrevolutionary activities of a substantial portion of the Jadid party leadership who had close ties with the basmachi.

The defeat of the supporters of Dzhunaid-khan was a result not only of a heroic struggle on the part of the volunteer detachments and Red Army units which had come to assist them, but was also a result of consolidation of Soviet authority, increased activeness on the part of the Khorezm toilers and strengthening of the ranks of the Khorezm Communist Party -- vanguard of the toiler masses Khorezm, established at the First All-Khorezm Party Conference in May 1920.

Of enormous importance in the defeat of the basmachi was strengthening of the Khorezm Red Army, which was formed in the course of the struggle for victory of the popular Soviet revolution. It consisted of dekhkans, artisans, small merchants and traders. The political directorate of the Khorezm (Khiva) Red Army (Purkhiv), headed by Communist Makhmud Musayev, was established in November 1920. Purkhiv took over direction of all party work in the republic, since at this time the bourgeois-nationalist Jadid group controlled the Central Committee of the Khiva Communist Party.[183]

Extremely close ties between the republic and Soviet Russia were a most important condition for strengthening the people's rule in the KPSR.

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On 13 September 1920 a treaty of alliance and economic agreement between the RSFSR and KPSR were signed, providing for military-political and economic cooperation; also signed was an agreement to provide assistance to the Khorezm Republic in the development of cotton growing, irrigation, communications, etc.[184]

The struggle against the basmachi in the Bukhara Republic was of a no less complex and difficult nature.

Long before the collapse of the emirate, basmachi bands were active in the mountainous areas of Eastern Bukhara. Alongside common criminals, they were frequently led by mullahs, high officials of the emirate, beks, and tribal chieftains. The basmachi bands stepped up their activities in the spring of 1919, when many basmachi from the Fergana Valley crossed over onto the territory of Eastern Bukhara. Making preparations for the struggle against Soviet Turkestan, the emir of Bukhara, who had entreated the King of England to take Bukhara into the British empire,[185] sought to utilize the basmachi. He dispatched messengers carrying letters in which he proposed the establishment of armed detachments.

The Lokay area, situated to the southwest of Dushanbe between the Kafirnigan and Vakhsh rivers, became a focal area of basmachi activity. Basmachi had long been active in this area, in conditions of extreme economic and sociocultural backwardness and prevalence of clan-tribal relations. Persons fleeing the blood vengeance of fellow tribesmen had traditionally settled in that part of the Lokay situated beyond the Vakhsh. Many of these people readily joined the ranks of the basmachi.

One Ibragim-bek, who had close ties with the leadership elite of the two largest Lokay tribes, became chieftain of the Lokay basmachi.

On 21 March 1920 the emir of Bukhara sent Ibragim-bek a letter containing an appeal to enter into "struggle against the infidels."[186] Ibragim-bek was happy to come to the defense of the emir. Not all the Lokay tribes, however, supported Ibragim-bek. The common working people and even entire tribes had no desire to join bands. Hostility between tribes grew more intense on these grounds. One of the tribes joined the basmachi only under threat of severe reprisals, and then only after Ibragim-bek executed the tribe's chief mullah, who had been opposed to the basmachi.

In the meantime the former emir and his retainers, who had fled the capital, arrived in Eastern Bukhara. It was not mere happenstance that they chose Eastern Bukhara as their base. Seyid Alim-khan and the Bukhara counterrevolutionaries placed high hopes on this region. Massive mountain ranges and the nearby frontier would enable them, when it became necessary, to take refuge in rugged mountain gorges or across the border. Ibragim-bek's large basmachi bands were operating precisely in this area.

The emir settled in Dushanbe for a short period of time and set about to consolidate his authority in Eastern Bukhara. In the latter half of September 1920 Seyid Alim-khan convened a kurultay in Dushanbe, which was attended by the

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leaders of the Bukhara, Fergana, Khorezm, and Samarkand basmachi, Russian White Guardists, British and Afghan advisers. They adopted a common plan of action against Soviet rule. Soon several caravans delivered British rifles and cartridges to Eastern Bukhara.

Assisted by the British, Seyid Alim-khan organized large bands, which he concentrated in the Kulyab, Gissar and Dushanbe areas. By mid-November 1920 his detachments had seized Baysun and Sherabad. The former emir announced compulsory mobilization of the dekhkans. By the beginning of December 1920 his army totaled 7000 men. It acquired artillery -- 30 guns. Five hundred camels were loaded with bales carrying ammunition. The emir's troops included soldiers sent by Afghan feudal lords. Capturing Shakhrisyabz, Kitab, and Yakkobag by the end of December 1920 and carrying out a new mobilization in these towns, the emir enlarged his army to 15,000 men.

The basmachi dealt brutally with the civilian population. Townspeople would be killed even for going out into the street, contrary to prohibition, when the former emir was riding along it. During the single night spent in Karatag, Seyid Alim-khan's retinue of of dignitaries and basmachi hacked several persons to death with sabers, for the most part persons who resisted the looting and violence.

The Lokay band, prominent among which was the large band of Ibragim-bek's father-in-law, played an appreciable role in Eastern Bukhara during the former emir's sojourn there.[187]

The acts of violence by the basmachi aroused the people's wrath. On 16 December 1920 the dekhkans of Karategin viloyat [province] rose up in rebellion against the emir. The uprising was mercilessly crushed. The residents of Sherabad, who had sent delegates to Termez requesting that Red askers [soldiers] be sent to their aid as quickly as possible, also rose up in rebellion.

The difficult situation in Eastern Bukhara demanded immediate measures.

The struggle against the basmachi in Eastern Bukhara and the northern areas of present-day Tajikistan would not be an easy one. The soldiers of the Red Army and the volunteer detachments had to fight fierce engagements against large bands which had well equipped bases. In the mountains the basmachi constructed unique fortresses with secret passageways and laid in large stores of provisions, feed and equipment. There was also a shop for the manufacture of cartridges.

The Central Committee of the Bukhara Communist Party (BCP) and the Bukhara Revolutionary Committee initiated an extensive political campaign among the public. Prominent BCP leader Alimdzhan Akchurin went to the Gissar and Karshi areas, while Fayzulla Khodzhayev, chairman of the Sovnarkom of the BPSR, went with 15 political workers to the Shakhrisyabz area. A "political assault group" under the leadership of Sagdulla Tursunkhodzhayev was dispatched to Dushanbe for this purpose. Dekhkan kurultays were held in a number of viloyats of the BPSR, at which the dekhkans discussed matters connected with forming people's self-defense detachments and assisting Red Army units.

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Political expeditions were sent into many areas to conduct agitation-explanatory work.

RSFSR envoy plenipotentiary V. V. Kuybyshev did a great deal of work in the Bukhara Republic. On 17 October 1920, in a telegram to the commander of the Turkestan Front, he requested that Soviet Bukhara be given fraternal assistance, stepping up the pace of operations by the front's forces against the basmachi.[188] At the end of October, at a joint meeting of members of the Turkkomissiya and the front's command authorities, with the participation of the RSFSR envoy plenipotentiary to Bukhara, V. V. Kuybyshev's proposals pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi were discussed in detail.[189]

Units of the Turkestan Front were being concentrated to engage the army of the former emir and the basmachi. In November 1920, by order of G. V. Zinov'yev, commander of the 1st Army, all Soviet troops in the BPSR were consolidated into the Bukhara Group of Forces, with the objective of conducting a Gissar expedition. By January 1921 five Red Army brigades, including 2 rifle and 3 cavalry brigades, had arrived in the Bukhara Republic.

At the end of 1920 the Bukhara Military Commissariat, under the leadership of Bolshevik B. Shegabutdinov, began the job of forming a Bukhara People's Army, and subsequently a Red Army. The command authorities of the Turkestan Front sent commanders and political workers to assist him.

A specially formed detachment mounted the first operation in the Gissar sector. Its mission was to mop up remnants of the emir's forces, to clear the Gissar Valley of these troops and basmachi bands, and to create conditions there for the establishment of Soviet rule.

By the end of December 1920 units of the Termez garrison had liberated Sherabad, the Samarkand group had captured Kitab, while another group had taken Yakkobag. On 20 February 1921 Red Army detachments reached Gissar. A battle ensued, in which the enemy was defeated and fled. By the end of February 1921 tenacious fighting had resulted in the liberation of Dushanbe, Kulyab and Garm, where the basmachi had long been entrenched. By the end of February the 3d Border Squadron, under the command of A. Ya. Pankeyev, was the first unit to reach the Soviet-Afghan border. The shattered basmachi groups scattered and dissipated in the vicinity of Karategin and in the valley of the Vakhsh.

The rout of the remnants of the emir's forces and the large basmachi bands brought Seyid Alim-khan's plans to naught. No longer hopeful of success and fearing capture, on 5 March 1921 the former emir of Bukhara, protected by a security guard of basmachi, crossed the Afghan border. A heavily-laden caravan of 300 camels hauled away plundered gold, precious stones and other valuables. Ibragim-bek and Davlyatman-biy fled across the border with the former emir.

The 1st Brigade, under the command of Ya. A. Mel'kumov, was pummeling the bands of Kurshirmat (who had come over from the Fergana) and Fuzayl Maksum. Unable to withstand the offensive pressure of the Red Army units and volunteer detachments, Kurshirmat retreated to the refuge of the Alay Valley.

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By the end of March the 1st Cavalry Regiment, under the command of D. Ye. Krasil'nikov, maintaining relentless pursuit of Fuzayl Maksum, delivered damaging attacks in the Katta Karamyk urochishche. In the course of the fighting the following were seized: approximately 5000 sheep, goods plundered from the population, and 40 leather trunks filled with valuables. Fuzayl Maksum's main forces (more than 800 men), however, headed for the refuge of the Darvaz, where the Darvaz bek Ishan Sultan was operating.

The men of the Red Army met sympathy and support on the part of the Bukhara toilers. In December 1921 a dekhkan uprising, under the leadership of Usman Mukhamadinov, erupted to the rear of the emir's forces. The insurgents captured Garm and forced the Karategin bek to flee. In spite of the fact that this uprising was soon crushed, it attested to the fact that the counterrevolutionary forces lacked a mass base.

The Gissar Expeditionary Detachment of the Red Army displayed great courage and heroism in liberating the toilers of the BPSR, a fact which was noted in a Revvoyensovet order. The 1st and 2d Cavalry regiments, the 8th Rifle Regiment and the 1st Mountain Battery of the 1st Independent Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, outstanding commanders and political workers were awarded decorations.[190]

Conducting aggressive actions against the basmachi, the Bukhara Communist Party and the government of Bukhara continued revolutionary reforms and strengthened the edifice of government. Measures taken by them consolidated the people's rule.

At this time an endeavor was made to define the essence and character of the revolution in Bukhara, in order to be able to take appropriate measures to accomplish its further development and deepening. The initiator in this endeavor was V. V. Kuybyshev, whose report on this subject was presented in November 1920 at a joint session of the BKP Central Committee, Revolutionary Committee and the BPSR Council of Nazirs [inspectors, supervisors]. Prominent Bukhara Republic leaders took part in the discussion of this report, including Fayzulla Khodzhayev and Sadriddin Ayni. A letter entitled "To the Bukhara Communists" was published on 7 January 1921, in which the Turkbyuro of the Comintern mapped out a program for mobilization of all the republic's resources to consolidate the achievements of the revolution and for defeating the basmachi.

The 5th Congress of the Bukhara Communist Party was held in February 1921, which was of great significance for the republic's progressive development. The congress resolution on the military question, the principal content of which was "Everything for the Red Army," played an important role in the successful struggle against the basmachi.

A Soviet-Afghan treaty was signed in Moscow on 28 February 1921. Among other points, the parties to the treaty agreed "to the genuine independence and freedom of Bukhara and Khiva, whatever form of government shall exist there in conformity with the wishes of their peoples."[191] The treaty struck a blow against the intrigues of reactionary circles in Afghanistan, which were actively supporting the basmachi.

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A treaty of alliance and an economic agreement between the RSFSR and the BPSR were signed on 4 March 1921. The Russian Soviet Republic recognized the independence of the BPSR, pledged to give it economic and other assistance and gave it an outright monetary assistance grant of 500,000 rubles.[192]

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ENEMIES OF PEACEFUL LABOR

Successes and Achievements of the Toilers of Central Asia

In November 1920 the troops of the Southern Front stormed across the Perekop Isthmus and liberated the Crimea, pushing into the Black Sea the remnants of the defeated army of Baron Wrangel'. M. V. Frunze, commander of the Southern Front, sent a telegram to Moscow, addressed to V. I. Lenin and the party Central Committee: "The armies of the front have carried out their duty to the republic. The final nest of Russian counterrevolution has been smashed...."[1]

The appeal of the 8th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which convened in Moscow in December 1920, rang out across the land: "The toilers of Russia have earned the right to commence peaceful labor, a right earned by these three years of great deprivations and bloody sacrifices. We shall devote all our energies to this labor. Let there not be a single person in our Soviet land who is capable of labor and is not working. Let there not be a single machine tool standing idle. Let there not remain unplanted a single desyatina of arable land....

"The victors over Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel', this country's highest agency of authority, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, call upon us to engage in new struggle and achieve new victories.

"Long live our victory on the labor front!"[2]

The 10th Congress of the RKP(b), held in March 1921, spelled out a campaign to rebuild and boost the economy. The congress adopted a resolution in response to the report of V. I. Lenin, calling for transition to a new economic policy (NEP). The changeover to NEP strengthened the alliance between workers and peasants on a solid economic foundation and created the requisite preconditions for successful reconstruction and development of the nation's economy.

In Central Asia the toilers were faced with great difficulties. The postwar economic chaos -- which was enormous throughout the country -- was particularly burdensome in Turkestan. By the beginning of 1921 agricultural output had declined to one third the prewar level. Total head of livestock had also diminished to one third. Half of the irrigation systems had become unfit for

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service during the war years. In 1915 the cotton harvest totaled 20 million poods, while in 1920 only 650,000 poods were harvested.

Industrial production, which had been modest to begin with, declined to one fifth its previous level. Transportation was in a disastrous state.

The toilers of Central Asia rolled up their sleeves and proceeded to rebuild the economy. Initially proceeding more slowly than in Russia's central regions, rebuilding of Turkestan's economy subsequently assumed an increasingly more rapid pace. In 1924-1925 gross industrial output reached almost four fifths the prewar level.

The irrigation network was being restored to working order, and acreage planted to cotton was increasing. In 1923 7 million poods of cotton were harvested. The economy of the Bukhara and Khorezm republics was gradually reviving.

The government of the RSFSR gave comprehensive assistance to the toilers of Central Asia. Manufactured goods, medicines, and equipment for restoring irrigation systems to service were sent into the region. The RSFSR provided the republics of Central Asia with substantial funds. Specialists -- engineers and doctors, scientific workers and teachers -- came to Tashkent, Samarkand, Ashkhabad, Khodzhent, and Bukhara from Moscow, Leningrad and other cities of the central region.

Of particular significance was the relocation of industrial enterprises to Central Asia. For example, the Zaraysk Weaving and Spinning Mill and equipment for textile, papermaking, tanning, and soapmaking enterprises were transferred free of charge to the Bukhara Republic.

Implementation of socioeconomic reforms in the Turkestan Republic continued. In 1921-1922 a land and water reform was carried out in Semirechenskaya, Syrdar'inskaya, Ferganskaya, and Samarkandskaya oblasts, and revolutionary transformations in Bukhara and Khorezm were expanded and deepened. Kazakh, Kara-Kalpak, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, and Uzbek toilers were becoming increasingly involved in building a new life.

The "Koshchi" union, a mass organization of dekhkan toilers, was growing rapidly. By the end of 1921 its ranks contained approximately 100,000 peasants of indigenous nationalities throughout Turkestan, while by 1924 the union had grown to a membership of 200,000.

Cultural development was advancing increasingly more broadly: schools were established with pupils taught in their native language, new cadres were trained, and enormous cultural-educational work was being done. The great Uzbek educator Khamza Khakim-zade Niyazi participated actively in organizing schools, children's homes, musical and dramatic troupes, libraries, "red chaykhanas," and likbez [elimination of illiteracy] circles.

Famed Uzbek film director Kamil' Yarmatov, who was an active participant in the struggle against the basmachi (in 1922 he served as militia chief and ChON

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[Special Purpose Unit] commander in Kanibadam), recalls that a theater under the directorship of Khamza came from Kokand to Kanibadam. "Khamza and his actors traveled not only among the cities, towns and kishlaks of Ferganskaya Oblast but also along the entire vast Turkestan Front.... They carried Bolshevik truth to the masses, exposing and ridiculing the basmachi, Islamists, autonomists, nationalists, reactionary mullahs, and other counterrevolutionaries. Their repertoire consisted of short, single-act plays, sketches, variety acts, and 'agitation posters.' The actors could sing and dance, and frequently they had to go directly into battle right off the stage, still wearing make-up and costumes."[3]

The Communist Party devoted great attention to correctly resolving the nationalities question and uniting all the peoples of our country into a unified fraternal family of builders of socialism.

A most important event was the establishment in December 1922 of a unified Soviet multinational state -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Establishment of the USSR facilitated to an enormous degree the struggle by all the peoples of our country to liquidate backwardness, to overcome the resistance of the exploiter classes, to achieve development of the economy and culture, and assisted the movement toward socialism.

An event of great historic importance took place in Central Asia in 1924-1925 -- the delimitation of national statehood. One of the conditions for accomplishing this was success in the Fergana, Bukhara, Khorezm and elsewhere.

The peoples of Central Asia had been without nationhood in the past. All three governmental entities which existed in Central Asia at the beginning of the 1920's -- the Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm republics -- were multinational. Their administrative boundaries did not coincide with ethnic boundaries. Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks, for example, were living in the Turkestan Republic, but none of these ethnic groups comprised an absolute majority. There were Turkmens living in all three republics, but nowhere did they comprise a majority. Tajiks were living in the Turkestan and Bukhara republics, and also did not comprise a majority. The Kirghiz resided primarily in Turkestan, but they represented less than 11 percent of the republic's total population.

In conditions of a Soviet system it became possible to unite the territories in which Uzbeks, Turkmens, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Kara-Kalpaks were living, territories which had been split and disconnected in the prerevolutionary past, and to reunify them in ethnically homogeneous Soviet republics and autonomous oblasts.

This task was placed on the agenda in 1924. By that time all three Central Asian Soviet republics had achieved notable successes. Rebuilding of the economy, consolidation of the Soviet system, and growth of indigenous cadres were creating the requisite conditions for performing demarcation on a national statehood basis. The Central Asian republics were strengthening relations among themselves in all areas.

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In March 1923 the Turkestan ASSR, the Bukhara and Khorezm republics decided to unite efforts in carrying out economic plans. Economic unification was of particular significance for the BPSR and KPSR, since it promoted their movement along the socialist path of development, which was an important condition for further mobilization of the economic means and resources of all the peoples of Central Asia for the struggle against the basmachi. At the same time it was an indicator of the strength and influence in Central Asia of Lenin's nationalities policy and policy of friendship among peoples. Both these factors played a primary role in the defeat of the basmachi.

The RKP(b) Central Committee approved the initiative of the local party and soviet organizations and on 12 June 1924 issued a decree entitled "On National Delimitation of the Republics of Central Asia (Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm)."

In September 1924 a Special Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkestan Republic, the All-Bukhara and All-Khorezm kurultays declared their support for the implementation of national-territorial delimitation. The USSR Central Executive Committee ratified this decision at a meeting in October.

A special commission of the Central Asia Bureau of the RKP(b) Central Committee performed the enormous job of studying the ethnic composition of the population, of establishing ethnic delimitations (which was an extremely complex business in view of the patchwork of settlement by the various nationalities), of elucidating the economic and cultural relationships of the individual areas, and on distribution of the property and capital of economic organizations and establishments.

There arose in place of the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm republics the Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics, the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast,[4] and the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast.[5] Kazakh areas of the Turkestan Republic were reunited with the Kazakh ASSR (at that time it was a component of the RSFSR). In May 1925 the Uzbek and Turkmen republics joined the USSR.

The Communist parties of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, as well as oblast party organizations of Tajikistan, Kirghizia, and Kara-Kalpakia were established simultaneously with national demarcation.

The creation of national Soviet republics and oblasts was an eminent event in the history of the peoples of Central Asia. The highly complex task of reunification of peoples, establishment of national delimitations, the creation of national Soviet nationhood was accomplished quite smoothly and painlessly. This created new opportunities for the further political, economic and cultural development of the peoples of Central Asia, growth of national cadres, and strengthening of the Soviet system.

The national delimitation of Central Asia, a process which reached historical maturation by the middle of the 1920's, was an expression of objective development trends of the Central Asian peoples in conditions of Soviet rule.

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It did away with the artificial entities which had been inherited from the times of feudal splintering and colonial bondage, and fostered overcoming of ethnic conflicts and interethnic distrust which had carried over from the prerevolutionary past.

Unification of the peoples of Central Asia with the other peoples of Russia, and particularly with the Russian people, signified strengthening of their political-economic position and military might, which facilitated accomplishment of the historic task of building socialism while bypassing the capitalist stage, a task formulated by V. I. Lenin.

End of the Fergana Basmachi

The successes and achievements of the toilers of Central Asia were gained in a tenacious struggle against the enemies of socialism. The dark forces of reaction refused to yield without a fight. They had the full support of the imperialist nations and reactionary circles in countries adjacent to Soviet Central Asia -- Iran, Afghanistan, and China. Domestic counterrevolution and reactionaries abroad were utilizing the basmachi in the anti-Soviet struggle to an even greater extent than before. The basmachi became the principal executors of numerous schemes aimed at thwarting the peaceful labor of the peoples of Central Asia.

No real peace came to Central Asia at the beginning of the 1920's. A February 1923 Turkestan Front order stated that Turkestan contained "the republic's last front."[6]

Activation of the basmachi at the beginning of the 1920's involved both internal factors and, chiefly, new plans on the part of international imperialism, which had refused to abandon its intentions to enslave the peoples of Central Asia and to transform Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm into, if not colonies, at least states dependent on the bourgeois West, as well as imperialist intrigues in the Near and Middle East.

S. I. Gusev, a companion-in-arms of V. I. Lenin and first secretary of the Sredazbyuro [Central Asian Bureau] of the RKP(b) Central Committee, noted that resumption of basmachi activities and recruitment into their ranks of a certain segment of toiler elements was facilitated by the slow implementation of the new economic policy and the only partial elaboration of the question of so-called "political concessions" to the local population (kaziy [Muslim judge in Central Asian khanates] courts, return of vakufs [property willed or transferred by a person to an Islamic ecclesiastical establishment with the right of usufruct of the income from said property but without the right of sale], etc). S. I. Gusev also wrote about the need for rigorous observance of the principles of the Communist Party's Leninist nationalities policy.[7]

One of the areas in which the basmachi staged a comeback was the Fergana Valley. Aided by British instructors and White Guard officers, the basmachi kurbashi were continuing in their attempts to unite their forces.

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The Turkestan anti-Soviet underground, utilizing the basmachi as a striking force, sent its representatives to the bands. They functioned as the ideological inspirers and organizers of the basmachi.

On the territory of Namanganskiy Uyezd this function was performed by Nasyrkhan-Tyurya Kamalkhan Tyuryayev, a hardened counterrevolutionary and former minister of education of the "Kokand Autonomy." The basmachi bands in this uyezd contained more than 200 White Guardists. The basmachi demolished mills, factories and rail lines, poisoned crops, and seized cotton and grain from the toilers. As of 1 May 1922, only 4 out of 180 cotton ginning mills in Ferganskaya Oblast were in operation. Not a single one of 18 oil mills was operating.[8] Agricultural crop plantings in the Fergana Valley had shrunk by 75 percent by 1923, while cotton plantings had declined by 90 percent. By 1923 the population of Fergana rural localities had declined by one third in comparison with the 1917 figure.

Basmachi were terrorizing the population. In February 1921 they seized four Komsomol members in the kishlak of Tash-Kurgan -- Mirkhamid Mirabidov, Abduvakhid Uvaysov, Dzhalalitdin Uvaysov, and Salidzhan Umarov. Three of them were burned alive.

These brutal reprisals taken against the Komsomol members in the kishlak of Tash-Kurgan increased the public's hatred of the basmachi, and the dekhkans became more active and organized. Self-defense detachments grew, swelling with volunteers. By the end of March 1921 three volunteer companies were formed in Kokand, totaling 550 men, and a detachment of 100 Communists and Komsomol members was organized in Kanibadam. Volunteer detachments were also established in Isfar (62 Communists and 63 Komsomol members), in Markhamat and Besharyk (117 Communists and 200 Komsomol members).

The command authorities of the Turkestan Front dispatched to the Fergana Valley units of the 3d Turkestan Division. By the summer of 1921 the 9th Cavalry and 8th Rifle brigades, the 15th, 16th, 17th and 19th Cavalry regiments, and the 26th Aviation Detachment had arrived in the valley.

In the first months of 1921 two operations were successfully prosecuted against remnants of the Parpi band. A substantial percentage of the basmachi were killed or captured, but some basmachi and Parpi himself succeeded in escaping. The 8th and 9th Cavalry Brigades hit the basmachi in Shakhimardanskiy, Kuraul'skiy, Kyzyl-Kiinskiy and Ferganskiy rayons. On 1 April 1921 several small groups were wiped out in the Bulak-Bashi area.

Many volunteer detachments distinguished themselves in these engagements. A volunteer detachment from Namanganskiy Uyezd under the command of Yuldash Baymatov displayed courage and fortitude. The detachment contained 126 dekhkans. Equipped with small arms, they repeatedly skirmished with the basmachi of the kurbashi Bayastan.

Red Army national combined units were playing an increasingly more appreciable role in the struggle against the basmachi. By January 1921 representatives of indigenous nationalities constituted one third of the troops of the Turkestan Front.

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The years of struggle against the basmachi taught the toiler population of the Fergana a great deal. Increasingly less frequently were they successful in enticing dekhkans to join the bands. Replacements in the basmachi groups were for the most part the sons of bai, representatives of the reactionary clergy, common criminals and déclassé elements.

Nor did the Soviet authorities reject peaceful means in conducting the armed struggle against the basmachi.

When the large bands were routed in April 1921, the Ferganskaya Oblast Revkom [Revolutionary Committee] once again offered basmachi an opportunity to expiate their offenses by surrendering voluntarily to the authorities within a month's time. Several kurbashi and rank-and-file basmachi gave themselves up. Even entire groups surrendered. Those who surrendered to the authorities, however, also included persons who at that moment simply saw no other way out and utilized their "voluntary" surrender as a maneuver. The kurbashi Dzhanybek Kazy, for example, voluntarily surrendered to Soviet authorities in April 1921 and did not engage in hostile activities up to December 1921. During this entire time, however, he was making preparations for an armed uprising, which he began in December 1921.

In July 1921 the kurbashi Aliyar entered into surrender negotiations. But his attempt to exploit the humaneness of the Soviet authorities in order to make preparations to continue the struggle was a failure. A test of Aliyar's sincerity was arranged. It was suggested that he take up arms against Kurshirmat, expiate his guilt for his crimes, and thus prove the sincerity of his statement of reconciliation with Soviet rule. Aliyar refused, pleading his personal friendship with Kurshirmat. It was then suggested that he take up arms against Muetdin's band. Nor did the basmachi agree immediately to this proposal. An outright refusal, however, would expose him, and he was forced to consent. But Aliyar was not about to proceed any further with this double game. En route to the kishlak of Naukat, where Muetdin was to be found, Aliyar linked up with two other basmachi groups and began plundering the surrounding kishlaks with them. The Red Army command authorities were forced immediately to surround and disarm Aliyar's band.

There were cases where the local authorities were too trusting of the "peaceful" declarations of basmachi chieftains, for which they paid dearly. At the end of April 1921 the kurbashi Shirmat Kirgiz voluntarily surrendered. The Andizhan authorities incorporated the entire band into a militia squadron and sent them out on an operational mission. Upon arrival at the destination, the basmachi took advantage of the favorable situation and suddenly attacked the militiamen. After killing 12 and wounding 7, they escaped.

The mistake made by the Andizhan authorities served as a bitter lesson. The Turkkomissiya and TurkTsIK issued a special decree in which all agencies of Soviet authority were instructed to disarm surrendered basmachi to a man and to keep a strict and constant watch on them. It was forbidden to enlist them into the Red Army and militia, and to enlist them into participation in any operations against the basmachi and counterrevolutionary organizations.

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In the summer of 1921 Red Army units and people's volunteers were continuing combat operations against the basmachi, although on a smaller scale than in 1920 and at the beginning of 1921.

The more substantial the successes achieved by the Soviet authorities, the greater the ferocity of the basmachi became. They would burn alive captured commanders and Red Armymen as well as local activists. The band of Rakhmankul, 2000 men strong, acted with particular brutality. In the kishlak of Ashava basmachi surrounded a mosque, in which 65 Red Armymen had taken refuge. Rakhmankul made several attempts to storm the mosque, but each time he was forced to retreat. The enraged basmachi lit the mosque on fire, and all its defenders were burned alive.

In connection with unceasing armed attacks by basmachi, in September 1921 the command authorities of the Turkestan Front decided to resume military operations against them. A "state of security emergency" was declared in the Fergana Valley effective 13 September 1921. The party Central Committee, in a decree dated 14 October 1921 entitled "On Turkestan Matters," acknowledged "liquidation of the basmachi to be the most important task of Turkestan party and soviet agencies."[9] On the basis of this decree, the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo and the RKP(b) Central Commitee Turkbyuro, jointly with the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party, elaborated and implemented the following measures:

a) all party organizations in Ferganskaya Oblast were placed on a martial-law status;

b) on 29 November 1921 TurkTsIK issued a decree entitled "On Amnesty to the Basmachi";

c) 29 November 1921 TurkTsIK issued an enactment calling for organization of a volunteer militia to combat the basmachi;

d) in September 1921 the Central Committee of the KPT drew up a statute on replacing the Soviet people's court with kaziy courts.[10]

The 6th Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party (1921) devoted considerable attention to the struggle against the basmachi and adopted a special resolution entitled "On the Fergana Question." The struggle against the basmachi moved to the center of attention of the Turkestan Communist Party. Mobilized for this struggle, in addition to the troops of the Turkestan Front, was a volunteer militia established in the Fergana, consisting of Komsomol members, members of the "Koshchi" union and trade union members, as well as volunteer dekhkan detachments in the kishlaks and auls.

Initially the main forces were concentrated against the forces of Kurshirmat and Israil. Their bands sustained heavy casualties in the very first clashes, especially Israil's band. Kurshirmat employed his old tactic of escaping from encirclement by moving in small groups across terrain which was difficult for the Red Army. He designated the kishlak of Shakhimardan as a gathering point for the small bands. This choice was not mere happenstance. Rabid nationalist-counterrevolutionaries were entrenched there.

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With the arrival of the kurbashi in the kishlak, the local counterrevolutionaries did everything they could to enhance his prestige, which had shaken following his defeat. They named him "khan of the Fergana," holding a magnificent ceremony on this occasion. But at the most solemn moment Red Army and people's volunteer detachments burst into the kishlak. The "khan" fled to escape capture.

Muetdin, leader of another group of basmachi, was playing a waiting game. He figured that combat actions between Red Army units and Kurshirmat would weaken both, and then he, Muetdin, would become the chief kurbashi of the Fergana. At the same time the basmachi figured that refusal to support kurshirmat would lull the vigilance of the Red Army command and local authorities.

But Muetdin had miscalculated. Kurshirmat's main forces were defeated completely in September 1921, although this time as well he and a group of bodyguards succeeded in evading pursuit (he later made his way into Eastern Bukhara). Then the Red Army units and peoples's volunteer detachments concentrated against Muetdin's basmachi. In October 1921 they were overtaken in the vicinity of Iski-Naukat and soundly defeated. Retreating into the mountains of Kirghizia, however, Muetdin was able to preserve the nucleus of his force.

In November 1921 units of the 7th Composite Cavalry Brigade conducted a successful operation to wipe out Rakhmankul's band. The fighting continued several days. The basmachi offered stubborn resistance. The local population came to the aid of the Red Armymen. Uniting their efforts, they mounted an assault and captured the fortified positions of the basmachi. The band was almost totally shattered, but the kurbashi himself escaped.

A few groups of basmachi, which had withdrawn into the Alay Valley, continued mounting raids on kishlaks. In the winter of 1921 they destroyed mail stations along the Osh-Khorog route and laid siege to the Pamir border post. This small garrison was cut off from the outside world for more than a month. The basmachi tried to starve the soldiers into surrendering. But neither hunger, nor cold, nor the difficult conditions at an elevation in excess of 4000 meters broke the fighting spirit of the border guards. Contact with Khorog and Vanch could be established only by making one's way past the basmachi roadblocks, along sheer ice-glazed cliffs and swift-flowing unfrozen mountain rivers. Soldier Mamedbek Gul'bekov volunteered to accomplish this mission. He was familiar with the area and was capable of getting and keeping his bearings on the mountain terrain.

Constantly in danger of being buried under an avalanche and of losing his footing on the sheer rock slopes and plunging into a yawning chasm, Mamedbek made his way for 2 days and nights toward friendly lines. Toward evening on the third day the Khorog garrison command was alerted to the situation and sent out a force to relieve the border post. When the reinforcements arrived, the siege of the post was lifted.

In January and February 1922 Red Army units and detachments of people's volunteers continued combat operations. I. F. Kuts did a fine job of commanding a Muslim battalion.

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The crushing defeat of several bands in Ferganskaya Oblast had a sobering effect on those bands which had not yet put down their arms. Without waiting for the same fate which had befallen Kurshirmat, Muetdin, and Rakhmankul, the kurbashi Dzhanybek Kazy sued for peace. The Turkbyuro of the RKP(b) gave its approval for negotiations, which continued until April 1922 and ended with Dzhanybek's surrender.

But counterrevolutionary, nationalist elements did not want to accept Soviet rule and looked for ways to step up basmachi activities. At the end of 1921 a secret meeting of Turkestan underground bourgeois-nationalist organizations was held in Tashkent. At this meeting it was decided to continue supporting the basmachi and simultaneously to step up actions aimed at disorganizing economic and political activities in the region.

In conformity with this decision, Kurshirmat returned to the Fergana Valley. On 22 March 1922 he was able to gather together surviving kurbashi in the kishlak of Karabua in Kokandskiy Uyezd. At this basmachi meeting it was decided to step up terrorist activities to a maximum degree, in order to improve their situation with a new wave of violence. "Whoever refuses to carry out the will of Kurshirmat," stated the proclamation adopted at the meeting, "will have his head chopped off, and his house will be burned to the ground together with his property and family."[11] The struggle became increasingly more intense from that time on. An RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] headquarters situation report dated 26 March 1922 stated that approximately 28,000 basmachi were operating against the troops of the Turkestan Front.[12]

The basmachi began increasingly more extensively employing a hostage system. They would force the male population to join their bands, while they would either herd the members of their families into base camps or leave them in their kishlaks under armed guard. If a dekhkan fled from the band, his entire family would be marked for death. Intensification of terrorist activity, however, could not save the basmachi. These actions merely demonstrated more vividly their antipopular essence.

An important role in activating the resources of the Red Army and the local population for the struggle against the basmachi in the Fergana Valley was played by an RKP(b) Central Committee letter dated 11 January 1922 on the nationalities question and a decision of the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo dated 1 February 1922 on the situation in Bukhara. The Politburo acknowledged the necessity of "consolidating the antibasmachi fronts on the territory of Bukhara and the Fergana...." Particular attention was focused "both on political work among the Muslim population and on strengthening supply of Red Army units."[13] In February 1922 questions pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi were discussed at a special plenary session of the Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee.[14] A Cheka for the Struggle Against the Counterrevolution in the Fergana was established on 13 February 1922.[15]

The arrival of G. K. Ordzhonikidze in Turkestan in May 1922 was of great significance for organizing the defeat of the Fergana basmachi. He was accompanied by Sh. Z. Eliava, member of the VTsIK and former chairman of the

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Turkkomissiya. A Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee Plenum was held with their participation on 12 May 1922. The plenum examined the current situation and specified concrete measures to wipe out the basmachi in the Fergana. G. K. Ordzhonikidze stated in his address that the basmachi represented a serious threat to Soviet rule and advanced a number of concrete proposals pertaining to organizing the struggle against them.[16] On 18 May 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo issued a decree based on G. K. Ordzhonikidze's report, entitled "On Turkestan-Bukhara Affairs," which set forth a program for combating the basmachi. The party Central Committee placed emphasis on military operations against those basmachi who were refusing to lay down their arms and continuing to mount armed attacks on kishlaks, party and soviet agencies, and garrisons. But there were many basmachi who were ready and willing, as was already noted, voluntarily to return to their hearth and home and to commence peaceful labor. Therefore, as in the past, military actions were to be combined with active explanatory work. The Sredazbyuro of the RKP(b) Central Committee, with the participation of G. K. Ordzhonikidze and Sh. Z. Eliava, drew up concrete measures to wipe out the basmachi.

Appeals by the governments of the republics of Central Asia entitled "To the Toiler Masses of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khiva" and an appeal to Central Asian Communists by the Sredazbyuro of the RKP(b) Central Committee were made public at the beginning of July 1922. These documents stressed that there could be no doubts whatsoever over the outcome of the armed conflict. The assistance of the great Soviet Federation would guarantee victory to the Red units. But the more extensively a political campaign was conducted among the dekhkans pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi, and the greater the degree to which party organizations were strengthened, the faster and more painlessly could victory be achieved.[17]

In 1922 the party Central Committee twice returned to the question of the struggle against the basmachi. On 14 August the RKP(b) Central Commitee Orgburo, in a decree dealing with party internal organizational development in Turkestan in response to a report by a commission consisting of V. V. Kuybyshev, Ya. E. Rudzutak, and Sh. Z. Eliava, drew attention to the necessity of intensifying the struggle against the basmachi, and on 21 August the RKP(b) Central Committee ratified directives of the Central Committee Sredazbyuro, the KPT Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Bukhara Communist Party, which noted that the British imperialists were conducting subversive activities inside Turkestan, directing the basmachi, bringing the region to ruin and increasing economic chaos. The RKP(b) Central Committee instructed the Sredazbyuro to consolidate military successes in the struggle against the basmachi with political agitation, and organizational measures.[18] It assigned to the Communists of Turkestan as one of their most important tasks liquidation of the basmachi, without which the region's economy could not be rebuilt.

In October 1922 the 7th Regional Conference of the KPT, with the participation of Ya. E. Rudzutak, who had been dispatched to Central Asia, elaborated practical measures to implement the directives of the RKP(b) Central Committee. The conference resolution passed in response to Ya. Rudzutak's report stated: "...The overall military-political situation in Central Asia remains tense. British agents are conducting subversive activities, especially in the Fergana

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and Samarkand, supporting and directing the basmachi, and wrecking the region's economy."[19]

In order to implement the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee, the Sredazbyuro adopted concrete measures to step up political work among the masses, and in particular local party units were organizationally strengthened. The party's principal resources were directed into the areas where the basmachi were active.

Considerable work was also being done in the area of governmental and economic organizational development. On 14 July 1922 a KPT Central Committee plenum made the decision to carry out a number of economic measures with the aim of consolidating successes achieved in the Fergana in the struggle against the basmachi.[20] Particular stress was placed on reviving economic life in the Fergana Valley and restoring cotton plantings.

Guided by humanitarian considerations and doing everything possible to avoid further bloodshed, the Communist Party and the government of the Turkestan ASSR repeatedly appealed to the basmachi to surrender voluntarily, guaranteeing personal and property immunity to those who had laid down their arms. Many rank and file basmachi and some kurbashi heeded the voice of reason and gave themselves up. As before, however, there were some among the leaders who agreed to voluntary surrender in order to build up their forces and continue their criminal activities. Such was the case, in particular, with Muetdin. In March 1922, when things were going badly for him, he agreed to talks, but as soon as the immediate danger was past, he advanced unacceptable terms, demanding that negotiations be conducted in the presence of a British representative. Naturally his demands were rejected. On 10 June 1922 Red Army units began an operation against Muetdin's band and achieved its final defeat on 6 July, taking its leader prisoner.

Other basmachi groups also suffered defeat. The kurbashi Tashmat, Tukhtasyn and Mirza-Pansat, under offensive pressure for a period of three days by Red Army units and people's volunteers, laid down their arms.

The setbacks suffered by the basmachi alarmed the foreign organizers of the anti-Soviet struggle in Soviet Asia. They secretly brought together at a location near Kabul representatives of reactionary forces in Afghanistan, kurbashi from the Fergana and Eastern Bukhara, and a group of Turkish officers. Considerable attention at this meeting was devoted to drawing up plans for railline sabotage actions, which were to disrupt communications between such important centers as Kerki, Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent. At the same time massive raids were to be mounted on garrisons and agencies of Soviet authority throughout Central Asia. Afghan reactionaries undertook fully to arm and equip 1200 men and 400 officers.

The plans drawn up at the secret meeting near Kabul became known to the Red Army command authorities, and they, jointly with party and soviet agencies, took countermeasures in advance. Red Army units were placed on a high state of alert, and volunteer units received reinforcements. The counterrevolutionaries did not succeed in carrying out their plans.

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In the meantime the struggle against the basmachi became intensified. As a result of joint actions by the Red Army and volunteer units, 119 (out of 200) bands, totaling 4400 basmachi, were defeated in detail in the Fergana Valley between February and 11 October 1922. A total of 511 men were killed, wounded or captured in December 1922 alone, with 127 voluntarily surrendering to the Red Army.[21]

The Leninist nationalities policy which was being implemented and the considerable assistance to the population coming from Soviet Russia played an enormous role in liquidating the quite substantial basmachi forces in the Fergana Valley. In 1921-1922 alone the toilers of the RSFSR allocated from their own meager resources 4.5 million poods of grain for the Turkestan dekhkans.

Everything being done by the party and government to assist the toiling dekhkans of the Fergana, in combination with combat operations, led to the rapid disintegration of the basmachi. Voluntary surrender of basmachi became typical of the final months of 1922. Five bands voluntarily laid down their arms in Andizhanskiy Rayon alone, and a total of approximately 4000 basmachi in the Fergana Valley by the end of 1922. No more than 2000 men remained in the bands.

Of great importance for exposing the basmachi once and for all in the eyes of the public were show trials of the basmachi leaders. The trial of Rakhmankul was held in the old part of Kokand. Many thousands of people from nearby kishlaks gathered here. Eyewitness testimony, painting a blood-chilling picture of the atrocities perpetrated by the basmachi, evoked a unanimous demand by the toilers to punish the bandit harshly.

Public trials, attended by many thousands of dekhkans and urban residents, were held for Aman-Palvan (in Namangan), the kurbashi Sangin, and others.

Here is an account of the public trial of Muetdin and his accomplices, held in September 1922.

"The enormous courtyard of the Azret mosque in the town of Osh. A crowd of a thousand people was present, local residents as well as curious visitors and delegates who had traveled hundreds of versts; every individual in attendance sought to make his way forward and see at least for a moment the prisoner's dock, which contained Muetdin, princeling of Oshskiy Rayon or, as he called himself, Emir-lyashkarbashi Muetdin-katta-bek Usman Aliyev, which translates as follows: Supreme Commander in Chief, invincible Muetdin, the great lord Usman Aliyev.

'Around Muetdin were his closest deputies. Also present was the notorious butcher Kamchi Temirbayev....

"Muetdin had exercised control over the dekhkans of Oshskiy Rayon by means of the cruelest, most unprecedented terrorist actions. His bloody deeds numbered in the dozens, and his victims ran into the thousands. It is not surprising that mothers invoked his name to frighten their children, and it is not surprising that even here, in court, witnesses turned pale and cringed from his very gaze.

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The presentation of eyewitness testimony continued for several days. The eyewitnesses were living pages of the frightful chronicle of bloody deprivations. Take the testimony of a corpulent arbakesh [drayman]. He had been hauling goods, with an escort of 45 Red Armymen.

"'In our group,' he related, 'there were about 60 civilians, including women and children. According to our laws, a pregnant woman is considered sacred. But for Muetdin there is nothing sacred -- he slaughtered everybody. They slit open the bellies of pregnant women, removed and threw down the fetus and stuffed their bellies with straw. They smashed children's heads against the wagon wheels or would tear them limb from limb by stretching them between horses. They burned the Red Armymen in a bonfire....'

"New witnesses took the stand, and they all stated the same thing: if the authorities did not execute this bandit they would leave their homes and depart for Mecca. Damning testimony was presented by dozens of citizens.

"A little boy of 11 or 12 years, with tears in his eyes and in a furious rage, screamed into the butcher's face: 'You slit my father's throat, I saw you do it.' 'That's a lie,' the basmachi leader replied. 'He cut his own throat accidentally with a knife.'

"Another witness, an elderly mullah, expressively raised his hands toward the heavens and intoned a prayer to Allah for a just proletarian sentence. And as if on command, thousands of voices joined in his prayer, and thousands of eyes gazed heavenward.

"The prosecutor's summation speech, demanding the execution of Muetdin and his retainers, was met with long, continuing applause. Shouts of protest and threats greeted the attorney for the defense, who was pleading for the mercy of the court. The defense attorney became flustered.

"There could be only one verdict. Muetdin and seven of his aides were sentenced to death by firing squad."[22]

Several bands were still active in the frontier areas. The numerical strength of the volunteer detachments was reduced to 2108 men, and the volunteer militia to 1200 men. But the detachments were becoming organizationally strengthened. The militia was placed under full support and financing by the state, and was armed with the latest small arms of that time.

Working in coordination with one another and with the active support of the toiler population of the Fergana, the Red Army, the GPU [State Political Administration], border guards, militia, and volunteer detachments, conducting combined actions in midsummer of 1923, mopped up those basmachi groups which were still active in the Fergana Valley. The largest was Bayastan's band, but even it totaled only about 200 men. The numerical strength of the other basmachi units did not exceed 50-60 men. They had scattered into the mountain gorges and from time to time would mount raids on small garrisons and the civilian population, robbing and killing old people, women and children.

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A great many basmachi concentrated in the Alay Valley. At the end of July a plan was drawn up for wiping out the bands in the Alay Valley as well. Two special detachments, led by Abdulla Yarmukhamedov[23] and I. F. Malikov, were formed to execute this mission.

The command authorities intended to employ peaceful means to persuade the basmachi to surrender, thus avoiding bloodshed. Representatives of the counterrevolutionary underground and agents of imperialist intelligence services, however, convinced the kurbashi to hold out for several months more in anticipation of assistance from abroad. The basmachi rejected peace proposals and commenced combat actions. The basmachi were defeated in engagements with Red Army detachments. A total of 1100 basmachi were killed, wounded or taken prisoner, including 30 kurbashi, 14 of whom surrendered voluntarily, just between 1 June and 1 July 1923.[24] Only insignificant numbers of basmachi succeeded in escaping across the border. an additional more than 10 kurbashi laid down their arms in July and August. A total of 85 kurbashi and 1520 rank-and-file basmachi were killed, wounded or captured in August-November 1923; 139 Kurbashi and 1437 basmachi surrendered.[25] A total of 66 kurbashi surrendered in September.

In October 1923 the Fergana Front Revvoyensovet planned an operation to accomplish the final defeat of the basmachi in the Fergana. This plan specified, in particular, establishment of permanent local "Conferences to Combat the Basmachi," which were to conduct mass political work aimed at disintegrating the basmachi bands and to find jobs for basmachi who surrendered voluntarily. Implementation of this plan produced tangible results. The KPT Ferganskaya Oblast Committee plenum held on 11 October 1923 stated that at the beginning of the year there had been 203 bands containing 6665 basmachi in the oblast, while by October there remained 81 bands with 2021 basmachi.[26] Aziz Niallo (Andrey Vladimirovich Stanishevskiy), one of the oldest Soviet writers, presented a chronicle of the struggle against the counterrevolution. Here are some facts from this chronicle, characterizing the death and capture of leaders of basmachi bands in the summer and fall of 1923.

24 May. Aman Palvan, leader of basmachi operating from Andizhan to the middle course of the Naryn -- captured.

12 June. Sabir-Pansat surrendered in Kokandskiy Rayon.

30 June. The band of Seid Efendi was defeated completely in the vicinity of Kulyab. Seyid Efendi escaped into Afghanistan.

1 July. The kurbashi Abdu-Mumin and Baymat surrendered in Ferganskaya Oblast.

9 July. The kurbashi Ruzy was captured in Bukhara, near Babkent.

3 August. The kurbashi Dadabay surrendered in the kishlak of Tyurya-Kurgan, Namanganskiy Uyezd. Akhmat-khan surrendered in Ferganskaya Oblast.

7 August. The kurbashi Ruzymat surrendered in Andizhanskiy Uyezd. The kurbashi Mirza Umur, Kichik-Karabay, Ubaydulla, and Mirzo-Ali surrendered in the kishlak of Yany-Kurgan.

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11 August. The kurbashi Baytuman surrendered in Namanganskiy Uyezd.

15 August. Nurmat-Minbashi's headquarters in the Alay Valley was captured.

18 August. The kurbashi Mulla-Rustam surrendered in Western Bukhara, in the kishlak of Khaturchi. The kurbashi Manas was killed in the Alay Valley.

19 August. The kurbashi Tokhtam-Pansat surrendered in the Alay Valley.

24 August. The kurbashi Mulla-Koshty surrendered in Ferganskaya Oblast.

27 August. The kurbashi Ishmat Baybachi surrendered in Kokandskiy Uyezd.

3 September. The kurbashi Kurban-Ali surrendered in the Chatkal Valley.

9 September. The kurbashi Atadzhan surrendered in Namanganskiy Uyezd.

14 September. The band of Madumar surrendered in the Sokh area.

22 September. The kurbashi Bayastan surrendered on the upper reaches of the Angren.

23 September. The kurbashi Sultan and Dzhurabek surrendered in Yangi-Bazar.

3-5 October. The kurbashi Islamkul, Kichik-Kazak (the Sokh-Lyaylyak areas) and Israil (Naryn) surrendered. Khamrakul and Umar-Ali surrendered in the Alay Valley. The kurbashi Yulchi surrendered in Myn-Tyube.

6 October. Nurmat Minbashi surrendered in the Alay Valley.

9 October. The kurbashi Buribay surrendered in Namanganskiy Uyezd.

21 October. The kurbashi Khamdam surrendered in Kokandskiy Uyezd.

22 October. The kurbashi Yunus surrendered in the kishlak of Khorabek, Andizhanskiy Uyezd.

20 November. The kurbashi Bazarbay was captured in the Fergana Valley.

30 December. The kurbashi Dzhuma-Pansat surrendered in the kishlak of Shaarikhan.[27]

The people of the Fergana celebrated the sixth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution in conditions of a long-awaited peace.

Subsequent operations were aimed at mopping up the last small basmachi groups in the Fergana, and measures were taken to prevent the forming of new bands. An RKP(b) Central Committee accountability report stated that in 1923 the basmachi in Central Asia were finished off as an organized movement.[28] This was also stated in documents of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro and local party organizations. For example, Sredazbyuro directives sent in 1923

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to local party and military organizations stated: "The basmachi have been successfully wiped out in the Fergana."[29] In 1924 the Fergana Valley was virtually entirely clear of basmachi bands. The resolution of the First Congress of the Uzbekistan Communist Party (1925) entitled "On Work Among the Dekhkans" stated: "As a result of liquidation of the basmachi, who ravaged dekhkan farm holdings for many long years, there has been created the opportunity for peaceful construction and undisturbed labor by the dekhkan to strengthen his farm operation."[30]

The almost seven years of struggle against the basmachi had left its mark. The basmachi had destroyed the majority of enterprises and had inflicted colossal damage on cotton growing. Many areas were in a state of total ruin. A large number of dekhkans had no means of subsistence.

In view of the situation, the Soviet Government took measures to rebuild the economy of those areas of the Fergana which had suffered from the basmachi pogroms. At the beginning of 1923 the USSR Sovnarkom allocated 125,000 rubles in gold to the Turkestan Republic for rebuilding the coal industry. In September 1923 20,000 head of cattle sent from the Russian Federation reached the Fergana. 8 million poods of wheat were sent from the RSFSR to the grain-growing areas.[31]

Selfless fraternal assistance by the peoples of Soviet Russia enabled the toilers of the Fergana rapidly to heal the serious wounds which had been inflicted by the basmachi.

Bukhara: The Struggle Continues

In spite of strengthening of the people's authority in the Bukhara Republic, the situation remained difficult. The existence of feudal-patriarchal relations, a low cultural and economic level, difficult conditions of life, and fidelity to religious beliefs hindered the toilers from correctly perceiving the significance of the transformations which were being carried out. Downtrodden in spirit for centuries, indoctrinated in conditions of absence of political rights and absolute submission to the clan elite, the bai and the clergy, the dekhkans were not able immediately to grasp the complex changes in the socio-political struggle. In addition, the dekhkan had blind faith in the Islamic clergy, while the reactionary segment of the clergy supported the counter-revolution, helped the basmachi leaders to gather together bands, and gave them inspiration.

The enormous influence of religion was combined in Eastern Bukhara with the dominance of feudal-patriarchal relations. In a memorandum entitled "On the Basmachi in Eastern Bukhara," written on 20 April 1922, the consul general of the RSFSR in Dushanbe, Nagornyy, noted that "there exists in the tribes the institution of clan chiefs, the activities of whom are totally independent of any central authority in Bukhara, be it the authority of the old emirs or, at the present time, authority in the person of Soviet agencies of the new Republic."

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The beks had their own armed retinues and autocratically administered justice and meted out punishment. "As a consequence of the total ignorance and political backwardness of the population, indoctrinated in the spirit of religious fanaticism," Nagornyy wrote further, "the beks, supported by the mullahs, are virtually absolute rulers. Judicial proceedings are either entirely lacking or follow certain traditions, but quite frequently the bek himself acts as judge, sometimes imposing as punishment for trivial offenses outright confiscation of the property of the guilty party or even corporal punishment, up to and including capital punishment. I should state that the most characteristic feature is the fact that the population views this social-legal order as legitimate and natural and, occasional display of their resentment notwithstanding, in general and on the whole the people patiently tolerate even gross violations of the order established by traditions."[32]

Utilizing religion, the counterrevolution instilled anti-Sovietism into the consciousness of religious believers. It attempted to demonstrate that the socialist revolution and Soviet rule were the works of "kafirs," that is, "unbelievers," who allegedly intended to destroy Islam and the religious believers themselves. The basmachi bands were portrayed as defenders of Islam.

Following the success of the Gissar expedition and the emir's flight into Afghanistan, the counterrevolution focused all its efforts on strengthening its position within the edifice of the young Bukhara Republic. Taking advantage of the shortage of trained cadres and the lack of ideological maturity on the part of many Bukharan Communists, reactionary elements were able to occupy important posts during the difficult months of establishment of the BPSR. Many former beks, emir functionaries and bai held positions in the republic's government and in local agencies of Soviet authority. They sabotaged democratic reforms and impeded the building of a Soviet society. Seeking to cause resentment toward Soviet rule on the part of the population, they carried out unwarranted acts of repression in the kishlaks (arrests, confiscation of grain and property).

Some honest soviet and party officials, who were dedicated to Soviet rule but were ill-prepared in an ideological-political respect, committed errors and distorted party policy out of lack of understanding or under the influence of hostile elements.

It was soon ascertained that many counterrevolutionaries holding important posts had established direct contact with the basmachi and were helping them reassemble their forces. The basmachi movement was experiencing a rebirth. Davlyatman-biy in Bal'dzhuan, Ishan Sultan in Darvaz, Fuzyl Maksum in Karategin, and Ibragim-bek in Lokay were rebuilding and consolidating their detachments.

The principal slogan of the basmachi was "gazavat" -- "holy war" against the "infidels." The kurbashi were amassing arms which, as before, were obtained from abroad, and were stockpiling provisions. Seyid Alim-khan was the supreme ringleader of the counterrevolution in Eastern Bukhara. He had a representative, Akhmed Toksabo, on Soviet territory. Before fleeing into Afghanistan, the emir had sent his agents around to the kishlaks for the purpose of organizing basmachi detachments.

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The growth of basmachi activities in Eastern Bukhara was fostered by the treacherous actions of Usman Khodzhi Pulatkhodzhayev, official representative of the government of the Bukhara Republic. Upon becoming chairman of the Central Executive committee of the BPSR, Pulatkhodzhayev sent into Eastern Bukhara his brother Atakhodzhayev, who continued the anti-Soviet activities of his predecessor. In August 1921 he entered into negotiations with the basmachi and handed over to them 12 aksakals [elders] who had actively aided the Red Army. The basmachi publicly executed six of these. Atakhodzhayev entered into an official agreement with the kurbashi Davlyatman-biy. The activities of the basmachi were given the seal of legitimacy, as it were. Many kurbashi were given important posts in soviet establishments. As the "legitimate" representatives of Soviet power, they proceeded to conduct mobilization and collect taxes for their own benefit. One and a half million poods of grain collected for the state ended up in their hands.

In view of the difficult situation, a joint session of the Revkom, Council of Nazirs and the Executive Bureau of the Central Committee of the Bukhara Communist Party decided to turn to the government of the RSFSR with a request that Red Army subunits be sent from Soviet Russia to the Bukhara Republic. This request was met. But at the beginning of 1921 the command authorities of the Turkestan Front were forced to redeploy to the Fergana Valley Red Army units from the most endangered area of Eastern Bukhara. Small garrisons remained only in a few large towns (Dushanbe, Gissar, Garm, and certain others), garrisons which were inadequately supplied with weapons, ammunition, provisions, and clothing.

The lack of a requisite number of military subunits on the territory of the Bukhara Republic enabled the basmachi kurbashi, who had received weapons and ammunition from abroad, to step up activities as early as the spring of 1921.

The leaders of the basmachi bands were acting independently, without any unity among them: each chieftain intended to become a sovereign leader. Davlyatman-biy, Fuzayl Maksum, and especially Ibragim-bek, on whom the former emir of Bukhara was continuing to place his hopes, began to stand out, however, among those who were operating on the territory of the Bukhara Republic, particularly in its eastern and northern areas. It was not mere happenstance that the choice fell on Ibragim-bek. It was due not only to his past history but also the fact that in that period the bulk of the Eastern Bukhara basmachi were natives of the Lokay, Ibragim-bek's home region.

The Matcha bands were among the first to resume devastating raids on the kishlaks. They destroyed and plundered several kishlaks in Ura-Tyubinskiy Uyezd and seized from the dekhkans approximately 500 horses and more than 1000 head of cattle. By the summer of 1921 Ibragim-bek, Ishan Sultan, and Fuzayl Maksum had reached an agreement on joint operations and had begun mounting attacks on small garrisons. Ishan Sultan and Fuzayl Maksum, possessing 1700 men between them, organized an offensive into the Darvaz and Karategin areas, simultaneously instigating an anti-Soviet insurrection there. From this moment the basmachi movement in the Garm Viloyat assumed a large scale.

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The commitment of new Red Army combined units to the struggle against the basmachi had become an urgent necessity.

In June 1921 the basmachi concentrated their main efforts in the Garm area, planning to capture the administrative center of the Karategin. On 20 June the bek Abdu-Khafiz, leader of the Matcha basmachi, arrived in the area with a detachment of 2500 men. The band of Abdu-Khafiz encircled Garm. The basmachi leader demanded the unconditional surrender of the garrison, which contained only 50 men, most of whom were sick with malaria. In the fort together with the Red Armymen were the chairman of the Karategin Revkom, Umarov, food commission chairman Nusratullo Maksum, and several families of local residents.

Dekhkans Israil and Mamed displayed a high degree of courage and ingenuity. On the instructions of the command, they were sent with reports to the headquarters of the cavalry regiments. Israil and Mamed made their way past the basmachi outposts unobserved. Skirting enemy roadblocks, they floated down the Surkhab on wineskins for some time, then, having passed through the danger area, delivered their messages by the shortest route.

Help arrived in time. The garrison was still holding the fort. Cavalry units engaged and routed the band of the Matcha bek. Abdu-Khafiz was taken prisoner.

But the basmachi continued mounting pogroms. In August 1921 the band of the Darvaz bek Ishan Sultan, approximately 1000 men strong, invaded the Garm area. The bek attempted to avenge the defeat of the Matcha leader, but he himself was met by the same fate. Ishan Sultan's band was defeated in detail by the forces of a cavalry regiment (A. Ya. Pankeyev's squadron particularly distinguished itself) and a rifle battalion. The basmachi chief, concealing his face behind a paranja, escaped.

The situation in the Kulyab area became critical in August. At that time the Kulyab garrison totaled approximately 80 men, was poorly armed, and had meager supplies of food provisions and feed. Garrison strength was increased by the addition of 12 local activists upon commencement of combat actions.

The basmachi, exploiting the small size of the Kulyab garrison, seized a number of passes and surrounded the fort. For 11 days and nights the garrison soldiers and local officials, who were manning the fort together with the Red Armymen, repulsed the enemy's assaults. Arriving Red Army units and detachments of people's volunteers waged stubborn battles with the basmachi bands for several days.

By the end of August 1921 the basmachi bands were badly battered. Heavy casualties forced them substantially to cut down on the number of attacks on the local population. A temporary lull ensued. While the kurbashi of Eastern Bukhara and the adjacent areas were planning new anti-Soviet actions and bringing their bands back up to strength, arms and ammunition were being transported in from abroad.

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Local party and soviet agencies were also taking advantage of the respite. They stepped up explanatory work among the population and held meetings of dekhkans. They devoted particular attention to the clergy. The essence of Soviet rule, the plans and tasks of the Soviet authorities were discussed at kurultays, to which members of the clergy were invited. This was producing positive results. Frequently the clergy would make the decision to support the Soviet authorities and the Red Army in the struggle against the basmachi.

The struggle for the masses by means of persuasion was one of the principal forms of the struggle against the basmachi not only in Eastern Bukhara but also in Central Asia as a whole. This was a course of policy delineated by Lenin. Specifying the thrust of activities by Central Asian party and soviet agencies, in 1921 V. I. Lenin demanded that the trust of the toilers of local nationalities be gained and that a tireless campaign be waged against great-power chauvinism. Attaching enormous importance to a correct resolution of the nationalities question, Lenin stressed: "We must be extremely strict in this matter. This will have reverberations in India and in the East. It is an extremely serious matter; we must be a thousand times cautious here."[33]

In August and September 1921 important political measures were being carried out in the Bukhara Republic, connected with preparations for the Second All-Bukhara Kurultay of People's Representatives. During the period of preparation for this congress, revolutionary committees, as temporary agencies of authority, were disbanded on the territory of the BPSR (except in areas of aggressive basmachi activities). Soviets of people's deputies were established in their place, which operated under the leadership of aksakals (elders), who were elected for a term of one year. The kurultay, which ran from 18 through 23 September 1921, adopted a new constitution, in which the main provisions of the constitution of the Russian Federation and the Turkestan Republic found expression, elected a Central Executive Committee and its Presidium, and formed a new government headed by Fayzulla Khodzhayev.

Domestic and foreign reactionary elements took advantage of the brief lull to prepare the bands in Eastern Bukhara and adjacent areas for new actions. At this time representatives of the former emir of Bukhara came from Afghanistan to the basmachi. They propagandized the idea of fighting for restoration of the emirate, attempted to unify the disunited bands, which had begun fighting among themselves, and tirelessly emphasized the point that Great Britain was giving all-out assistance to the former emir.

In the first half of September 1921 a clandestine meeting of basmachi leaders took place in Eastern Bukhara, at which a decision was reached to make common cause, with the aim of overthrowing popular rule in Eastern Bukhara. This assemblage proclaimed Ibragim-bek chief of the basmachi of Eastern Bukhara. For all practical purposes even independent bands operating on the territory of Central and Western Bukhara also came under his influence. Concerned, however, that in case of success Ibragim-bek would seize power, the former emir took measures, through his agents, to restrict the latter's independence.

The detachments of Ibragim-bek commenced combat operations on 15 September 1921. Their main forces (approximately 4000 basmachi) laid siege to Dushanbe

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on 23 September. But they were unable to capture the city. Red Army units which arrived on 18 October 1921 broke the siege.

The situation in Eastern Bukhara remained critical, however. By mid-October 1921 the Fayzabad, Kulyab, Garm, and Kurgan-Tyube districts were in basmachi hands. Their successes were assisted by pan-Turkists, who had managed to get into high positions. Ardent nationalist Abdulkhay Arifov held the post of military commissar. Former Turkish colonel Ali-Riza was head of the republic militia. Usman Khodzha Pulatkhodzhayev, chairman of the Bukhara TsIK [Central Executive Committee], was an impassioned enemy of Soviet power. Holding high posts in soviet agencies, these people knew about all plans being prepared against the basmachi. They disclosed them to the enemy and secretly supplied him with arms, ammunition and food. In the fall of 1921, when the basmachi stepped up their activities, some pan-Turkists openly went over to their side. Cheka chairman Muetdin Maksum-Khodzhayev was one of those who went over to the enemy's camp. While holding this responsible post, he formed a 150-man detachment. The Sherabad military commissar, Khasan-efendi, a former officer in the Turkish Army, defected to the basmachi with a detachment of 50 men.

In the meanwhile the counterrevolution was preparing for another large-scale operation against Soviet Bukhara -- the Enver Pasha venture.

The Enver Pasha Escapade

Enver Pasha, former war minister of the Ottoman Empire and a British stooge, arrived in Bukhara in the fall of 1921.[34] He was assigned the mission of uniting all the basmachi forces, of creating an anti-Soviet front, and of ultimately toppling Soviet rule in Central Asia. The British consul general in Kashgar, Etherton, wrote that "Enver... had plans of creating a great Islamic state as a buffer against Russia."[35] It was planned to include in this state not only Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm, but also adjacent countries.

International imperialism and counterrevolutionary forces in Central Asia linked with Enver Pasha their plans to strangle Soviet rule in our country's eastern regions.

The British imperialists were hoping that Enver would unite under his leadership all anti-Soviet elements, particularly the basmachi. The nationalists believed that Enver would give them a banner for pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist agitation and counterrevolutionary activity. The reactionary clergy portrayed Enver as an emissary of Allah, bearing "holy credentials written in burning letters."[36]

Seyid Alim-khan, the former emir of Bukhara, was hoping to restore the Bukhara emirate with Enver Pasha's help. Alim-khan feared, it is true, that if Enver was successful he might get rid of Alim-khan, and therefore he made every attempt to hold the Bukhara basmachi under his control. In a letter to Ibragim-bek, Seyid Alim-khan wrote the following about Enver: "...He is a most eminent and illustrious person.... Secure his favor. You need him very much. Convey him across the Amu Darya River with honors...."[37] But in another letter the former emir stated: "Under no circumstances give him (Enver Pasha -- Auth.)

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complete power over the troops of the districts, but only coordinate your actions with Enver-bek."[38]

Enver Pasha, consumed by ambitious dreams and seeking to become "the deputy of Muhammad" on this sinful earth as quickly as possible, hurried events. In a letter to the former emir he boastingly declared that he would topple Soviet rule within no more than 2 months.

Upon his arrival in Bukhara, Enver Pasha took up residence in the home of Usman Khodzhi Pulatkhodzhayev, chairman of the Bukhara TsIK. The first clandestine meeting of local leaders of counterrevolutionary organizations and basmachi bands took place here, at which Enver Pasha was proclaimed leader of the basmachi. Boastful and ambitious, the first thing Enver did was to order a large silver seal with the inscription "Supreme Commander in Chief of All the Forces of Islam, son-in-law of the caliph and deputy of Muhammad." Since the newly appointed commander in chief possessed higher military education and considerable military experience, he realized that the disunited, poorly organized basmachi detachments were no army. Therefore Enver Pasha attempted to make the basmachi bands into a centralized "army" according to the European model.

In November 1921, accompanied by six former Turkish officers and 90 askers, he departed for Eastern Bukhara, allegedly on a hunting trip.[39] Prior to his departure he sent to all the kurbashi of Eastern Bukhara a letter demanding that they submit to his authority and commence joint operations against Soviet rule. The local basmachi leaders, however, looked with suspicion on Enver's arrival in Eastern Bukhara. Only 85 basmachi joined his detachment in Eastern Bukhara. Enver headed with them to Dzhalanashkul', where there was to be a meeting with local chiefs and Afghan representatives. But only two representatives of Ibragim-bek arrived at the designated meeting place, accompanied by 200 horsemen; these representatives stated to Enver that the bek declined to join him.

Enver proceeded to seek a face-to-face meeting with Ibragim-bek. The latter finally consented, but for his own secret purpose. When the meeting took place, Ibragim-bek disarmed and arrested Enver. Seyid Alim-khan learned about this. The actions of the Eastern Bukhara leaders were contrary to the schemes of the former emir. Enver was freed at his demand.

Reactionary forces in Afghanistan and British agents undertook urgent steps to unite the efforts of Ibragim-bek and Enver. They sent one agent after another to Ibragim, until they obtained his agreement to a truce.

At a new meeting the kurbashi of Eastern Bukhara acknowledged Enver as their leader. The unified detachments began to call themselves the "Army of Islam." Enver declared that he had no desire for the throne of Bukhara and that as soon as Soviet authority was toppled, he would summon Seyid Alim-khan to take the throne.[40]

Enver Pasha's true intentions gradually became evident. He was planning to seize Eastern Bukhara, to advance on the capital of the Bukhara Republic and to

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proclaim himself emir. After that he planned to unite with the Fergana basmachi and initiate joint action against Soviet Turkestan. Concrete plans were already being drawn up for toppling the power of the people throughout Central Asia.

Enver Pasha's army grew to impressive size -- approximately 16,000 men. Subsequently there were as many as 50,000 men under his leadership.

Enver decided to commence military operations with the capture of Dushanbe. For the conduct of this operation, he massed the main forces of the basmachi of Eastern Bukhara in the Gissar Valley.

At this time Usman Khodzha Pulatkhodzhayev, chairman of the Bukhara Republic TsIK, arrived in Dushanbe with a detachment of 700 men, under the pretext of organizing defense of the city. The detachment was commanded by Turkish colonel Ali-Riza, chief of the Bukhara militia, and Daniyar-bek.

In the first half of December 1921, before commencing combat operations, Enver Pasha gathered together his kurbashi for a meeting, which was also attended by the traitors Ali-Riza and Daniyar-bek. Enver Pasha was counting heavily on them: it was precisely they who were to ensure the capture the capture of Dushanbe.

On the evening of 9 December 1921 Pulatkhodzhayev summoned Morozenko, military commissar of the Dushanbe garrison, Deputy Military Commissar Mukhin, Nagornyy, consul general of the RSFSR in Eastern Bukhara, and other high Soviet officials. As soon as the invitees arrived, Pulatkhodzhayev placed them under arrest. Threatening them with death, he forced Morozenko and Mukhin to sign a prepared text of an order calling for the Red Army garrison to lay down arms and withdraw from Dushanbe. Disarming of the garrison was assigned to the detachment of Ali-Riza and Daniyar.

The traitors, escorted by a mounted detachment, arrived at the garrison and, brandishing the order, demanded that the men lay down their arms. The order appeared suspicious to Grintsevich, commander of the 2d Battalion. He proceeded to inquire as to the whereabouts of the military commissar. At this point the traitors attempted to place him under arrest, and thus exposed their plans. The battalion refused to disarm. The first shots rang out. A skirmish began between Ali-Riza's detachment and the Red Armymen of the 2d Battalion. The traitors retreated in confusion. The garrison command was freed from arrest. They also succeeded in recovering some of the weapons taken from the 3d Battalion. In the meantime Grintsevich contacted Turkestan Front headquarters and reported what had transpired.

On the morning of 10 December 1921 a composite detachment of the 7th Regiment and subunits of the 9th Regiment were dispatched to the assistance of the Dushanbe garrison. Learning of the approach of reinforcements, the traitors fled from the city during the night of 13 December. They took with them an entire supply train containing property looted from the residents of Dushanbe.

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Mounted troops of Ibragim-bek overtook them at a mountain kishlak and confiscated all the plundered valuables from the unlucky rivals.[41]

Enver Pasha then decided to take Dushanbe by storm. The small garrison (approximately 600 soldiers and commanders), however, held out for 72 hours against the continuous fierce assaults by the basmachi detachment, which was several thousand men strong.

Failing to accomplish his objective, Enver Pasha regrouped his detachments and surrounded the city. The situation of the defenders of Dushanbe was becoming increasingly more critical with each passing day. Food supplies were running low. Many Red Armymen and commanders, debilitated by hunger, had fallen ill. They were almost out of ammunition. During these difficult days the local population came to the aid of the besieged garrison. Unbeknownst to the basmachi, feed and provisions were being delivered to the fort. Gaib Poshev and Akhmed Ashurov, chairmen of the revolutionary committees of the Chorbog and Kharangon tyumens, organized the collection of provisions, broke through the encircling forces and delivered them to Dushanbe.

But the situation at the garrison remained critical. Therefore the Turkestan Front command authorities ordered a withdrawal. On the night of 15-16 February 1922 the soldiers left Dushanbe and fought their way toward Baysun, where they were to link up with units of the Red Army.

Reactionaries greeted with rejoicing the entry by Enver Pasha and Ibragim-bek into Dushanbe. Congratulatory messages flooded in from abroad. New insurgents joined their detachments. Former beks and functionaries of the emir, as well as Bukhara nobility arrived in Dushanbe. They proceeded to reinstitute the old emirate order. Enver Pasha was recognized as leader of the basmachi of Central Asia, from the Fergana and Samarkandskaya Oblast to and including Eastern Bukhara.

A regime of terror and violence was established in areas captured by the basmachi. Mass executions became the order of the day in Eastern Bukhara. Numerous taxes and levies were imposed on the toilers. Many communities were totally destroyed.[42] Reactionary elements in Afghanistan, of course not without the support of British ruling circles, sent to Enver Pasha (under the guise of a volunteer detachment) a 500-man subunit of regular troops.[43] Garrisons were beefed up and roads repaired along the Soviet border. A special headquarters was set up in Afghanistan to handle the supplying of arms and food provisions to the Eastern Bukhara detachments.

Following the capture of Dushanbe, the basmachi army grew to 20,000 men. Buoyed by success, Enver launched an offensive toward Western Bukhara along two main axes: part of the forces, under the command of Daniyar, was to proceed via Shakhrisyabz. The main forces, led by Enver himself, were to advance via Baysun.

Ibragim-bek was virtually excluded from active operations. Enver Pasha assigned to him the role of vicegerent in Eastern Bukhara. This ambitious kurbashi, who had been enviously observing the strengthening of his rival, took countermeasures. First of all he increased the numerical strength of the

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detachments directly under his command. Although strengthening of the basmachi bands was in the common interest of the counterrevolution, this move caused Enver Pasha concern, since he realized that Ibragim-bek would not let slip by an opportunity to wrest power from him. In view of this, Enver Pasha sought to set against Ibragim-bek the major kurbashi: Davlyatman-biy, Fuzayl Maksum, Ishan Sultan, and others. Enver Pasha sought the removal of kurbashi supporters of Ibragim-bek from such important areas as Darvaz, Karategin, and Kulyab. By the spring of 1922 relations between the two leaders had deteriorated to such an extent that Ibragim-bek withdrew with his detachment into a remote mountain area.[44]

In spite of the difference between the leaders, the basmachi, exploiting the fact that the Soviet troops were few in number, rapidly advanced deep into the Bukhara Republic, laying waste to everything in their path. The population of Eastern Bukhara had decreased appreciably by the time of establishment of the Tajik ASSR. In seven tyumens of the Kulyab and Garm viloyats the basmachi, according to far from complete figures, killed 5528, wounded and maimed 2912 inhabitants from 1922 through July 1924.[45]

During the brief period of military operations initiated by Enver Pasha, acreage under crops in the Bukhara Republic shrank by 72 percent, and the total number of livestock decreased by two thirds.

Basmachi detachments occupied Karshi Viloyat and thus opened up the way into Western Bukhara. At this time, in the spring of 1922, the pan-Turkist Abdulkhay Arifov, military commissar of the Bukhara Republic, went over to the side of the basmachi. His deputy, former Turkish officer Talat-zade, defected with him. Enver Pasha joyously greeted the traitor Arifov and named him his deputy.

The imperialist press loudly proclaimed the inevitable collapse of Soviet rule in Central Asia. Enver Pasha called himself the head of a nonexistent government of the so-called Turkish Central Asian Republic. The flow of arms and ammunition from abroad increased. A new 300-man detachment formed of Afghan military personnel arrived and placed itself at Enver's disposal.[46]

At the end of March and the beginning of April Enver received from his patrons two caravans laden with arms. In addition to rifles and cartridges, the shipments contained six cannon.

The former Bukhara emir was furnishing false information to the basmachi leaders. In letters to Enver and Ibragim-bek, Seyid Alim-khan, making reference to foreign sources, assured them that Moscow had fallen and that practically no Communists remained in Ashkhabad, Merv and Kokand.

Filled with optimistic expectations, Enver began making threats even to the government of Soviet Russia. On 19 May 1922 he sent a letter to Moscow in which he demanded in the form of an ultimatum that Red Army units be recalled from Khiva, Bukhara and Turkestan, threatening war against the RSFSR in case of failure to comply. In the letter he officially designated himself as commander in chief of the armies of Khiva, Bukhara and Turkestan.

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The situation was becoming increasingly more critical. It was essential to gather together the requisite forces immediately in order to deal a decisive blow against the basmachi on the territory of Eastern Bukhara.

In view of the complex situation and the fact that government agencies and the military commissariat were filled with alien and even hostile elements, in January 1922 the Bukhara Communist Party Central Committee, TsiK and Council of Nazirs of the BPSR established by joint decision an Emergency Dictatorial Commission of the BPSR TsIK for Eastern Bukharan Affairs. The commission was empowered to issue orders and instructions, to be carried out mandatorily and undeviatingly by all establishments and by all officials. Its main task was to impose revolutionary order in areas of combat against the basmachi and to restore Soviet authority in areas liberated from the enemy. Following establishment of the Emergency Dictatorial Commission, Nasyr Khakimov, its chairman, did considerable work behind enemy lines, chiefly in Dushanbe, while commission member Alimzhan Akchurin worked in tactical areas of operations.[47]

In addition, a Bukhara Communist Party Bureau for Eastern Bukhara was established.

On 13 March 1922 the BPSR Council of Nazirs enacted a decree calling for establishment of a Bukhara Red Army.[48] A central and oblast commissions to assist the Red Army were formed. Detachments of volunteers and people's militia were strengthened. The dekhkans willingly joined the volunteer detachments. The atrocities, plundering and destruction perpetrated by the bands were convincing them more and more of the necessity of an aggressive struggle against the basmachi.

The Russian Communist Party was doing everything it could to assist the toilers of Central Asia, including the people of Bukhara, in their struggle against the basmachi.

Up to 1922 the Communist parties of Bukhara and Khorezm were not part of the RKP(b). Guidance was handled by the Comintern. The Communists of Bukhara and Khorezm submitted a request to the Central Committee of the RKP(b) that they be accepted into the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).[49]

On 1 February 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo issued a special decree on Bukharan matters. It was drafted by a commission consisting of V. V. Kuybyshev, I. V. Stalin, F. Khodzhayev, and G. V. Chicherin. The decree called for solving a broad range of problems connected with strengthening mutual relations between the party organizations of the RSFSR, BPSR, and KPSR, with consolidation of anti-basmachi fronts, and with intensifying political work among the indigenous population in order to clear the territory of Bukhara of counterrevolutionary elements as quickly as possible.[50] It was specified that the Bukhara Communist Party would have the same status as republic Communist Parties within the RKP(b). One representative each from the Central Committees of the Bukhara and Khorezm Communist parties was added to the RKP(b) Central Committee Turkbyuro.

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The Communists of the Bukhara Republic, just as of all Central Asia, closed ranks solidly behind the RKP(b) and worked to strengthen the alliance with the Russian people. Entry by the Bukhara Communist Party into the RKP(b) was of enormous significance for the future of the toilers of Bukhara and fostered organizational and ideological strengthening of the Bukhara Communist Party.

In these conditions the functions of the Turkbyuro were essentially expanded to the functions of the Sredazbyuro of the RKP(b) Central Committee.[51]

S. S. Kamenev, commander in chief of the armed forces of the RSFSR, drew up a concrete plan of military assistance to Eastern Bukhara.

The complexity of the situation in Bukhara, incessant actions by basmachi bands, and economic chaos dictated that the Politburo and Sredazbyuro of the party Central Committee repeatedly and specifically address the situation in the BPSR. The following enactments were issued: by the RKP(b) Central Committee Orgburo dated 18 January 1922 -- on measures to assist Bukhara; the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo dated 22 February 1922 -- on the situation in Bukhara; dated 1 March 1922 -- "On Reinforcing Troops and Facilities in Eastern Bukhara"; dated 13 March 1922 -- "On Bukhara." A number of measures of a political, economic and military nature were adopted pursuant to these enactments. Party-soviet and military officials were sent to Central Asia, and the population of areas cleared of basmachi were exempted from the foodstuffs tax in kind. The party Central Committee Politburo stated that extermination of the basmachi as quickly as possible was an urgent task of local party organizations.

The military situation became even more critical at the beginning of March 1922. Basmachi detachments had reached the approaches to Bukhara and were besieging the city from all sides. The government of the BPSR appealed to the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet. On 11 March, following 3 days of fighting, units of the Red Army and detachments of volunteers pushed the basmachi back beyond Babkent, Gizhduvan, and Kermine. But these were only initial successes, although important ones. No turning point had as yet occurred in the struggle against the basmachi. In some areas the basmachi were once again turning to the offensive.

On 20 April 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo examined the question of the situation on the Turkestan Front and made the decision to send G. K. Ordzhonikidze and Sh. Z. Eliava to become acquainted with matters on the spot; the Politburo also decided to place Central Asia under martial law until the basmachi were totally eradicated.

The armed forces of the Bukhara Republic were at the initial stage of formation and could not successfully combat the large, well-armed bands. Therefore the command authorities of the Turkestan Front detailed some of their own units to reinforce the Bukhara Front.

Ya. Kh. Peters, an old Communist and prominent statesman, and commander in chief S. S. Kamenev arrived in Bukhara. By order to the Republic Revvoyensovet, a Revvoyensovet of the Bukhara Front, headed by Fayzulla Khodzhayev, was

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established effective 1 April 1922, on the basis of an RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo decision. Its mission was "organization of unity of actions against the basmachi in Eastern Bukhara."[52]

On 4 May 1922 G. K. Ordzhonikidze arrived in Bukhara. Assessing the situation, he reported to the Central Committee that a difficult struggle lay ahead: "Enver will require a real fight, but I am confident that we shall succeed in wringing his neck."[53] In other reports to the Central Committee, G. K. Ordzhonikidze advanced a number of proposals aimed at strengthening Soviet authority, at purging the ranks of the Bukhara Communist Party (it totaled 14,000 members) and Komsomol against class-alien elements, and at improving the health of the economy of the Turkestan ASSR and the Bukhara Republic. He also discussed this in his report presented on 12 May at a Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee Plenum.

On 18 May 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee issued the above-mentioned decree entitled "On Turkestan-Bukharan Affairs." It specified concrete measures to strengthen Soviet authority in Central Asia and on mobilization of the toiler masses, as well as on initiation of an extensive political campaign (political rallies, conferences of the non-party people, meetings) against the Enver Pasha venture. At the same time the RKP(b) Central Committee recommended that both in Turkestan and Bukhara vakuf lands be returned to their former owners, that the local national courts be recognized as legal (kaziy and biy [head of tribe or union of tribes] courts), etc. This would correct some of the mistakes made by local Communists in the area of nationalities policy.[54] The decree called for a declaration of amnesty to Bukhara and Khorezm basmachi who surrendered. It played an important role in uniting all revolutionary forces in the republics of Central Asia for wiping out the basmachi.

A plenary session of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, of new makeup (a plenum executive committee was approved, consisting of members S. I. Gusev, N. Tyurakulov, and F. Khodzhayev, and candidates A. A. Sol'ts, A. Rakhimbayev, and Makhmudov), was held on 19-20 May 1922, with the participation of G. K. Ordzhonikidze and Sh. Z. Eliava. The plenum discussed the party Central Committee decree and examined questions pertaining to economic development of all Central Asian republics, devoting particular attention to bringing the BPSR and KPSR into the mainstream of building socialism, improving the position of the toiler masses, and consolidating Soviet authority. A resolution entitled "On Economic Unification of the Three Republics" was adopted.[55]

Pursuant to the decisions of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro Plenum, on 26 May 1922 the Turkestan TsIK issued a decree specifying the return of vakufs to their former owners and reestablishment of the kaziy and biy courts. The decree emphasized that the Soviet authorities did not see their task as combating local customs but called upon everybody to take part in the struggle to strengthen the rule of the toilers.[56]

Decrees by local authorities, adopted pursuant to the instructions of the party Central Committee and Sredazbyuro, promoted the cause of stepping up the campaign against the basmachi.

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A great deal of work was being done to implement the instructions of the party Central Committee under the direct guidance of G. K. Ordzhonikidze and the Sredazbyuro. Special attention was devoted to a purge of counterrevolutionary elements from the party, the soviet machinery of government, the Red Army, and the militia, and to enlistment of the finest representatives of the people, particularly dekhkans, to high positions in the structure of government. Addressing a conference of Bukhara Communist Party officials, G. K. Ordzhonikidze stated: "We must take all steps to purge the Bukhara Government not only of counterrevolutionary elements but also of nepotism.... We further have the enormous task of extracting from Bukhara, chiefly from the dekhkans, all the very best they have to offer, and involve this best in government."[57]

Bukhara Group of Forces headquarters was established in April 1922. The group of forces included the 1st and 2d Independent Turkestan Cavalry brigades, the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division, and 2 cavalry squadrons from the Vernenskiye Cavalry Command Courses. Subsequently units from the Moscow Military District and from Belorussia were assigned to the group of forces. The Bukhara Group of Forces totaled 4500 bayonets, 3039 sabers, and 20 artillery pieces. It was commanded by N. Ye. Kakurin. He was soon replaced by P. A. Pavlov.

At this same time the Bukhara Communist Party conducted an extensive political campaign among the population. The task of the struggle against Enver Pasha was explained and the essence of his antipopular policy was demonstrated at meetings and political rallies, in proclamations and appeals directed to the toilers of indigenous nationalities. Particular attention was focused on exposing Enver's links with British imperialism.

Intensified preparations for dealing a decisive blow against the basmachi were in progress throughout the month of May. The main forces of the Red Army were being massed in Samarkand.

Enver Pasha was also preparing for the forthcoming battles. He held several meetings with the leaders of basmachi bands and drew up a plan of action with the participation of agents of foreign intelligence services. Additional consignments of arms and ammunition arriving from abroad were placed at Enver Pasha's disposal. The imperialist reactionaries assured the kurbashi through their agents that they would provide them with everything they needed, in whatever quantity.

Enver Pasha undertook an attempt to thwart the operation for which the Red Army command authorities were preparing. Moving large forces toward Baysun, he established a solid ring of encirclement around it. Threatening total annihilation of the garrison and the entire population, Enver Pasha demanded the town's surrender. The commanders, Red Armymen and the toilers of Baysun, however, rejected the ultimatum and courageously defended the city.

Early in June 1922 the Bukhara Group of Forces commenced offensive operations on a broad front, jointly with the Bukhara Red Army, detachments of volunteers and people's militia.

Initially several large bands were routed, the blockade of Baysun was lifted, and the kishlak of Kofryun, in which Enver Pasha's headquarters were located,

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was liberated. The enemy retreated toward the Surkhan Darya Valley. On the following days units of the Red Army, people's militia and volunteer detachments hit the basmachi with one attack after another. On 22 June the right-hand column of advancing troops captured Kabadian and commenced liberation of the Vakhsh Valley.

Following the defeat in detail of large basmachi units at Baysun, the Red Army, supported by the population, proceeded to advance, liberating one area after another. On 14 July 1922 Red Army units operating on the right flank approached Dushanbe and, following a fierce battle, liberated the city that same day.

Enver Pasha's detachments were noticeably demoralized, and a disintegration of spirit began among the basmachi.

Enver Pasha attempted to explain away his setbacks as being due not to offensive actions by Red Army units but rather to disagreements with Ibragim-bek. Of course differences between the leaders did to some measure exert a negative effect on the fighting efficiency of the bands. In particular, Enver Pasha and Ibragim-bek were unable to achieve coordinated actions. (It is true that at the beginning of the operation Ibragim-bek had dispatched his main forces, numbering 7000 men, to assist Enver Pasha at the latter's request. These detachments took part in the battles at Baysun.[58] But following the defeat at Baysun, Ibragim-bek took refuge in the mountains, while Enver Pasha retreated in the direction of Bal'dzhuan). But of course the main reason for the defeat of the basmachi lay in their antipopular essence. The successes of the Red Army were due to active support by the toiling people. The dekhkans saw the Red Army as their savior from the terrorism and pillaging of the basmachi and therefore willingly assisted it with food and direct participation in armed combat against the bands.

The RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, the Bukhara Communist Party and the government of the BPSR took steps to provide extensive explanation to the population of Enver's political aims and to mobilize the masses for his final defeat. The above-mentioned appeal by the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro to the Communists of the republics of Central Asia stressed that through the common efforts of the "toilers of Bukhara, Turkestan and Khorezm and their Red troops, there will be fewer bloody victims of Enver's bloody venture, and peace, desired by the toiling population of all Eastern Soviet Republics, will be achieved."[59] The decisions of the Fourth Session of the All-Bukhara TsIK (July 1922) stated that "Enver's desire, jointly with the Eastern Bukhara basmachi, to place Bukhara under the British heel is a crime both from the standpoint of the Muslim and from that of the Bukharan." The session appealed to the entire Bukharan people to "gather under the Red Banner and combat the basmachi and Enver Pasha with united forces."[60] The Presidium of the All-Bukhara TsIK received instructions from the session to concentrate the republic's resources first and foremost on the struggle against the basmachi and to grant a pardon to those who would voluntarily surrender and show repentance to the Soviet authorities.

The toiling population greatly assisted the Red Army and volunteer detachments with food provisions and aided them in crossing mountain rivers. A decisive

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role in mobilizing the masses to assist the Red Army was played by the local soviets, which were reestablished immediately following expulsion of the basmachi. In the Lokay Valley, which Ibragim-bek was endeavoring to turn into an impregnable stronghold, the toilers and even the chiefs of some of the tribes took the side of the Soviet authorities. Tribal chiefs Abdul-Gazis, Karshi-aksakal, and Dany-aksakal actively aided the Red Army. They exposed to the people the basmachi and their leaders as enemies of the toilers and appealed to the dekhkans to fight the bands.

Enver Pasha proceeded to fight his way toward the border, in order to escape abroad. But the Red Army cut off his avenues of retreat.

Patching together remnants of scattered detachments totaling 5000 men, Enver Pasha succeeded in surrounding the 16th Cavalry Regiment near the kishlak of Sangtud. The first assault mounted by Davlyatman-biy's cavalrymen was repulsed, however. The regiment launched a counterattack. The basmachi, unable to stand up under the onslaught of the Red Armymen, took to their heels. The fleeing basmachi reached Bal'dzhuan before Enver was able to stop them, where he organized a defense. Stubborn fighting raged in Bal'dzhuan for 3 days. Five hundred of Enver Pasha's basmachi went down on the battlefield. He withdrew with the remaining troops to the kishlak of Obdar, between Khovaling and Bal'dzhuan. Enver Pasha's last battle took place in this kishlak on 4 August. His band was encircled, and Davlyatman-biy and Enver Pasha were killed in battle.

Thus ended one of the most dangerous international reactionary plots against the Soviet Central Asian republics The peoples of the Soviet East recall the name of Enver Pasha with revulsion. He added a dismal page to the long history of Central Asia.

The VTsIK and TsIK of the BPSR awarded combat decorations to the most meritorious participants in the struggle against the basmachi and to individual military units. Fayzulla Khodzayev, chairman of the government of the BPSR, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. This constituted recognition of the important role played by the Council of Nazirs of the Bukhara Republic in the struggle against the emir-basmachi bands and in consolidating the people's rule in this republic.

The Third All-Bukhara Kurultay of People's Representatives (15-18 August 1922) summed up the results of the struggle against Enver. It branded the basmachi as an antipopular movement of the exploiter classes, supported by imperialist nations. The kurultay took particular note of the noble internationalist mission of the Red Army. "The Russian Red Army," stated the kurultay resolution, "came to Bukhara not at its own initiative, for the sake of achieving some selfish objective, but on the contrary, at the request of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic to liberate its territory and oppressed people from the persisting basmachi movement."[61] In a proclamation to the public, the kurultay stated: "The Bukhara People's Soviet Republic, faced with a powerful adversary, fought shoulder to shoulder with the toiling people of Russia, who through their heroic struggle showed the peoples of the East the way to revolution and liberation. We have achieved fine results in the fraternal alliance of both republics against our enemies."[62]

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The Chieftains Refuse to Lay Down Their Arms

On 6 September 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo adopted a decree on measures to give military and economic assistance to the BPSR. It pointed to the necessity of strengthening the military units of Turkestan which were fighting against the basmachi; the necessity of sending military specialist cadres to the BPSR to provide military training to the local population and to form volunteer detachments among the dekhkans and the urban poor; to raise prices on cotton.[63] Following the defeat of Enver, the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro specified the following measures to intensify the struggle against the basmachi: neutralize the middle peasant from the bai and mullahs, and work persistently to involve the middle dekhkans in government; develop state and cooperative trade; organize and expand cooperative activities in the area of agricultural credit, with the objective of gradually liberating the peasants from the power of the bai and usurers.[64] People's kurultays were convened. In September-October 1922, for example, five people's kurultays of several tribes in the Lokay Valley were held; a congress of the Tajik population of the Gissar Viloyat was also held in October. A total of 40 tyumen, 5 viloyat, and 7 national kurultays were held in Eastern Bukhara, with the participation of approximately 16,000 persons, and 20 tyumen, 6 viloyat and 1 national (Turkmen) kurultay in Western Bukhara, with the participation of more than 5000 dekhkans and herdsmen, were held prior to the convening of the Fourth All-Bukhara Kurultay of Soviets.[65]

In these conditions it was becoming increasingly more difficult for imperialist agents to organize basmachi detachments. Basmachi ranks were thinning, and their area of operations was shrinking. The basmachi leaders, however, were refusing to lay down their arms. Following the defeat of Enver Pasha the situation in the Bukhara Republic continued to remain complex. Groups operating in Western Bukhara (especially in the viloyats of Kashkadarya and Surkhandarya) and in Eastern Bukhara (in Karategin and over the vast territory of the Kulyab, Kurgan-Tyube, Gissar, and Sherabad viloyats) presented a substantial threat. Imperialist circles (Great Britain in particular) and reactionary elements in Afghanistan continued to entertain hopes of toppling Soviet rule in Central Asia, particularly in Eastern Bukhara, with the assistance of their own man. This time the choice fell on an associate of Enver Pasha, former Turkish officer and British intelligence agent Salim-pasha (Khodzha Salim-bey). He and a group of Turkish officers were instructed to put together new detachments on the territory of the Bukhara Republic.

Seyid Alim-khan gave his approval of the nomination of Salim-pasha as new leader of the Bukharan basmachi, since the Bukharan counterrevolutionaries, failing to possess genuine resources for the struggle against Soviet rule, were placing their main hopes on assistance from the imperialist powers. It is not surprising that all appeals by the former emir of Bukhara to the basmachi kurbashi were accompanied by promises of aid from foreign powers (primarily Great Britain). At the same time Seyid Alim-khan, fearing loss of the Bukharan throne in case of success by the basmachi, was continuing to count on Ibragim-bek.

Commencing preparations for a new anti-Soviet venture, Seyid Alim-khan, with active participation of British station chiefs, prepared for and held a meeting

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in Kabul in August 1922. The meeting was attended by Central Asian counter-revolutionary leaders, including several basmachi kurbashi, as well as representatives of Afghan reactionaries. As was already noted, good-neighbor relations were being established between the Soviet and Afghan nations. Pro-British reactionary circles in Afghanistan, however, were attempting to push their own specific policy, which was hostile to the interests of both countries.

A plan for a new combined offensive against Soviet rule in Central Asia was hammered out at this conference. A general offensive by the basmachi bands was to begin in the spring of 1923.

In the fall of 1922 Salim-pasha made his way into Bukhara and established contact with a number of leaders of the Matcha, Samarkand, Western Bukharan and Fergana basmachi. Some kurbashi refused to recognize Salim-pasha as their leader.

The foreign patrons dispatched to Salim-pasha from India a 40-camel caravan laden with arms and ammunition.

Salim-pasha was relying on the backing of former supporters of Enver Pasha, and particularly on the band of Fuzayl Maksum. He sent Fuzayl Maksum 30 of his own bodyguards and helped him gain the upper hand over his rivals -- Ishan Sultan and Ishan Suleyman. Gaining victory over his opponents with Salim-pasha's help, Fuzayl Maksum declared himself the emir of Darvaz and Karategin.

With the appearance of Salim-pasha on the territory of the Bukhara Republic, the basmachi once again became active, particularly the Matcha basmachi, who had established close contacts with Salim-pasha. They resumed their forays against the kishlaks of Ura-Tyubinskiy and Dzhizakskiy uyezds. Nor did Ibragim-bek cease combat operations.

The command authorities of the Turkestan Front and the Bukhara Group of Forces, party and soviet agencies closely monitored the development of events and, in conformity with the developing situation, took requisite measures to protect the toiler population.

Following the defeat of Enver-Pasha, the Soviet Government pointed to the necessity of accelerating the liquidation of remaining bands and invited the rank-and-file basmachi to surrender voluntarily, with a guarantee of amnesty.

Party and soviet agencies of the Bukhara Republic and Samarkandskaya Oblast were conducting active political indoctrination work among the population and giving material assistance to the poorest segments of the population, while Red Army command authorities and leaders of volunteer detachments were continuing military operations against the basmachi.

In the fall of 1922 units of the 13th Corps (the former Bukhara Group) routed several basmachi forces. An attempt by Ibragim-bek to unite with Daniyar-bek was thwarted. In October 1922 Ibragim-bek was dealt several appreciable blows, but once again he succeeded in fleeing into the mountains.

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Putting together several large detachments, Salim-pasha decided to mount a concentrated attack on Kulyab and Dushanbe, to topple Soviet rule in Eastern Bukhara and then, having established a base, to advance into the central areas of the Bukhara Republic.

In December 1922 Salim-pasha, with a 600-man detachment, redeployed into the Kulyab area, where several other basmachi groups joined him. In the first clash with the Kulyab garrison, which contained only 60 men, Salim-pasha failed to achieve success. The garrison, under the command of D. K. Gol'tsev, with the support of the townspeople, withstood furious assaults by the basmachi for 30 days. Finally on 11 January 1923, when their ammunition had run out, the Red Armymen abandoned the city. But the band did not hold out long in Gulyab. The 152d Cavalry Regiment soon dislodged it.

Salim-pasha proceeded to the Gissar Valley, where he linked up with Ibragim-bek. They agreed to conduct subsequent combat operations in two forces. Salim-pasha advanced toward Bukhara with 4000 basmachi, while Ibragim-bek remained in the Lokay with 2000 men, to cover Salim-pasha's rear and at the same time to attempt to capture Dushanbe.[66]

The situation was clearly not developing in favor of the counterrevolution, however. The process of political and economic strengthening of the Soviet republics of Central Asia was becoming increasingly more appreciable.

The resolutions of the 12th Congress of the RKP(b) and the decisions of the 4th Conference of the RKP(b) Central Committee with Representatives of the National Republics and Regions were of great significance in mobilizing the people for the struggle against the basmachi. They armed the party and all toilers with a program of concrete actions to achieve further strengthening of friendship and mutual assistance of the peoples of Russia.

Agencies of popular authority were becoming stronger throughout Eastern Bukhara; a land reform was being carried out in Eastern Bukhara -- land was being handed over to the dekhkans. A tax reform was being carried out in the interests of the toilers, and there was taking place a process of further strengthening of the Bukhara Communist Party.

A. I. Kork, commanding general of the Turkestan Front, sent to the Bukhara Republic the 3d Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the 11th and 12th regiments and an artillery battery. The brigade took part in defeating the main forces of Salim-pasha, which had concentrated in the Sherabad area.

The first clash between the brigade and Salim-pasha's detachments took place on 11 March 1923. The fighting continued for about 3 days. Salim-pasha's main forces were routed. He withdrew to Kelif. But here Red Army units hit his band once again. After this the basmachi scattered. Some began operating independently, others withdrew to Matcha, while still others, led by Salim-pasha, returned to the Gissar Valley.[67]

Taking advantage of his rivals' weakness, Ibragim-bek moved into the Surkhan Darya Valley.[68] But he failed to achieve success. Volunteer detachments and

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Red Army units advanced into the valley and inflicted a defeat on Ibragim-bek, forcing him to return to the Lokay.

Following the winter and March operations of 1923 which were conducted against the basmachi on the territory of the Bukhara Republic, the bands divided into three principal groupings. One grouping was still (now more in form than substance, to be true) under the command of Salim-pasha. It was based in Matcha. The majority of Zeravshan basmachi had concentrated there and were continuing to threaten the northern part of Tajikistan and Samarkandskaya Oblast. A second group was based in Karategin and Darvaz. It was led by Fuzayl Maksum, who still maintained relations with Salim-pasha but was seeking to be independent. Taking advantage of the absence of Red Army units in Karategin and Darvaz, he established his base in Garm Viloyat and considered himself total master of the area. The third group was concentrated in the Gissar Valley. Ibragim-bek and Salim-pasha were operating in this area. The basmachi detachments totaled up to 15,000 men. Salim-pasha received substantial new manpower reinforcements, arms and ammunition from abroad.

The existence of three fairly large bases of basmachi operations demanded vigorous actions to eliminate them. But the Bukhara Republic could not fight all the basmachi groups with its small armed forces. Therefore the government of the BPSR requested that the government of the USSR send an additional military contingent to Bukhara. This request was met. A cavalry division and two cavalry brigades were dispatched to Bukhara in March 1923. Local units were also strengthened. Special committees for combating the basmachi were formed, as well as commissions to mobilize the male population into the Bukharan Red Army.

Salim-pasha was the first to be hit. His 2000-man detachment was overwhelmed. Losing almost 300 men, Salim-pasha retreated in the direction of Kurgan-Tyube.

Soon Red Army units began actions against Ibragim. In several engagements the basmachi lost more than 500 men.

The army of Ibragim-bek and Salim-pasha had virtually disintegrated. Most of the basmachi (approximately 12,000 out of 15,000) had returned to their kishlaks. Ibragim-bek, leaving a small covering force in the Lokay, took a detachment of 350 men[69] and proceeded to the left bank of the Vakhsh.

Salim-pasha and Ibragim-bek began avoiding encounters with Red Army units and volunteer detachments, sending out small groups to attack kishlaks and, occasionally, small garrisons.

The basmachi base in Matcha was cleaned out in the spring of 1923.

In the latter half of 1922 the command authorities of the Turkestan Front concentrated substantial forces against the Matcha basmachi. The enemy sustained heavy casualties. Subsequently the situation deteriorated, however. Basmachi groups from Eastern Bukhara broke through to Matcha. Kholbuta's band alone was 800 men strong. Elimination of the "bekstvo" was delayed. Soviet troops were not able to launch an offensive until the spring of 1923.

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A special detachment under the command of S. M. Shevtsov was formed from the 13th Rifle Corps to conduct the operation. Volunteer detachments from Pendzhikent, Ura-Tyube and other areas fought in coordination with the Red Army subunits.

The operation commenced on 18 March 1923. The basmachi offered fierce resistance. They burned bridges across the gorges and rivers and demolished roads. The inhabitants of the kishlaks, however, rebuilt the bridges, showed the Red Armymen alternate routes, carried artillery pieces across the passes on their shoulders, helped haul ammunition and food supplies, and evacuated wounded. Organizing volunteer detachments, the local population guarded liberated kishlaks, enabling the Red Army units to continue the offensive.

The kishlak of Oburdon, where the bek's palace was situated, was liberated on 2 April. The Matcha basmachi force had ceased to exist. Only small groups of basmachi succeeded in making their way across the mountain passes. Some of them joined up with Fuzayl Maksum, while others went into the Fergana Valley. Kholbuta, accompanied by 150 basmachi, took refuge in the mountains of the Karategin. Discontent and strife intensified in the bands, which were suffering one defeat after another. Kholbuta was killed by one of his underlings in the course of this strife.[70]

Thus the history of the Matcha basmachi, who had brought much grief and suffering to the population on the upper reaches of the Zeravshan, ended ingloriously.

The lull which ensued in Central Asia by no means signified the establishment of peace, especially in Eastern Bukhara, where some of the amnestied basmachi would readily join bandit gangs in a favorable situation. The center of basmachi activities was shifting more and more abroad, from where reinforcements could arrive at any moment (and in fact were arriving). In connection with this, in June 1923 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo addressed the Bukhara question and made the decision to mobilize necessary reserves to crush the remaining bands. The Politburo proposed establishment of an Eastern Bukharan Revkom and that military and civil authority be concentrated in its hands. Fayzulla Khodzhayev, head of government of the Bukhara Republic, was appointed Revkom chairman.[71] The Politburo also considered it essential to carry out a number of measures to achieve Sovietization and further democratization of the government of the BPSR. The RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo decision mobilized local party and soviet agencies, Red Army commanders and men, and the entire toiler population to smash the remaining bands.

RKP(b) Central Committee Secretary Ya. E. Rudzutak was sent to Bukhara for practical implementation of the Politburo instructions and to assist the Bukhara Communist Party. A report by Ya. E. Rudzutak entitled "On the Communist Party's Nationalities Policy in Light of the Resolutions of the 12th Congress of the RKP(b)," was presented at a Bukhara Communist Party Central Committee plenum held on 22 July 1923. The participants in the plenum proposed a number of suggestions for strengthening Soviet rule. The activities of the Council of Nazirs, the membership of which included former merchants, traders, and mullahs, but not a single dekhkan, were subjected to sharp criticism.[72]

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In light of the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo, important measures to strengthen Soviet rule were taken in Bukhara, first and foremost a purge of central party and soviet establishments. A verification and listing of the BCP membership was conducted, a uniform party membership card was adopted, the raykom party committees were strengthened, and party cells [primary party units], which had not previously existed in the Bukhara Communist Party, were formed.

Squabbling among the basmachi leaders became more intense. Barat-bek and Usmankul-bek intended to settle accounts with Salim-pasha. This fact hastened Salim-pasha's flight abroad. On 15 July 1923, accompanied by Turkish bodyguards, he crossed the Amu Darya and returned to Afghanistan.[73]

Completing the defeat of the main forces of Salim-pasha and Ibragim-bek, the Red Army command authorities proceeded with wiping out the third base area of the basmachi operating in the Karategin and Darvaz. The basmachi of Fuzayl-Maksum presented the greatest threat in this area. He was in Garm at this time with a detachment of 1500 men. Rifle and cavalry units were sent to the area. A small advance guard swept through the basmachi roadblocks by the kishlak of Dubursa, ensuring that the advancing units closed rapidly on the basmachi main forces. The Red Army swiftly negotiated mountain passes. On 29 August 1923 Garm was liberated following a brief but intensive battle. Fuzayl Maksum fled across the Soviet-Afghan border, pursuers hot on his heels. As in other operations, detachments of local volunteers fought together with regular units against this basmachi force.

As a result of the smashing defeat of the basmachi main forces in the Eastern Bukhara, Samarkandskaya Oblast and Matchinskiy Uyezd, some of the shattered bands and their kurbashi fled into Afghanistan. Rid of his rivals, Ibragim-bek now had the opportunity to achieve his long-standing dream: to become leader of all the basmachi of Bukhara. This held him on Soviet territory. He sent a letter to the former emir of Bukhara and to certain Afghan officials, in which he reported the flight of many diehard groups into Afghanistan. Ibragim-bek stated that he was incapable of doing battle with his remaining bands, and requested assistance. If refused, he threatened to leave the country.[74]

In response to this letter, Seyid Alim-khan designated Ibragim-bek head of the basmachi of Eastern Bukhara and his vicegerent. He was promised assistance and instructed to hold on until it arrived.[75]

An experienced and cunning tactician, Ibragim-bek avoided engagements with border guards and Red Army units, concentrating his forces in mountain and desert areas.[76] His bands engaged chiefly in plunder and sabotage. Ibragim-bek was receiving arms and ammunition, as well as personnel, from abroad. Many of the foreign basmachi, however, did not make it to Ibragim-bek's bands. Many of them were killed or taken into custody by Soviet border guards while crossing the border.

The Bukhara Communist Party and the government of the Bukhara Republic were continuing to take measures to combat the basmachi, especially in the Lokay area.

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On 28 July 1923 the Revvoyensovet of Eastern Bukhara issued a decree on changing the administrative division and on calling kurultays of tribes, at which questions pertaining to stepping up the struggle against the basmachi, strengthening the Soviet rule and assistance to the poor were to be settled. Material assistance to the public was also expanded. On 23 August the city of Dushanbe received 95,000 rubles worth of various goods.

The Red Army command and local authorities called a meeting of tribal leaders and influential tribe members, at which it was ordered that all persons in possession of and carrying weapons surrender them to the authorities. In order to thwart this measure, Ibragim-bek, who had not completed his preparations for launching aggressive actions in Eastern Bukhara, attempted to incite the population of Lokay to rise up against Soviet rule, but the dekhkans refused to support him, and Red Army units arriving in the Lokay forced the small basmachi groups to return to the mountains.

On September 1923 Ibragim-bek once again tried to cause the people of the Lokay to rise up against Soviet rule. He intended to make use of what seemed to him to be a favorable situation. The fact is that in September those Red Armymen and junior command personnel who had completed their specified term of service were discharged into the reserves; they were replaced by green recruits who had no experience in fighting the basmachi. But the basmachi were suffering defeats as a result not only of heroic actions on the part of the commanders and men of the Red Army but also the steadily increasing activeness of the toilers themselves. Ibragim-bek was now made aware of this with particular acuteness: there were no Soviet troops in the Lokay, and yet his attempt to force even part of the population to join his bands failed.

Preparing for an offensive, the kurbashi gathered together everybody they could, particularly those basmachi who had previously scattered and dispersed. A specific area of operations was assigned each kurbashi. Alla Nazar was sent to Kulyab, Ismat to Bal'dzhuan, Gairbek to Fayzabad, etc. Ibragim-bek proceeded toward Yavan with a detachment of 200 men.[77]

Instigators of counterrevolution across the border were mobilizing basmachi who had fled into Afghanistan to assist Ibragim, and were massing them near the Soviet border.

Ibragim-bek was endeavoring to raise the spirits of the basmachi. He felt that the best means of achieving this would be a victory, even an insignificant victory, in battle against the Red Army. In order to ensure winning such a victory, Ibragim-bek picked out a small garrison stationed in the kishlak of Naryn. He sent to this site a band which was tens of times stronger than the garrison force. The battle continued for 2 days. The Red Armymen fought tenaciously. On the third day, 23 September 1923, a 22-man detachment arrived to aid the beleaguered garrison. Near Naryn the detachment encountered Igamberdy's group (400 men), which was blocking the approaches to the kishlak. Some of the basmachi who were assaulting the kishlak rushed to Igamberdy's assistance. Taking advantage of the confusion, the garrison broke out of the encirclement and attacked the basmachi from the rear. Thus the operation conceived by Ibragim-bek ended ingloriously for him.

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Red Army units and detachments of volunteers conducted an offensive against other bands of Ibragim-bek, concentrating in the Dzhitymtau area. A battle with the basmachi took place here on 25 September.

In order to prevent the basmachi from obtaining reinforcements from abroad, the Soviet Government took additional measures to secure the border. Border guards fought the basmachi and protected the local population in the border areas, displaying a high degree of courage and staunchness.

On 18 December 1923 approximately 250 basmachi attacked the kishlak of Baba-Sakal, robbed the population and fled into the mountains. A platoon under the command of border guard Klimov was sent out to destroy this band. The search continued throughout the night. At dawn the basmachi were spotted in a mountain gorge. The platoon commander decided to attack them without a halt to deploy.

The basmachi were thrown into confusion as the battle began. But soon the kurbashi realized that his force was numerically superior, and he proceeded to envelop the border troops. Hour by hour, the basmachi tightened the noose of encirclement. Klimov ordered border guards Ivanchenko and Krylov to make their way through to friendly lines and report on the situation. Basmachi took off in pursuit. Red Armyman Ivanchenko's horse was killed in an exchange of fire. Ivanchenko injured his leg when going down. He continued to return fire, thus enabling his comrade to evade pursuit and reach friendly lines. Border guard Ivanchenko died a hero's death in unequal combat.[78] In the summer and fall of 1923 party and soviet agencies of the Bukhara People's Republic implemented new political measures to combat the basmachi. Of particular significance was further involvement of the toiler masses in agencies of authority. National, viloyat and tyumen kurultays were held throughout Eastern Bukhara. Ninety-eight percent of the participants were dekhkans and handicraft workers, while only 2 percent of the delegates were representatives of the exploiter classes and mullahs.

On 14 August 1923 a decree on revising the text of the constitution of the BPSR, which had been in force since September 1921, was adopted at a special meeting of the Bukhara TsIK. The decree stressed that the revision of articles of the constitution aimed at creating a powerful, genuinely Soviet edifice of government, standing truly close to the toiler masses and capable of protecting the interests of these masses against encroachments by the exploiter classes. The decree broadened toiler oversight over the activities of agencies of authority. The exploiter classes were deprived of voting rights. A statute on viloyat executive committees (revolutionary committees) was also ratified at the meeting. A new administrative-territorial division was performed. Five viloyats were established in Eastern Bukhara -- Dushanbe, Garm, Kulyab, Kurgan-Tyube, and Sary-Assiy.

Economic reforms were implemented at the same time.

A land reform in the Lokay Valley, carried out in November 1923, played an important role in the campaign against the basmachi. It undermined the economic roots of the bai-feudal elite. For the first time, the poor peasant received

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land. The status of the poor and middle peasant improved to an even greater extent due to a simultaneously implemented tax reform. Taxes on the land-holdings of th middle peasants were substantially reduced, while the poor peasants, who needed assistance, were totally exempted from taxes. "Koshchi" unions, uniting the toiling dekhkans, began to be formed in the BPSR, following the model of Soviet Turkestan. These and other economic and political measures greatly strengthened Soviet rule in Eastern Bukhara. For the first time delegations from this region took part in the proceedings of the 4th Congress of Soviets of the BPSR (October 1923). The congress focused particular attention on assistance to the population of Eastern Bukhara. The congress adopted the decision to form an autonomous Turkmenskaya Oblast. The congress passed a resolution to indict certain nazirs linked with the basmachi.

The RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro and the Bukhara Communist Party were accomplishing a great deal of work in the area of establishment and organizational structuring of local party organizations in Eastern Bukhara. A BCP Orgburo was established in Eastern Bukhara. Local party organizations, in spite of their small size (there were only 12 Communists, for example, in the Dushanbe city party organization as of 1 January 1923),[79] became genuine organizers of the defeat of the basmachi. The resolutions of the 8th (4th) All-Bukhara Party Congress (January 1924) greatly fostered further ideological-organizational strengthening of the entire Bukharan party organization.

An important role in mobilizing the people for the struggle against the basmachi was played by economic and cultural assistance given by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and particularly by the Turkestan Republic, to People's Bukhara. Outright gifts of equipment were made for a textile mill and paper mill, a tannery and soap works, for the Krasnyy Vostok Spinning and Weaving Mill, plus several other enterprises. Engineers, technicians, and skilled workers came to Bukhara from the country's central region. The finest representatives of the republic's youth were sent from Bukhara to study in Moscow, Tashkent and other cities. Schools, libraries, theaters and museums were established.

The position of the basmachi had weakened considerably in Eastern Bukhara by the end of 1923. It was apparent from situation reports of the Red Army command authorities that 117 kurbashi and 1565 rank and file basmachi had been killed or captured in Eastern Bukhara between September and the end of December 1923, while 1200 basmachi had voluntarily surrendered. According to incomplete figures, somewhat more than 3000 men remained at large in scattered bands at the end of 1923. Some of Ibragim-bek's active supporters were more and more clearly realizing the hopelessness of the struggle against popular rule. Some of them began to abandon the basmachi and even began trying to persuade Ibragim-bek to cease brigand activities. At the end of October 1923 a group of elders from the Isankhodzha tribe came to him and requested that he lay down his arms. He was still hoping for success, however, and continued the struggle against Soviet power.

The principal bases of the basmachi were now the high-elevation mountain areas, the barren sands of Turkmenia and the border areas of neighboring countries, to which the bai, beks, reactionary segment of the clergy, the clan nobility,

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and other elements hostile to Soviet authority had fled. Considerable numbers of basmachi counterrevolutionaries had moved abroad.

The former Bukhara emir, who had taken up residence abroad, made every effort to encourage stepped-up counterrevolutionary activities. He generously doled out titles and ranks. Ibragim-bek received a particularly large number of titles.

At the beginning of 1924 the foreign and domestic counterrevolution succeeded once again in reviving the basmachi on the territory of Eastern Bukhara.

At this time Ibragim-bek was on the left bank of the Vakhsh. Comparatively small basmachi groups remained in the Lokay and were occasionally making their presence known. More and more new bands, however, were mounting forays from across the border. In December 1923 three large basmachi groups crossed the border into Eastern Bukhara. Several other bands were preparing to cross. All were well armed. Reliance on bands formed on the territory of neighboring countries was vivid evidence of the radical social changes which had taken place in Eastern Bukhara, where the counterrevolution had lost all support among the toiler population.

Local Soviet authorities and the Red Army command were taking effective measures against the basmachi.

An important role in disintegration of the basmachi camp was played by the All-Lokay Conference held on 25 December 1923, attended by all the mullahs of Lokay tribes. They unanimously acknowledged that Soviet rule was not in conflict with the Muslim religion, and consequently basmachi opposing Soviet authority could not link their actions with defense of Islam. The decision by the religious authorities exerted enormous influence on religious believers in Eastern Bukhara. Of particular significance was the fact that the conference bound all mullahs to conduct agitation against the basmachi. It is not surprising that Ibragim-bek assessed the decision of the conference as betrayal of Islam. He realized that time was working against him.

Toward the end of December 1923 and at the beginning of 1924 Ibragim-bek undertook a new attempt to unite the basmachi of all Eastern Bukhara, particularly Gissar and Lokay. In actual fact the obtained structure of subordination was relative: the kurbashi coordinated with Ibragim-bek only general matters pertaining to the anti-Soviet struggle. Nevertheless the numerical strength of the basmachi, under the chieftainship of Ibragim-bek, grew to 2500 men in the winter months of 1924. Two special detachments and a composite Bukharan border detachment were formed for the purpose of wiping them out. With the active participation of the local population, the majority of the small groups had been smashed by the end of January 1924. Many basmachi voluntarily surrendered to the Soviet authorities. Ibragim-bek once again withdrew into the Gissar Valley.

An important role in crushing the bands in the winter and spring of 1924 was played by the flexible policy conducted by local party and soviet agencies among the clergy and influential tribesmen. Actions similar to the All-Lokay

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Conference were arranged in other areas of Eastern Bukhara in the winter of 1924. Appeals to the basmachi to return to peaceful labor were adopted at these conferences. These appeals would usually be ratified by the signatures of ecclesiastics. "The people are tired, the people have been ravaged by the basmachi and demand that they lay down their arms forthwith, for which the Soviet authorities will pardon all dzhigits and kurbashi," stated one of the appeals. An even more serious warning to the basmachi was an appeal to religious believers signed by 113 ecclesiastics on behalf of all the ulema of the Bukhara Republic. It stated, in particular: "Our appeal expresses a single wish -- to free the people from the anxiety and calamities caused by the basmachi. If the basmachi reject this appeal, if they continue harming the civilian population, then it will be necessary to take the most resolute measures against the basmachi; the entire population must assist in this matter, pointing out where basmachi are hiding and where their weapons are, and this will lead to an early end to the basmachi and to the establishment of peace, order and an upright life."[80]

Of course not the entire clergy and not all influential tribesmen actively supported the campaign against the basmachi. Nevertheless statement of opposition to the basmachi by a portion of the clergy and prestigious representatives of the tribes attested to the fact that the counterrevolution, including the chiefs of the bands, had lost support among the tribes.

Ibragim-bek and his masters abroad still did not wish to lay down their arms, although they were compelled temporarily to suspend the fighting. Once again they altered their tactics, entering into negotiations with the Soviet authorities, as had happened on numerous occasions in the past. But the talks did not produce results. Delaying tactics were evident at the very first meetings, at which Ibragim-bek presented unwarranted demands. He would demand a year's postponement of the surrender, or would have an objection to the composition of the delegation, etc. Military operations again resumed.

On 11 February 1924 composite detachments dealt Ibragim-bek another blow. The basmachi lost 80 men in this battle. On the following days some of the basmachi voluntarily laid down their arms.

Ibragim-bek took refuge in the mountains. He would send out small groups on marauding raids on kishlaks, and he continued terrorizing the population.

In April 1924 several thousand basmachi were active in Central Asia.[81] By the summer of 1924 Ibragim-bek had again assembled a detachment of 600 men from the Lokay, Dushanbe, and Babatag.[82] The detachment's main forces were based in the vicinity of the kishlak of Aul-Kiik. The basmachi burned crops in the field, confiscated grain and livestock from the dekhkans, punished the "disobedient," but avoided confrontations with Red Army units and people's volunteer detachments. They were not always able to evade pursuit, however. Ibragim-bek's band lost 30 dead and 50 wounded in a clash with a squadron of the 10th Cavalry Regiment. After this, Ibragim-bek changed his base to Aral-Tugay. A composite battalion of the 66th Regiment and a squadron of the 65th Cavalry Regiment, in which new recruits dominated, set out for this area. Hoping to exploit this fact, Ibragim-bek decided to engage. The inexperienced Red Armymen, however, fought courageously. The basmachi were unable

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to withstand the cavalry charge and took to their heels. This battle cost Ibragim-bek 50 dead. The commander of his personal bodyguard was among these casualties.

The main forces of the basmachi were massing at this time in the Kulyab area. Maneuvering in the rugged mountain conditions, the basmachi avoided frontal encounters and remained elusive. The command authorities dispatched the combat - famed 6th Independent Altay Cavalry Brigade, under the command of civil war hero N. D. Tomin, to wipe them out.[83] As the brigade was approaching Kulyab in mounted formation, Tomin dismounted short of town and ordered all of his men to dismount. "We are not conquerors, but liberators," he told them. "Therefore we should enter town on foot. This is a sign of respect for the people."[84]

In June 1924 300 basmachi of the kurbashi Akbartugsabo attacked the brigade's headquarters in Kulyab. The headquarters security guard boldly engaged the attackers and staunchly defended the fort, in which the headquarters subunits were quartered. The basmachi lost 170 dead and wounded in the fierce battle, and withdrew.

In the summer of 1924 the basmachi main forces in Kulyab Viloyat were soundly defeated. The remaining small groups continued to attack caravans and small garrisons and to raid kishlaks.

The successes in the campaign against the basmachi provided the Bukhara Communist Party and Bukhara TsIK a basis for implementing a number of measures to strengthen Soviet rule in Eastern Bukhara. In May 1924 the Bukhara Communist Party decided to abolish the Revkoms and establish agencies of Soviet authority throughout Eastern Bukhara. On 28 May 1924 the Bukhara TsIK issued a decree entitled "On Sovietization of Eastern Bukhara," on the basis of which the Emergency Dictatorial Commission ceased existence. It was replaced by a Provisional Central Executive Committee of Soviets of People's Deputies of Eastern Bukhara. An election campaign was held in the summer of 1924, in preparation for elections to dzhamagat [village-level administrative unit], kent [settlement, town], tyumen, and viloyat congresses of people's representatives. A congress of Soviets of Eastern Bukhara was held at the beginning of September 1924, following elections to local agencies of Soviet authority.

The month of September 1924 was of significance for the entire Bukhara People's Soviet Republic. In this month the 5th All-Bukhara Congress of Soviets issued an enactment transforming the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic into the Bukhara Soviet Socialist Republic. The congress enactment emphasized that the main task of the peoples of Bukhara -- Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz, and Kazakhs, among whom there was full equality, was "achievement of a transition to socialism by carrying out socialist reforms and crushing all counterrevolutionary actions against the proletariat and its dictatorship."[85] The Bukhara Soviet Socialist Republic declared its fraternal unity with all socialist republics and with the Great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The transition by the BPSR to the path of building socialism became possible as a result of the considerable success which had been achieved by the toilers of

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Bukhara in 1920-1924, the consolidation of Soviet rule, and mobilization of all manpower and resources for the struggle against the bitterest enemies of the people -- the basmachi.

Central, republic, and oblast permanent conferences to combat the basmachi were established in September 1924 to organize the struggle against the basmachi bands in Central Asia. The membership of each conference included a representative of the executive committee (as head), party agency secretary, the commander and commissar of the military combined unit stationed on the territory of the republic or oblast, GPU chief, chief of finance agencies, worker-peasant inspectorate chief, and the procurator. The Central Conference to Combat the Basmachi was headquartered in Tashkent. It was headed by the chairmen of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, and the chairman of the Uzbekistan Sovnarkom served as his deputy. Later the conferences were renamed commissions to combat the basmachi.

A policy of coordinating all manpower and resources to combat the basmachi was adopted. An increasingly extensive effort was conducted to break up the basmachi groups and to persuade them to surrender voluntarily.

In response to the measures taken by the Soviet authorities, the instigators and organizers of counterrevolutionary activities, seeking to galvanize the basmachi, beginning in December 1924 proceeded to move in large groups from abroad. The border guards at the Kui-Kara-Komar border post twice engaged basmachi who were attempting to penetrate Soviet territory.

Between 15 and 23 December 1924 350 basmachi penetrated into Karshinskiy Rayon, where they proceeded to engage in terrorist activities against activists, party and soviet officials, and dekhkans who were sympathetic to Soviet rule.

At the end of December 1924 Ibragim-bek returned to the Lokay. Once again he succeeded in gathering under his command almost all the basmachi of Eastern Bukhara. They totaled as many as a thousand men.

The groups were formed in a unique manner. Distrusting the dekhkans, the leaders divided the basmachi into volunteers consisting of well-to-do elements which were clearly hostile to Soviet rule (forming the basic nucleus of these groups), and askers, who were mobilized by coercion.[86]

Among the askers there many who not only had no desire to join the basmachi but who endeavored to utilize their forced presence in the band to demoralize it and, when opportunity arose, would desert the basmachi encampments.

Ibragim-bek endeavored to improve organization and discipline among the basmachi. All basmachi suspected of insufficient ferocity or guilty of some offense would be sent to a special ("punishment") detachment. Records were kept on the rolls of basmachi, forces, weapons, ammunition, and equipment. A system of subordination of small to larger kurbashi was established. An intelligence gathering system through informers was established, for which they enlisted former functionaries of the Bukhara emirate and the reactionary clergy.

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Special groups were assigned to rob the population (under the guise of collecting various assessments and taxes). If the population refused to pay taxes, force would be used. The "tax collectors" were directly subordinate to Ibragim-bek. This system enabled him to keep the plundered booty under his control and use it for purposes of personal enrichment, as well as for supporting the former Bukhara emir and his retainers.

As a result of the activities of these bands, a return to normal life in the fertile Gissar and Vakhsh valleys was proving difficult.

Letters seized from Ibragim-bek attest to the continuous direction from abroad of the basmachi on the territory of Soviet Central Asia. These letters contained general instructions on how to operate, reported appointments, promotions, etc.[87] The basmachi in turn sent back over the border intelligence of espionage interest which they had collected.

This correspondence, which dates to 1925, contains many facts indicating that some tribes and clans were in their entirety opposing the basmachi. Dekhkans, forced to join the bands, were undertaking mass escapes. In a letter to Ibragim-bek the kurbashi Temir reported that he was unable to deliver food supplies, because in the Kafirnigan River area all the basmachi had dispersed and gone home, while the "population has become unreliable; they will capture and tie up askers."[88]

Mullahs across the border would write to Ibragim-bek and his kurbashi: "...Some persons have joined you and then again left your bands. Please inform us who these persons are, and in conformity with the shariat these persons will be declared unbelievers on the basis of the shariat, and will be condemned to death by that same shariat."[89]

Ibragim-bek took desperate measures to save the basmachi bands from defeat. He sought to exert psychological pressure on the population, to compel the people to believe in the strength of the basmachi. Toward this end he instructed the kurbashi to step up sabotage activities, "to destroy telegraph lines, to put goods storage facilities to the torch, etc."[90] At the same time Ibragim-bek organized special groups which were sent to the auls and kishlaks to conduct anti-Soviet propaganda and to perpetrate terrorist actions against the recalcitrants. Early in January 1925 Ibragim-bek conducted a raid into the Surkhan Valley, into the Sherabad and Baysun areas, chiefly a reconnaissance foray. The basmachi leaders once again saw clearly that the toiling population was hostile to them. The dekhkans quickly formed volunteer detachments. In only 5 days four volunteer detachments totaling 400 men were formed just in the Gissar Valley. Dekhkans of the Isankhodzha tribe formed a detachment of 100 men.

In the winter of 1925 basmachi were surrendering to Soviet authorities, especially in the Kashka Darya and Surkhan Darya areas. Land and water reform measures being carried out by the Soviet Government for the benefit of the dekhkans, which evoked among the basmachi the strong desire for peaceful labor, fostered disintegration of the basmachi. Askers demanded that they be allowed to go home and work in the fields. Fearing a final collapse of the bands, some kurbashi were forced temporarily to allow their basmachi to return to their kishlaks.

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As before, however, voluntary surrender did not always signify sincere repentance. Taking advantage of the amnesty and the humane laws of the Soviet Government, a portion of the basmachi gave up their outlaw status in order to gain time, to end clan and tribal hostility, and then, choosing a suitable moment, to recommence the struggle against Soviet rule.

Many basmachi who surrendered to Soviet authorities continued to keep their weapons, including machineguns, in a number of localities continued collecting various taxes from the population for their own benefit, and maintained contacts with the kurbashi hiding in the mountains. The kurbashi Berdy-Dotkho, for example, utilized negotiations about surrendering to the Soviet authorities in order to stock up on food supplies and prepare the basmachi for new raids. This once again attested to the perfidy of the basmachi leaders and demanded constant vigilance and a high degree of combat readiness on the part of the toiler masses, party and soviet agencies, commanders and Red Armymen.

The basmachi inflicted immense damage on the economy of Tajikistan. This is eloquently indicated by the following figures: between 1919 and 1925 the total number of sheep declined from 5 million to 120,000, and goats -- 2.5 million to 300,000. Constant devastating basmachi raids forced the population of a number of areas in which bands were concentrated to abandon settled localities. During this same time population numbers in areas of active operations of basmachi bands declined substantially, while in some areas the population dwindled practically to zero: everybody went to where the Soviet authorities were in firm control. In Kurgan-Tyubinskiy Rayon, for example, only 5 out of 36 kishlaks remained. The population in Gissarskiy Rayon declined catastrophically.

The RKP(b) Central Committee continued closely monitoring the class struggle in Central Asia. On 27 January 1925 the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo once again examined the basmachi question and ratified measures drafted by the Sredazbyuro to wipe out the bands. At the same time it pointed to the necessity of more resolute actions against the basmachi in Eastern Bukhara. Conditions were more favorable for this than in previous years. The numerical strength of the bands had diminished considerably. National-state delimitation and establishment of the Tajik ASSR, with its capital at Dushanbe, ensured the resolution of many socioeconomic and political problems taking the specific features of the region into account.

Measures taken to beef up security along the border were hampering the basmachi forces. In those years, however, there were no means of solidly sealing the border in the difficult conditions of mountain terrain. The basmachi found way to get through and sent Ibragim-bek arms, ammunition, and men.

Receiving reinforcements in manpower and arms, in the spring of 1925 Ibragim-bek resumed combat operations. On 18 April 1925 the Tajik ASSR Revkom placed the republic under martial law.[91]

Of great significance in subsequent mobilization of the indigenous population of Uzbekistan to combat the enemy was the resolution of the 1st Congress of

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the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (February 1925), attended by M. I. Kalinin, entitled "On National Military Units,"[92] which were intended primarily for fighting the basmachi. Communists and non-party toilers were assigned to the national units. The Independent Uzbek Rifle Battalion, the Independent Uzbek Cavalry Battalion, the Independent Uzbek Rifle Company, the Independent Uzbek Packhorse Battery, the Independent Tajik Cavalry Battalion, the Independent Turkmen Cavalry Battalion, the Independent Kirghiz Cavalry Squadron, and the Kazakh Cavalry Regiment were formed in 1924-1927.[93]

An important event for the entire Turkestan Front was award to the 13th Rifle Corps, which was operating against the basmachi (civil war hero I. F. Fed'ko, corps commander), of the banner of the Communist Party of Great Britain at the 1st All-Uzbek Congress of Soviets, held in February 1925.

In the spring of 1925 a coordinated shock campaign was conducted to combat the basmachi in Tajikistan, a campaign which combined economic, political, administrative, and military methods. As always, such a campaign was accompanied by intensification of political work among the masses.

Public trials of band chiefs were held, for example. They exposed the true countenance of the basmachi and unmasked the views hostile to the people which were being propagandized by the organizers of the basmachi bands.

Once again mass volunteer detachments were formed, which played an important role, together with the volunteer militia detachments, in defeating the basmachi. They fought staunchly and courageously. There were 16 volunteer detachments, containing a total of 327 active fighting members, just in Gissarskiy, Kulyabskiy, and Kurgan-Tyubinskiy rayons in August 1925.[94] A number of men of the volunteer detachments were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, and M. Sultanov was named People's Hero of Tajikistan.[95] The volunteer detachment from the kishlak of Mingachar, Gissarskiy Rayon, containing 50 men and operating under the command of Yu. Sakhibnazarov, gained extensive fame. The bandits feared it. While escorting a caravan carrying food supplies, the detachment engaged several groups of basmachi which were attempting to seize the people's property. The caravan advanced step by step for 3 days, fighting off continuous enemy attacks. The goods, fully intact, were delivered to their destination.

As a result of the spring campaign of 1925, the number of bands operating on the territory of Tajikistan had decreased to 31 by the end of May, totaling slightly more than 400 men. Basmachi were retreating into the mountains and into the sands of the desert. Intertribal and interclan hostility between the kurbashi and the rank-and-file basmachi was becoming increasingly more marked. As a result, the bands continued to break up into smaller ones.

In connection with the crop failure in 1924, party and soviet agencies took measures to aid the dekhkans. Taxes were reduced, and in those areas where the situation was particularly calamitous, the population was totally exempted from taxes and given the requisite material support: seed loans were made, special commissions were formed to assist the spring planting, aryks were repaired, and kishlaks were provided with services and amenities. An enormous

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job was done to assist starving people in Lokay, Kulyab, and Garm viloyats, which had suffered the most from the drought and basmachi pillaging.

Local party and soviet agencies resettled a portion of the dekhkans in an organized manner to fertile areas, on the lands of former bai. There was no abatement of mass-political work. Political rallies were held in the kishlaks, and reports were presented on the tasks and achievements of the Soviet authorities, on the aims of the basmachi bands and their foreign leaders and instigators. The USSR Sovnarkom allocated large subsidies for Tajikistan and forgave the republic its total arrears in agriculture.

The status of the struggle against the basmachi was once again examined on 2 June 1925 at an RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro plenum. The plenum specified additional measures to complete the defeat of the basmachi and pointed to the necessity of working among the clergy with the aim of detaching it from the basmachi.

Individual basmachi and small groups were voluntarily surrendering almost daily.[96] During the first 10 days in June 1925 alone 142 persons, including 10 kurbashi, voluntarily surrendered to the Soviet authorities.

The toilers frequently sent delegates to the bands demanding that they surrender to the Soviet authorities, and took into custody basmachi who appeared in the kishlaks. Ties between the dekhkans, the Red Army and the border guards were growing stronger. The Red Armymen and the border guards were not only protecting the population against pillaging, terrorism and violence but were also helping them provide kishlaks with services and amenities, helping out in farm work, and taking part in political work.

By the end of May 1925 in many areas of Central Asia there were practically no large basmachi groups. In Samarkandskaya Oblast, for example, only small groups remained (2-4 men each), which would take refuge in the kishlaks, only occasionally making their presence known by isolated terrorist acts and depredations.

The situation in Tajikistan's border areas remained more serious. But basmachi were continuing to surrender voluntarily to Soviet authorities in these areas as well. Individual kurbashi even publicly repented their evil deeds before the people. The kurbashi Khalar-bek, for example, addressed a crowded political rally and asked forgiveness and mercy of the dekhkans, swearing a solemn oath to expiate his guilt by actively assisting the Red Army. In June 1925 the kurbashi Abdraim, with 12 basmachi, voluntarily surrendered to Soviet authorities in the kishlak of Nory.[97] Soon Mulla-Turdy, an aide of Ibragim-bek, Mulla-Kendzha, a machinegunner for Ibragim, and many others followed his example.[98]

By the end of June 1925 Dushanbinskiy, Kafirniganskiy, Fayzabadskiy and a number of other rayons were completely cleared of basmachi bands. A report on the situation in Tajikistan by the Turkestan Front command dated 7 July 1925 stated: "...The campaign against the bands is proceeding successfully in all areas of Tajikistan. The men are in good spirits.... The dekhkans are

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becoming increasingly more actively involved in the struggle against the basmachi, by organizing volunteer Muslim detachments -- palochniki [lightly armed rearguard units] -- which are doing the important job of ferreting out the bands and affecting their morale.... The military pressure as well as economic and political measures have demoralized the basmachi bands.... The surrender of basmachi and individual kurbashi is continuing."[99]

Clashes with basmachi took place almost exclusively in frontier areas. In certain instances battles on the border were of an extended nature, lasting from 5 to 11 hours.[100]

But the more hopeless the position of the counterrevolution became, the more intensified became the terrorist activities of the last basmachi bands against the toilers, who were actively supporting Soviet rule. In May 1925 basmachi shot to death several local residents in the Kafirnigan area, and hacked to death two dekhkans and three aksakals in the Yavan area. On Ibragim-bek's orders, aksakals and kurbashi who had decided to give up the fight against the Soviet authorities were executed.[101]

Ibragim-bek formed special groups consisting of common criminals for the perpetration of terrorist acts. In June 1925 he ordered the establishment of ambushes and roadblocks in order to prevent basmachi from leaving the bands.

The basmachi brutally abused captured Red Armymen. In July 1925 a group of border guards, numbering 14 men, under the command of Sitnikov, engaged a band of 100 basmachi. The surrounded border guards fought to the last cartridge. Some of them were killed in the unequal battle, and some were wounded. A border guard squadron which came to their assistance found 14 mutilated bodies on the battlefield. The basmachi had mutilated the dead and tortured the wounded.[102]

Instances of crop burnings became more frequent in the summer months of 1925. Basmachi burned more than 600 hectares of grain crops in the Karaulinskaya Valley alone. They destroyed large acreages of grain crops in the Lokay.

Terrorist acts were applied not only to those who actively supported the Soviet authorities but to the entire population. Men, women, and children were shot and hacked to death. In one kishlak the basmachi of Berdy-Dotkho burned 250 dwellings and slaughtered 238 villagers, including 56 women and 106 adolescents. The pretext for the massacre was the people's refusal to allow the basmachi into the village and to give them food.[103]

In the Shakhrisyabz area the members of a village were herded into the village mosque on the orders of that same Berdy-Dotkho. There the basmachi slaughtered 8 persons in front of all the villagers.[104] In the kishlak of Besh-Bulak basmachi burned 30 dwellings, destroyed stocks of grain, hacked to death three dekhkans, and threw two men and two infants into a blazing bonfire.[105]

This faced the Red Army command authorities with the necessity of arranging security for the kishlaks in areas where the bands were operating most aggressively.

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The RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro Commission to Combat the Basmachi stated in a decision dated 30 July 1925 that the principal task for the fall-winter period was ensuring maintenance of public order and protecting the personal safety of citizens, as well as pursuit and annihilation of basmachi bands. Particular attention was focused on consolidation of achieved successes in the Dushanbe area and in the Lokay, stepping up the campaign against bandit units in Tajikistan's border areas, as well as in the Surkhan Darya and Kashka Darya areas of Uzbekistan.

Dekhkan self-protection detachments were formed, alongside volunteer fighting detachments. At the same time militia bodies, which were participating actively in the campaign against the basmachi, were beefed up.

Soviet authorities intensified oversight over the collection of taxes, thus depriving the basmachi leaders of the opportunity to engage in illegal collecting of taxes from the population. Worker-peasant inspectorates and commissions to assist them were established in all localities in order actively to involve the toilers in monitoring the activities of local authorities.

The party and soviet structure in the localities, Red Army and border troops political agencies continuously conducted mass-political work among the population. The dekhkans were extensively encouraged and rewarded for active support of measures being carried out by the Soviet authorities and for participation in the struggle against the basmachi.

Increased quantities of foodstuffs were hauled into areas where there were shortages, and seed was made available for planting crops. Measures were taken to develop cottage industry, and communications and transportation were improved. Ways were sought to speed up construction of the rail line between Termez and Dushanbe.

In the meantime Ibragim-bek had received new reinforcements from abroad and, in part, from domestic counterrevolutionary forces. By the fall of 1925 approximately 12 groups totaling approximately 400 men were under his command.

Red Army units, border troops, and volunteer detachments conducted a successful search-and-destroy operation against basmachi bands. During this operation they thoroughly mauled the forces of Ibragim-bek and Khuram-bek in the mountainous Babatag and Surkhan Darya area.

Within the span of several days three groups of basmachi (53 men) voluntarily surrendered together with their kurbashi in Surkhandar'inskiy Rayon.[106]

A number of bands were wiped out on the territory of Uzbekistan, including the bands of Said-Murat and Turdy-bay, who had been hiding in the Karatau Mountains for quite some time. After this, there was a sharp decline in basmachi terrorist activities on the territory of Uzbekistan.

New defeats inflicted on the basmachi units promoted their further disintegration not only on Soviet territory but, in part, abroad as well. According to

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figures as of 22 October 1925, in the Central Asian sector approximately 4000 persons (basmachi and their families) had crossed the border and voluntarily surrendered to Soviet authorities.

But Ibragim-bek was continuing to receive arms, ammunition and clothing from abroad. At the end of 1925, for example, the brother of the former emir of Bukhara sent him a large shipment of equipment and ammunition. Ibragim-bek's camp was frequently visited by British intelligence agents, who conducted training, brought money, and worked out ways of delivering arms and equipment. Four British intelligence officers visited basmachi camps at the end of September and beginning of October 1925 alone.[107]

Border guards and the local population displayed heroism in the struggle against the basmachi. On 8 January 1926 a well-armed band of 60 men crossed the border. It was spotted by a five-man group of border guards. Group leader Red Armyman Pryshchenko immediately sent a report with one of his men to the border guard post. Two additional groups of seven men each arrived in response to the prompt alert. The border post deputy commander for political affairs, Safonov, assumed command of the combined groups. The basmachi were unable to withstand the attack and fled into the mountains, leaving behind more than 20 dead.

At the beginning of 1926 there were even fewer basmachi in Central Asia than in the fall of 1925. As of 1 September 1925, according to incomplete figures, there were slightly more than 1000 basmachi in Central Asia (70 in Turkmenia, more than 500 in Uzbekistan, and 450 in Tajikistan).[108] By 22 February 1926 there were slightly more than 430 (70 in Turkmenia, less than 60 in Uzbekistan, and more than 300 in Tajikistan).[109] As was noted at a meeting of the Commission to Combat the Basmachi, however, held on 20 January 1926, the remaining bands still represented a definite threat. They might increase in numbers, since the basmachi continued to retain their social base -- the exploiter strata of the population.

In Tajikistan the majority of the basmachi, headed by Ibragim-bek, had concentrated on the left bank of the Surkhan Darya. Berdy-Dotkho, leader of the Kashka Darya basmachi, had moved into the same area. At the beginning of 1926 rumors began to spread among the population about an imminent meeting of all leaders for the purpose of consolidating the remaining basmachi groups under the command of Salim-pasha. At the same time Ibragim-bek issued instructions to fawning supporters among the reactionary clergy and the clan-tribal nobility to step up anti-Soviet agitation.

The VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee Sredazbyuro, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, and the party organization of Tajikistan acknowledged the necessity of wiping out remnants of bands on the territory of Soviet Central Asia. Toward this end preparations were made in Eastern Tajikistan in the spring and summer of 1926 for a combined operation against the basmachi. It was preceded by considerable preparatory work. By decision of party and soviet agencies, additional Red Army national units and volunteer detachments were formed, and border security was beefed up, especially along river sectors. Party and soviet workers were

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added to military units operating against the basmachi, to conduct political work among the population and to take measures to strengthen local authorities in areas where basmachi were still active.

The main striking forces included the 8th Independent Turkestan Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the 82d and 84th Cavalry regiments, the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The 7th Red-Banner Turkestan Rifle Regiment (the former 208th Regiment of the 24th Simbirsk Iron Rifle Division) of the 3d Turkestan Rifle Division distinguished itself in combat in 1925-1926. Operating on the left bank of the Vakhsh, it covered an assigned area of more than 1000 square kilometers. A total of 950 operational detachments of this regiment took part in defeating the basmachi. Border guards, a Tajik cavalry battalion, and an Uzbek rifle battalion took active part in the fighting.

The operation was directed by famed field commander and civil war hero S. M. Budennyy, member of the USSR Revvoyensovet, who arrived in Central Asia in the spring of 1926, and K. A. Avksent'yevskiy, commander of the Turkestan Front.[110] In recognition of his special merits in the struggle on the Central Asian Front, S. M. Budennyy was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor of the Uzbek SSR.[111]

The operation was conducted on a wide front, in order to contain the basmachi bands, to prevent them from escaping across the border, and to defeat them completely.

In the course of the fighting Ibragim-bek, pressed on all sides, succeeded in fleeing into Afghanistan during the night of 21 June 1926, accompanied by a small protective force. Khuram-bek also took refuge across the border.

The main forces of the basmachi were virtually eliminated as a result of this victory. At the beginning of the operation there were 73 small bands operating in Central Asia, while by 1 September 1926 there remained only 6.

In the Sands of the Kara Kum

Basmachi activities continued without cease in Khorezm in the period 1921-1927. Dzhunaid-khan was particularly active.

At the end of 1920 a proposal was made to Dzhunaid that he lay down his arms and expiate his guilt for his crimes against the people. This basmachi leader, however, rejected the proposal. Dzhunaid-khan's bands continued to perpetrate marauder raids on kishlaks. The Red Army command authorities resolved to achieve total defeat of the bands remaining in Khorezm. Operations were conducted by two Red Army groups consisting of 5 companies and 3 squadrons. The cavalry squadron under the command of Mirkamil' Mirsharapov, one of the first outstanding Uzbek military commanders, who in 1921 became chairman of the Khorezm Republic Revvoyensovet, distinguished itself in combat.

In the spring of 1921 the basmachi concentrated at the well of Adzhi-Kul'. Subunits of the Red Army caught up with them here. The opposing forces

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engaged in battle, in the course of which the basmachi main forces were destroyed or captured. The remaining basmachi fled into the desert with Dzhunaid-khan and remained inactive for some time.

In the meanwhile the toiling people of Khorezm were consolidating the Soviet system. The toiler masses, led by Communists, opposed the Jadids, whose rightist leaders had ties with the basmachi.

In April 1921 a special commission of the Turkkomissiya of the VTsIK and RSFSR SNK and Comintern, headed by Eastern studies specialist D. Yu. Gopner, which had devoted special attention to the Turkmen areas of the KPSR, headed for Khorezm. The RSFSR and Turkestan stepped up economic assistance to Khorezm.

The Second All-Khorezm Kurultay of Soviets was held in May 1921, with a number of vitally important items on the agenda: land-water, finances, armed forces, education, etc.

The kurultay devoted considerable attention to the nationalities question, which was of great importance in ethnically diverse Khorezm. Guided by Lenin's teaching, the kurultay spoke out in favor of equal rights for the citizens of the republic, regardless of clan, tribe, race and ethnic affiliation. Concrete measures were specified for strengthening friendship among peoples -- Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks -- who had been shedding one another's blood for centuries in internecine strife. Two departments were formed under the TsIK of the KPSR to find a practical resolution of the nationalities question: a Kazakh-Kara-Kalpak, and a Turkmen department.

Local agencies of Soviet authority were reorganized. The exploiter classes no longer participated in their election, although the clan principle of their organization continued to exist; aksakal'stvo, that is, subordination to the clan elder, remained.

On the basis of the resolutions of the Second Kurultay of Soviets, a 5000 man Red Army was formed in the Khorezm Republic; courts, people's militia and Cheka agencies were organized.

The process of establishing a Soviet State in Khorezm was taking place in conditions of an intense class struggle. Exploiting the fact of tenacity of old prejudices and with the aid of various machinations and devices, representatives of the exploiter classes and nationalist elements continued to preserve their positions in soviet agencies and in the party. They were making preparations to overthrow Soviet rule in Khorezm. At the end of 1921 an anti-Soviet plot was exposed, a conspiracy headed by Ata-Maksumov, chairman of the KPSR TsIK. Working in league with him were People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Mulla-Niyaz and several other officials. In the course of the investigation Ata-Maksumov, Mulla-Niyaz and their retainers fled to the basmachi.

In 1922 the Khorezm Communist Party became a component part of the RKP(b). This event played an enormous role in the life of the Khorezm toilers, in strengthening and development of the popular regime, and in accelerating the

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transition to socialist transformations. As a component of the RKP(b), the KCP [Khorezm Communist Party] rigorously implemented Leninist principles of nationalities policy. Another purge of the KCP took place in April-June 1923. A total of 709 persons remained in the party's ranks of the 1157 full and probationary party members.[112] The city and rayon committees were also enlarged. The Khorezm Communist Party devoted considerable attention to bringing toilers into party membership. By the fall of 1923 the class composition of the party had changed sharply: dekhkans comprised 77 percent of the total membership of the Khorezm Communist Party.[113]

Transformation of the KPSR into a socialist republic became an eminent event in the history of the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic. This took place in October 1923 at the Fourth All-Khorezm Kurultay of Soviets. A new Constitution was adopted, which declared that "Khorezm is a republic of soviets of workers', Red Army and dekhkan deputies.... The principal task of the Khorezm Government is creation of conditions whereby it will be impossible for one group to oppress others."[114] The Constitution, while giving voting rights to all toilers, denied the voting right to exploiters, ministers of religious cults, and all persons who consciously and deliberately opposed Soviet rule.

The Fourth All-Khorezm Kurultay of Soviets removed basmachi accomplices from official posts (in particular, Khodzha-Bobo, chairman of the All-Khorezm TsIK) and specified measures for enlisting toilers into agencies of authority.

The Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet, on the instructions of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, took measures to step up the campaign against the basmachi in Khorezm. M. K. Levandovskiy, commander of the Turkestan Front, redeployed units from the Fergana to Khorezm; Khorezm's national military units were strengthened with command personnel, instructors, and weapons. A Revvoyensovet of the Khorezm Group of Forces was formed (consisting of three representatives from the KSSR and two from the Revvoyensovet of the Turkestan Front), which was charged with directing military operations against the basmachi. I. C. Kutyakov, a civil war hero and associate of V. I. Chapayev, was named commander of the Khorezm Group of Forces.

Political and military measures to combat the basmachi were conducted in conditions where counterrevolutionary activities in Khorezm had revived by the end of 1923. The basmachi had launched an anti-Soviet struggle throughout the republic and had stepped up terrorist activities against party and soviet activists.

The new basmachi upsurge was a result of an aggravation of class conflicts at that stage in the history of the peoples of Khorezm when they were proceeding to build a socialist society. There was a clear delineation of the camp of the revolution and socialism, represented by the toiler masses, and the camp of the counterrevolution -- the exploiter classes in the person of feudal lords, the khan's functionaries, the clergy, and spokesmen for their interests -- bourgeois nationalists.

The leader of the Khorezm basmachi was able to exploit for his own purposes the campaign which was in progress at that time to strip the clergy of landholdings

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and political rights. Naturally the measures being carried out by the Soviet authorities caused resentment among the clergy and vacillations on the part of some religious believers. Playing on religious feelings and supported by assistance from the reactionary clergy and bai, and exploiting the dissatisfaction of a portion of the dekhkans caused by certain mistakes made by the Khorezm Communists in implementing socialist reforms, Dzhunaid-khan increased the numerical strength of his detachments to 9000 men.

An anti-Soviet insurrection flared up in January 1924 in a number of areas of the KSSR. Dzhunaid-khan, who was hiding in the desert, played an active role in preparing for this insurrection.

Dzhunaid-khan captured Tashauz, Pitnyak, Gurlen, Gazabad, and other communities. On 10 January 1924 savage fighting erupted around Khiva. On 19 January Dzhunaid-khan laid siege to Khiva and Novo-Urgench.

The toilers rose up in defense of the republic's capital. A Revkom was formed, which drew up a plan of defense of the city. Communists and Komsomol members stood in the vanguard of the defenders. Within just a few days they had established a volunteer detachment of 500 men and, together with 90 soldiers of the 4th Turkestan Cavalry Regiment and 200 Red Armymen of the 3d Rifle Battalion, staunchly defended Khiva against the basmachi. Battle-toughened units of the Khorezm Group of Forces were approaching the city.

Large-scale operations were conducted in the sands of the Kara Kum. Units of the Turkestan Front, which had hurried to the assistance of the toilers of Khorezm, accomplished a desert crossing for the first time in the history of the Red Army.[115]

Dzhunaid was attempting to exert a psychological effect on the city's defenders. In front of the walls of Khiva the basmachi brutally tortured captured soldiers, party and soviet officials, and activists. They put out the eyes and hacked off the arms of the gravely wounded commander of the 2d Cavalry Squadron, Anzhello. They then beheaded him, impaled his head on a pole, and displayed it by the gates of the fort. More than 200 soviet employees were slaughtered in Pitnyak, Tashauz, and Takhty. The atrocities perpetrated by the basmachi, however, failed to break the fighting spirit of the Red Armymen and volunteers, but merely intensified their hatred toward the enemy and their desire to avenge the deaths of their comrades.

The 218-man Turtkul' Company, formed of volunteers from Amudar'inskaya Oblast, the Shurkhan Volunteer Platoon, and a composite detachment totaling 130 sabers and 45 bayonets from Novo-Urgench came to the aid of the besieged city.

There was savage fighting with Dzhunaid's forces on 28 and 29 January. The basmachi sustained heavy casualties in fierce clashes. The fighting began to abate on the following days. The siege of the capital was lifted on 4 February 1924.

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The pilots of the 2d and 4th Independent Reconnaissance detachments, under the command of P. Kh. Mezheraup, commander of the air force of the Turkestan Front, greatly assisted ground units in defeating the bands of Dzhunaid-khan.[116]

During the siege of Khiva basmachi captured part of the town of Khazarasp. The remainder of the town was in the hands of a small garrison. A detachment of Kara-Kalpak volunteers, 300 men strong, came to the assistance of the Red Armymen. On the night of 28 January 1924, the detachment attacked the enemy without a halt to deploy. A drawn-out battle ensued. The basmachi withdrew by evening on 2 February. Remnants of the band fled into the desert. For courage and valor displayed in battle against the basmachi, several units of the Turkestan Front were awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner of the USSR TsIK and the Honorary Revolutionary Red Banner of Khorezm. I. S. Kutyakov, commander of the Khorezm Group of Forces, was awarded a third Order of the Red Banner. All large basmachi combined units on the territory of the Khorezm Republic had been wiped out by the end of spring 1924. Peacetime building of socialism resumed, and accelerated restoration of agriculture was begun. In this situation the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro decided in March 1924 to send to Khorezm a special commission to give direct assistance to the republic's Communists. On the basis of the commission's report, the Sredazbyuro pointed to the danger of isolation of the KCP from the masses and therefore recommended that particular circumspection be shown in regard to the middle strata of the population (the middle peasant, local intelligentsia, artisans and handicraft workers). In order to strengthen the social base of revolutionary reforms and to correct mistakes which had been made, the Sredazbyuro suggested broadening the group of persons granted suffrage and more boldly enlisting middle dekhkans and citizens at large to participation in Soviet rule. Some recommendations dealt with taxation policy, dekhkan credit, etc. Gold, hard rubles and other assistance were sent to Khorezm.[117] An RKP(b) Central Committee commission headed by G. I. Broydo came to the republic, and did a great deal of work on strengthening local party organizations and correcting their mistakes and deficiencies in practical work.

In March 1924 the Khorezm Republic TsIK adopted a law which substantially reduced taxes on dekhkans and small handicraft workers, which had a beneficent influence on development of the economy and forming political consciousness in the toilers.

The toiler population of the Khorezm Republic was given assistance from funds of the USSR (500,000 rubles) and the RSFSR (125,000 rubles). Water transport and communications were being restored.

Certain success was also achieved in the area of nationalities policy. In May 1924 the Khorezm TsIK decided to establish Turkmen and Kazakh autonomous oblasts as elements of the Khorezm Soviet Socialist Republic.

All the measures enumerated above strengthened Soviet rule in Khorezm and undermined the foundations of the basmachi. But execution of these measures was not proceeding easily. Clan and tribe leaders did not wish to give up age-old privileges. The Soviet authorities, gradually depriving the leaders of their power, sought to avoid aggravating relations with them, for land and

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livestock were still in their hands, which gave them the capability to raise up arms against the toiling people again in the future.

Having suffered a crushing defeat in 1924, Dzhunaid-khan took refuge in the desert. Having lost the majority of his nukers [members of a military commander's personal bodyguard] and kurbashi, who had returned to peaceful labor, it seemed that Dzhunaid comprehended the hopelessness of continued struggle. He entered negotiations with the Soviet authorities and voluntarily surrendered.

The First All-Turkmen Congress of Soviets (February 1925), moved by the desire to end military operations as quickly as possible and to concentrate all resources on rebuilding and improving the economy, amnestied Dzhunaid-khan.

But it was soon ascertained that Dzhunaid-khan had not laid down his arms. This vicious predator, the recent ruler of Khiva, could not accept defeat and the new life which had powerfully invaded the most remote corners of Turkmenia. Dzhunaid continued to maintain contacts with British intelligence and with the counterrevolutionary emigré community, organized new basmachi detachments, and spread rumors that the capitalist nations would attack the USSR any day now.

In the summer and fall of 1927 several caravans laden with arms and ammunition reached Dzhunaid from abroad. Couriers bearing instructions from foreign intelligence services would arrive now and then from Kabul and Mashhad.[118]

On 19 September 1927 Dzhunaid stirred up an insurrection against Soviet rule. Continuous raids began to be mounted on the kishlaks located in the vicinity of the town of Kunya-Urgench. Basmachi bands once again appeared in the Tashauz District, Bakhardenskiy, Kazandzhikskiy, and other rayons of Turkmenia.[119]

It became obvious at the very outset that the people of Turkmenia not only did not support Dzhunaid but had actively enlisted in the struggle against the basmachi. Collection of the agricultural tax was successfully continuing. The population was voluntarily providing Red Army units with fodder and food supplies. Volunteer detachments were formed in many auls (Khodzha-Kumbet in Takhtinskiy Rayon, No 3 in Kunya-Urgenchskiy Rayon, etc), which directly participated in the struggle against Dzhunaid's bands. The TsIK and Sovnarkom of Turkmenia declared Dzhunaid-khan an outlaw.

The Revvoyensovet of the Central Asian Military District received an order from the Soviet Government to wipe out Dzhunaid's bands. Two groups of forces were formed -- the Southern, and the Northern. A lengthy pursuit of Dzhunaid-khan by several Turkestan cavalry regiments began on 27 October 1927. The enemy was spotted by aircraft in the vicinity of Orta-Kuyu well. Following aerial bombardment, cavalry squadrons under the command of A. A. Luchinskiy (later to rise to the rank of army general and to become an outstanding military commander in the Great Patriotic War) and G. S. Markovich, a Serb, put Dzhunaid-khan to rout. G. S. Markovich was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for this battle. It was his third combat decoration. All were received on the Turkestan Front. A. A. Luchinskiy and many other soldiers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.[120]

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Soldiers Annamurad Saryyev, Orazmamed Tachmamedov, Sergey Shcherbakov, G. Nazarov, Kara Baymuradov, and others distinguished themselves in the fighting against Dzhunaid.[121]

The outcome of the struggle was as could be expected. Dzhunaid's detachments were defeated.[122] Dzhunaid-khan hid for several months deep in the Kara Kum, and in June 1928 made his escape to Iran.[123] There he continued his anti-popular activities, making preparations for new escapades.

Other basmachi leaders were also operating in Turkmenia in 1924-1927. These minor "dzhunaids" and "dzhunaidiks" would mount raids, killing and looting, and then flee across the border. Here are several examples.

On 23 August 1924 young people from Khorezm auls set out in two kayuks [car-sail river cargo vessel] along the Amu Darya to various towns to enroll in school. The basmachi of Durdy-Klych set up an ambush in clumps of rushes near Khodzheyli. As soon as the first kayuk, carrying 30 students, drew abeam of the spot where the band waited in ambush, the basmachi opened fire on the unarmed passengers. Some of the students fled into the rushes. The basmachi captured 16 young boys who were actively participating in the establishment of Soviet rule. After taunting and torturing them, they bound them with rope and pushed them into the water. On 26 August basmachi seized 8 more students and brutally tortured 7 of them -- only 1 succeeded in escaping. The basmachi tortured the students in the presence of their wives and children, who were traveling with them.

When they learned of the band's actions from the student who had succeeded in escaping, the Komsomol members and young people of Tashauz immediately formed a volunteer detachment and proceeded toward Khodzheyli. In a brief skirmish they soundly defeated the basmachi and rescued the surviving students, women and children. Durdy-Klych escaped into the sands of the Kara Kum.

Almost a year later, on 14 August 1925, the 1st Squadron of the 83d Cavalry Regiment of the 8th Cavalry Brigade conducted a search operation to locate Durdy-Klych's group, which was making marauding raids on auls from the Kara Kum.

In the course of the operation the squadron captured several basmachi. Among the prisoners was Durdy-Klych's brother, Tagan-Durdy. He had personally participated in the brutal torture of the Khorezm students. Tagan-Durdy received deserved punishment along with the other basmachi, who had perpetrated many crimes against Soviet rule and peaceful citizens.

The activities of the bands had practically ceased on the territory of Turkmenia by October 1925. Only infrequently did small bands rob the population or perpetrate isolated terrorist acts. But soon the situation on the Soviet-Iranian border deteriorated in connection with an insurrection by several Turkmen tribes residing in Iran. Iranian troops, which had frequently crossed the border in groups of up to 200 men, concentrated in the vicinity of Atrek to fight the insurgents.[124]

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Seeking to avoid potential border incidents between the USSR and Iran, Soviet and Iranian representatives held a meeting in December 1925, at which they agreed to the appointment of border commissioners to settle disputes. The basmachi attempted to exploit the disquieting situation which had arisen.

On 11 May 1926 a basmachi band attacked a border post in the Kara Kum. Post commander Nesterov and his 13 men engaged in an unequal contest. Machinegunner Barannik displayed particular heroism. Delivering accurate fire, he forced the basmachi time and again to withdraw with heavy casualties. Border post commander Nesterov and Red Armyman Barannik were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for courage and valor displayed in this battle.[125]

Liberation of the territory of Soviet Central Asia from basmachi bands did not yet signify total elimination of the basmachi. Counterrevolutionary forces, concentrated in the border areas of Afghanistan and Iran, as well as basmachi who had fled across the border could form new bands. Some of the bands in the Central Asian republics had gone underground and under certain conditions could once again become active.

In October 1926, that is, after Soviet territory had been cleared of the principal basmachi bands, isolated groups still remained, especially in the Khorezm, Mary and Tashauz areas. These bands engaged chiefly in armed robbery. They were small in numbers but were mobile, and maintained close contacts with the basmachi abroad. Therefore party and soviet agencies and the command authorities of the Red Army and border troops kept the volunteer detachments and military units at a requisite state of combat readiness and devoted considerable attention to instilling vigilance both among military personnel and the local population. Local executive committees and border guards continued combating the remaining groups. OGPU [Unified State Political Directorate] proposed to the USSR Labor and Defense Council that border security be strengthened, especially in lightly populated areas. At the end of 1926 the Soviet Government allocated funds to beef up border security in Central Asia.

A number of agreements and treaties made with Afghanistan and Iran in 1926 and 1927 helped improve things on the Central Asian border. On 1 October 1927 G. V. Chicherin, USSR people's commissar of foreign affairs, and Iranian minister Ali Goli-khan Ansari affixed their signatures to a treaty of security and neutrality. The treaty of 1 October 1927 reaffirmed the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921, and at the same time expanded opportunities for further development of good-neighbor relations on a basis of equality.

Soviet-Afghan relations were also developing favorably. On 31 August 1926 the USSR and Afghanistan concluded a neutrality and mutual nonaggression treaty. In connection with the fact that a great many counterrevolutionary emigrés were residing on Afghan territory, the Soviet-Afghan treaty stated that the parties to the treaty would refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of the other party, and also would not permit on their territory any activity directed against the other country.

But with all its fidelity toward the Soviet Union, during those years Afghanistan was unable to establish a situation in its border zone which

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hampered basmachi raids onto Soviet territory, since Afghanistan did not possess the requisite military forces. The counterrevolutionary emigrés continued to utilize Afghan territory as a base for anti-Soviet activities.

From 3 September 1926 through 7 January 1927 alone basmachi groups formed abroad invaded Soviet territory on 21 occasions. On 3 September 25 basmachi robbed the residents of Ravnina Station. On 25 September 59 basmachi attacked a topographic party, killed a geologist, seized property and fled back across the border. On 5 October a 70-man band from across the border sacked the kishlak of Chepek-Yab. On 19 October 100 horsemen crossed the border and robbed the people of the kishlak of Lyambe and looted a cotton purchasing station. On 4 December 200 basmachi raided Iolotanskiy Rayon.

The Soviet Union could not ignore the pillaging and violence perpetrated by basmachi from across the border. In November 1926 the USSR people's commissar of foreign affairs made a formal request to the Afghan minister of foreign affairs that requisite measures be taken to stop incursions by these bands against the republics of Central Asia from Afghan territory. The Afghan Government took steps to comply with these and other requests, but they were insufficiently effective due to the difficult situation within Afghanistan. Actions by bands from abroad directed against the Soviet republics of Central Asia would cease temporarily, subsequently to be resumed.

In December 1927 a 20-man party of border guards, under the command of Antonov, encountered a band of 70 basmachi who were attempting to escape back across the border. The border guards fought an unequal battle for several hours. Possessing a substantial numerical superiority, the basmachi attacked Antonov's force time and again. But not one of these attacks was successful. Border guards Antonov, Zheltenkov, Grivas and Lepikhov were awarded the Order of the Red Banner for selflessness displayed in combat.[126]

In January 1928 12 border guards engaged 60 basmachi. On this occasion as well the staunchness, courage and high degree of proficiency of the border guards ensured them victory in combat. Only a few basmachi succeeded in returning across the border into Iran.[127]

In July 1928 a group of basmachi led by Utan-bek attempted to invade Soviet territory near a border post. The band lost half of its men in the ensuing exchange of fire. Utan-bek retreated with the surviving remnants of the band.[128] A few days later he once again crossed over into Soviet territory. A cavalry detachment led by mobile group commander Maslennikov was sent out on 31 August to pursue and destroy the band. The detachment located the band in a mountain gorge beyond the Kafirnigan River. They joined battle, with the engagement lasting more than 48 hours, with one break in the fighting. The basmachi sustained heavy casualties and fled across the border.

Raids into Soviet territory ceased temporarily, but anti-Soviet forces continued to utilize basmachi based abroad. The surviving basmachi leaders refused to lay down their arms.

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A DYING ENEMY IS DANGEROUS

Incursion by Ibragim-Bek

A last flareup of basmachi activities began in 1929. Why did basmachi activities resume precisely in this year? It is due to many factors. In the broad historical overview, 1929 was marked by intensification of anti-Soviet activities on the part of international imperialism. Various interventionist schemes were carried out in 1929-1930.

Successful progress in building socialism was evoking growing concern on the part of the captains of the capitalist world. Their calculations that the Soviet people would be unable with their own resources to overcome the devastation and develop industry and agriculture proved erroneous. This country was moving forward, boosting the economy, picking up speed. New factories, industrial plants and electric power stations were coming on-stream -- the process of socialist industrialization was advancing on an increasingly broader front.

Our enemies' expectations of a bourgeois regeneration of the Soviet State also failed to pan out, expectations which appeared following the transition to NEP. The party set a course toward building socialism, toward squeezing out capitalist elements in the city and village, and toward ending man's exploitation of man. And this Leninist course of policy was being implemented.

World imperialist reactionary forces sought to strangle the USSR -- the bulwark of peace and socialism -- before it could build a powerful industry and transform the village according to socialist principles, and if they could not strangle it, they sought at least to impede the building of socialism and once again to cast the country into the abyss of destruction. Considerable hopes were placed on internal counterrevolutionary forces. The inevitable aggravation of the class struggle caused by a course of policy aimed at liquidating capitalist elements in the city and village presented the opportunity to utilize remnants of the domestic counterrevolution in the anti-Soviet struggle.

The forming of deliberate wrecking organizations in industry ("Shakhtintsy"), the activities of remnants of the Socialist Revolutionary-Menshevik underground, attempts to utilize the armed forces of the White Guard emigré community,

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diplomatic pressure brought to bear by the European imperialist nations, threatening a new intervention, and organization of acts of armed provocation in the Far East (Chinese militarists attacked Soviet territory in 1929) were all elements of a unified anti-Soviet front at the end of the 1920's.

They were unable to carry out these plans on a full-scale basis. The wise and flexible policy of the Soviet State knocked links out of this chain one after the other. Underground anti-Soviet organizations were neutralized. The swift defeat of the Chinese militarists in the Far East demonstrated the growing might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Nevertheless the international situation at the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's remained tense. The world economic crisis which began at the end of 1929 intensified the imperialists' desire to resolve their difficulties at the expense of the USSR. Once again attempts were undertaken to blockade the USSR politically and economically, anti-Soviet intervention schemes were hatched, the propaganda campaign intensified, and appeals to organize a "crusade" against the Soviet Union, an idea conceived by the reactionary Catholic elite, were constantly carried by the newspapers.

An important role in the overall plan of anti-Soviet struggle was assigned to the basmachi of Central Asia. Exerting considerable effort to step up basmachi activities, imperialist agents were counting on basmachi actions paralyzing economic life in the young republics of the East, on generating chaos and thwarting the implementation of socialist reforms. If successful, the basmachi could prepare the soil, create a bridgehead for the invasion of large interventionist forces, with the objective of detaching Central Asia from the Soviet Union and transforming it into a colony of the Western powers.

A number of circumstances made these anti-Soviet plans especially dangerous. The proximity of the border and its great length made it possible for imperialist agents to give meaningful assistance to the basmachi detachments. Considerable emigré forces were concentrated in the border areas of neighboring countries. Defeated in preceding years, counterrevolutionary groups which had fled from the Soviet Republic were anxious to continue the fight.

In many areas of Central Asia (in contrast to Central Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia), the revolution and civil war had not led to a cardinal change in socioeconomic relations. In the 1920's the feudal-bai strata retained their economic positions in some measure: they possessed a large part of the land, water, and livestock, thus retaining control of important levers of influence on the dekhkans.

As long as exploiter strata continued to exist, the class foundation of the basmachi also continued to exist. At the same time measures to restrict, squeeze out and liquidate feudal-bai elements inevitably would cause resistance on their part and lead to aggravation of the class struggle. But resistance by feudal-bai elements in conditions of Central Asia signified strengthening of the basmachi, for the activities of the basmachi constituted a specific form of the class struggle.

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Mass socioeconomic measures were carried out in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the latter half of the 1920's.

Land-water and livestock reforms were carried out during these years in Southern Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Landholdings of the feudal service tenant type were eliminated, excessive acreage was removed from large landholdings, and land was distributed among the landless peasants and those with insufficient land. More than 123,000 poor and middle peasants received land in the republics of Central Asia. In Kazakhstan the first /mass/ redivision of land took place in 1926-1928, with arable land and hayland acreage taken away from the feudal lords-bai. Following this, in 1928 livestock and equipment were confiscated from the bai (they comprised 6 percent of landholding units but owned 33.8 percent of the livestock).

All these measures improved the situation of the toiler masses and created conditions for proceeding along the road of building socialism. At the same time the class struggle was becoming more aggravated.

It reached an even greater degree of acuteness with the beginning of mass collectivization. Since the objective was now the total liquidation of exploiter elements, their resistance became particularly fierce. Supported by the assistance of reactionaries abroad, ranked solidly with the anti-Soviet emigré community, and exploiting the not yet eradicated ignorance and backwardness of the dekhkans, clan-tribal remnants and the influence of the reactionary clergy, feudal-bai elements engaged in a tenacious struggle against Soviet rule. These elements comprised a nutrient medium for basmachi activities, and the basmachi became their shock-force detachments, the main force in the anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary struggle.

Our enemies also utilized for their own ends the fact that in the course of collectivization the pace of collectivization was unwarrantedly accelerated and Leninist principles of voluntary participation were violated in a number of areas. The Communist Party corrected mistakes in a prompt and timely manner and eliminated cases of going too far. On 20 February 1930 the VKP(b) Central Committee issued a decree entitled "On Collectivization and the Struggle Against Kulaks in Economically Backward Ethnic Areas." This decree leveled sharp criticism at distortions of the party line which had occurred locally. The Central Committee demanded that in economically backward areas the focus be shifted to /preparations/ for total collectivization and to creation of the organizational-political and economic preconditions for its accomplishment. On 25 February the Central Committee again leveled criticism against those methods of collectivization which were being practiced in certain areas of Uzbekistan and in the Northern Caucasus. The Central Committee stressed the necessity of carrying out collectivization at a slower pace in these areas.[1]

The kolkhoz movement, overcoming difficulties, and taking position on a firm, healthy foundation, was growing and expanding. By the fall of 1931 64.1 percent of all peasant households in Kazakhstan had joined into kolkhozes. In

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1931 kolkhozes produced 52.1 percent of Uzbekistan's total agricultural output. In Kirghizia the percentage of collectivization reached 53.4 by the end of 1931, and 62.2 percent in Turkmenia. Collectivization was proceeding more slowly in Tajikistan -- in 1932 approximately 42 percent of all dekhkan households had joined kolkhozes (although this percentage was substantially higher in the republic's cotton growing areas).

The building of a new life was proceeding successfully in all the republics of Central Asia, and socialism was advancing on all fronts.

Deep in the steppe construction workers were selflessly laying the steel rails of the Turksib -- the Turkestan-Siberia Mainline. In July 1929 the tracks reached Alma-Ata, and the southern and northern sections were joined on 25 April 1930. The Turksib was opened to through traffic 17 months ahead of schedule.

In the fall of 1928 the Karsakpay Copper Smelting Combine came on-stream. New coal mines were being constructed in Karaganda -- it was becoming the country's third largest coal producing base -- and large enterprises were being built in Ridder, Aktyubinsk, Chimkent, and Dzhezkazgan. Heavy-industry enterprises, cotton processing mills and canneries, textile mills and food processing combines were going up in Uzbekistan and Kirghizia, in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The power industry was growing rapidly -- new electric power stations were appearing everwhere. In Uzbekistan gross industrial output increased by 130 percent and generation of electric power by 270 percent in the first five-year plan.

Soviet national statehood of the peoples of the East was consolidating successfully. As already stated, in 1926 the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast became the Kirghiz ASSR. At the end of 1929 Tajikistan, which had previously been an autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR, was transformed into a union republic.

The rapid advance of socialism was spreading across Central Asia, powerfully making its way into lush oases and distant mountain kishlaks. In the meantime, however, new basmachi detachments were being formed along the borders of the Soviet Central Asian republics, arms were being brought in, and forces were regrouping....

Beginning in the first weeks of 1929, increased activeness was noted on the part of basmachi bands from across the border. On 24 January 1929 more than 20 basmachi appeared on the road leading from Kushka to Merv. Spotting a border guard detail, the basmachi attacked it. After a brief exchange of fire they turned back in the direction from which they had come and took refuge in thickets of rushes.

In February 1929 two basmachi bands invaded Soviet territory in the vicinity of the kishlak of Nizhnyaya Chaaga. Isolated small bands also crossed or attempted to cross the border in other areas.

This was merely reconnaissance in force. The main basmachi organizers were making preparations for a large-scale venture.

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In March 1929 British intelligence officers, the former emir of Bukhara, leaders of the Uzbek and Tajik emigré communities, and basmachi leaders held a secret conference, at which they hammered out an agreement on the invasion of Tajikistan. Ibragim-bek was to command the united Tajik and Uzbek emigré armed forces. Soon another secret meeting was held under the direction of British agents.

At both meetings representatives of British intelligence sought to unite all emigré forces for joint operations against Soviet rule in Central Asia. Nationalistic conflicts within the counterrevolutionary emigré community, however, and personal animosity between leaders hindered accomplishment of this effort. They did succeed, however, in concentrating counterrevolutionary forces in two important sectors. One force, led by Ibragim-bek, was to operate against Soviet Tajikistan, while another force, led by Dzhunaid-khan, was targeted at Soviet Turkmenia. The bands of Fuzayl Maksum, Abdugaorar, Davliya Sardar, Utan-bek, and several others were sent into the areas of forthcoming combat operations as an advance guard.

At the beginning of March 1929 Utan-bek crossed the border with 50 horsemen and attacked the supply train of a cavalry regiment escorted by three Red Armymen under the command of platoon leader Artemov. The unequal battle lasted about an hour. The handful of Red Armymen succeeded in fighting off all basmachi attacks and reached base safely.

Three parties of border guards, totaling 35 men, under the command of Maslennikov, Ryumin, and Dauksh, were sent out to destroy the band. The basmachi, avoiding engagement, fled into Afghanistan.

That same day approximately 100 basmachi led by Kerim Berda twice attempted to cross the border. Both attempts to invade Soviet territory, however, were thwarted by resolute actions on the part of border guards.

In the first half of March 1929 unusual activity was observed on the other side of the border. Armed horsemen were galloping along the border, and parties of mounted men were arriving in the kishlaks. At night large campfires were observed. Soon the answer came: foreign-based basmachi kurbashi began arriving in the border zone.

By the middle of March 1929 approximately 600 well-armed basmachi, led by Ibragim-bek, had massed by the Soviet border.

In addition to direct military preparations, Ibragim-bek and the former emir of Bukhara, with the active participation of the reactionary clergy, conducted anti-Soviet agitation among the emigrés, calling for "liberation of noble Bukhara from the infidels." The spiritual mentors promised to absolve all the sins of those who would take part in an anti-Soviet campaign and that those who fell in battle would be ranked among the holy. The organizers of this counterrevolutionary plot did not restrict themselves to exerting moral influence on emigrés. Those who joined the bands were given a monthly salary: foot soldiers received 43 rupees and cavalrymen were paid 46 rupees. Special compensation was specified for kurbashi who organized bands numbering 100 basmachi or more.

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By the end of March large new basmachi detachments had been formed in various locations in Afghanistan: a 300-basmachi detachment in Imamseyid, and a 400-man unit in Khanabad. Large forces were formed in Rustak, Talikan, Faizabad, and in several other localities.

The rapid organization of counterrevolutionary forces on the territory of Afghanistan was fostered by political events which were taking place there, a change of regime in power, a situation which the reactionaries utilized. Reactionary circles in Afghanistan were exerting pressure on the new Afghan Government of Nadir-khan, attempting, in concert with agents of Western powers, to give its policies an anti-Soviet thrust. They conducted anti-Soviet propaganda and demanded that open assistance be given to the basmachi. In spite of the official position of the Afghan Government, many clan-tribal leaders and feudal rulers gave practical assistance to the basmachi leaders in gathering forces and mounting provocational forays on the Soviet border.

In view of the prevailing situation, the Soviet Government took steps to beef up security along the border. Border troop strength was increased, and volunteer detachments and militia bodies were also strengthened. This enabled the border troops to suppress the increased numbers of border violation attempts.

In March it was learned that the basmachi of Davliya Sardar were about to launch an attack on Soviet territory. The command authorities took the requisite measures. Teams of border guards armed with light machineguns were sent out to the possible border crossing points. One 7-man party was led by border post deputy commander Kirsanov, while the other was led by deputy platoon commander Romashevskiy. An additional two teams of border guards were placed on ready status.

On 17 March Romashevskiy's party discovered that approximately 70 basmachi had crossed over onto Soviet territory. Sending a messenger back with a report, Romashevskiy and the 5 remaining men engaged the intruders. The basmachi, avoiding combat, set off into the desert at a canter. Six border guards took up pursuit. They were soon joined by reserve parties under the command of deputy commandant Kolesnikov and G. Sokolov. The pursuit continued for almost 24 hours, an exhausting 100 kilometer trek across the sands of the Kara Kum. Finally a patrol sent out from Kolesnikov's group overtook the enemy, but the basmachi hastily broke camp and once again attempted to escape. The groups led by Sokolov and Kolesnikov resumed pursuit. It took an additional 36 hours to catch up with the basmachi.

Two small parties of border guards under the command of Kirsanov and Yudin arrived in time to assist them. Sokolov led his men in an attack, without pausing to deploy. Bursting into a valley and overwhelming the enemy's security outposts, Sokolov's men galloped up to the foot of a hill. Here the border guards dismounted, left two men with the horses, and proceeded to advance up the slope toward the hilltop.

The courageous troopers advanced under a hail of enemy bullets. They closed to not more than 200 paces from the basmachi. At this moment Sokolov was wounded

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for a second time. Yudin took over command. Attacking aggressively, they dislodged the basmachi from the hilltop. The border guards now held the high ground. By this time Kolesnikov's party had captured another hilltop and was successfully advancing across the valley, pushing the basmachi back from their second defensive line. Squeezed on two sides, the basmachi could not withstand the onslaught. Only a few members of Davliya Sardar's band succeeded in escaping.

On 12 April 1929 former Karategin bek Fuzayl Maksum crossed the border with a fairly large force. Sweeping into the kishlak of Kalai-Khumb, the basmachi settled accounts with activist dekhkans. The same story was repeated on the following day in the border kishlak of Vanch, which was captured by the band of Kurshirmat, former leader of the Fergana basmachi. Soon 12 more bands infiltrated to the left bank of the Vakhsh. They were small in numbers but, utilizing the element of surprise and possessing good familiarity with the terrain, the basmachi captured a few kishlaks and carried out pogroms.

Fuzayl Maksum was showing the greatest aggressiveness. His basmachi mounted a bloody foray through the kishlaks of the Darvaz and Karategin. Bai, reactionary mullahs, and former basmachi joined forces with him. As a result the band swelled to 200 men. By 20 April Fuzayl Maksum had captured Kalai-Labi-ob and Tavil'-Dara and was advancing on Garm. There were no military units stationed in Garm. On 22 April small detachments of volunteers, led by F. A. Makritskiy and F. F. Gutovskiy, engaged the basmachi, a force exceeding 400 men. Gutovskiy's detachment was surrounded in the kishlak of Nimich, 35 km northeast of Garm. All 18 volunteers were killed. In addition to Gutovskiy and several Soviet officials, there were 12 teachers in the detachment -- Karimdzhan Khuseynov, Yakh'ye Olimov, Alikbar Khasanov, Sayfullo Aliyev, Abduzhabbar Mukhamedov, Nasyr Umarov, Abdullo Kasimov, Abdulakhad Rakhimov, Khikmat Gani, Abdusalom Islamov, Ubaydullo Gaynuddinov, and Mummodzha Saidmuradov. The people honor the memory of these fallen heroes. Streets and schools in Garm have been named after them, and a monument was erected in their honor.

The basmachi detachment sustained heavy casualties, but nevertheless pushed into Garm and seized part of the town. Volunteers under the command of A. I. Kravchuk defended the other part of the town in a night battle.

The success of the basmachi was short-lived. Two aircraft arrived from Dushanbe and disgorged a small assault force led by brigade commander T. T. Shapkin and commissar A. T. Fedin. The band withdrew following a 15-minute exchange of fire. The Red Armymen, accompanied by the volunteer detachment, pursued close on the heels of the basmachi. After losing more than 100 men, Maksum made his way to and fled across the border.

Thus the first basmachi raids were unsuccessful. A certain portion of the population, however -- representatives of the exploiter strata and reactionary clergy -- continued to support the basmachi. In addition, the savage acts of terrorism and bloody reprisals perpetrated by the basmachi exerted considerable influence on many peasants. They were afraid that if they came out in support of the Soviet authorities the basmachi would take savage revenge on them

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and their families on their next raid. Creation of an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear was one of the aims of the March-April basmachi raid into Soviet territory.

The situation in the frontier zone remained tense. At the end of April and in May, when the mountain passes began to open up, the basmachi made a new attempt to infiltrate into Soviet territory in small groups. The basmachi main forces, concentrated in Afghanistan close to the Soviet border, had not yet been put into action. All this demanded maximum vigilance and constant combat readiness. Basmachi captured in May told of feverish preparations to invade Soviet territory with large units. According to their testimony, by mid-May more than 30 detachments, totaling 2000 men, were organized across the border. In June Ibragim-bek held in K'anabad a meeting with emigré leaders and basmachi kurbashi. He ordered reliable protective bases established on Soviet territory. More than 100 basmachi were covertly infiltrated into Tajikistan for this purpose. Scattering among their native kishlaks, they were to make contact with their supporters and ready them for joint actions.

Execution of the plans to invade Soviet territory was complicated, however, as a consequence of the position taken by official Afghan authorities. Pursuant to the terms of the Soviet-Afghan treaties, the Afghan Government forbade the basmachi from carrying out anti-Soviet raids from Afghan territory.

In connection with this, Ibragim-bek held another meeting, with the participation of 200 basmachi kurbashi, at which he instructed them henceforth not to cross the border without explicit instructions, while continuing secret preparations for operations on Soviet territory. Letters bearing the signature of Ibragim-bek began to be sent to "influential persons" in Uzbekistan, containing an appeal for aid and assistance to the basmachi.

In the meanwhile the British, unbeknownst to the Afghan authorities, were continuing to supply arms and ammunition to the basmachi. At 0300 hours on 20 June five trucks, flying Iranian flags and carrying arms and ammunition for the basmachi, departed from the British consulate in Mashhad with a destination in Afghanistan and accompanied by two people from the consulate.

Early on the morning of 6 October, 40 basmachi of Utan-bek crossed over into Soviet territory. This small group contained several kurbashi. This unusual makeup of the party indicated plans to form new bands. But the plans came to naught. Encountering a hostile attitude on the part of the population and pursued by a Red Army detachment, Utan-bek limited his activities to reconnaissance and hastily took refuge across the border in Afghanistan.

On 24 October a basmachi group totaling 300 men appeared in the foothills of the Pamirs. It was immediately spotted by a detachment under the command of Communist M. T. Maslov. In the very first engagement the basmachi lost 19 dead and wounded. Thirty-two basmachi, led a by a kurbashi, surrendered. The surviving bandits attempted to take refuge in the mountains. But Maslov's detachment again spotted them on 28 October. The enemy was smashed in a brief but fierce engagement. After several days of continuous pursuit, remnants of the basmachi group were captured.

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The swift and resolute resistance offered the invading forces prevented Ibragim-bek and his lofty patrons from putting their main forces into action. Once more they saw that the bulk of the population did not support them and that hopes for a popular uprising were entirely without foundation.

In the meanwhile conflicts between the basmachi and the Afghan authorities were becoming more frequent. Things were going as far as armed clashes.

All this prevented the basmachi from carrying out their plans of invading Soviet territory in 1929. Nor were they able to do so in 1930. But comparatively large, well armed basmachi detachments continued to be based on Afghan territory. The more successfully the building of socialism progressed in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, the more illusory the hopes of the counterrevolutionaries became, the more adventuristic the plans of the basmachi became and the greater their anger and bitterness.

In the spring of 1931 they undertook a decisive invasion attempt. This time the basmachi main forces, under the command of Ibragim-bek himself, went into action. On 30 March 1931 several hundred horsemen (600-800 men) invaded the territory of Soviet Tajikistan.

From the very outset the basmachi resorted to mass terrorism, sabotage, and indiscriminate pillaging. They sought to preventing the planting of crops, to disrupt the flow of goods, to destroy kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and to disable rail lines and enterprises.

The emigré and basmachi leaders, conducting aggressive anti-Soviet actions on the territory of Tajikistan, were counting on broad support on the part of counterrevolutionary elements as well as that segment of the population addicted by the opiate of religion. As soon as he had set foot on Soviet territory, Ibragim-bek dispatched his kurbashi to their kindred tribes to enlist the people into basmachi detachments and to organize an anti-Soviet uprising.

The hopes of the basmachi to gain the support of the population, however, once again proved erroneous. The years of peaceful labor had made their mark. Socialist transformations had strengthened the prestige of the Soviet authorities and had enabled them to indoctrinate a large and dedicated body of activists. They took the wind out of the sails of exploiter groups and strengthened the social foundation of the Soviet system.

The population took active part in the struggle against the basmachi. The public informed Soviet authorities and command authorities of the Red Army and border troops when basmachi bands appeared. The dekhkans themselves took part in pursuit and capture of basmachi. In the Rogatinskiy Soviet, for example, kolkhoz farmers from the various kishlaks, armed with fowling pieces, pursued a band for more than 24 hours and captured three basmachi. Elsewhere dekhkans organized self-protection and thwarted repeated basmachi attempts to pillage kishlaks.

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When Ibragim-bek called a political rally in one of the captured kishlaks and explained the purpose of the invasion -- return of the emir to power -- one of the dekhkan women said: "We remember the emir's tyranny with abhorrence and revulsion; we shall not forget the atrocities and pillaging nor the violence done to women and even children." At that same political rally an old basmachi, who had once been Ibragim-bek's teacher, also condemned the basmachi, who had brought people nothing but tears, grief, and death.

At mass political rallies kolkhoz farmers pledged the following oath: "We shall either kill the basmachi or die ourselves, but we shall not allow the kolkhoz to be plundered." Dekhkans stated at a meeting in the kishlak of Shura that the basmachi sought to take power away from the people and restore the hated rule of the wealthy. "The bai owned a great many sheep, while we had nothing and he gave us nothing. But Soviet rule gives us bread, tea, sugar, and cloth. We are provided for on the kolkhoz; we have everything, while on our own we live in poverty." In Dzharbashinskiy Dzhamagat the kolkhoz members, discussing the struggle against the basmachi, unanimously resolved: "Wherever the Soviet authorities send us, we shall go, and whatever the Soviet authorities call upon us to do, we shall do."

Ibragim-bek himself subsequently stated at his trial: "During the Rentgantau campaign I endeavored to enlist all the people of the Lokay into the struggle against Soviet rule, but the population would not go along. I became convinced that the people of the Lokay had become atheists."

At the same time there were cases where individual dekhkans joined bands or supported them. The bai and reactionary clergy called upon the population to join the bands and carry out terrorist actions against party and soviet activists. With their participation the basmachi succeeded in capturing some kishlaks and taking fodder and food supplies from the population.

A Central Political Commission and local troikas consisting of party rayon committee secretaries, executive committee chairmen, and OGPU officials were formed in Tajikistan to coordinate the struggle against the basmachi. Sixteen special-purpose companies numbering 3000 men were formed of Communists and Komsomol members on a volunteer basis. Local party and soviet agencies formed detachments of "krasnopalochnikov" ["redstavers"], in addition to volunteer detachments.[2]

In many kishlaks all adult males sought to enlist in "krasnopalochniki" detachments. Since it was impossible to accept all volunteers, the most active were accepted. The people of many kishlaks delegated representatives to be sent to the bands to persuade the basmachi to surrender.

Participation by the toiler population of Tajikistan in the struggle against the basmachi was fostered by considerable explanatory work conducted by party and soviet agencies, as well as the personnel of military units. Political workers just of the 83d OGPU battalion held 20 talks in April 1931, which were attended by more than 4000 persons.

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The basmachi who invaded Soviet territory were met with fire by border guard details, after which they were relentlessly pursued by Red Army units, border guards, and volunteer detachments with the active assistance of the general population. The basmachi bands suffered one defeat after the other.

An Uzbek cavalry brigade (I. Ye. Petrov, commanding), as well as a Tajik and Kirghiz cavalry squadrons distinguished themselves in the fighting. In the vicinity of Dangara the bulk of Ibragim-bek's army (more than 600 basmachi) attacked a squadron of the 79th Cavalry Regiment on 8 April. The basmachi surrounded the Red Armymen on all sides. But they were unable to overrun their position. The soldiers held on until help arrived from the 7th Independent Cavalry Brigade. Joint efforts succeeded in inflicting heavy casualties on the band, and it withdrew.

By mid-April Ibragim-bek's detachments began disintegrating. Some of the basmachi voluntarily surrendered to the Soviet authorities. The situation improved in those areas where the activities of local authorities had temporarily been paralyzed. On 19 April Ibragim-bek marched into the Lokay Valley, hoping to find support there. The dekhkans of the Lokay, however, fought the basmachi. Ibragim-bek crossed over onto the left bank of the Vakhsh, into Babatag.

Toward the end of April 1931 the foreign patrons of the basmachi sent in reinforcements to aid Ibragim-bek -- a 250-man detachment led by Utan-bek. But Utan-bek did not get beyond the Soviet-Afghan border. He was met there by border guards. The band was routed in a battle while crossing the Pyandzh River. Utan-bek returned into Afghanistan with the remnants of his detachment.

The situation of Ibragim-bek's army was catastrophic. Basmachi were voluntarily surrendering to the Soviet authorities, both singly and in groups. Tashakul', Ibragim-bek's uncle, surrendered on 16 May. By 20 May 1931 12 kurbashi and 653 rank-and-file basmachi had turned themselves in. Ibragim-bek was down to not more than 250 men. Pursuers close on his heels, he barely made it to the Surkhan Darya, from where he intended to escape into Afghanistan.

It was essential to take into custody this basmachi leader and dangerous criminal at all costs, to prevent him from escaping the just verdict of the people.

A special group led by Abdulla Valishev was formed to capture Ibragim-bek.

On 21 June 1931 Valishev's party set out in the direction of the kishlak of Isanbay, where Ibragim-bek had repeatedly crossed the border. En route to Isanbay, they were joined by the volunteer detachment of Mukum Sultanov. He was assigned the mission of occupying all crossing points on the Kafirnigan River and of conducting reconnaissance, with the assistance of the population and "krasnopalochniki" from kishlaks in the area.

On the morning of 23 June kolkhoz members Yuldash Igamberdyyev and Karim Alim Alimardanov reported that they had spotted Ibragim-bek on the right bank of the

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Kafirnigan River near the kishlak of Bul'bulon. Ibragim-bek demanded that he be transported across to the opposite bank. Kolkhoz member Gyul'-Khodzha Nazar was sent out to the basmachi as ferryman. He succeeded in disarming Ibragim-bek, his secretary Rakhmat-Ali, and the kurbashi Saib, requesting that they secure their weapons to the gupsars (special ferry equipment) during the crossing. As soon as the raft reached shore, the basmachi were arrested. Thanks to the leadership of the Communist Party, the extensive participation of the local population, the courage and heroism of the Red Armymen and dekhkans, and the bold actions of local party and soviet officials, the basmachi gangs were rapidly eliminated and cleared out of Tajikistan.

Final liquidation of the basmachi enabled the Soviet authorities to concentrate their main efforts in Tajikistan on the peaceful building of socialism. As a result of implementation of the Leninist nationalities policy, constant solicitude by the Communist Party and the assistance of the entire Soviet people, Tajikistan achieved substantial success. Agriculture was developing successfully, rapid growth of industry was continuing, and the people's living standards had risen. The dekhkan had firmly taken the path of building socialism. The high degree of class consciousness on the part of the toilers of Tajikistan and their solidarity behind the Communist Party was attested by the high degree of organization and activeness in the struggle against the basmachi. More than 50,000 dekhkans joined volunteer detachments and detachments of "krasnopalochniki" just in the spring of 1931.

The leaders of the basmachi were forced to acknowledge the strength of Soviet rule and the socialist system in Tajikistan. Ibragim-bek testified in court: "When I left for Northern Afghanistan in order to cross over into Soviet territory... I was given assurances by Yusufbay Mukumbayev, the former emir's representative at the League of Nations, that the League of Nations had resolved to return Bukhara to the former emir. For me this meant that foreign countries would give armed support in my struggle against Soviet rule. I was also counting on receiving extensive support by the population. I found the opposite to be the case, however. I received no support from the population in Tajikistan proper, and I have come to that end which is inescapable for those who fail to understand the basis of Soviet power -- which rests on the solid support of the toiler population...."[3]

One of Ibragim-bek's assistants, Suleyman Salakhutdinov, stated: "Out of my ignorance I failed to grasp the strength of Soviet rule. While engaged in the struggle I became convinced that our venture, that is, our struggle against powerful Soviet rule, was foolish."[4] Ishan Isakhan Mansurkhanov, another assistant of Ibragim, also acknowledged the strength of Soviet rule: "Our plans were not carried out," he stated, "because we had no idea of the strength of Soviet rule. In the course of the struggle I became convinced that our undertakings were absurd."[5]

The struggle against the basmachi came to an end in Tajikistan with the defeat of Ibragim-bek. Isolated groups led by Utan-bek, which had fled across the border, were pursued by detachments of Afghan troops. A few small bands were continuing to undertake attempts to invade Soviet territory, but each time they were fittingly repulsed by Soviet border guards. Utan-bek was roving about the mountains and

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deserts of Northern Afghanistan with a couple of dozen basmachi. Early in December he and a small band fled into Iran to the protection of the leader of the Turkmen emigré community.

The situation on the Soviet-Afghan border became tranquil in the latter half of 1931. Massive basmachi raids had ended. The main struggle now was being conducted against smugglers.

The defeat of the basmachi in Tajikistan strengthened Soviet rule to an even greater degree and increased the political activeness of the toilers in the struggle for socialist transformations in this republic.

Rout of the "Predators of the Desert"

At the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's the toilers of Turkmenia were compelled once again to fight the basmachi, who had again become active. Development of basmachi activities in this republic at the beginning of the 1930's was promoted by a number of factors. Socialist reforms in Turkmenia were taking place in the presence of more substantial elements of precapitalist societal relations than in the other republics of Central Asia. In addition, in the agricultural districts of the Turkmen Republic -- Chardzhou, Tashauz, and Kerki -- there had not been carried out a land reform, which in the other republics of Central Asia had played an important role in preparing for collectivization. Feudal-patriarchal relations had in large measure been preserved in the nomadic and semi-nomadic areas of Turkmenia at the commencement of collectivization. The bai continued to represent a great economic force. The bulk of the livestock (60 percent) and sources of water supply, which were of exceptional important for the economy of the Turkmens, were in the possession of the bai-clan elite; private ownership of wells had been preserved. In 1929 only 2.4 percent of dekhkan households were unified in kolkhozes in the Turkmen Republic. In 1929 bai comprised 6.9 percent of the total dekhkan population, but they owned 27 percent of the means of production, 12.5 percent of the acreage under crops, and 52.7 percent of small livestock. Representatives of the exploiter elite in Turkmenia included feudal lords and clan leaders. Therefore they exerted great influence on the toiler masses of Turkmenia.

The soviet and cooperative edifice was heavily contaminated by class-hostile elements, and in some localities consisted almost entirely of the feudal-clan nobility and their henchmen. The worker class was small in numbers. Rural party and soviet agencies lacked work experience. The situation was aggravated by a low level of cultural-political development of the poor hired laborer masses and active resistance to Soviet authority on the part of the clergy. This is why basmachi bands were joined not only by manifestly counterrevolutionary elements but also by a certain segment of the toiler population, especially in the Kara Kum Desert. Counterrevolutionary elements skillfully utilized toward their own end isolated extremes to which local agencies of Soviet authority went in carrying out party policy pertaining to socialist transformation of the aul. In Turkmenia these extremes were for the most part those which occurred throughout the country during collectivization: violation of the principles of voluntary participation, skipping over the artel to the commune, failure to observe a correct pace of collectivization, etc. In spite of this, the process of

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building kolkhozes was accelerating in tempo. By 1930 28.9 percent of poor and middle-peasant landholdings in Turkmenia had been collectivized.[6]

The building of socialism in Turkmenistan was proceeding in a situation of fierce class struggle. V. I. Lenin wrote with full justification, on the basis of experience of the first two years of dictatorship of the proletariat, that the class struggle, following overthrow of the power of capital, "/does not disappear/... but merely changes its forms, becoming even fiercer in many respects."[7]

The main center of leadership of the basmachi in Turkmenia was located across the border, and was closely linked with British intelligence via its permanent representative Shukimbayev. It is not surprising that the struggle against the basmachi was particularly intense on the border and in border areas.

Basmachi groups across the border as well as local groups were headed by bai and reactionary clergy. They were actively supported by bourgeois nationalists, who preached the idea of bringing Central Asia into the system of British dominion countries.[8]

Groups across the border commenced aggressive anti-Soviet actions in the middle of June 1929. On 15 June a band 700 man strong, led by Ishik-khan, son of Dzhunaid, crossed the border into Turkmenia. At dawn of the following day, basmachi attacked the Ak-Rabat border post, which was defended by only 11 men. Border post commander Kondratenko and his deputy Rostenko skillfully organized defense. The basmachi, sustaining substantial losses, fled across the border.[9]

Some of the basmachi who had previously fled across the border with Dzhunaid-khan returned to the Tashauz district in October of 1929. At the end of the year a battle was fought in the vicinity of Charyshly well with the band of Shaltay-Batyr -- one of Dzhunaid's underlings. Defeated, Shaltay-Batyr fled into the desert. In January 1930 Shaltay-Batyr's band attacked Geoklen in Il'yalinskiy Rayon. The basmachi committed a barbaric crime -- they slaughtered approximately 200 peaceful dekhkans gathered for a wedding toy [celebration]. Shaltay was killed in an exchange of fire with self-defense detachment members.[10]

At the end of 1929, proceeding on a unified plan drawn up abroad, feudal-bai elements in Turkmenia proceeded to form basmachi detachments. At the same time forays by basmachi across the border against Soviet border guards and the local population increased in frequency. In February and March 1930, for example, two large basmachi groups invaded Soviet territory from across the border. Border guards overtook and totally annihilated them.[11]

But armed basmachi forays onto the territory of Turkmenia continued. Anti-Soviet elements abroad continued to support and encourage them. British intelligence allocated 30,000 rupees, for example, for training a basmachi group formed in the fall of 1930. British intelligence established on Iranian soil a number of special points for organizing crossing of the Soviet border.[12]

In September 1930 Kerim-khan, one of the clan leaders, organized a large band and plundered several cooperatives and Turkmentorg warehouses in Iolotanskiy Rayon.

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On 10 October a Soviet aerial observer spotted a long ribbon extending across the desert. It was a caravan of 400 camels -- Kerim-khan was proceeding toward the border with plundered loot. Two border guard squads led by Bondarenko and Korp were the first to engage Kerim-khan's band. Platoon commander Tsyplakov and several soldiers arrived as the battle was in full swing. The basmachi lost 90 men killed and wounded. The survivors fled, abandoning their stolen spoils and approximately 10,000 head of livestock.

Davliya Sardar's force, numbering more than 90 men, attempted to break through and come to the assistance of Kerim-khan. It was met by a detachment of border guards led by Kotel'nikov and a Red Army squadron under the command of Ayrapetov. Following a 12-hour battle the basmachi, having sustained heavy casualties, fled across the border.

On 29 December 1930 another group, 100 men strong, crossed the border near Kushka. Met by heavy fire delivered by border guards, it fled back across the border.

Raids by bands from across the border into Soviet Turkmenistan signaled activation of domestic counterrevolutionary forces. A total of 11 basmachi groups were liquidated within Soviet Turkmenistan in the first half of 1930 alone.[13]

Many bands, having committed criminal offenses, subsequently sought to flee abroad. On 30 October border guards wiped out a group of 12 men attempting to flee across the border after plundering villages. In November 1930 a band of 40 basmachi robbed a number of cooperatives and sought to flee into Iran. Their path was blocked by squads of cavalry and a small party of border guards led by platoon commander Krasnoshchekov. The gang left more than half of its basmachi members and all the plundered property and livestock on the field of battle.[14]

In the fall of 1930 and the spring of 1931 Ishik-khan, who maintained close contacts with bai stockmen, was particularly active in forming local bands. He promised generous assistance to domestic counterrevolutionaries and, in case of failure, a secure refuge across the border.[15]

The notorious Oraz Gel'dy Kondzhik was the principal coordinator of basmachi forces in Turkmenia. In April 1931 he assembled a band of 60 basmachi and carried out a number of pillagings, pogroms and murders of soviet officials. Gathering together representatives of the bai, he declared himself khan and even formed a "government."[16]

Ishik-khan sent several kurbashi across the border to assist Oraz Gel'dy. Murad-Ali, one of the kurbashi taken into custody, told why they had come to Soviet Turkestan: "Kara Mukht, from Persia, crossed the border onto Soviet territory, into Geok-Tepinskiy Rayon.... A few days later Kara Mukht... came to see me at the Ak-Kuyu well. He told me that under no circumstances should I accept Soviet rule and I should fight it to the end... that he, Kara Mukht, had come from Persia for the purpose of joint aggressive actions against Soviet rule."[17]

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By June 1931 Oraz Gel'dy had 400 men under his command.[18] His main force mounted several raids on small garrisons and villages, after which it moved on to Tedzhenskiy Rayon. Their it succeeded, carrying out mass terrorist actions, in thwarting the procurement of grain and in looting collection stations.

At the same time a large group of Kazakh herdsmen made its way to Krasnovodskiy Rayon. Following the commencement of collectivization, these herdsmen had succumbed to bai agitation and were proceeding across Turkmenia in order to escape abroad.[19] The bai organized several armed detachments of these herdsmen, which joined together with local basmachi gangs.

Resistance by bai-kulak elements in Soviet Turkmenia to the building of socialism had by the beginning of April 1931 assumed the form of an extensive armed basmachi insurrection against Soviet rule. The basmachi established their base camp in the Kara Kum Desert. From there they carried the attack to other areas.

In 1931 the Kara Kum became the center of basmachi activities not only due to the geographic features of this desert region but also by virtue of a number of socioeconomic conditions: preservation of feudal-clan relations, and little class differentiation; dominance of clan chiefs, bai and mullahs in the soviets.

In addition, several former basmachi leaders had found refuge in this area, and all those who were hiding from the Soviet authorities had fled to this area.

At the commencement of coordinated action by domestic and external counterrevolutionary forces, three types of basmachi bands were operating on the territory of Soviet Turkmenistan: foreign, Turkmen, and consolidated Turkmen-Kazakh, or Iomud-Kazakh. The bands were divided into five principal groupings on the basis of geographic, ethnic-clan, and to some extent economic criteria: Iomud-Kazakh, led by Eyli Akhun and operating in Kazandzhikskiy and Krasnovodskiy rayons; a Tekin grouping formed of basmachi from Bakhardenskiy and Geok-Tepinskiy rayons, led by Murad Ali; a Tekin grouping led by Oraz Gel'dy Kandzhik, operating in Tedzheno-Mervskiy Rayon; the Dargan-Ata grouping -- led by Karadzha Aksakal; the Tashauz grouping.

Each of these groups had its own specific features, but they were linked by a common objective -- overthrow of Soviet rule in Turkmenia. They also employed common methods of struggle: mass terrorism, especially against party and soviet officials, smashing of legitimate agencies of authority and government establishments, and plundering of the population.

The basmachi swung into action in Turkmenia in the latter half of March 1931. The arrival of Khak Murad's group from across the border served as a signal to go into action. As they proceeded, the basmachi smashed Soviet establishments, terrorized and robbed the population.

A small detachment (52 men) from the 85th battalion of OGPU forces under the command of Tseytlin was dispatched to Krasnovodskiy Rayon to prevent further depredations by this group. The arrival of this detachment and the arrest of several bai evoked alarm among the counterrevolutionaries. At a clandestine meeting of basmachi leaders, it was decided to destroy the detachment and flee

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across the border. This decision was reported to Dzhunaid-khan, leader of the basmachi abroad.

On 19 April 400 basmachi attacked members of the Cheka. The detachment was fired on from ambush at a range of 30-40 meters. The commander and two of his men were killed, while the remainder established a perimeter defense. The battle continued for 72 hours. Fifteen wounded soldiers fell into the hands of the basmachi and were brutally murdered. One of the basmachi who had taken part in this atrocity acknowledged during interrogation following his capture in 1931: "Not one of them begged for mercy."[20]

The attack on the Cheka detachment served to activate all the basmachi. At the end of April small bands plundered several cooperatives, seized grain caravans, and in some kishlaks murdered party and soviet officials.

The counterrevolution also raised its head in the Khiva oasis. With the aid of basmachi who had arrived from abroad, local counterrevolutionaries were able to put together a force of 175 men. But the main events took place on the territory of Turkmenia, where the principal bai-kulak and basmachi forces had concentrated. A band up to 200 men in strength was operating in the Kizyl-Arvat area. Dzhunaid sent Ishik-khan's detachment to this area.

Krasnovodskiy and Kazandzhikskiy rayons became a center of basmachi activities. The Iomud-Kazakh force, which totaled approximately 1500 men, was concentrated there. Mass pogroms and terrorist actions began. On 22 April the basmachi destroyed buildings and looted warehouses in Khodzha-Sufi, inflicting considerable financial loss. On 27 April they plundered the sulfate mining operation of the Kara-Bugaz Sul'fat Trust.

The bai were able to swell the ranks of the basmachi as a result of anti-Soviet agitation, blackmail, threats and outright coercion. By the beginning of June 1931 three large groups totaling 1960 men were operating in Krasnovodskiy Rayon alone. A 60-man band from across the border made its way into this same area.[21]

The counterrevolutionary elite consolidated all its detachments into a striking force. By June 1931 a unified central body had been established, which contained, in particular, Eyli-Akhun and Anna Durdy, notorious for their brutality. The base camp of basmachi headquarters was at the well of Chagyl.

With establishment of the basmachi headquarters, each group was assigned a specific area, within which it was to carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism, break up kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and destroy the soviet machinery of government.

In July alone the basmachi conducted 17 raids, perpetrated 41 acts of terrorism, and a great many pillagings and acts of violence. On 30 July, during a raid on Kazandzhik, they demolished a stretch of railbed, causing two mail trains to wreck.[22] Basmachi actions paralyzed economic life in certain areas. The operations of industrial enterprises ground to a halt in the Krasnovodsk area, while in some kishlaks life came to a stop for a period of three months. In carrying out mass acts of terrorism, the basmachi leaders explained their actions in a simple fashion: a teacher had to be killed for turning children into

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atheists, dekhkans for sympathizing with the Soviet detachments, and women for wanting to learn to read and write.[23]

Special detachments of border guards, OGPU troops, Red Army troops and volunteers were formed to combat the basmachi.

On 20 May units of the OGPU 24th Cavalry Regiment under the command of I. I. Lamanov were sent into Krasnovodskiy Rayon. Two other groups were sent to fight basmachi bands in Kizyl-Arvatskiy, Kazandzhikskiy, Dzhebelskiy, and Tashauzskiy rayons.

The detachments in the Krasnovodsk sector commenced combat operations on the night of 27 May. By 10 June they had cleared basmachi from a vast territory in the western part of Turkmenia. Endeavoring to preserve their forces and gain time to regroup, the basmachi would agree to negotiations for voluntary surrender. And if such a maneuver succeeded, they would once again resume armed actions after strengthening their detachments.

In view of the situation, the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro and the Turkmen Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee made the decision to mobilize the population, particularly Communists, Komsomol members and soviet activists, for the struggle against the basmachi. All military and volunteer subunits were brought to a state of combat readiness. A specially formed field headquarters staff drew up a plan for attacking the principal bases of the basmachi around Orta-Kuyu, Geoklen-Kuyusy, and Kaymat wells.

Prior to commencing the operation, the government of the Turkmen Republic carried out a number of measures of a sociopolitical nature, which undermined the influence of the counterrevolutionary forces on the toiler population: decrees were issued announcing nationalization of wells and confiscation of livestock and other property from the bai elite who had joined the basmachi bands, and appeals were issued to herdsmen to return to peaceful labor.

Special groups made up of party and soviet activists were formed to conduct explanatory work, for practical implementation of government decrees, and to reestablish agencies of authority in kishlaks which had been targets of basmachi pogroms. "Krasnopalochniki" detachments were organized in the kishlaks to protect the population against basmachi raids. By the fall of 1931 these detachments exceeded 12,000 men.[24]

Preparatory measures made it possible to commence the operation in an organized manner and to execute it rapidly. Close coordination between party and soviet agencies and the command of military units, active assistance by the toilers, and the excellent morale and fighting qualities of the soldiers and their commanders guaranteed success. In Krasnovodskiy Rayon operations were back to normal in soviet agencies, at enterprises and mining operations by 23 June.

The Red Armymen and volunteers staunchly endured all difficulties. They accomplished marches across the waterless desert lasting many days, and they displayed courage and valor in combat against the basmachi.

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The detachment led by Kobisskiy fought a battle at Tereskay well for 96 hours. This 90-man detachment defeated a well-armed basmachi band of 200 men.

The successes of the operation were overestimated, however, by field headquarters. Top headquarters officials viewed the defeat of large basmachi units as liquidation of the base proper of the counterrevolutionary forces and halted further conduct of the operation on 23 June 1931. And yet the situation remained serious.

By the end of June 14 bands, totaling more than 2000 basmachi, were operating in Turkmenia. Approximately 1000 basmachi were in the Iomud-Kazakh force, which presented the greatest threat. It is true that there was a lack of unity among the basmachi. Enlisted into the bands by deception or threat, the poor dekhkans had no desire to oppose the Soviet authorities. More and more frequently they were openly expressing their resentment. But the leaders were taking drastic measures to preserve the bands, insisting on continuing the armed struggle, and severely punishing the "insubordinate." Under their pressure groups which had agreed to turn themselves in conducted only partial disarmament. In addition, the kurbashi who were conducting surrender negotiations began insisting on postponing the disbanding of their detachments.

In the meantime the OGPU command authorities were rashly hastening to deactivate the Krasnovodsk combat sector. Sector commander I. I. Lamanov sent a report in which he stated that these actions were premature, and requested that the military units deployed in the sector be left in place. But headquarters ignored this report.

Taking advantage of the breathing space, the basmachi leaders reorganized their remaining forces. They again went into action in the latter half of July.[25] The basmachi terrorized the population and pillaged. As before, basmachi from across the border hastened to their assistance.

On 3 August a 40-man group crossed over onto Soviet territory. On 27 August the Kara Mukht band attempted to raid a village near the Kul'-Takir well. The basmachi raid was repulsed by a Communist detachment.

Somewhat earlier, at the beginning of August, the Kakabay band, totaling 350 men, laid siege to the Erbent well, which was defended by a detachment of militia and a subunit of the 2d Turkmen Regiment. The fighting went on for 6 days. Sustaining heavy casualties, the basmachi fled into the desert.

The 600 basmachi of Oraz Gel'dy were operating in Geok-Tepinskiy Rayon. They were robbing grain caravans, killing soviet and party officials and activists, and even besieged a number of kishlaks. In Tashauzskiy Rayon small basmachi groups were systematically terrorizing the population. By the beginning of September 1921 the basmachi had mounted 86 forays. Peaceful kishlaks, 34 kolkhozes and sovkhozes had been pillaged. Thirty-four party and soviet officials were killed during these raids.

In spite of some successes in the struggle against the basmachi, as of 1 September there were as many as 3000 armed basmachi in Turkmenia. The Iomud-Kazakh grouping was still the largest. It was operating in the northern part

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of Krasnovodskiy and Kazandzhikskiy rayons. Its central base was located in the vicinity of Chagyl well. The Bakharden grouping, together with the basmachi of Murad Ali, totaled more than 400 men. The Ashkhabad force, led by Kakabay and Akdyr-khan, totaled as many as 150 men. The Tedzhen force was a consolidation of remnants of the defeated bands of Oraz Geldy (who was killed on 28 August) -- 375 basmachi. The Bayram-Ali force contained up to 160 men, the Dargan-Ata force -- 120, and the Tashauz force -- as many as 260 men.

The basmachi controlled practically the entire Kara Kum. This new basmachi flare-up was in the final analysis caused by aggravation of the class struggle in connection with the offensive mounted by the Soviet authorities against remnants of capitalist elements in the city and village, as well as by attempts on the part of basmachi-emigré circles to regain their lost economic and political positions. In these conditions the party Central Committee, VTsIK and USSR Sovnarkom instructed the Central Asian Military District to clear bandit gangs from the Kara Kum as quickly as possible.[26]

Party-soviet agencies of Central Asia and Turkmenia and the command authorities of the Central Asian Military District decided to conduct in Turkmenia and Khorezm a new, more powerful combined operation to wipe out the bands and protect the population. The main objective of the operation was to destroy large basmachi detachments, return the dekhkans to peaceful labor, given them requisite assistance, improve their cultural and living conditions, and strengthen Soviet authorities in those areas stricken by banditry.

Initially four composite detachments were formed to execute this plan. The Western (main) Force was to mount a drive in the direction of the Dzhurkul'-Chapan and Kyuy-Kun frontier area; the Southern Force was to launch a secondary attack in the direction of Busag well and the Az-Kum frontier area; the Eastern Force was to perform a blocking function in the vicinity of Kin-Tychke spring and was simultaneously to mount short thrusts in the Osmantay-Matay area; the Northern Force was to perform combined missions of destroying basmachi. Just as during the first operation, activists, Communists and Komsomol members were to take part in the fighting. A group of party and soviet officials was assigned to conduct mass political work among the population in each of the four sectors. The operation was scheduled to commence on 9 September 1931. In view of heightened basmachi activities, however, the operation began ahead of schedule, on 5 September.

Overall direction of the operation was assigned to the commander of the Central Asian Military District (CAMD), P. Ye. Dybenko, G. G. Yastrebov, member of the front Revvoyensovet, and G. G. Yevdokimov, official representative of OGPU. They set up an OGPU central command group and CAMD field headquarters, located at Kizyl-Arvat station. Assigned to field headquarters were representatives of the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro (Zaytsev), the Turkmenistan Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) Central Committee (Ya. A. Popok, Central Committee first secretary, and Central Committee Secretary Ch. Vellekov), and the Turkmen SSR Sovnarkom (Sovnarkom Chairman K. S. Atabayev).

Larger Red Army forces and volunteer detachments proceeded to take up their attack positions. In Krasnovodsk cadets from the Tashkent Military School imeni

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V. I. Lenin, led by A. K. Malyshev, prepared for the operation. Also in Krasnovodsk was a mechanized detachment under the command of I. I. Lamanov, chief of border and internal security troops of the Central Asian Directorate of OGPU; N. Aytakov and S. Ungalbayev served as representatives of the KPT Central Committee in the detachment. A cavalry brigade under the command of Ya. A. Mel'kumov moved out from Kazandzhik Station; A. Muradov was the KPT Central Committee representative. The Uzbek Cavalry Regiment, under the command of Mirkamil' Mirsharapov, proceeded from Kizyl-Arvat; KPT Central Committee representative -- Annamukhammedov. Another Uzbek cavalry regiment, under the command of I. P. Bikzhanov, proceeded from Bakharden; B. Atayev and O. Tachmamedov were representatives of the KPT Central Committee in this regiment. A detachment of border troops, with M. S. Kadzharov representing the KPT Central Committee, moved out from Artyk Station. The Thrice Red-Banner 82d Aktyubinsk Cavalry Regiment, under the command of A. I. Batskalevich, with the KPT Central Committee represented by A. Kurdov, advanced from Tedzhen. The 83d Baglinskiy Cavalry Regiment, under the command of M. V. Samokrutov, proceeded from Merv. The 84th Red-Banner Cavalry Regiment, under the command of I. I. Khryukin, and a regiment of OGPU troops under the command of Konstantinov proceeded from Khiva and Tashauz. The 1st Communist Company, under the command of T. Chaykazin, was forming in Ashkhabad.[27]

The operation was conducted in two stages. At the first stage, which ran to 19 September 1931, an attack was mounted on the principal basmachi base camps.

The first clash between the mechanized detachment under the command of I. I. Lamanov and the outposts of the Iomud-Kazakh force took place on 12 September. On 13 September the 2d Turkmen Regiment and Lamanov's detachment attacked the main forces of the Iomud-Kazakh group. Occupying well-fortified positions (the fortifications ran 3 km in frontage and 4 km in depth) and with a considerable superiority in manpower, the band offered fierce resistance. The battle went on for 14 hours. The basmachi were unable to withstand the offensive pressure of our units. A total of 198 bandits were killed or wounded; the kurbashi Khak Murad, who had been acting as liaison with representatives of British intelligence, was killed. I. I. Lamanov and Cheka member Chary Muradov died the death of the brave in battle at Chagyl well. At the most critical moment in the battle, both led attacking lines of Red Armymen, ensuring penetration of the enemy's defense. Heroism was displayed by cadet N. G. Lyashchenko.

Remnants of the Iomud-Kazakh force fought their way northeastward. On 17 September they were overtaken at the Dakhly well by a composite cavalry battalion under the command of Malyshev. Battle was engaged -- the fiercest and bloodiest of the entire operation. For a period of 10 hours the bandits resisted with the fury of the doomed. Soon a detachment of cadets under the command of Yakub Kuliyev arrived on the scene. The basmachi were totally routed. Only a few made good their escape.

On 17 September Red Army units encountered the Tashauz force, which was attempting to link up with the bands operating in the Kara Kum. Of the 250 basmachi, 90 were killed, wounded, or captured.

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In this phase of the operation six basmachi forces were defeated in detail, 1037 enemy were killed or captured, and the major base camps of the bands were seized. "Defeat in detail of the basmachi forces and capture of their bases at these centers (at the Charyshly, Dakhly, Tuar, and Chagyl wells)," stated the report of the field political directorate of the Central Asian Military District, "ended the first phase of the operation against the basmachi bands."[28]

The Red Armymen, commanders and fighting men of the volunteer detachments had withstood a severe test. Acting in a united front and inspired by a common cause, Communists, Komsomol members and non-party people, Russians and Ukrainians, Belorussians, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and representatives of other of our country's nationalities fought heroically, shoulder to shoulder. Self-defense and "krasnopalochniki" detachments were formed of representatives of indigenous nationalities. This had become a mass movement by the end of 1931.

The mission in the second phase of the operation was to wipe out the remaining basmachi groups, to prevent them from escaping across the border, and to disarm them.

This phase began on 22 September 1931. The situation was as follows at that time. In a number of areas small groups of basmachi, posing as peaceful inhabitants, were hiding among nomads in remote encampments. In Bakhardenskiy, Yerbentskiy, Mervsko-Tedzhenskiy, and certain other rayons in which military operations had not previously been conducted, the basmachi had maintained their forces. Groups which had come across the border had also not yet been wiped out.

The second phase of the operation contained a number of specific features. First of all, there was increased participation by the general population in the struggle against the basmachi. Secondly, after the largest forces had been wiped out, the basmachi no longer offered such stiff resistance as previously, and the pace of their disintegration stepped up significantly. Not only rank and file basmachi but kurbashi as well were voluntarily surrendering with increasing frequency.

A total of 1043 rank and file basmachi and 17 kurbashi voluntarily surrendered in September-October 1931. During this same period of time 84 basmachi were killed and 98 captured in combat encounters. But some of the leaders still refused to lay down their arms. At the beginning of October, for example, remnants of the scattered Kazakh and Turkmen groups in the northern part of the Kara Kum, totaling up to 400 men, once again consolidated into a united force. The principal role in this unification was played by Durdy Murt and Bekdzhan-khan.

A cavalry regiment and other units were sent against the basmachi. Conducting joint actions, they wiped out the basmachi main forces (most were captured, while only Bekdzhan-khan and Durdy Murt succeeded in escaping).

The 1st Turkmen Regiment and a mechanized detachment were operating in Kunya-Urgenchskiy Rayon, the Uzbek Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Battalion of the 10th Cavalry Regiment in Il'yalinskiy Rayon, while the 84th Cavalry Regiment was operating in Takhtinskiy Rayon.

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A general offensive began on 7 October, in which local residents took extensive part. They actively assisted in searching out, capturing and disarming basmachi and in confiscating hidden weapons. As a result of assistance by the local population, more than 4000 rifles and revolvers were confiscated just between 7 and 10 October 1931.

As a result of the operation in the Kara Kum, 3287 basmachi voluntarily surrendered, were captured, killed or wounded.

By the fall of 1931 the basmachi main forces in Turkmenia had been eliminated. The feudal-clan elite had ceased to exist as a socioeconomic stratum. Thus the basmachi were deprived of a nutrient medium, soil and base. In the course of the struggle against the basmachi, as many as 50,000 sheep and goats and 10,000 camels were handed over to the poor peasants.

This did not end the struggle against the basmachi in Turkmenia. Thanks to assistance by the counterrevolutionary emigré community, some kurbashi continued their banditry activities for quite some time, which was fostered by the geographic conditions of Turkmenia -- vast desert expanses in which small basmachi groups could easily hide.

In 1932 and in the first half of the 1933 Dzhunaid-khan, Akhmed-bek, Durdy Murt and others sent several dozen basmachi gangs into Soviet Turkmenia. From 1 January through 7 March 1932 alone 32 groups totaling more than 1,430 men crossed over into Soviet territory; the majority of these were either taken into custody or killed by border guards in skirmishes on the border. In July 1932 six small bands were hiding deep in the Kara Kum.

Toward August 1932 Akhmed-bek and Durdy Murt succeeded, for the last time, in putting together a fairly large force, which raided Soviet establishments and kishlaks. This force was subsequently divided into two groups: a central and a eastern group.[29] Avoiding encounters with border guards and volunteer detachments, the basmachi were able to hold out for more than 6 months. In May 1933 the central group was caught up with and defeated in detail. Durdy Murt and Akhmed-bek were killed in the engagement.[30] Somewhat later the bands of the Eastern Force were wiped out or disintegrated. Only a few small groups were hiding in inaccessible areas and infrequently conducting pillaging forays.

The ground was burning under the feet of the basmachi. A vivid example of this is the last foray of Utan-bek. On 11 October 1933 this experienced veteran basmachi, accomplanied by 20 horsemen, crossed over into Turkmenia. But the very first hours of their sojourn on Soviet soil, the very first tens of kilometers became a terrible nighmare for Utan-bek and his associates. Women gazed at them with hatred and cursed them, "krasnopalochniki" posts guarded the entrances to kishlaks, their way was blocked at crossroads, and they could hear the relentless clattering of hooves of the approaching pursuit....

Awareness of the inevitability of defeat, fear, and the self-preservation instinct this time proved to be stronger than anger, desire for revenge, and the wish to loot and kill.

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...Standing up in his stirrups, Utan-bek waved his kamcha [riding whip], and the entire band wheeled in the direction of the border. Several days after Utan-bek had successfully crossed back over the border, he went to Ishan Khalifa, leader of the Turkmen emigré community, and stated that he would never again cross the Soviet border.

The basmachi did enormous detriment to the Turkmen Republic. The old truism which states that a dying predator is dangerous was persuasively confirmed. The basmachi -- predators of the Kara Kum Desert -- left behind wounds which took a long time to heal. How many courageous fighters for socialism fell at the hands of the basmachi, and how many children became orphans!

The list of fallen heroes includes Berdyyev and Sadykov, rayon officials in Kunya-Urgench; the Annamuradov brothers, activists from the aul of Mulik-Yazy (Vekil-Bazarskiy Rayon); Bekmurad Dovletov, Komsomol cell secretary in the aul of Khodzham-Kala-2 in Kara-Kalinskiy Rayon; Amannepes Ovezov, activist from Porsinskiy Rayon; activist Keyik Sametova from Karabekaul'skiy Rayon; poor peasant Nobat Ovezmuradov from Chardzhouskiy Rayon; Rakhman Niyazov, hired farm laborer and kolkhoz activist from Bayram-Aliyskiy Rayon; plus many others.

The basmachi did great detriment to the economy. The list of warehouses put to the torch, looted stores, demolished enterprises, sovkhoz buildings and dwellings is long. And added to this are trampled crops and destroyed farm equipment!

Stock raising was hit particularly hard. The total number of head of livestock declined by 19 percent just in the winter of 1930. A total of 375,000 karakul sheep died, were stolen or driven abroad. In 1931, when basmachi activities in Turkmenia reached their apogee, the total number of karakul sheep declined by 41 percent, coarse-fleeced sheep by 62 percent, and cattle by 52 percent.

Long years and persistent labor by the workers and kolkhoz farmers of Turkmenia were required in order to heal the wounds inflicted by the "predators of the desert."

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CONCLUSION

The activities of the basmachi comprised one of the forms of the class struggle in Central Asia, which assumed an exceptionally savage character. It constituted an expression of the class struggle of the bai, the local bourgeoisie and the reactionary Islamic clergy against the dictatorship of the proletariat. M. V. Frunze correctly noted in a memorandum to V. I. Lenin that the basmachi represented an "armed protest against the new principles on which a new life is to be built."[1]

The feudal lords, clan nobility, former large landholders, emirate and khanate functionaries constituted the social base of the basmachi. Stripped of their wealth and privileges by the revolution, they were its sworn enemies. The majority of basmachi leaders came from this milieu. It was emphasized in the accountability report of the KPT Central Committee to the 7th KPT Congress (March 1923) that "all individual kurbashi are great feudal lords, great oppressors of the broad dekhkan masses."[2]

The emerging local national bourgeoisie also took active part in development of the basmachi. Its position was defined by the struggle against the socialist path of development of Turkestan and the struggle for the capitalist path.

The bai and the feudal nobility, which were the most numerous exploiter class in Central Asia, provided the basmachi with cadres. The Karategin bek Fuzayl Maksum and the wealthy Kuvandyk-bai, who owned more than 10,000 karakul sheep; prominent emir functionary and Lokay clan leader Kayum Parvanchi and the powerful bai Bayram Molla; Salakhutdin Suleymanov, mullah and son of the head of the Islamic clergy in the Bukhara emirate, and wealthy stockman Kurartyk Adirov; powerful Kirghiz manap [privileged class of Kirghiz feudal-clan elite] Muetdin, who had in his employ more than 5000 agricultural laborers, chayriker, and herdsmen; and Turkmen feudal lord Dzhunaid -- these are social photographs of the basmachi leaders. Common criminals, lumpen and other déclassé elements who joined the ranks of the basmachi forces intensified their sinister, bandit, and briggand-terrorist coloration to an even greater extent.

The 6th Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party (August 1921), defining the social countenance of the basmachi, stated that "the bai and déclassé professional banditry elements constitute the leaders and organizing force (of the basmachi -- Auth.)."[3]

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The counterrevolutionary thrust of the basmachi is also persuasively attested by numerous facts of basmachi making common cause with blackguard White Guardists. It would seem that the basmachi, who claimed to be spokesmen for the national interests of the peoples of Central Asia, should have seen as manifest enemies the Russian White Guard, who made no attempt to conceal their chauvinist views. But the basmachi were not enemies but rather friends and allies of the Russian White Guard. Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin, and the White Cossack atamans Dutov, Tolstov, and Annenkov maintained close relations with and assisted the basmachi leaders. Basmachi ranks contained many White Guard officers, serving as military instructors.

The reactionary Islamic clergy played an important role in organizing the basmachi. It proclaimed a "gazavat" and declared the basmachi to be "warriors of Muhammad" and "fighters for the faith," calling those who would not join basmachi bands "giaours" and "kafirs." Extensive pan-Islamic and pan-Turkist propaganda and agitation were conducted with the assistance of the Islamic clergy.[4] The basmachi camps always contained pan-Islamic agitators.

Characterizing the basic nucleus of the basmachi, M. V. Frunze wrote in May 1920 that the ranks of the basmachi contained those who were accustomed to brigandage and violence, who were accustomed to living an idle and untrammeled life at the expense of the ruthlessly fleeced population, those who, with the support of a gang collected under their banner, dreamed of becoming ruler of the region, a new khan.[5]

Bourgeois nationalists were the ideological leaders of the basmachi. Claiming to be defenders of overall national interests but in actual fact expressing the interests of the exploiter classes, they kindled interethnic hostility and attempted to use the basmachi to reestablish the domination of the feudal lords and bai and to detach Central Asia from Soviet Russia. A number of bourgeois nationalists, holding positions in executive agencies in the Central Asian republics, were secretly supporting the basmachi and arranging for supply of arms and ammunition to them.

But the basmachi did not include only representatives of the overthrown exploiter classes. A certain portion of the toiling dekhkans was also enlisted into basmachi bands.

This was due to a number of factors. Following the victory of the socialist revolution in Turkestan, just as throughout the country, measures were taken to implement Lenin's land decree. Success was not achieved in Turkestan, however, in implementing the Land Decree and the law on socialization as was the case in the Russian village. The bulk of the land remained in the hands of the exploiters. The Fourth Regional Conference of Soviets ascertained that in spite of the land law, purchase and sale of land was continuing in the region. This applied to an even greater degree to Bukhara and Khorezm.

Resolution of the land question in Turkestan was connected not only with the elimination of land ownership by the landed gentry but also to a significant degree involved the necessity of eliminating land ownership by Russian kulak settlers.

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The land question in the conditions of Central Asia had to be resolved in a close link with the water question. Central Asia's irrigation system was little developed, and this was impeding resolution of the agrarian question.

Feudal-patriarchal carryovers were strong in the majority of areas in Central Asia. This was particularly true of the remote areas of Turkmenia, Tajikistan, and the southern part of Kirghizia. The Kirghiz community, for example, consisted of several clans, at the head of which stood the hereditary manap, who was considered to be the absolute master. His decisions had the force of law for all residents of the community. Following the victorious October Revolution, the manaps sought to remain in control and endeavored to set the members of the community against Soviet rule.

The 2d Congress of the Uzbekistan Communist Party (1925) stated in its resolutions that the land question had not been resolved in Uzbekistan right up to 1924. The congress resolution stated: "Vestiges of feudal relations in the kishlaks, expressed in the existence of private ownership of land and leading to the concentration of more than one third of cultivated land in the hands of a small group of landed gentry and urban and rural bai-kulak elements, and bondage of the poor and middle peasant strata of the kishlak, have not yet been eradicated."[6]

The conduct of the dekhkans was to a substantial degree determined precisely by the fact that the agrarian question had not been resolved. Not having felt through their personal experience the great changes of land ownership, the dekhkans remained to a substantial degree dependent on and under the influence of the old exploiters and clergy, who were calling upon them to combat Soviet rule. At the same time basmachi activities seriously complicated and impeded the implementation of radical agrarian reforms. The class enemy was counting precisely on this: through basmachi activities they hoped to preserve the old socioeconomic relations and, preserving them, to leave a base for new basmachi outbursts.

Distortions of party nationalities policy, committed chiefly by chauvinist, nationalist and socialist revolutionary elements which had infiltrated agencies of Soviet authority in Central Asia, promoted the enlistment of a certain part of the dekhkans into basmachi gangs. Distorting the nationalities policy of the Soviet authorities, alien elements aroused distrust among the backward segment of the dekhkans, a fact which was extensively exploited by the organizers of the basmachi.

The political and cultural backwardness of the dekhkan masses as well as their religious prejudices offered a nutrient medium for agitation by the basmachi leaders and reactionary clergy. In addition, the basmachi hindered overcoming this backwardness by thwarting the political-education efforts on the part of the Soviet authorities, engaging in terrorist actions not only against Soviet activists but also against any bearers of progress and culture. Nor should one underestimate the significance of terrorist activity, with the aid of which the basmachi kurbashi compelled dekhkans to join their forces. Coercion and intimidation as well as employment of the method of holding hostiges (persons, livestock, property) resulted in thousands of persons who hated the basmachi

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enlisting in their ranks against their own will, subsequently having great difficulty in returning to a peaceful life.

The organizers of the basmachi took advantage of the difficult economic situation in Turkestan on the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution. A decline in cotton growing led to the impoverishment of hundreds of thousands of dekhkan families. The basmachi leaders made every effort to enlist into their bands impoverished dekhkans who could not obtain work in agriculture. And the basmachi activities in turn were leading to a worsening of the financial plight, retaining this reserve for replenishing basmachi forces.

The participation of a certain number of dekhkans in basmachi detachments did not give basmachi activities the character of a popular movement. The claim that the basmachi were supported by the majority of the indigenous population of Turkestan throughout the civil war constitutes slander against the peoples of Central Asia. Let us recall that on the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution V. I. Lenin wrote: "The broad masses of the oppressed nations... have greater trust in the proletariat of Russia than in the bourgeoisie.... The bourgeoisie has foully betrayed the cause of freedom of oppressed nations, while the proletariat is faithful to the cause of freedom."[7] It is quite natural that the toiler masses of Turkestan could not support the basmachi, who were their inveterate class enemies.

The overwhelming majority of the toiler population of Central Asia had contempt and hatred for the basmachi. Numerous facts, reflected in archival documents and in the recollections of the participants in the events of those years, attest to the negative attitude toward the basmachi on the part of the majority of residents of the kishlaks and auls and attest to the fact that the toiling Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Kara-Kalpaks fought against the basmachi. The 6th Congress of the KPT (August 1921), analyzing the results of the struggle against the basmachi for the preceding years, noted in its resolution that the majority of the dekhkan toiler masses "do not sympathize with but oppose this movement (the basmachi -- Auth.), these sentiments being based on an overmastering desire to liquidate the basmachi at all costs and as quickly as possible."[8]

The KPT Central Committee accountability report to the 7th KPT Congress emphasized that the masses were fighting the basmachi. At the same time it was pointed out that the overthrown exploiter classes "were endeavoring to give the basmachi a political coloration, to provide a specific program, and to turn it into a broad popular movement."[9]

Many popular Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen songs from the time of the struggle against the basmachi have been preserved. All of them speak of the basmachi as butchers, oppressors, and brigands.

We harvested the grain --
The basmachi took it away.
The basmachi left us
Grief, misfortune, and tears.[10]

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As has been indicated in this book, the majority of toilers of the indigenous nationalities did not support the basmachi. This was the main reason for the defeat of the basmachi, and this was one of the most important conditions for the victory of Soviet power over the united forces of the interventionists and domestic counterrevolution in Central Asia.

Basmachi activities, abating and then flaring up once again, continued for a period of almost 15 years in certain areas. A question arises: what is the reason for the great duration of this struggle? We discussed above the social roots of the basmachi and the internal factors promoting their spread. The external factor, however, should be acknowledged as the main factor causing the vitality of the basmachi. Foreign support, given on a most extensive scale, ensured the initial upsurge on the part of the basmachi, their subsequent expansion, and galvanized and inspired subsequent flareups of basmachi activity. Once can consider to be an absolutely proven fact that the Anglo-American intelligence services, with the assistance of official representatives in China, Iran, and Afghanistan, and supported by the ractionary circles in those countries, were in constant contact with basmachi leaders and bourgeois-nationalist organizations and directed their activities. All prominent basmachi leaders were agents in the employ of the U.S. and British intelligence services. It was precisely foreign organizers, foreign arms and gold which ensured the establishment of many basmachi bands -- large and small. The significance of this factor was particularly graphically manifested in the final stages of the basmachi. Throughout the period of a number of years the principal basmachi cadres, following defeats, were ensconced safely and snugly across the border. There the bands armed, reorganized, added personnel, and from there invaded Soviet territory, in order once again to suffer defeat and once again to take refuge abroad.

A statement by M. V. Frunze (May 1920) that the basmachi, "lacking support among the local population," were finding support "abroad, in British, Afghan and Bukharan gold and arms,"[11] excellently characterizes the role of foreign assistance.

Thousands upon thousands of facts confirm that the basmachi were receiving money, arms, equipment and clothing from abroad and attest to the participation of foreign military units, instructors, and advisers in combat operations, and to the infiltration of numerous agents, couriers, and saboteurs. Many of these facts have been acknowledged and corroborated by former military officers, diplomats, and intelligence officers of foreign countries.

Basmachi themselves time and again gave damning testimony on the guiding role of their foreign masters. Ibragim-bek, one of the most prominent basmachi leaders, stated to the investigators that when the invasion of Soviet Tajikistan was being planned, persons representing the former Bukharan emir gave him, Ibragim-bek, detailed instructions "pertaining to the further struggle against Soviet rule," supplying the basmachi with arms, ammunition, etc. Ibragim-bek was to "head for the Soviet border, cross it and organize an extensive movement against Soviet rule."[12] Nor did Ibragim-bek conceal the following "minor" detail: a British representative took part in the discussion of all these matters.

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Analyzing the history of the struggle against the basmachi, one inescapably reaches the following conclusion: without foreign support the basmachi movement could not have assumed such a substantial scale and could not have continued for such an extended time.

International reaction assigned to the basmachi an important role in strategic anti-Soviet plans both during the period of struggle for the victory of the October Revolution, during the years of civil war, and at subsequent historical stages. At first the objective was to prevent a victory of Soviet power in Central Asia. When this failed, international reaction decided, with the aid of the basmachi, to impede the building of socialism and to establish a large anti-Soviet bridgehead. At all stages it was the fervent aim of the foreign patrons of the basmachi to turn Central Asia into a colony. In case of victory by the basmachi, the toilers of Central Asia were to pay with their own sweat and blood, bearing a colonial yoke, for the rifles and machineguns which had so generously been provided to Dzhunaid-khan, Ibragim-bek and their ilk.

The basmachi were living as parasites on the ignorance of the masses, on the dominance of religion, and on economic backwardness. The counterrevolution was attempting to incite a wave of nationalism, seeking to profit from the hostility of the masses toward the policy of national oppression which had been conducted by czarism in the preceding years.

Development of the basmachi was fostered by the economic-geographic isolation of many areas of Central Asia, which was intensified in connection with the total encirclement of Turkestan by civil war fronts, which took place twice -- in the summer of 1918 and in the spring of 1919. The basmachi were not cut off from the other Turkestan fronts (Transcaspian, Semirech'ye, Orenburg[13]) by a combat zone. The development of fronts in Turkestan pursued a single objective. They were closely interlinked and in the final analysis guided by a single conductor -- Anglo-American imperialism, which was hoping to strangle Soviet rule throughout Central Asia by launching a combined attack from the Fergana, Bukhara, the Transcaspian, and the Semirech'ye. One's attention is also drawn by the fact that subsequently basmachi bands were entrenched in areas situated in the mountains or in the desert, in areas with an isolated patriarchal economy, with practically no links with the outside world. This cultivated economic backwardness and impeded sociopolitical development. It is not surprising that the focal centers of basmachi activity were most persistent precisely in such remote, isolated areas.

The basmachi did considerable detriment to the republics of Central Asia. The immense economic devastation in Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm following the defeat of the main forces of the interventionists and White Guard was to a substantial degree the result of basmachi actions. But even in the first half of the 1920's, when the Soviet nation was undertaking peaceful economic construction, in a number of areas of Central Asia fighting was continuing, people were dying, crops were being trampled, kishlaks were being burnt to the ground, and livestock was being driven off. The Central Asian republics also sustained enormous losses during the basmachi raids of 1929-1932. It was not merely a matter of losses, however. The struggle against the basmachi was diverting the people's energies away from accomplishing productive tasks and

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was hindering consolidation of the soviets and cultural development. All this complicated and to a certain degree impeded the building of socialism.

The struggle against the basmachi demonstrated the invincible power of the Soviet system. The broad masses, united under the leadership of the Communist Party, became active fighters and builders of a new life. Neither the invocations of myrmidons of the counterrevolution nor terrorist acts by the basmachi could force them to turn from their chosen path.

The workers of Central Asia displayed outstanding staunchness and courage. With the aid of the workers of Central Russia, they became the cementing nucleus in the young republics of the East and led the millions of toiling dekhkans. The dekhkan masses, the vast majority of whom supported Soviet rule, subsequently became increasingly more active and resolute in standing to its defense. Tens of thousands of dekhkans who fought against the basmachi in the ranks of the Red Army, in volunteer detachments and self-defense forces were the genuine spokesmen for the thoughts and feelings of the people.

Liquidation of the basmachi signified victory of the lofty ideals of socialism and progress. This was a victory over intellectual darkness and ignorance, over ethnic and religious prejudices, over social, economic, and political backwardness, over feudal-bai carryovers, and over the force of clan-tribal ties.

The defeat of the basmachi in Central Asia was of significance not only for the subsequent fate of the peoples of the Soviet East. It also thwarted to a considerable degree the plans of foreign imperialism to strangle the national liberation movement in the colonial East, particularly in China and India.

Muscovite and Uzbek workers, the Fergana dekhkan, the Ukrainian peasant and Bukharan handicraft worker fought shoulder to shoulder against the basmachi, and Tajik "krasnopalochniki" supported the Red Army company in the assault. The friendship among peoples, sealed by commonly shed blood, became tempered and strengthened in this struggle. Liquidation of the basmachi would have been impossible without a class alliance of the toilers of all nationalities of Central Asia. A military-political alliance between the worker class and the toiling dekhkans, which became a decisive social and political force in achieving victory over the enemy, was created and became strengthened in the course of the struggle against the basmachi. A most important factor which ensured strengthening of this alliance in the conditions of Central Asia was unswerving implementation of Lenin's nationalities policy by the Communist Party. The ideology of proletarian internationalism gained victory over the envenomed weapon of nationalism.

The toilers of our entire country rendered fraternal assistance to the peoples of Central Asia in the difficult struggle against our enemies. This assistance was a vivid example of performance of internationalist duty.

The Leninist nationalities policy implemented by the Communist Party ensured creation and strengthening of an alliance of peoples, the advance and

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prosperity of the national Soviet socialist republics. The toilers of Central Asia marched to the victory of socialism as a single family, shoulder to shoulder, fighting and building, and together with the entire Soviet people are successfully advancing along the road of building communism.

At the end of the civil war the dekhkans of Uzbekistan composed a song, which went as follows:

> The sun has risen above the mountains,
> The ice has melted throughout the world.
> Our government is with us,
> The people have expelled the basmachi.[14]

The words of this popular song speak of the glory of the people and the inglorious end of the basmachi.

Elimination of the basmachi became possible thanks to the leadership of the party Central Committee, which attached enormous importance to preserving and strengthening Soviet rule in Turkestan, and subsequently in the Central Asian republics as well, as a beacon of socialism for the entire East. Attesting to this are repeated discussion in the Central Committee Politburo of matters pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi, adoption by the highest party body of critical decisions which determined the policy of defeating the basmachi, as well as the fact that it sent to the basmachi fronts such prestigious party, government and military leaders as M. V. Frunze, V. V. Kuybyshev, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, Ya. E. Rudzutak, S. I. Gusev, Sh. Z. Eliava, S. S. Kamenev, and S. M. Budennyye.

The finest sons of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and prominent party-government officials led the fight against the basmachi together with them and under their direction: N. Aytakov, K. S. Atabayev, Yuldash Akhunbabayev, B. D. Dadabayev, I. A. Zelenskiy, Akmal' Ikramov, Turar Ryskulov, Nazir Tyurakulov, and Fayzulla Khodzhayev. Prominent military leaders were assigned to the Turkestan fronts: K. A. Avksent'yevskiy, I. P. Belov, P. Ye. Dybenko, A. I. Kork, M. K. Levandovskiy, A. I. Todorskiy, V. D. Sokolovskiy, and V. I. Shorin. Party-political work among the troops of Turkestan was conducted by Yu. I. Ibragimov, D. I. Manzhara, N. A. Paskutskiy, Ya. Kh. Peters, D. P. Salikov, Kh. Sakhatmuradov, S. Tursunkhodzhayev, Khamza Khakim-zade, and Abdulla Yarmukhamedov. Courage and heroism were displayed by front commanders, commanders of groups of forces, combined units and units: N. A. Verevkin-Rokhal'skiy, V. M. Ionov, I. S. Kutyakov, I. F. Kuts, I. I. Lamanov, Ya. A. Mel'kumov, Mirkamil' Mirsharapov, P. A. Pavlov, I. Ye.Petrov, M. V. Safonov, A. P. Sokolov, N. D. Tomin, I. F. Fed'ko, Ya. D. Chanyshev, and T. T. Shapkin. Internationalists from the countries of Europe and Asia who gained fame included E. F. Kuzhelo, G. S. Markovich, and Ma Sanchi. The names of Yakub Kuliyev, A. A. Luchinskiy, N. G. Lyashchenko, Abdulla Nabiyev, A. Osmonbekov, Sabir Rakhimov, Yuldash Sakhibnazarov, M. Sultanov, and Ye. Khamidov were inscribed in the chronicle of the heroic struggle against the basmachi.

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The basmachi suffered a logical, historically dictated defeat. Victory over them was of enormous significance, since the basmachi pursued the aim of detaching the peoples of Central Asia from Soviet Russia, of overthrowing Soviet rule, of restoring the dominion of the khans, beks, bai, and local national bourgeoisie, and of transforming Central Asia into a colony of imperialism. The basmachi were fighting against the socialist path of development of Central Asia and for preservation of the old, prerevolutionary order. Consequently the struggle of the toiler masses against the basmachi was a struggle to defend the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution and for triumph of the cause of socialism.

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APPENDIX

Historiographic Survey

Professional historians, party and soviet officials, military leaders and active participants in the civil war have devoted their research and memoirs to the history of the emergence of the basmachi, their roots, the war against them, and their final defeat. Extensive literature has been amassed up to the present time, which requires synthesis and a historiographic appraisal, not only to review what has been written but also to determine new horizons of research work, which is of great political and theoretical-cognitive significance.[1]

Formation of the problems examined in this book took place for the most part within the boundaries of the generally accepted periodization of development of historical science of the Soviet society, since the general patterns of development of historical science in the USSR are characteristic of literature on the basmachi. At the same time certain specific features of study of this subject have also been observed, which is natural for such a unique phenomenon as the class struggle which was fought in the outlying areas of distant, backward Central Asia.

The first period -- formation and close examination of the subject of the emergence and defeat of the basmachi: from the beginning of the 1920's to the end of the 1950's.

The second, contemporary period, when the most substantial success in research has been achieved: from the end of the 1950's to the present.

There are also individual stages within these periods.

The formation and development of Soviet historical science is closely linked with the organization and improvement of a system of scientific-historical centers. The heart of their activities, as of the entire front of Soviet social sciences investigation, was the campaign for confirmation of Marxism-Leninism as the ideological-theoretical and methodological foundation of scientific achievement.

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In Turkestan the first scientific centers around which congregated young cadres of historians, party-soviet and military officials, who on the party's instructions began synthesizing the experience of the October Revolution and the civil war, included the Turkestan People's (from 1920 -- State) University, the TurkTsIK Commission to Study the History of the Revolutionary Movement, established at the end of 1921, and the Commission on History of the Turkestan Communist Party, formed that same year. In 1922 the Commission on History of the October Revolution and the Turkestan Communist Party (Turkbyuro Istparta) began functioning in 1922 under the auspices of the Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee; this commission was subsequently transformed into the Central Central Asian Istpartbyuro (Department of History of the Party and the October Revolution of the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, which existed up to 1930).[2] Military-scientific societies were being established at the same time. Problem topics connected with the basmachi were also being elaborated at the Turkestan (subsequently the Central Asian) Worker-Peasant Communist University, which existed in 1921-1931; this institution trained cadres of scientific workers from representatives of indigenous nationalities. The Society for the Study of Kirghizstan and the Historical-Regional Studies Committee of the Turkmenistan TsIK, plus certain other scientific organizations dealt with these same problems to a certain degree.

Study of the history of the Soviet society and the civil war, including the basmachi, began during those years when the flame of struggle was still blazing in Turkestan. The most characteristic feature of the "embryonic" state of historiography was the fact that those who were beginning to investigate the history of the formation of the Soviet society were themselves actively participating in the struggle for the victory of Soviet power, which was entirely logical. This was dictated not only by the lack of professional historians and established archives, but also by the fact that the process of accumulation of knowledge was only just beginning and that the participants in the struggle against the basmachi were endeavoring to make the amassed experience available to the broad masses. Therefore study of events took on enormous political and indoctrinational significance from the very outset.

Personal recollections were extensively utilized in many works written soon after the events themselves. The first works by Marxist historians were small articles, published chiefly in the journals ZHIZN' NATSIONAL'NOSTEY, NOVYY VOSTOK (Moscow), KOMMUNIST, VOYENNAYA MYSL', VOYENNYY RABOTNIK TURKESTANA, KRASNAYA LETOPIS' TURKESTANA (Tashkent), and others.

A correct understanding of the history of the class struggle in Central Asia was connected first and foremost with publication in periodicals, including those published in indigenous languages, of the works of V. I. Lenin, and mastery of the Lenin legacy by historians.

History of the struggle against the basmachi, as well as certain other topics pertaining to history of the Soviet society, became an area of knowledge in which a fierce ideological struggle developed. Party member-historians, who were still in the military or doing party-soviet work, endeavored to interpret

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the course of historical events which were taking place before their eyes. Their attention was focused not only on combat operations on the Turkestan Front but also on such important problems as the class nature of the basmachi, their political objectives, and the role of British imperialism in organizing basmachi forces. At the same time those who were expressing the interests of the national and the Russian bourgeoisie, feudal-clerical circles and the former colonial bureaucracy were falsifying the great achievements of the October Revolution, the nationalities policy of the Communist Party, and the course of events of the civil war. Thus at the very dawn of existence of the Soviet State, Soviet historical science entered into an uncompromising struggle against the ideologues of the opposing class camp. We should note that not all Communist-historians, and not immediately, were able correctly to assess the history of the establishment and consolidation of Soviet power in Turkestan, the history of the Turkestan Communist Party during the civil war years, and the history of the struggle against the basmachi.

The journals VOYENNAYA MYSL' (published by the Turkestan Front Revvoyensovet) and ZHIZN' NATSIONAL'NOSTEY were among the first to develop the topic of the basmachi. The two years' issues of VOYENNAYA MYSL' for 1920-1921 contained several articles, chiefly about the Fergana basmachi, including an article by one of the leaders of the Turkestan Communist Party, Nazir Tyurakulov (T. Dervish).[3] While V. Kuvshinov expressed the idea that it would be useless to seek the causes behind the emergence of the basmachi "in the conditions of realities of the revolutionary time," M. Shklyar was one of the first to show that the basmachi constituted a politically counterrevolutionary phenomenon which "is nourished primarily by substantive support by the bai and wealthy profiteers"; as a consequence of this the basmachi were waging a struggle, as he put it, against the "peaceful villagers," who were "on the side of Soviet rule."[4]

An attempt to investigate the class roots of the basmachi was undertaken by N. Tyurakulov, whom V. V. Kuybyshev called "an outstanding person of natural gifts, a Marxist-thinking person."[5] Opposing the point of view according to which the basmachi constitute "a criminal anthropological atavism," allegedly characteristic of the inhabitants of Central Asia, N. Tyurakulov defined the basmachi as "a counterrevolutionary petit-bourgeois element," as a product of the economic and social conflicts of a transition period, the breaking of the old, precapitalist native society and the birth of a new society.[6] A vulgar-economic approach could not, however, produce fruitful results in elucidating the true nature of the analyzed phenomenon.

Some political writers (A. Vinogradova et al) were the first to attempt to gain an understanding of the distribution of class forces and the social composition of the Khorezm basmachi.[7] They state questions pertaining to the place of individual Turkmen tribal leaders in the struggle against the basmachi and the role of British imperialism in organizing the basmachi in the KPSR. The latter question was specifically addressed in an article by V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin.[8] There was not sufficient data available in the 1920's, however, fully to reveal the counterrevolutionary activities of imperialism pertaining to guiding the basmachi.

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The process of formation of this complex topic took place in a tenacious struggle. Attempts to falsify the history of the Turkestan Communist Party were revealed, including its struggle against the basmachi. A vivid example of this was a book by G. Safarov.[9] Written by a future active participant in the Trotskyite-Zinov'yev opposition bloc, it contained an antiscientific analysis of the main questions pertaining to the history of the first years of Soviet rule in Turkestan and distorted Communist Party policy in the Soviet East and the history of the struggle against the basmachi. G. Safarov incorrectly analyzed the causes behind the emergence of the basmachi and the degree of participation by the toilers of indigenous nationalities.[10] G. Safarov's views were uncritically accepted by N. Batmanov, G. Skalov, S. Ginzburg, D. Zuyev, and A. Syrkin.[11]

Errors in interpretation of the essence of the basmachi were caused both by the inadequate theoretical and methodological training of the first historians and political writers and by the extremely narrow range of sources utilized in their scholarship.

Articles by F. Khodzhayev and Di-Mur on the basmachi, and books by S. Ayni, P. Alekseyenkov, N. A. Paskutskiy, and Ye. Kozlovskiy were a certain indicator of initial successes in investigation of the history of the basmachi.[12] Broadening of the territorial and chronological framework of study of this topic was a new element.

A book by famed Central Asian writer and historian Sadriddin Ayni gave historiographers reason to place him among the ranks of the first historians of the people's revolution who laid down the foundations or study of the basmachi on the territory of the BPSR.[13]

In his brief article (four pages of text) Di-Mur correctly stated that the Eastern Bukharan basmachi had from beginning to end deployed "under the banner of reactionary feudalism, which is attempting to unite all anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary elements behind a broad pan-Islamic program."[14] Developing this initial thesis, Di-Mur showed that slogans about the commonality of interests and goals of the indigenous inhabitants of Central Asia being preached by the exploiter elite and clergy are alien to the toiler masses and "are directed only at a narrow stratum of the Muslim intelligentsia and merchant class."[15] Former beks, mullahs, bureaucrats, and Turkish officers were the leaders of the basmachi, noted Di-Mur.

The ideas stated by Di-Mur, just as prior to that time the ideas presented by the authors of articles in VOYENNAYA MYSL', were not further developed initially, however. It is possible that these writings were not even known to some historians.

P. Alekseyenkov made an appreciable contribution to elaboration of the history of the struggle against the basmachi. Studying the question of a "peasant rebellion" in the Fergana, he succeeded in fairly completely showing the history of unification of the basmachi and the Russian kulaks for a joint struggle against Soviet rule and in describing the heroic defense of Andizhan and the defeat of the united kulak-basmachi forces. The author attempted to

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analyze the causes of the victory by the Red Army and the failure of the forces of the counterrevolution. Many pages in P. Alekseyenkov's book, in spite of the fact that they were written more than 50 years ago, have still retained their scholarly significance and even today are read with great interest. P. Alekseyenkov also deserves credit for the fact that he was the first to show the activities of the local party organizations as well as the mobilizing and guiding role of the uyezd-city committees in the struggle against the basmachi.

While P. Alekseyenkov specifically focused on the history of the struggle against the basmachi, Ye. Kozlovskiy showed in his book on the Red Army in Turkestan how the toiler masses of Khorezm -- Uzbeks and Turkmens -- organized for the struggle against the bands of Dzhunaid-khan.

One common shortcoming of the first studies of the basmachi was the fact that their authors made almost no mention of the link between the facts they were describing and the events taking place at that time on other fronts in Turkestan, and particularly throughout the entire Soviet Republic.

At the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's development of historiography of Central Asia was beneficially influenced by celebration of the 10th anniversary of the October Revolution and establishment in 1929, at the initiative of the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, of the Central Asian Association of Scientific Research Establishments (SAANIU),[16] which included a Marxist historian section, which laid the foundations for the Central Asian Society of Marxist Historians (1930-1939). Subsequently historical science in Central Asia developed during a period of 12 years with the assistance of the party Central Committee Sredazbyuro (from April 1922 through October 1934). In 1930, on the basis of the 28 May 1928 decree of the VKP(b) Central Committee entitled "On Reorganization of Istpart," which called for establishment of party-history scientific research institutes based on local istparts, Sredazistpart was reorganized into the Central Asian Scientific Research Institute of History of the Revolution (SANIIR). Party influence on the development of historiography of the civil war in Turkestan was also exerted by the journals of the Sredazbyuro, other party and scientific organs -- ZA PARTIYU, PARTRABOTNIK, KOMMUNISTICHESKAYA MYSL', and REVOLYUTSIONNYY VOSTOK. The first reviews of works on history of the civil war in Turkestan appeared in these and other journals (including those published in Moscow) and publications.[17] A campaign was being waged both against Trotskyites and nationalists, who were attempting to distort the heroic struggle with the counterrevolution, as well as against foreign falsifiers of history, who were seeking to justify British intervention in Turkestan.[18] Work was in progress to organize archives and put them in order. Of great importance was establishment of a unified party archives at the Lenin Institute in 1929, by decision of the 15th Party Congress and taking into account the recommendations of the VKP(b) Central Committee. Local party archives were being made into branches of the Central Party Archives. A Unified Party Archives of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro was established in 1929. Documents of party organizations (up to 1924) of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizia were concentrated at this facility.[19]

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All these organizational measures promoted the accumulation and assimilation of a large quantity of factual material on the basmachi, which had an effect on deepening of investigative research on this topic. A positive role was also played by further work in the area of study of the common problems of the history of Soviet Turkestan and the Turkestan Communist Party, as well as the Khorezm and Bukhara republics and their party organizations.

Development of study of the problem of the basmachi was furthered by books by D. A. Furmanov, S. Muraveyskiy (V. Lopukhov), T. Ryskulov, and A. Mel'kumov (with a preface by I. Vareykis), as well as the three-volume "Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918-1921gg." [The Civil War, 1918-1921].[20] At the same time some authors, T. Ryskulov and S. Muraveyskiy in particular, did not fully comprehend the class nature of the basmachi. T. Ryskulov ignored the processes of stratification in the kishlak and aul and therefore was unable to show the class foundations of the basmachi. S. Muraveyskiy saw the roots of the basmachi chiefly in the economic crisis and economic chaos.

The first major specialized study of the basmachi, written by P. Alekseyenkov, was published in 1931.[21] Since this work determined for a number of years the directional thrust of research in this area, we shall examine it in greater detail.

Having formulated the question: "Just what is the basmachestvo?" P. Alekseyenkov proposed the following definition: basmachestvo is a "form of struggle by capitalist elements against the socialist development of Central Asia." He wrote that the basmachestvo was "antinational in character."[22] These theses unquestionably represented a step forward in study of this problem, but were not yet adequate for a scientific understanding of it, since one cannot agree that the basmachestvo is merely "a form of struggle by /capitalist elements/ (our italics -- Auth.) against the socialist development of Central Asia." Bourgeois (Russian and local) strata of the population and representatives of feudal circles also joined the basmachi. The last group were the predominant force in the basmachi.

P. Alekseyenkov traced in a fair amount of detail the difference between the prerevolutionary and the post-October basmachi and characterized the process of class differentiation in the Turkestan kishlak. One can on the whole agree with the author's following conclusions: the post-October basmachi "essentially were in no degree whatsoever a continuation or development of the pre-October basmachi"; "the post-October basmachestvo took from the pre-October basmachestvo in the main only its external form, while in essence it was a movement independent of it, had absolutely specific socioeconomic causes and set for itself objectives which were to a significant degree different from those of the pre-October basmachestvo."[23] We shall note that the author is incorrect in considering the basmachi activities to be a "movement."

The author, just as in his preceding work, addressed the role of the subjective factor in formation of the basmachi. He stood firmly on his position that errors in the area of nationalities policy could not be the "cause of the emergence of the basmachi."[24] In his opinion they were merely exploited by counterrevolutionary forces for their own purposes. Such a statement of the question was an important contribution by the author.

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P. Alekseyenkov also sought to answer the following question: what was the attitude of the toiling dekhkans toward the basmachi?

While in his preceding book ("The Kokand Autonomy"[25]) P. Alekseyenkov persuasively argued that following the October Revolution the great majority of the dekhkans were not active supporters of the bourgeois nationalists, in his book on the basmachi, while correctly noting that the basmachi were diversified in social structure, he unwarrantedly stated, however, that the dekhkans supported the basmachi, constituting their principal manpower pool.[26] It is true that the author did make the reservation that this applies only to the "first years of the basmachi movement" and by no means signifies that all the dekhkans of Turkestan supported the basmachi. Even with these stipulations, however, his conclusion does not correspond to the historical truth. One's attention is drawn to the fact that P. Alekseyenkov stated his conclusion without any reference to sources.

Thus although P. Alekseyenkov formulated a large number of questions pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi, he was unable to present an integral scientific picture.

I. Kutyakov, one of the military leaders in the struggle against the basmachi, addressed the history of the defeat of the basmachi at the same time as P. Alekseyenkov.[27] Basing his presentation on his own personal observations and archival documents, he endeavored to analyze the reasons for the relatively protracted basmachi operations in Khorezm. The author drew upon a large quantity of factual material, which serves to clarify the course of combat operations by the Red Army and military units of the KPSR. The theoretical value of this book was diminished to a great extent due to the introductory article by its editor, N. Kakurin, in which the roots of the basmachi are incorrectly characterized.

For a long period of time following publication of the book by P. Alekseyenkov and I. Kutyakov, no special studies dealing with the struggle against the basmachi were published. Individual elements were touched upon in general works (for example, V. Bozhko, "Grazhdanskaya voyna v Sredney Azii" [The Civil War in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1930; D. I. Manzhara, "Revolyutsionnoye dvizheniye v Sredney Azii" [The Revolutionary Movement in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1934).

Thus the initial stage of accumulation of knowledge on the topic is characterized by an intense class and ideological struggle. Questions pertaining to study of the history of the defeat of the basmachi were defined during this time. The problem of the social and class essence of the basmachi and the attitude of the toiling dekhkans toward them was becoming the central focus of scientific investigation. The topic of the role of British imperialism in organizing basmachi forces was also specified.

In the subsequent period, covering almost 20 years, the historiography of this problem became enriched with new topics and theoretical points.

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Further development of scholarly work on the problems of the civil war was promoted by a VKP(b) Central Committee decree dated 30 July 1931 on publication of a multivolume history of the civil war in the USSR. A. M. Gor'kiy, initiator of this publication, met with members of the Bureau of the Central Asian Association, veterans of the revolution and the civil war -- A. A. Kazakov, F. I. Kolesov, and N. A. Paskutskiy -- for the purpose of activating efforts in the area of collecting materials and elaboration of the history of the October Revolution and the civil war. The newspaper KOMSOMOLETS UZBEKISTANA published a telegram from A. M. Gor'kiy to the veterans of the revolutionary struggle, in which he emphasized that "the history of the civil war should show the selfless struggle by the toilers of the national republics for Soviet rule, for the world proletarian revolution, and for socialism." The telegram ended with the appeal: "Gather in a shock-work manner material on the history of the civil war in your republic."[28]

The job of collecting materials was directed by the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, the central committees of the Communist parties of the union republics, the Central Asian Scientific Research Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro, established in 1933 on the base of SANIIR, and republic institutes of the history of Marxism-Leninism, history of the revolutionary movement, and history of the party.[29] Numerous get-togethers were held with veterans of the civil war. At the same time the press began carrying extensive criticism of great-power-chauvinist and bourgeois-nationalist ideas on history of the party and history of national-statehood organizational development.

VKP(b) Central Committee and USSR Sovnarkom decrees in 1934-1936 on teaching civil history and the development of historical science, undertakings in the area of planning scientific research, as well as establishment of departments and faculties of history at the universities and pedagogic higher educational institutions in the Central Asian republics in turn promoted the development of scientific research work on history of the civil war and the defeat of the basmachi, a component part of civil war history.

Investigators could henceforth be guided by new materials from the Leninist ideological legacy: the XVIII, XXI and XXIV Lenin collection volumes were published in 1931-1933, containing documents on the civil war. Individual documents on the history of the civil war in Turkestan were being published at the same time.[30]

At the end of the 1930's and beginning of the 1940's institutes of party history under the central committees of the Communist parties -- branches of IMEL [CPSU Central Committee Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute] -- were established in the Central Asian republics.

A notable phenomenon in Central Asian historiography prior to the Great Patriotic War was the publication of two small books which, although not specifically dealing with the basmachi, exerted considerable influence on studies of this subject.[31] K. Zhitov and V. Nepomnin provided for the first time in the Soviet literature a synthesized sketch of the history of colonial

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and Soviet Uzbekistan (up to the middle of the 1930's). B. Gafurov and N. Prokhorov, revealing the reasons for the collapse of the Bukhara emirate, endeavored to define the character of the revolution and of revolutionary transformations in the BPSR.

New steps were taken in studying this problem in the 1940's and 1950's. Two books by S. P. Timoshkov and a monograph by A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev dealt with the role of British imperialism in organizing the basmachi and supplying them with weapons and ammunition.[32] The authors showed for the first time in Soviet historiography, utilizing a wealth of material, how British imperialism planned its aggressive policy toward the Soviet East, what aims it pursued, and by what methods it sought to achieve its objectives. We should note in passing that the policy of U.S. imperialism in Central Asia and the methods of its implementation have as yet been little studied.

Another topic which attracted the attention of historians was the role of the Turkkomissiya of the VTsIK and RSFSR Sovnarkom and the RKP(b) Central Committee Turkbyuro in the struggle against the basmachi following the final unification of Turkestan with the country's central region (September 1919).[33] As a result of formulation of this topic and utilization of new sources, chiefly obtained from central archives, the activities of the party Central Committee and Soviet Government and their official agencies in Turkestan in organizing the struggle against the basmachi began to be more thoroughly investigated. A number of aspects of party-political work among toilers of indigenous nationalisties were studied, and a change carried out under the guidance of M. V. Frunze and V. V. Kuybyshev in the tactics of the struggle against the basmachi was shown. At the same time new subjects of investigation were specified: the extensive enlistment of toilers of indigenous nationalities into the Red Army and onto the front of the struggle against the basmachi, activities of local party and Soviet organizations in the kishlak and aul, etc.

There also appeared books and articles in which an attempt was made, in parallel with elaboration of the general questions of the civil war in Central Asia, to treat more thoroughly the history of the basmachi. Kirghizia, and in part Turkmenia and Tajikistan were particularly "fortunate" in this regard.[34]

Books by Aziz Niallo and P. P. Nikishov present a general picture of the struggle against the basmachi in the areas of contemporary Kirghizia. It is to the credit of P. P. Nikishov that he traces, although within a limited framework (the southern part of Kirghizia), the struggle against the basmachi from the emergence of the first bands to liquidation of basmachi remnants in 1923. Investigations had not been conducted in the past within such a chronological framework. At the same time these authors, just as some of their predecessors, were unable fully to reveal the causes of the emergence of the basmachi. P. P. Nikishov, for example, did not see a difference between bandits of the pre-October period and the basmachi. The bandit gangs operating in Central Asia prior to the October Revolution, which were frequently called basmachi, differed radically in their class origin and political thrust from the basmachi who emerged following the defeat of the "Kokand Autonomy."

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G. Nepesov undertook to show the class composition of the Khorezm basmachi. But the author was unable to cope with this task. His book was subjected to harsh criticism.[35] The ensuing debate indicated that extreme views existed in appraising some of the clan-tribal leaders who fought against Dzhunaid-khan. At the same time it became clear that further scientific investigation of the question is necessary, with the employment of archival data.

Tajik historians (M. Irkayev,R. Amanov, and I. T. Yusuf-zade) attempted to investigate on a comparatively narrow source base (chiefly on the basis of the reminiscences of participants in the civil war) the struggle against the basmachi in the central and southern areas of Tajikistan. They devoted particular attention to the liberation of Eastern Bukhara and the Matchinskoye Bekstvo from the basmachi.[36]

D. Fan'yan and M. Zelinskaya, for the first time in a popular scientific pamphlet, dealt with combat by Red Army ethnic units against large basmachi bands. The authors exaggerated, however, the degree of consciousness and organization of the toilers of indigenous nationalities in the first year following overthrow of the emir's rule in Bukhara. Books by M. Irkayev and Yu. Nikolayev also discuss the organization of volunteer ethnic detachments.[37] Through their efforts the names of Tajik commanders who fought for the victory of Soviet rule became known to scholars.

The shortcomings of the books and articles published up to the end of the 1950's were due in large measure to the fact that they had a fairly narrow source-material base. Highly valuable materials from central and local archives were not yet available to scholars. There was extremely little collecting and publishing of memoirs of active participants in the civil war, as a result of which some important aspects of the historical process remained almost totally uninvestigated.

Additional factors included the negative consequences of the cult of personality, as a result of which the decisive role of the masses was not adequately revealed, particularly the role of toilers of the indigenous nationalities, in the struggle against the interventionists, White Guard and basmachi; the role of V. I. Lenin as organizer and leader of victories in the civil war was not investigated, and there was little analysis of the activities of local party and soviet organizations in the area of leading the toiler masses. The names of many party, soviet and military officials who played an important role in the struggle against the basmachi received almost no mention in these works.

The process of overcoming these and other deficiencies took place in the productive atmosphere generated following the resolutions of the 20th CPSU Congress, in the course of assimilating new sources which became available to scholars after the congress, and as a result of growth in cadres of historians on Central Asia. Of particular importance were new publications of the Leninist ideological-theoretical legacy ("Voyennaya perepiska" [Military Correspondence], the 3rd volume of the "Leninskiy Sbornik" [Lenin Collection]), and republication of the records of proceedings of the 8th, 9th, and 10th RKP(b) congresses. The results of the activities of the institutes of history of the

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union-republic Academies of Sciences and branches of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, which had become stronger and were engaged in productive work, gradually had an effect. The latter published collected volumes of memoirs and reminiscences of participants in the October Revolution and the civil war in Central Asia.[38] The CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism prepared and published in 1960-1961 a three-volume collection of documents entitled "Iz istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [From the History of the Civil War in the USSR]. Some of the documents are connected with the basmachi. The introductions prefacing each of the volumes were of independent scholarly significance.

The most important feature of development of historical science in Central Asia at the end of the 1950's was the publication of synthesizing works on the history of the Central Asian republics, which contain chapters on the civil war,[39] in which questions pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi are presented in a fair amount of detail. The role of the masses, especially the toilers of indigenous nationalities, in the events taking place in that time is investigated in these studies more extensively than in preceding works, and an attempt is made to show the activities of the party Central Committee, headed by V. I. Lenin, pertaining to guiding the local party organizations and their campaign to defeat the enemy in the Central Asian republics. The authors endeavored to investigate the civil war in Turkestan, including the defeat of the basmachi as a component and integral part of the civil war throughout the country. They stated, although they did not fully resolve it, the question of the factors which ensured victory over the united forces of the interventionists, White Guard and basmachi in the extraordinarily difficult conditions prevailing during the civil war years in Turkestan. Soviet economic and cultural construction are shown fairly completely. The activities of the Turkestan Communist Party in mobilizing the masses for the struggle against the basmachi are reflected. These studies present for the first time a Marxist definition of the basmachi as an "expression of the class struggle of the bai and reactionary Muslims against Soviet rule."[40] A shortcoming of these studies was the fact that they took little account of objective economic processes and the correlation of class forces at the various stages of the civil war in Central Asia.

In addition to summarizing works on the history of the Soviet society, the problem topics pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi were also reflected in special studies.[41]

Tajik historians M. Irkayev, Yu. Nikolayev, and Ya. Sharapov, in connection with the fact that the basmachi engaged in their anti-Soviet activities in Eastern Bukhara following the victorious people's revolution in Bukhara at the end of 1920, concluded the necessity of changing the chronological framework of the civil war period for the territory of their republic. They hold that the war began here in 1921 and continued up to and including 1926, when the basmachi were defeated. A prominent place in their book is given to an investigation of the methods of fighting the basmachi in conditions where the process of rebuilding the economy was taking place throughout the country. The authors failed, however, to show the struggle against the basmachi in the northern areas of Tajikistan and in the Pamirs.[42]

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Books by Sh. Tashliyev and M. Yazykova, as well as a monograph by S. N. Pokrovskiy help gain an understanding of the specific conditions of the struggle against the basmachi in Turkmenia, as well as to gain an understanding of the mobilizing role of local party organizations.[43]

K. Malyshev endeavored to present a general picture of the defeat of the basmachi in the southern part of Kirghizia. He demonstrated that the areas of present-day Kirghizia and adjacent areas of Turkestan were targets of interest on the part of the British and American imperialists. K. Malyshev's thesis about a high degree of social differentiation in the kishlak and the aul is debatable. Drawing attention to only one aspect of this process -- the gradual land dispossession of the poor, he failed to consider another factor; the strong dependence of the dekhkan on the mullahs, the bai, the manaps, clan and tribal vestiges, etc, mentioned by V. I. Lenin at the 8th Congress of the RKP(b) when discussing the party's draft program.

A popular scientific pamphlet by A. Kokanbayev discusses the struggle against the basmachi in the Fergana Valley. This, as well as the basmachi in Samarkandskaya Oblast (chiefly on the territory of the present Tajik SSR), are discussed in a pamphlet by T. Kh. Kel'diyev. A. Kokanbayev specifies the vanguard role of the worker class of the Fergana and notes its staunchness and devotion to Soviet rule.

The scholarly level of these pamphlets is diminished to a great extent by the confused presentation of the question of the social nature and causes of emergence of the basmachi. A. Kokanbayev, for example, correctly stating that the local exploiters were the class support of the basmachi, subsequently inclines to the idea that the roots of the basmachi should be sought in the colonial policy of Russian czarism in Turkestan. This naturally is incorrect. Frequently A. Kokanbayev and T. Kh. Kel'diyev forget to link a given stage in the defeat of the basmachi with the general Turkestan and general Russian situation, in particular the situation on the civil war fronts.

The role of the Communists in Turkestan, their political and organizational work during the civil war years, including on the Fergana Front, are discussed in a monograph by M. Kh. Nazarov.[44]

New data on the struggle against the basmachi at the final stage of their existence are contained in a book which discusses the glorious past of the troops of the Turkestan Military District.[45] Meriting attention is an endeavor to determine and make available to scholars the names of commanders of units and combined units who through their skill, experience and valor contributed to the victorious conclusion of the war against the basmachi. A thorough study of source materials and review of obsolete views and opinions enabled G. Nepesov to advance significantly investigation of the problem of the struggle against the basmachi on the territory of Khorezm. The author presents interesting material on the contribution of the toilers of many of our country's nationalities toward the defeat of the basmachi. The question of dating the emergence of the basmachi on the territory of Khorezm, however, remains controversial.[46]

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Departures from achieved positions were also noted alongside substantial achievements in study of the problem of the basmachi. This was indicated, in particular, by a book by Sh. A. Shamagdiyev.[47] The author was endeavoring to show more fully the active participation of the toilers of indigenous nationalities under the guidance of local party organizations in the struggle against basmachi bands. He achieved some success in this as well. But at the same time he "ignores all standards and demands which are generally accepted in scientific research work in the field of history. He... adjusts and adds to cited sources and documents, ascribes to party and soviet agencies decisions which they never made, cites sensational 'facts' and new dates of events while making no reference whatsoever to sources, and confuses names, positions, and party affiliation of some individuals."[48]

Thus in the first period, in spite of the fact that part of this period falls within a time when, as a result of the operation of subjective factors, there was limited source material availability, as well as the operation of certain adverse factors in scholarly activity, considerable successes were achieved in investigation of the history of the defeat of the basmachi.

A number of monographs and books were published on history of Soviet society in the Central Asian republics, which contained special chapters on the basmachi in which the authors discussed from a scientific party position fundamental questions pertaining to history of the struggle against the basmachi which had previously not been investigated or had not been examined in full measure (for example, on the role of the masses in achieving victory in the civil war and on the social nature of the basmachi). The following conclusion was a major achievement of historiography: the basmachi represent one of the forms of the class struggle in the era of dictatorship of the proletariat.

Investigations published after the end of the 1950's, in spite of certain debatable and even erroneous theses, determined a qualitatively new stage in the development of historiography of this topic.

In the contemporary period new successes have been achieved in investigation of history of the struggle against the basmachi. They were dictated by such an objective factor as the victory of developed socialism in the USSR as well as by the influence of subjective factors: publication of new materials from the Leninist ideological legacy, theoretical and methodological instructions of the 22d-24th CPSU Congresses and party Central Committee documents, and by growth in the professional expertise and maturity of historians.

The appearance of specific-topic collected volumes containing writings of Lenin pertaining to the history of Central Asia acquired particular importance for Central Asian historiography: "V. I. Lenin o Sredney Azii i Uzbekistane" [V. I. Lenin on Central Asia and Uzbekistan] (Tashkent, 1957) and "V. I. Lenin o Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane" [V. I. Lenin on Central Asia and Kazakhstan] (Tashkent, 1960). Other titles published include "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya s"yezdov Kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana (1918-1924)" [Resolutions and Decrees of Congresses of the Communist Party of Turkestan (1918-1924)] (Tashkent, 1958), "Pis'ma trudyashchikhsya V. I. Leninu (1917-1924 gg.)"

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[Letters from Toilers to V. I. Lenin (1917-1924)] (Tashkent, 1964), and "Trudyashchiyesya Turkmenistana V. I. Leninu" [The Toilers of Turkmenistan to V. I. Lenin] (Ashkhabad, 1960).

The Complete Collection of Writings of V. I. Lenin and the Biographical Chronicle of V. I. Lenin expanded the theoretical and source-material arsenal of Central Asian social scientists.

Characteristic features of the present stage of investigation of the history of the defeat of the basmachi include detailed specialized study of the topic, formulation of new questions, and utilization of new sources.

By the beginning of the 1960's books and articles were appearing on problems which had not been raised in previously published works. This applies first and foremost to questions pertaining to the international unity of toilers in the struggle against the basmachi, as well as certain theoretical aspects of the role of British imperialism in stirring up the basmachi.

I. S. Sologubov, A. M. Matveyev, Ya. M. Seryy, and G. B. Nikol'skaya[49] demonstrated for the first time in Central Asian historiography how during the difficult years of civil war Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Austrians, Germans, Chinese, Indians, Persians and others residing in Central Asia manifested a feeling of proletarian solidarity upon being given their freedom by Soviet power: with weapon in hand, fighting shoulder to shoulder with Russians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kirghiz and representatives of other peoples, they defended the achivements of the Great October Revolution, taking part in defeating the basmachi forces.

The role of international, particularly British imperialism in the unleashing and spread of civil war in Central Asia, in organizing and guiding the basmachi was investigated by A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev.[50] Of particular interest is a second book, in which the author, on the basis of additional sources, provides a new understanding of a number of fundamental aspects of the foreign policy of British imperialism.

The fact that A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev examines the policies of British imperialism in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Iran from a single, consistent point of view is praiseworthy. Such a statement of the question made it possible to elucidate two most important aspects of the subject: the significance of the defeat of British intervention and subsequently the basmachi as well in Central Asia for development of the liberation movement in Afghanistan and Iran; the interrelationship between the struggle of the peoples in Central Asia and the peoples of the Middle East against a common foe. This aspect, as was persuasively demonstrated by A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, is not in conflict with the fact that the toilers of Central Asia, under the guidance of the Communist Party, were fighting for socialism, while the peoples of the Middle East were waging a national liberation struggle.

A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev extensively utilized party documents, which enabled him to give a correct political assessment of British policy aims and methods following the victorious conclusion of the civil war in Central Russia. He showed

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how, having failed with their undisguised intervention, the British imperialists shifted to organization of anti-Soviet conspiracies and insurgencies, to expanding the basmachi, inciting neighboring countries to anti-Soviet aggression, and utilizing economic chaos with the aim of penetration by British capital and restoration of capitalism in our country.

The history of the struggle against the basmachi also found reflection in the five-volume "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [History of the Civil War in the USSR]. While the basmachi are only mentioned in the third volume, in the fourth and especially in the fifth volume[51] an attempt is made in the sections entitled "Decisive Victories of the Red Army Over the United Forces of the Entente and Domestic Counterrevolution (March 1919-February 1920)" and "The End of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War in the USSR. Liquidation of the Last Focal Areas of Counterrevolution (February 1920-1922)" to reflect some of the most important events in the history of the struggle against the basmachi. The significance of these synthesizing works lies not only in the factual material presented but also in a new methodological approach to study of the history of the civil war, in the endeavor on the part of their authors to overcome the errors and deficiencies characterizing works written prior to the 20th CPSU Congress, as well as the extensive presentation of the names of those military leaders and political workers who had not been mentioned previously in the literature. This could not help but have an effect on subsequent study of the history of the struggle against the basmachi.

A detailed investigation of the history of the basmachi was manifested in study of the struggle against them within the framework of the contemporary Central Asian republics. But the following questions arise: Is it correct for the struggle against the basmachi within the geographic framework of the contemporary Central Asian Soviet republics which were formed in the 1920's to become the subject of investigation? Is this not an aggravation of the well-known deficiencies of historiography of the civil war in Central Asia of the preceding period? M. Irkayev used the example of the Tajik SSR to demonstrate the possibility of independent investigation of the history of the basmachi within the boundaries of regions which were not independent governmental entities at the time of the struggle against the basmachi.[52]

M. Irkayev rejected the previously adopted chronological framework of the civil war in the central and southern areas of Tajikistan (1921-1924)[53] and proposed a different dating: 1921-1926. He divided the entire period of the war into three stages: the first (1921 to the first half of 1923) -- emergence of and large-scale basmachi activities; the second (latter half of 1923 to the end of 1924) -- loss of power by the basmachi and the changing of basmachi activities into banditry; the third (1925-first half of 1926) -- end of the civil war in Tajikistan and liquidation of remnants of the basmachi. M. Irkayev points out that at all stages the aims of the basmachi remained unchanged, while the forms of the struggle and its scope changed.[54]

The periodization advanced and substantiated by the author was in its basic features approved by Tajikistan's scholars.

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An important place in M. Irkayev's book is devoted to the internal and external circumstances of the emergence of the basmachi, a description of their social base, and the reasons for a significant intensification of basmachi activities at a moment when restoration of the economy had begun throughout the country. The author correctly states that the feudal lords, the clergy, the bureaucracy, the bai, and emerging bourgeois elements constituted the social base of the basmachi.[55] Examining the degree of participation of the toiler population in the basmachi movement, he reaches the general conclusion that "in the initial period basmachi activities occurred on a significant scale on the territory of Tajikistan due to the backward and deceived segment of the population."[56] Participation by the toiler masses in the basmachi bands is also traced in this book at other stages. The author does not hold, however, that all toilers of indigenous nationalities sided with the basmachi. M. Irkayev writes that "many dekhkans, from the very first days of the revolution, sided with them (the new authorities -- Auth.) and actively struggled for establishment and strengthening of the power of the Soviets," and that "at the beginning of the struggle for Soviet rule a substantial segment of the toiling dekhkans took a wait-and-see position, and then quite soon, recognizing the facts of the revolution and the Soviet system, also began supporting the policy of the Soviet authorities."[57]

M. Irkayev made new party documents available to scholars for the first time, particularly decisions of the RKP(b) Central Committee Politburo pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi, and a quantity of factual data obtained from Central Asian and central archives.

The civil war on the territory of Soviet Tajikistan is also discussed in a number of other works. Important among these is a monograph by G. Kh. Khaydarov.[58] The author attempted to establish the time of activities by basmachi bands in the Matcha area[59] and combat against them by Red Army forces.

While M. Irkayev succeeded in making a thorough study of history of the struggle against the basmachi on the territory of this republic, which in the past had belonged to various political entities or administrative units, S. B. Zhantuarov, the author of a book dealing with the civil war in Kirghizia,[60] did not succeed in this endeavor, and here is why. The following should definitely be a condition for such an approach: the existence of a broad general background of class struggle; an investigation of the dialectical interrelationship of the struggle in different areas within the region, as well as the ability objectively to separate the most important from the secondary. But there is noticeable in S. B. Zhantuarov's book a separation of the events in Kirghizia from the overall events in Turkestan, of which they were a part, not to mention operations on the fronts of the entire Soviet republic.

The successes of historiography of the civil war in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the amassing of factual material, resolution of a number of fundamental problems, as well as growth of cadres of historians grouped around branches of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and history institutes of the Academies of Sciences of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan promoted activation of research on the history of party organizations. Publications

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included a monograph on the history of Turkestan,[61] books on the history of individual republics and their Communist parties,[62], as well as other works on party history.[63]

The most important achievements of the authors of these works include investigation of the struggle against the basmachi as an integral component part of the struggle against the entire Central Asian counterrevolution, as well as examination of the history of the Leninist resolution of the nationalities question in Turkestan and implementation of a policy of enlisting the masses to defend the republic, which ensured a solid military-political alliance of workers and peasants of all the nationalities of Central Asia.

The above-mentioned books had overcome a number of deficiencies and shortcomings characteristic of previous publications and stated substantiated opinions on certain questions which previously had been considered debatable or unresolved. In "History of the Kazakh SSR," for example, the author demonstrates more solidly, utilizing some new data, the specific features of the civil war in Kazakhstan and the causes of the victory by the people over counterrevolutionary forces, and more fully reveals the essence of the policy of War Communism. The events on the Semirech'ye Front are more closely linked with the events on the other Turkestan fronts. Certain factual errors occurring in the previous edition were also corrected.

In "History of Kirghizia" one can consider as successful the author's elaboration of questions pertaining to implementation of the policy of War Communism on the territory of contemporary Kirghizstan and on the combat operations of local units.

"History of the Tajik People" synthesizes civil war historiographic data on the various areas contained within today's boundaries of the Tajik SSR; Northern Tajikistan and the Pamirs, which were previously a part of the Turkestan ASSR; Central and Southern Tajikistan, which up to 1920 were under the authority of the emir of Bukhara. Revelation of some of the specific features of the class struggle during the first years of Soviet rule is one of the positive elements of this book. A no less important distinctive feature of this book is the fact that it closely ties in local events with events of a determining nature which were taking place in Tashkent, the central city of Central Asia. The authors discussed the defeat of the basmachi in Eastern Bukhara in detail, partially on the basis of new material. The authors sought to reveal the role of the Tajik toilers in defeating the forces of the couterrevolution and foreign imperialists. Confirmation was presented for the view that the civil war in Eastern Bukhara continued up to mid-1926.

Shortcomings of the first edition of the "History of the Tajik People" included the descriptive character of many processes and statement of facts in the absence of a thorough analysis of the distribution of class forces and the causes which ensured victory in the civil war.[64]

In "History of the Uzbek SSR" (Volume III, Chapter 2), published at the end of the 1960's, the authors consolidate successes achieved by that time in studying the history of the defeat of the basmachi. They present not only a

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formulation of the basmachi as an expression of the class struggle, a statement which has become generally accepted, but also make a successful attempt to elucidate additional reasons for participation by a portion of the dekhkan toilers in the basmachi bands. The course of progress of the civil war on the territory of Uzbekistan, including the struggle against the basmachi, is viewed as a part of the general military offensive against Soviet Russia by domestic and international reactionaries.[65]

Historical sketches on local party organizations devote considerable attention, alongside problems of a party-organizational nature and matters of party-organizational development, to party activities in the area of mobilizing the toilers to defeat the enemy. The value of these publications lies in the fact that they cite most important party documents pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi. They also present for the first time the names of many active participants in defeating the basmachi. These sketches laid the groundwork for producing a single synthesizing work on the history of the Central Asian party organizations.

Subsequent successes in studying the history of the civil war in Central Asia, in particular history of the basmachi, as well as discussion of untreated and debatable questions were impossible without new documents and sources. In connection with this, substantial publishing activities were undertaken beginning in the 1960's, activities which far from exhausted all possibilities existing in this regard.

The institutes of history of the Academies of Sciences of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, the Kazakh and Kirghiz branches of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism, together with the archives administrations of the Councils of Ministers and Central State Archives of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, and Kirghiz SSRs, published two volumes of documents on the civil war in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.[66] The compilers discovered a great many new documents and materials in archives in Moscow, Tashkent, Ashkhabad, Alma-Ata, Frunze, Dushanbe, Orenburg, Astrakhan', and other cities. A total of 1158 documents were published, some of which were being made available to the scholarly community for the first time; a number of these documents were connected with the basmachi. Of great value is the 25 December 1918 Workers' and Peasants' Defense Council decree calling for a "more aggressive offensive against Orenburg" with the objective of breaking Turkestan out of encirclement and linking it up with the country's central region (Volume I, page 279), as well as a direct-wire conversation between M. V. Frunze and I. P. Belov on 2 October 1919 (Volume II, pages 261-263). These materials shed additional light on the concern of V. I. Lenin, the party and Soviet State for the peoples of Central Asia during these peoples' difficult days of existence and struggle. A letter from Denikin to British General Malleson (Volume I, page 363), published for the first time, reconfirms the conclusion of Soviet historiography that the civil war in Central Asia and Kazakhstan was a component part of the struggle throughout our country and reveals a new aspect of the role of British imperialism in anti-Soviet intervention in Turkestan. Also attesting to this is a report by Dzhunkovskiy (one of the leaders of the "Turkestan Alliance for the Struggle Against Bolshevism") to Denikin (Volume I, page 341) and the latter's reply

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(Volume I, pp 86-87), as well as a report on links between the basmachi and British imperialism (Volume II, pp 415-416).

The history of the struggle against the basmachi in 1918-1923 occupies an important place in the two-volume "History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan."[67] In this publication the authors endeavor, utilizing preceding advances in historiography, to resolve a number of theoretical and methodological problems (periodization of the civil war in Central Asia, patterns and specific features of the policy of War Communism and NEP in Turkestan, etc). The historiographic introduction presented in the first volume is of definite interest. Its polemical keenness shows the existence of debatable and unresolved problems in the topic area of investigation.

This two-volume study presents new factual material on the struggle against the basmachi, especially on the territory of the Bukhara and Khorezm People's republics and in Kara-Kalpakia. One important virtue of this work is the profound analysis of the economic and political life of the peoples of the Turkestan Republic, the Bukhara and Khorezm people's republics, without which it is impossible to understand the history of the emergence and collapse of the basmachi. The authors reveal in greater detail than had been done in the past the role of party nationalities policy in bringing the basmachi to an end in the Fergana and show the economic, food supply and cultural work of party and governmental agencies.

Published in this work for the first time are basic documents of the RKP(b) Central Committee and party Central Committee Sredazbyuro in 1921-1922 pertaining to the struggle against the basmachi, and their mobilizing and organizing role in defeating the enemy is shown; the materials of a number of local party and soviet agencies are analyzed.

In connection with the fact that this study is to a certain degree a summarizing work on the problem of the basmachi, we shall examine it in greater detail.

One of the principal tasks assigned the authors was /"to reveal the class essence of the basmachi, exposing the true instigators and leaders of the counterrevolutionary movement."/[68] This statement of the topic of investigation would be entirely legitimate if no attempts had been made in this area prior to that time. In the introduction to the first volume, however, the authors drew attention to the fact that an extensive literature existed, which has made firm attempts to define the class essence of the basmachi and to reveal the actual instigators and organizers. We have already discussed in this survey the fairly successful resolution of these questions.

Also incorrect, as has already been noted, is the statement that the basmachi constitute a "movement."

One of the major methodological problems of historiography is the problem of periodization of the struggle against the basmachi. The authors correctly hold the view that the civil war in Uzbekistan, including the basmachi, "is not an isolated phenomenon but a component part of the struggle of all the people, on a scale of the entire Soviet State."[69] This by no means

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signifies, however, that the general laws and patterns did not have specific manifestations in the concrete historical conditions of such areas as the Fergana, Bukhara, Khiva, and Kara-Kalpakia. This also applies to periodization. The end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919 are considered to be the time of intensification of the civil war in Turkestan. What confirmation is there for this? The fact that "a plan was drawn up for a joint offensive against Soviet Turkestan by British troops, White Guard, and basmachi bands."[70] As we know, however, this plan was a total failure. The authors also state that "at the end of 1918 the civil in the Fergana Valley intensified... in connection with preparations for a general offensive on Tashkent." Such preparations were indeed being made at that time.

In actual fact, however, intensification of the civil war in Turkestan was taking place in the spring and summer of 1919. This was due to the following circumstances: in April 1919 Turkestan, following a brief linkup with the country's central region via Orenburg, once again found itself encircled by the enemy, a fact which counterrevolutionary forces on almost all the Turkestan fronts utilized for an offensive against Soviet rule. The volume's authors themselves acknowledged this. They write about the "revival of counterrevolutionary forces in Turkestan" in connection with Kolchak's offensive.

The authors hold to debatable views on the chronological framework of the concluding stage of the struggle against the basmachi. They claim that the end of the civil war in Turkestan and, consequently, the end of the basmachi took place in 1920, while "liquidation of remnants of the basmachi" took place in 1921-1923, that in these years "not military, but rather political and economic measures advanced to the forefront in the struggle against remnants of the basmachi."[71] Standing in conflict with this view is the actual state of affairs in the Fergana Valley, and even more so in the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics, where a stubborn and bloody civil war was in progress in 1921-1923. This did not mean that the process of rebuilding the economy was not taking place and the New Economic Policy was not being implemented in a number of areas of Central Asia beginning in 1921. Political and economic measures were taking on increasing significance, but they could not yet be carried out at full effort without resolving the military question.

This was indicated in a number of party documents. The RKP(b) Central Committee, for example, emphasized in a circular dated 11 January 1922 that the basmachi were "an important factor in the economic disintegration."[72] On 21 August 1922 the RKP(b) Central Committee, in directives to the Central Committee Sredazbyuro, the Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee, and the Bukhara Communist Party Central Committee, stated the task of wiping out the basmachi "as one of the most important," without which restoration of the economy could not be achieved.[73] The 7th Regional Conference of the Turkestan Communist Party (October 1922) stated in its resolution on the report of Ya. E. Rudzutak: "In addition to wiping out the basmachi, we are faced with the formidable task of Turkestan's economic recovery."[74] This resolution also noted the role of British imperialism in leading the basmachi.[75] These documents provide us with a bearing for correctly assessing the actual state of affairs in Central Asia.

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The authors of this book themselves state repeatedly the "protracted nature of the civil war in Uzbekistan,"[76] and therefore almost half of the material in the second volume deals with events which took place in 1921-1923.

Works dealing with individual major problems of the history of Central Asia of the Soviet period help gain a deeper understanding of the objective and subjective reasons for the defeat of the basmachi, the mobilizing and organizing role of the party in the struggle against counterrevolutionary forces. Of particular importance among them are works on history of Soviet organizational development during the civil war years, and particularly dealing with the role of the Proletarian Tashkent Soviet in the struggle against the basmachi, as well as new synthesizing studies on history of the party. Several monographs deal with the soviets.[77]

R. A. Nurullin drew attention to the activities of the soviets pertaining to enlisting dekhkans into the Red Army and on disintegration of the basmachi bands. The role of the Tashkent proletariat in forming units and detachments sent to the basmachi fronts is given extensive treatment in books by G. Rashidov and T. Pulatov.

An important event in the ideological-political affairs of the Central Asian republics was publication of "History of Communist Organizations of Central Asia,"[78] produced by a team of leading party historians of the Central Asian and Kazakh branches of the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The significance of this work is determined not only by the fact that it contains chapters, written on a high theoretical level, which present the history of party direction of the struggle against the basmachi, but also and chiefly by the fact that a number of theoretical-methodological problems are examined in it which are of great importance for an understanding of the mechanism and specific features of the defeat of the counterrevolution in Central Asia. These include the following: the international mission of the Russian revolutionary proletariat -- the guiding force in the campaign to liberate the toilers of indigenous nationalities from social and ethnic oppression; the character and specific features of the military-political alliance of workers and peasants and its role in the victory over the basmachi; the character and aims of the popular revolutions in Bukhara and Khiva and the process of their gradual development into socialist revolutions; the mechanisms of the noncapitalist path of development of the peoples of Central Asia; the process of consolidation of Bolshevik organizations in conditions of a former outlying colonial region; the position of the Communist Party vis-à-vis the various classes, political parties and organizations operating in Central Asia during the first years of Soviet rule.

This work introduces a new element into one's understanding of the essence of the basmachi. In the chapter entitled "The Turkestan Communist Party in the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War," the authors present, on the basis of previous scholarly works and the employment of new material, an objective reply to questions about the social-class nature of the basmachi and the reasons for their greatest development namely in the Fergana Valley. It states, in particular: "The basmachi represented an armed form of

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struggle by the overthrown local exploiter classes against the dictatorship of the proletariat."[79] It further states: "It would not have been particularly difficult to put down the basmachi if only the exploiter elite and déclassé elements had participated. The situation was in fact much more complicated, for many toiling dekhkans joined basmachi bands."[80] This chapter provides an explanation of the reasons why a portion of the toiling dekhkans joined the basmachi and indicates the revolutionary forces which came to the defense of Soviet rule. Precisely this formulation of the problem made it possible correctly to analyze the heroic struggle against the basmachi.

The struggle against the basmachi in the BPSR and KPSR is presented in less detail in "History of Communist Organizations of Central Asia."

This synthesizing work on the history of party organizations of Central Asia once again confirmed that the main thrust of subsequent research on problems of party history as well as on specific topics pertaining to history of the civil war lies in the direction of further thorough study of the Lenin ideological-theoretical legacy, Marxist-Leninist methodology, and a Leninist analysis of factual material.

New themes appeared in historiography in the latter half of the 1960's and in the 1970's. These include first and foremost studies grouped under the title "Lenin and the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan."[81] They show the essence of the Leninist scientific conception of the history of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and disclose the scientific laboratory of its formation. Particular attention is devoted to Leninist ideas on the nationalities question and their significance for the victory over the united forces of the interventionists, White Guard, and the basmachi. At the same time there remains a great deal to be done in order to achieve further detailed study of the Leninist ideological-theoretical legacy and methodology of a Leninist analysis of factual material. It is also necessary to make available to the scholarly community new materials from the complete works of V. I. Lenin, and especially from the biographical chronicle of V. I. Lenin, including on the history of the class struggle in Central Asia.

Another topic which was also of great methodological significance for studying the struggle against the basmachi is that of the activities of the VKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro. Solid, substantial monographs were written by V. M. Ustinov, S. Nazarov, M. F. Anderson, K. Khasanov, A. T. Azizkhanov, and A. A. Roslyakov; Ya. M. Seryy published a number of articles.[82]

These works contain sections or chapter subdivisions with material on party guidance of the struggle against the basmachi. A. A. Roslyakov holds that at the first stage of the history of the Sredazbyuro (1922-1924), its main task was "crushing of the armed resistance of the feudal-bai counterrevolution, that is, defeat of the basmachi."[83] He also endeavored to give a definition of the social nature of the basmachi at the concluding stage of their existence. To quote the author, they constituted "a feudal-nationalist counterrevolution," "an undisguised armed feudal counterrevolution."[84] In our opinion this definition can apply (and even then not fully) only to certain areas (Eastern Bukhara, certain areas of Turkmenia). One can hardly

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discount the bai and the emerging national bourgeoisie, which played a decisive role, together with feudal circles, in promoting the basmachi. The author's theses on the reasons for the participation of certain dekhkan groups in basmachi forces are not entirely accurate.[85]

The third topic is connected with showing the nationalities policy of the Communist Party and its implementation by local party organizations.[86] In monographs by Kh. T. Tursunov, K. A. Gafurova, N. Rakhmanov and other investigators, the authors show how the party, due to its internationalist policy, united peoples for the struggle against the enemy. K. A. Gafurova presented new material on the role of British imperialism in supplying the basmachi with arms and on giving them material assistance.

Leninist principles of party nationalities policy were also embodied in a practical manner in military organizational development in Central Asia. Investigators could not help but note this, as a result of which special studies by V. M. Kuz'mina, K. Amanzholov, O. Khudoyberdiyev and others on Red Army national units and their participation in defeating the counterrevolution were published.

The fourth topic was history of the popular revolutions in Bukhara and Khiva. Substantial monographs were written (by A. I. Ishanov, K. Mukhamedberdyyev, B. I. Iskanderov, and Kh. Inoyatov), and collected volumes of documents and the proceedings of jubilee scientific sessions were published.[87] It was established as a result of debates and exchange of views that the revolutions in Bukhara and Khiva were popular-democratic, antifeudal and antiimperialist. They were a consequence of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and a continuation of this revolution. These conclusions are of great significance for a correct assessment of the basmachi on the territory of the BPSR and KPSR.

At the end of the 1960's and in the 1970's the history of the struggle against the basmachi was reflected in two books on the civil war in Turkestan -- by M. Kh. Nazarov and Sh. T. Tashliyev, and in a monograph on the period of "War Communism" by R. A. Nurullin.[88] These works, written at a party-history level, contain a wealth of material on the struggle against the basmachi.

M. Kh. Nazarov in particular demonstrated in greater detail than his predecessors the role of the Communist Party and its political and organizational work in defeating the basmachi in the Fergana Valley in 1918-1920. The study by Sh. T. Tashliyev is of the greatest interest from the standpoint of our topic of investigation in its presentation of material dealing with the history of the emergence and defeat of the Khivan basmachi led by Dzhunaid-khan. In analyzing these questions, the author revealed the great complexity of the intertribal and and interethnic relations in Turkmenistan and emphasized that an enormous role in wiping out the local basmachi was played by observance of the greatest caution by party, government and military agencies and an understanding of the way of life of the Turkmens and Uzbeks, their customs, religious beliefs and prejudices.

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R. A. Nurullin, while not specifically discussing the history of the struggle against the basmachi, presented material on the specific features of implementation of the policy of "War Communism" as a whole in the Turkestan Republic and in individual areas of this republic, particularly in rural areas, which fosters an understanding of the reasons for the successful struggle against the basmachi bands.

An analysis of the development of scientific thought on the topic reflected in our book enables one to reach the following main conclusions.

As a result of the collective efforts of a large group of historians in the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as Moscow scientific workers, a Marxist-Leninist conception of the essence and class roots of the counterrevolutionary basmachi has been elaborated. An essentially faithful picture has been created of the heroic struggle of the peoples of Central Asia, who were defending the achievements of the Great October Revolution against encroachments by the united forces of the White Guard, basmachi and interventionists, a struggle which took place under the guidance of the Communist Party. Many cardinal questions pertaining to history of the struggle against the basmachi have been resolved on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology.

Special studies have been written on this subject, which is extremely important for historical science, including monographs, books and articles, as well as sections, chapters, and chapter subdivisions in synthesizing works on history of the civil war in Central Asia, history of Central Asian party organizations, as well as in books on individual theoretical questions connected to one degree or another with the class struggle in the 1920's and 1930's. Investigation of the decisive role played by the toiler masses, guided by the Communist Party, is occupying the center of attention. It has been proven that, in waging a struggle to preserve Soviet power in Central Asia, the Communist Party created and consolidated a military-political alliance between the worker class and the toiling dekhkans as a decisive social and political force which ensured victory over the enemy. The most important factor which promoted strengthening of this alliance in the conditions of Central Asia was unswerving implementation of a Leninist nationalities policy by the Communist Party.

A no less important condition for organization of a successful struggle against the counterrevolution in Turkestan was the rendering of daily economic and military-political assistance to the peoples of Central Asia by the RKP(b) Central Committee, the Soviet State, and the Great Russian people. This assistance cemented the friendship of the peoples of Russia with the peoples of the Turkestan Republic, the Bukhara and Khorezm People's republics.

As a result of historiography overcoming the consequences of the cult of personality and related departures from historical truth, the role of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, headed by V. I. Lenin, in defeating the united forces of the interventionists and domestic counterrevolution in Turkestan began to be revealed increasingly more fully. Much has been accomplished in order fully to show the theoretical and practical assistance rendered by V. I. Lenin to the party organization of Turkestan and his

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struggle for ideological-organizational strengthening of the KPT, for victory of the ideas of Marxism and proletarian internationalism in the young party organizations which arose following the October Revolution in the outlying regions of the Russian East. Thanks to skilled leadership by the Central Committee, headed by V. I. Lenin, and assistance by plenipotentiary agencies of the Central Committee and Soviet Government, the Turkkomissiya, Turkbyuro and Sredazbyuro of the Central Committee, the Communists of Central Asia, overcoming enormous difficulties and correcting their own mistakes and shortcomings, were able to forge out numerous cadres who became the leading detachment of the worker class and the toiling dekhkans and who led the campaign to strengthen Soviet rule and the building of socialism in this region, and the struggle for victory in the civil war.

Historians have given essentially correct answers to such complex and important questions as the social and class nature of the basmachi and the reasons for their relatively prolonged existence in certain areas of Central Asia; the forms and methods of foreign intervention and the reasons for the failure of British intervention in Turkestan.

On the whole a successful endeavor has been made to investigate the nationalities and agrarian policy of the Communist Party and its role in the struggle against the basmachi. The forms and methods of enlisting the toiler masses of indigenous nationalities in the business of building socialism and their unification behind the proletariat and the Communist Party have been studied and are being studied in connection with this. A number of studies have shown how an indissoluble alliance of Soviet peoples was forged out and how proletarian internationalism developed in the struggle against the basmachi and other counterrevolutionary forces.

The list of treated problem topics has expanded, especially in the last 20 years, which has made it possible to study the history of many important events which had not been investigated for a protracted period of time. In the 1920's and 1930's, for example, for the most part only the course of combat events on the civil war fronts was analyzed, while today studies encompass the situation on the home front, the unity between battle front and home front, the distribution of class forces and their change at various stages of the civil war, the establishment and strengthening of the alliance of the worker class with the dekhkans during the war years and the role of this alliance in bringing the war to a victorious conclusion, and party nationalities and agrarian policy. Methods of political organization of the toilers in conditions of a noncapitalist path of development and the forms of their enlistment in political activity, which was one of the important conditions for defeat of the basmachi bands, are revealed at the same time. The names of many commanders and political workers as well as civil war heroes who have been undeservedly forgotten or who previously have not been mentioned in historiography are being awakened in the memory of the people.

There still exists, however, a certain unevenness in investigation of a number of problems. The military and political history of the struggle against the basmachi has been more fully studied than the socioeconomic conditions of their emergence and defeat.

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The scholarly level of investigation improved appreciably in the 1960's and 1970's. An important role in this was played by a broadening of the source materials base, supplementing archival and newspaper materials with the memoirs of active participants in the civil war, as well as improving the level of scholarly qualifications of historians and strengthening historical scientific research establishments and departments of social sciences of higher educational institutions in Central Asia.

The monograph is gradually becoming the principal form of investigation. One's attention is drawn not only by conclusions but also observations of a particular character which have been made during study and comparison of diversified sources.

Thus new qualitative results have been achieved in study of this subject. At the same time, however, one cannot state that all problems have been resolved and that investigation of this subject is fully completed. The future still holds the writing of works worthy of the demands imposed on historical science by the 21st CPSU Congress.

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FOOTNOTES

Introduction

1. V. I. Lenin, "Speech at a Conference of Railway Workers of the Moscow Rail Center on 16 April 1919," "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 38, page 315.

2. Lenin, "Speech on 4 (17) June 1917 at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Worker and Peasant Deputies on Position Toward the Provisional Government," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 32, page 274.

3. Lenin, "Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions on 26 July 1920 at the Second Congress of the Communist International," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 41, page 244; "Report to the 8th Congress of the RKP(b) on 19 March 1919 on the Party Program," Vol 38, pp 158-159.

4. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 41, page 244.

5. Lenin, "Report at the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East on 22 November 1919," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 329.

6. Ibid.

7. Lenin, "Report at the 8th Congress of the RKP(b) on 19 March 1919 on the Party Program," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 38, page 159.

8. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 304.

9. Lenin, "On the Food Tax," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 33, page 228.

10. Lenin, "Report of the Commission..., op. cit. page 246.

11. Ibid., pp 244-245.

12. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 42, page 132.

13. This was also true of the Khiva People's Soviet Republic.

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14. Lenin, "Letter of 7 August 1921 to G. M. Safarov," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 53, page 105.

15. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 329.

16. Lenin, "Letter to the Communist Comrades of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Dagestan, and the Mountain People's Republic," "Polnoye..," op. cit., Vol 43, page 198.

17. Ibid., page 200.

18. Ibid., page 199.

19. Lenin, "Report of the Commission..," op. cit., page 244.

20. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 53, page 105.

21. Ibid., Vol 34, page 215.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., Vol 37, pp 7-8.

24. Ibid., Vol 36, page 8; Vol 37, page 38; Vol 39, pp 141-142; etc.

25. Lenin, "Letter to the Workers of Europe and America," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 37, pp 455-456.

26. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 320.

27. Lenin, "Report at the 8th Congress...," op. cit., page 161.

28. Lenin, "Letter to A. A. Ioffe dated 13 September 1921," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 53, page 190.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., Vol 41, pp 435-436.

31. Ibid., page 153.

32. Lenin, "Report at the Second All-Russian...," op. cit., page 321.

33. Lenin, "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 53, page 189.

34. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK (1898-1970)" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums (1898-1970)], 8th edition, Vol 1, page 448.

35. Ibid., page 449.

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36. Ibid., Vol 2, page 45.

37. Ibid., pp 246-251.

38. Ibid., pp 433-443.

39. Ibid., page 249.

40. Ibid., page 436.

41. These instructions were published in the local press.

42. V. V. Kuybyshev was in Central Asia from 4 November 1919 to the beginning of 1921; M. V. Frunze -- from 22 February to September 1920; Ya. E. Rudzutak -- from 4 November 1919 to May 1920, from April to July 1921, from October 1922 to April 1923, and from January to May 1924.

43. Writings by M. V. Frunze which deal with Turkestan have been published in the following: "Sobraniye sochineniy" [Collected Writings] (Vols 1-3, Moscow, 1941); "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings] (Moscow, 1940, 1957); "M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny v Turkestane" [M. V. Frunze on the Battle Fronts of the Civil War in Turkestan] (Moscow, 1941). The writings of V. V. Kuybyshev and Ya. E. Rudzutak have not been collected and published.

44. Frunze, "Na frontakh...," page 309.

45. See L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vols 1-8, Moscow, 1970-1981.

46. D. A. Kunayev, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978; Sh. R. Rashidov, "V yedinoy sem'ye narodov SSSR" [In the United Family of Peoples of the USSR], Tashkent, 1974; Rashidov, "Torzhestvo Leninskoy natsional'noy politiki" [Triumph of Lenin's Nationalities Policy], Tashkent, 1974; Rashidov, "Sovetskiy Uzbekistan" [Soviet Uzbekistan], Moscow, 1978; Rashidov, "Yazyk nashego yedinstva i sotrudnichestva" [Language of Our Unity and Cooperation], Moscow, 1979.

47. I. A. Zelenskiy, "Ob itogakh provedeniya natsional'noy politiki partii v Sredney Azii" [On the Result of Implementation of Party Nationalities Policy in Central Asia], Samarkand, 1927; F. Khodzhayev, "Izbrannyye trudy" [Selected Works], Vols 1-3, Tashkent, 1970-1973; A. Ikramov, "Izbrannyye trudy" [Selected Works], Vols 1-3, Tashkent, 1972-1974.

"Former Slaves Became Free"

1. Takyr -- a flat clay expanse in the desert, almost totally barren of vegetation.

2. Turkestanskiy Kray consisted of Zakaspiyskaya, Samarkandskaya, Semirechenskaya, Syrdar'inskaya, and Ferganskaya oblasts and the Amudar'yinskiy Division ("Sovetskaya istoricheskaya entsiklopediya" [Soviet Historical Encyclopedia], Vol 14, Moscow, 1973, page 525).

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3. Other population figures for Turkestanskiy Kray are also encountered in the literature.

4. See "Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy narodnykh sovetskikh respublik" [History of the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Soviet Republics], Moscow, 1971, pp 13-14.

5. In 1914 Turkestan contained a total of 856 industrial enterprises, including 239 cotton ginning mills. The cotton processing industry accounted for 73 percent of gross industrial output. See "Ocherki khozyaystvennoy zhizni Turkrespubliki" [Essays on Economic Life in the Turkestan Republic], Tashkent, 1921, page 133; "Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik 1917-1923 gg." [Statistical Yearbook, 1917-1923], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1924, page 42.

6. The average wage per worker in the processing industry in Turkestan in 1908 was 147 rubles per year -- 98 rubles or 60 percent less than the average for the Russian empire. On the eve of World War I the degree of exploitation of Turkestan workers was 4.5 times that of Russia as a whole (see T. S. Mel'nikova, "Formirovaniye promyshlennykh kadrov v Uzbekistane" [Formation of Industrial Cadres in Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1956, pp 21-22).

7. V. V. Zaorskaya and K. A. Aleksander, "Promyshlennyye zavedeniya Turkestanskogo kraya" [Industrial Establishments of Turkestanskiy Kray], Tashkent, 1915.

8. Cited in "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy Sredney Azii" [History of Communist Organizations of Central Asia], Tashkent, 1967, pp 24-25.

9. S. Ayni, "Bukhara. Vospominaniya" [Bukhara. Reminiscences], Stalinabad, 1954, pp 243, 246, 247, 256, 258.

10. Lenin, "The Revolutionary Proletariat and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 26, page 62.

11. Kh. Sh. Inoyatov, "Pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane" [The Victory of Soviet Power in Turkestan], Moscow, 1978, page 41.

12. Cited in T. Ye. Yeleuov, "Ustanovleniye i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Kazakhstane" [Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Rule in Kazakhstan], Alma-Ata, 1961, page 161.

13. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Soviet Government Decrees], Vol 1, Moscow, 1957, page 40.

14. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane" [History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1964, page 58.

15. NASHA GAZETA, 15 December 1917.

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16. "S"yezdy Sovetov Soyuza SSR, soyuznykh i avtonomnykh sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik. Sbornik dokumentov v trekh tomakh" [Congresses of Soviets of the USSR, Union and Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Collection of Documents in Three Volumes], Vol 1, Moscow, 1959, page 254.

17. "Dekrety...," op. cit., Vol 2, Moscow, 1959, pp 274-278.

18. Lenin, "From the Diary of a Political Commentator," Polnoye..., op. cit., Vol 35, page 189.

19. PRAVDA, 15 April 1978.

20. PRAVDA, 10 February 1974.

21. Lenin, "On Revising the Party Program," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 34, page 379.

Imperialist Intervention and Civil War

1. V. I. Lenin, "Speech at a Political Rally in Lefortovskiy Rayon on 19 July 1918," "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 36, page 528.

2. ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, No 5, 1953, page 103.

3. L. Ya. Eventov, "Inostrannyy kapital v neftyanoy promyshlennosti Rossii" [Foreign Capital in Russia's Oil Industry], Moscow-Leningrad, 1925, pp 44, 62, 85, 89.

4. See I. F. Gindin, "Russkiye kommercheskiye banki" [Russian Commercial Banks], Moscow, 1948, page 362.

5. See L. M. Landa, "American Imperialism -- Active Organizer of Anti-Soviet Intervention in Central Asia (1918-1920)," TRUDY MUZEYA ISTORII UZBEKSKOY SSR [Works of the Museum of History of the Uzbek SSR], Issue II, Tashkent, 1954, page 25.

6. See "Otchet Russko-Aziatskogo banka za 1910 g." [Report of the Russo-Asian Bank for 1910], Saint Petersburg, 1911, page 2.

7. The "government" of Kokand intended to come to an agreement with Dutov on including Turkestan in the "Southeastern Russian Union," in which the Orenburg, Kuban', Urals, and Semirech'ye Cossack troops, as well as the population of the Kalmyk, Kazakh, and Kirghiz lands and the Muslim population of the Caucasus were to unite against Soviet rule.

8. "Dokumenty po istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [Documents on History of the Civil War in the USSR], Vol 1, Moscow, 1940, page 492.

9. "Arkhiv polkovnika Khauza" [Archives of Colonel House], Vol 4, Moscow, 1944, pp 152-153.

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10. See A. Ye. Kunina, "Proval amerikanskikh planov zavoyevaniya mirovogo gospodstva v 1917-1920 gg." [Failure of U.S. Plans to Gain World Domination in 1917-1920], second, enlarged edition, Moscow, 1954, page 95.

11. See A. Girshfel'd, "On the U.S. Role in Organizing anti-Soviet Intervention in Siberia and the Far East," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 8, 1948, page 20.

12. See Kunina, op. cit., pp 95-96.

13. "Arkhiv polkovnika..., op. cit., Vol 3, Moscow, 1930, page 275; Vol 4, pp 152-153.

14. "General-mayor Denstervil'. Britanskiy imperialism v Baku i Persii. 1917-1918 gg" [Major General Dunsterville. British Imperialism in Baku and Persia, 1917-1918], translated from English, Tiflis, 1925, pp 122-123.

15. DIE POST, 6 March 1919.

16. TsGAOR SSSR [USSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution], Fund 1318, List 1, File 627, Sheet 78. From the report of Barakatulla, head of an Afghan delegation to Moscow, 1919.

17. TsGAOR UzSSR [Uzbek SSR Central State Archives of the October Revolution], Fund R-17, List, File 317a, Sheet 80.

18. Photocopy of message, see Yu. Aleskerov, "Interventsiya i grazhdanskaya voyna v Sredney Azii" [Intervention and Civil War in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1959, page 31.

19. "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR" [History of the Uzbek SSR], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1957, page 54; see also NASHA GAZETA, 17 Dec 1917 and 1 Jan 1918; EL'-BAYRAGI, 16 Jan 1918.

20. Ye. A. Babushkin (1880-1927), joined the party in 1902, delegate to the 6th Congress of the RSDRP(b), sent by the party to Turkestan in 1917 to direct party work. Subsequently served in diplomatic posts.

21. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 130, List 2, File 1095, Sheet 2, reverse side.

22. Cited in A. I. Zebelev, "Iz istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane" [From the History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1959, page 64.

23. NASHA GAZETA, 9 March 1918.

24. "V boyakh za Sovetskuyu vlast' v Ferganskoy doline. Sbornik vospominaniy" [Fighting for Soviet Rule in the Fergana Valley. Collected Reminiscences], Tashkent, 1957, page 182.

25. In September 1918 Dzhunaid placed the weak-willed Seyid Abdulla on the khan's throne.

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26. U. Cherchill', "Mirovoy krizis" [World Crisis], Moscow, 1932, page 105.

27. Lenin, "Speech at Joint Session of VTsIK on 29 July 1918," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 37, page 7.

28. "Smena vekh" [Change of Landmarks], collected volume of articles, Prague, 1921, page 125.

29. Cited in R. H. Ullman, "Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921," Vol II, "Britain and Russian Civil War." Princeton-Oxford, 1966, page 14.

30. See SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA, No 4, 1926, pp 68-69.

31. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R-25, List 1, File 27a, Sheet 2. In 1918 there were approximately 10 missions, delegations and foreign agencies in Tashkent alone.

32. A. Niallo, "Ocherki istorii revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyny v Kirgizii i Sredney Azii" [Sketches on History of the Revolution and Civil War in Kirghizia and Central Asia], Frunze, 1941, page 64.

33. SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA, No 4, 1926, page 62.

34. See K. A. Gafurova, "Bor'ba za internatsional'noye splocheniye trudyashchikhsya Sredney Azii i Kazakhstana" [Struggle for the International Unification of Toilers of Central Asia and Kazakhstan], Moscow, 1972, pp 56-61; Gafurova, "Documents Expose," VOPROSY ISTORII, No 8, 1970, pp 30-41.

35. Cited in Gafurova, "Bor'ba...," op. cit., page 59.

36. SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA, No 5-6, 1926, page 37.

37. Ibid., No 4, page 68.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., page 69.

40. Ibid., No 5-6, page 36.

41. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyne v Uzbekistane" [History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1964, page 238.

42. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1334, List 1, File 3, Sheet 41.

43. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, List 1, File 144, Sheet 3. The precise number of workers sent is not indicated.

44. Zevelev, "Iz istorii...," op. cit., page 288.

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45. "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR" [History of the Uzbek SSR], Vol 3, Tashkent, 1967, pp 187-188.

46. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [History of the Civil War in the USSR], Vol 4, Moscow, 1959.

47. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny" [M. V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts], page 209.

48. "Krasnyy arkhiv" [Red Archive], Vol 3(100), Moscow, 1940, page 14.

49. Zevelev, op. cit., page 416.

50. Lenin, "To the Communist Comrades of Turkestan," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 39, page 304.

51. Ibid., page 329.

52. Ferganskaya Oblast consisted of 5 uyezds: Skobelevskiy, Namanganskiy, Oshskiy, Kokandskiy, and Andizhanskiy. In 1917 Ferganskaya Oblast had a population of approximately 2.5 million persons.

53. According to the figures of the Kokand Exchange Committee, which conducted a survey in 47 volosts in the oblast (out of 84), more than 50 percent of the area under crops was planted to cotton. In nine volosts cotton comprised 90 percent of the land under crops, 80 percent in four, and 70 percent in 23 (see A. N. Demidov, "Ekonomicheskiy ocherk khlopkovodstva, khlopkotorgovli i khlopkovoy promyshlennosti Turkestana" [Economic Sketch of Cotton Growing, Cotton Trade and the Cotton Industry of Turkestan], Moscow, 1922, page 49). In 1916 Fergana produced 11 million poods of the 16 million poods of cotton exported from Turkestan (TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], Fund 110, List 1, File 163, sheets 156-157).

54. K. K. Palen, "Materialy i kharakteristika narodnogo khozyaystva Turkestana" [Materials and Description of the Economy of Turkestan], Saint Petersburg, 1911 (calculations by A. R. Nezhevenko].

55. "Materialy sel'skokhozyaystvennoy perepisi 1917 g." [Materials of the 1917 Agricultural Census], Vol 2.

56. Ibid., page 53.

57. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1318, List 1, File 627, sheets 135-136.

58. "Zhizn' natsional'nostey" [Life of the Nationalities], Book 1, 1923, page 87.

59. From a report of the Syr Darya military governor. See "Zemel'nyy vopros v Uzbekistane. Materialy ko vtoromu kurultayu Sovetov" [The Land Question in Uzbekistan. Materials on the Second Kurultay of Soviets], Samarkand, 1925, page 5.

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60. In 1917 there were 159 cotton ginning mills operating in Ferganskaya Oblast, comprising 68 percent of the total number of cotton ginning mills in Turkestan (26 in Andizhan, 17 in Namangan, 11 in Margilan, 10 in Kokand). Seventeen out of a total of 38 oil mills were in Ferganskaya Oblast (44.7 percent). These were the largest mills (12 presses). Just as the cotton ginning mills, they were concentrated for the most part in Kokand and Andizhan (see I. Alkin, "Srednyaya Aziya" [Central Asia], Moscow, page 283). Also operating in this oblast were the Chimion oilfield and oil refinery, the Santo oilfield, as well as the Kyzyl-Kiya and Sulyukta coal mines.

61. "Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii za 1913 G." [Russia Statistical Yearbook for 1913], Vol 2, part 1, Saint Petersburg, 1914, page 87.

62. NASHA GAZETA, 24 Nov 1917.

63. K. Ye. Zhitov, "Establishment of Soviet Rule in Uzbekistan," "Iz istorii Sovetskogo Uzbekistana" [From the History of Soviet Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1956, page 8.

64. NASHA GAZETA, 11 and 30 Nov 1917.

65. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund 25, List 1, File 15, Sheet 123.

66. Ibid., File 16, Sheet 35.

67. The municipal dumas in Namangan and Osh were dissolved in the summer of 1918, and in Andizhan in October 1918.

68. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R-25, List 1, File 80, Sheet 70.

69. Following the February Revolution, druzhinas of the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun bourgeois nationalist party were formed in the Fergana. The Dashnaks, however, did not so much protect the Armenian civilian population in Ferganskaya Oblast from pillagers as rob the inhabitants of kishlaks and auls under the pretext of fighting the basmachi. The TurkTsIK Cheka for the struggle against the counterrevolution in the Fergana stated in its order dated 26 May 1919: "In the Fergana detachments of the party (Dashnaktsutyun -- Auth.) have displayed ethnic intolerance toward the local population, which has to a substantial degree fostered the development of an extensive brigand movement" (Zevelev, op. cit., page 129).

70. V. D. Figel'skiy -- an outstanding son of the Polish people and one of the 14 Turkestan commissars killed in January 1919 during an anti-Soviet insurrection.

71. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund R-25, File 7, Sheet 5.

72. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1318, List 1, File 627, Sheet 373.

73. Zevelev, op. cit., page 128.

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74. Materials of the Turkestan Republic Sovnarkom for January 1918 state that in the uyezds of Ferganskaya Oblast "there is noted an influx of clergy from Bukhara... issuing an appeal to support Irgashkhan, who is defending the interests of the Muslims" [TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 25, List 1, File 80, Sheet 3].

75. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R-25, List 1, File 69-a, sheets 61-62; Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, List 1, File 205, Sheet 9, reverse.

76. Party archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, List 1, File 205, Sheet 9.

77. Ibid., Sheet 8, reverse.

78. According to the figures of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the Turkestan Republic, as a result of looting and plundering by the basmachi, the indigenous population of Andizhanskiy Uyezd retained no more than 2 percent of their horses.

79. For example, In November 1919 Irgash issued an order for Naymanskaya Volost, according to which each pyatidesyatnik [designated elder of a 50-household unit?] was to collect from his jurisdiction 500 rubles for the basmachi, while every dekhkan who possessed land was obliged to contribute 500 rubles per tanap [50 tanap equal about 37 acres] of land (TsGASA, Fund 149, File 71, Sheet 229). Another basmachi kurbashi, Makhkam-khodzha, levied a tax in kind -- clover and oats -- on the residents of the kishlak of Tokachi: each pyatidesyatnichestvo was to deliver 1 chirik of oats (5 poods 24 pounds) and 50 sheaves of clover (TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 44, Sheet 354).

80. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 2, File 409, sheets 35-38.

81. "Inostrannaya voyennaya interventsiya i grazhdanskaya voyna v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane. Sb. dokumentov" [Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Collection of Documents], Vol 1, Alma-Ata, 1963, page 422.

82. Ibid., page 423.

83. Ibid., page 443.

84. Ibid., page 449.

85. Ibid., page 450.

86. Ibid., page 455.

87. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 81, Sheet 45.

88. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 187, Sheet 28.

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89. Initially it was called "Operations Headquarters for the Struggle Against the Brigands."

90. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 154, Sheet 14.

91. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, List 1, File 210, Sheet 10.

92. NASHA GAZETA, 7 Jan 1919.

93. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 155, sheets 11-12.

94. PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 22 Nov 1957.

95. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, List 1, File 41, Sheet 1.

96. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 81, Sheet 26.

97. Throughout 1919 and at the beginning of 1920 one of the principal gathering places of the basmachi bands operating under the command of Madaminbek was the area aound the kishlak of Gorbua, situated 18 km from Gorchakovo Station and 8 km from Vladykino siding. The basmachi were based not in the kishlak proper but in a Muslim cemetery located in the vicinity, which was intersected by aryks and hillocks and containing a large burial mound in the center.

98. Not far from Kokand, in the vicinity of the kishlak of Bachkyr, Irgash constructed fortifications, ringing them with adobe walls.

99. Zevelev, op. cit., page 334.

100. Ibid., page 335.

101. Ibid.

102. VOPROSY ISTORII, No 12, 1980, page 88.

103. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 4, File 275, Sheet 26.

104. A communiqué issued by the government of the Turkestan Republic stated that foreign imperialists were the initiators and inspirers of the conspiracy and that "it was supported chiefly by foreign capital" (NASHA GAZETA, 29 Oct 1918).

105. TsGAOR UzSSR, Fund R-25, List 1, File 31, Sheet 14; File 120, Sheet 34.

106. Gafurova, op. cit., page 38.

107. THE TIMES, confirming the fact that Bailey had gone underground, reported that he had been operating "undiscovered in Turkestan for more than a year."

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This also includes his sojourn in Bukhara (see RSFSR People's Commissariat of International Affairs telegram sent to the Turkkomissiya in February 1920). Zevelev, op. cit., page 246.

109. TsGASA, selection, List 2, File 835, Sheet 188.

110. According to other information, the mission consisted of three officers, an interpreter, and accompanying persons ("Trudy Muzeya istorii AN UzSSR," op. cit., Issue 2, Tashkent, 1954, page 37).

111. "Zhizn' natsional'nostey," op. cit., Book 1, 1923, page 89.

112. Cited in "Trudy Muzeya...," op. cit., page 38.

113. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, List 1, File 65, sheets 22-23; TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1334, List 1, File 6, Sheet 159.

114. TsGASA, Fund 149, File 51, Sheet 124.

115. Cited in "Bor'ba za ustanovleniye i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Khodzhenskom Uyezde (1917-1920 gg). Sb. dokumentov" [The Struggle for Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Authority in Khodzhenskiy Uyezd (1917-1920). Collection of Documents], Leninabad, 1957, page 107.

116. A privileged stratum of Russian kulak settlers, who had loyally supported the czarist autocracy in Turkestan, became established in several uyezds of Ferganskaya Oblast, today situated for the most part on the territory of the Kirghiz SSR.

117. This exceeded Soviet forces in the Fergana approximately fivefold.

118. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 44, Sheet 328.

119. Ibid., Sheet 42.

120. Ibid., Sheet 97. From intelligence obtained by the Fergana Front Special Branch.

121. Ibid., List 6, File 47, sheets 231-a, 232.

122. PROLETARSKAYA MYSL' (Organ of the Ferganskaya Oblast Committee of the RKP(b)), 10 Sep 1919.

123. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 7, Sheet 352 reverse.

124. Ibid., File 44, Sheet 43.

125. From the memoirs of Mirzo-Kasym Akhmedov, a party member from 1918. See "Vospominaniya uchastnikov grazhdanskoy voyny v Andizhanskoy Oblasti" [Reminiscences of Participants in the Civil War in Andizhanskaya Oblast],

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Andizhan, 1957, page 114. No record of proceedings of this meeting has been found.

126. The ranks of the Andizhan party organization contained approximately 300 Communists.

127. S. K. Kuzy-Akhmedov -- one of the organizers of the defense of Andizhan, in the past had been a Baku oil worker, party member from 1918.

128. From the memoirs of V. N. Sidorov. See "Vospominaniya uchastnikov...," op. cit., page 103.

129. I. P. Shishkanov states in his memoirs that "letters and proclamations of surrender began to be sent" into the city and the detachments defending Andizhan (Ibid., page 39).

130. "V boyakh za Sovetskuyu vlast' v Ferganskoy doline" [In the Battles for Soviet Rule in the Fergana Valley], Tashkent, 1957, page 148.

131. "Vospominaniya uchastnikov...," op. cit., pp 25-26.

132. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 44, sheets 109-110.

133. Ibid., File 13, Sheet 454.

134. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 881, Sheet 77.

135. Ibid., List 2, File 400, Sheet 307.

136. TsGASA, Fund 25859, List 1, File 44, Sheet 193 reverse.

137. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 84, Sheet 19.

138. A. Middendorf, "Ocherki Ferganskoy doliny" [Fergana Valley Sketches], St. Petersburg, 1872.

139. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 1, Moscow, 1950, page 102.

140. Such activities were conducted for an extended period of time and produced positive results.

141. This idea was also expressed in other documents of Fergana party-soviet organizations.

142. Zevelev, op. cit., page 536.

143. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 285, Sheet 80 reverse.

144. Ibid., List 1, File 23, Sheet 17.

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145. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., page 280.

146. Five major basmachi chieftains joined Kurshirmat: Ishmat Baybachi (his bands operated in Kokandskiy Uyezd), Parpi (in Andizhanskiy Uyezd), Aman-Palvan (Namanganskiy Uyezd), Rakhmankul (the foothills of the Chatkal'skiy Range), and Muetdin-yulchi (south of a line running Skobelev-Osh).

147. Sh. Z. Eliava soon left the Fergana for Moscow.

148. Zevelev, op. cit., page 560.

149. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., page 282.

150. Ibid.

151. Lenin, "Speech at the Fourth Conference of Gubernia Chekas on 6 February 1920," "Polnoye...," op. cit., Vol 40, page 119.

152. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., pp 309-311.

153. Ibid., page 312.

154. IZVESTIYA, Tashkent, 16 June 1920.

155. Zevelev, op. cit., page 582.

156. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 2, File 409, Sheet 153.

157. "Istoriya Kirgizii" [History of Kirghizia], Vol 2, Frunze, 1956, page 106.

158. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 522, sheets 60-63.

159. Ibid., sheets 43, 47.

160. Ibid., Sheet 64.

161. Ibid., Sheet 82.

162. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 1, File 29, sheets 230, 257, 261.

163. TsGASA, selection, List 2, File 836, Sheet 254.

164. Zevelev, op. cit., page 588.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Lenin, "Speech at the Fourth Conference...," op. cit., Vol 40, page 114.

168. Dutov was in Western China at this time.

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169. Zevelev, op. cit., page 589.

170. P. I. Baranov, an old Bolshevik, served subsequently as chief of the Air Forces Directorate of the Red Army and chief of the Aviation Industry Administration of the Supreme Council of the National Economy. He was killed in an airplane crash in 1933.

171. The Fergana Army Group contained the 1st Turkestan Division, the 3d Turkestan Cavalry Division (Andizhan), the 7th Brigade (Kokand), the 4th Brigade (Andizhan), the 5th Brigade (Fedchenko), the 6th Brigade (Namangan), and certain other units.

172. These measures, however, were not carried out sufficiently consistently in certain parts of the oblast.

173. At this same time uyezd and village conferences of party-unaffiliated toiling dekhkans were being held.

174. Basmachi forces here never exceeded several thousand men.

175. The history of the struggle against the forces of Dzhunaid-khan during this time is presented in detail in the memoirs of B. V. Cheprunov ("Porazheniye Dzhunaid-khana. Za Sovetskiy Turkestan" [The Defeat of Dzhunaid-khan. For Soviet Turkestan], Tashkent, 1969), and in a work by T. Gumenyuk ("Bor'ba za Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Pyataya godovshchina Krasnoy Armii" [The Struggle for Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Fifth Anniversary of the Red Army], Tashkent, 1923). The following reply by the defenders of Nukus in the autumn of 1919 attests to the heroism displayed in the struggle against Dzhunaid's bands: "The Bolsheviks will not lay down their arms until every last one of them is dead" (Gumenyuk, page 93).

176. "Istoriya Bukharskoy i Khorezmskoy narodnykh respublik" [History of the Bukhara and Khorezm People's Republics], Moscow, 1971, page 96.

177. IZVESTIYA, Tashkent, 22 July 1920.

178. Cited in A. Ishanov, "Bukharskaya Narodnaya Sovetskaya Respublika" [The Bukhara People's Soviet Republic], Tashkent, 1969, page 164.

179. Ibid., page 188.

180. "M. V. Frunze na frontakh...," op. cit., page 330.

181. TsGAOR SSSR, Fund 1318, List 1, File 715, Sheet 13.

182. Khivan Jadids -- petit-bourgeois democrats who initially opposed Khiva's feudal system and who demanded the implementation of reforms limiting the power of the khan. Their political orientation was extremely indeterminate. For this reason they could not lead the revolutionary struggle of the dekhkan masses. Subsequently some of them collaborated with the Soviet authorities, while the rest took the path of struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

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183. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy Sredney Azii...," op. cit., page 630.

184. See "Obrazovaniye SSSR. Sb. dokumentov 1917-1924" [Formation of the USSR. Collected Documents, 1917-1924], Moscow, 1949, pp 241-247.

185. This is attested by P. E. Etherton, British consul general in Kashgar, in his book "In the Heart of Asia," London, 1925.

186. "Pogranichnyye voyska SSSR. 1918-1928 gg. Sb. Dokumentov" [USSR Border Troops, 1918-1928. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1973, page 39.

187. "Muzey pogranichnykh voysk" [Border Troops Museum], Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 1.

188. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 260, Sheet 3.

189. These proposals were of a military-political character.

190. "Boyevyye podvigi chastey Krasnoy Armii. 1918-1922" [Combat Exploits of Red Army Units, 1918-1922], page 183.

191. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [USSR Foreign Policy Documents], Vol 3, Moscow, 1959, page 552.

192. See "Obrazovaniye SSSR...," op. cit., pp 251-257.

Enemies of Peaceful Labor

1. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol 1, Moscow, 1950, page 420.

2. "S"yezdy Sovetov Soyuza SSR, soyuznykh i avtonomnykh sovetskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik. Sb. dokumentov v trekh tomakh" [Congresses of Soviets of the USSR, Union and Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics. Collected Documents in Three Volumes], Vol 1, Moscow, 1959, pp 155, 156.

3. K. Yarmatov, "Ribbon of Time," DRUZHBA NARODOV, No 11, 1977, page 212.

4. In 1929 the Tajik ASSR, which had been a component of the Uzbek SSR, became a union republic. In 1932 the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast became an autonomous republic. In 1936 it became a component of the Uzbek SSR.

5. In 1925 the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast was redesignated the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast, in 1926 was made an autonomous republic, and in 1936 a union republic.

6. KRASNAYA KAZARMA (Organ of the Political Directorate of the Turkestan Front), No 6, 1923.

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7. See KOMMUNIST (organ of the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party), No 3-4, 1922.

8. See Sh. M. Ul'masbayev, "Promyshlennoye razvitiye Sovetskogo Uzbekistana" [Industrial Development of Soviet Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1958, page 84.

9. Party Archives of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, Fund 60, File 1503, Sheet 1.

10. See "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana" [Sketches From the History of the Turkestan Communist Party], Tashkent, 1960, pp 65-66.

11. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane" [History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1970, page 294.

12. TsGASA, Fund 7, List 2, files 38, 230. See also ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV, No 1, 1961, page 132.

13. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 294.

14. Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee Party Archives, Fund 60, Folder 1, b/d, sheets 66-68.

15. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit.

16. Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee Party Archives, Fund 60, List 1, File 1421, Sheet 34.

17. IZVESTIYA, Tashkent, 4 and 8 July 1922.

18. UzCP CC Party Archives, Fund 60, Folder 2, b/d, 2148.

19. "Byulleten' VII konferentsii KPT" [Bulletin of the 7th Conference of the Turkestan Communist Party], Tashkent, 1922, page 25.

20. UzCP CC Party Archives, Fund 60, List 1, File 1821, Sheet 5.

21. KRASNAYA KAZARMA, No 1, 1923, page 150.

22. "Boyevyye epizody. Basmachestvo v Fergane i Khorezme. Sb. materialov" [Combat Episodes. The Basmachi in the Fergana and Khorezm. Collected Materials], Moscow-Tashkent, 1934, pp 46-47.

23. Abdulla Yarmukhamedov was a hero of the civil war in Turkestan. He was three times awarded the Order of the Red Banner for courage and heroism displayed in the struggle against the basmachi.

24. KRASNAYA KAZARMA, No 7, 1923, page 114.

25. Ibid., No 11, 1923, page 58.

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26. UzCP CC Party Archives, Fund 60, List 1, File 3027, sheets 4-5; File 3030, sheets 85-86.

27. See A. Niallo, "Ocherki istorii revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyny v Kirgizii i Sredney Azii" [Sketches From the History of the Revolution and the Civil War in Kirghizia and Central Asia], Frunze, 1941, pp 158-160.

28. See IZVESTIYA TsK RKP(b), No 4 (52), 1923, page 4.

29. This conclusion was based on factual data.

30. "Rezolyutsii i resheniya s"yezdov KP Uzbekistana" [Resolutions and Decisions of Uzbekistan Communist Party Congresses], Tashkent, 1957, page 21.

31. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 311.

32. Cited in A. Ishanov, "Bukharskaya Narodnaya Sovetskaya Respublika" [The Bukhara People's Soviet Republic], pp 275-276.

33. V. I. Lenin, "Letter to A. A. Ioffe on 13 September 1921," "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," op. cit., Vol 53, page 190.

34. Following Turkey's surrender, Enver fled to Germany, after which he spent some time in Soviet Russia. Failing in his attempt to make his way to Anatolia and lead the struggle there against Mustafa Kemal, he took active part in the basmachi insurrection in Central Asia. He left for Bukhara allegedly to take a journey through the region (see BSE [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], Vol 30, Moscow, 1978, page 173; "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy Sredney Azii" [History of the Communist Organizations of Central Asia], Tashkent, 1967, page 676).

35. Cited in A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, "Proval angliyskoy agressivnoy politiki v Sredney Azii" [Collapse of the Aggressive British Policy in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1955, page 144.

36. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 3, File 577, Sheet 155.

37. Border Troops Museum, Folder 16, File 2, Sheet 5.

38. Ibid., Sheet 6.

39. Ibid., Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 1.

40. Ibid., Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 1.

41. Ibid., Sheet 3.

42. See "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 326.

43. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 3.

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44. Ibid.

45. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., pp 691-692.

46. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 3.

47. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 686.

48. It was formed as a people's army.

49. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 563.

50. Ibid.

51. See V. M. Ustinov, "Establishment of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro and Its Role in Organizing Economic Cooperation Among Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 7, 1964.

52. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 689.

53. KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 15 June 1949.

54. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 564.

55. Ibid., page 564-565.

56. Ibid., pp 565-566.

57. ZVEZDA VOSTOKA, No 12, 1951, page 131.

58. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 3.

59. See IZVESTIYA (organ of the Turkestan Communist Party Central Committee and TurkTsIK), 4 and 8 July 1922.

60. UzSSR TsGA [Uzbek SSR Central State Archives], Fund 47, List 1, File 136, sheets 71-73.

61. "S"yezdy Sovetov...," op. cit., Vol 2, Moscow, 1960, page 588.

62. Cited in D. Fan'yan, "K istorii sovetskogo stroitel'stva v Tadzhikistane" [On the History of Soviet Organizational Development in Tajikistan], Stalinabad, 1941, page 41.

63. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 692.

64. Ibid.

65. See "Istoriya Sovetskogo gosudarstva i prava Uzbekistana" [History of Soviet State and Law in Uzbekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1960, page 173.

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66. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, sheets 5, 62.

67. Ibid., Sheet 5.

68. Ibid.

69. Another figure -- 120 persons -- is given in a work M. Irkayev ("Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane" [History of the Civil War in Tadzhikistan], page 400).

70. See R. A. Abdulkhayev, "Uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v rayone verkhov'ya Zeravshana (1918-1923 gg.)" [Consolidation of Soviet Rule on the Upper Reaches of the Zeravshan (1918-1923)], Dushanbe, 1972, page 121. There are also other accounts of Kholbuta's fate. In particular, M. Irkayev, op. cit., writes that Kholbuta and his band were buried by an avalanche. Documents preserved in the Central Archives of the Border Troops corroborate the account given by R. A. Abdulkhayev.

71. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy...," op. cit., page 333.

72. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 694.

73. Border Troops Museum, Folder 245, File 3, Sheet 5.

74. Ibid., sheets 62-63.

75. Ibid., sheets 5-6, 63.

76. Ibid., Folder 16, File 2, Sheet 10.

77. Ibid., Folder 245, File 3, sheets 5-6.

78. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 698.

79. Ibid.

80. Irkayev, op. cit., pp 451, 452.

81. TsGASA, Fund 110, List 2, File 530, sheets 12-13; File 527, Sheet 18.

82. Ibid., File 531, Sheet 86.

83. Nikolay Dmitriyevich Tomin (1887-1924) fought against Kolchak on the Eastern Front in 1918-1919. In 1920 he served as commander of the 10th Cavalry Division. Took part in defeating the White Guard bands on the Kuban' and putting down the Antonov insurrection in Tambovskaya Guberniya. Took part in the liberation of Volochayevka and Khabarovsk. Killed in battle with the basmachi on 12 August 1924.

84. PRAVDA, 18 December 1970.

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85. TsGA UzSSR, Fund 47, Proceedings of the 5th Kurultay of the BPSR. Cited in "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 707.

86. Border Troops Museum, Folder 16, File 2, sheets 12-13.

87. Ibid., sheets 18-19.

88. Ibid., Sheet 28.

89. Ibid., Sheet 20.

90. Ibid., Sheet 12.

91. In effect until 10 July 1925.

92. "Rezolyutsii i resheniya s"yezdov KP Uzbekistana" [Resolutions and Decisions of Uzbekistan Communist Party Congresses], Tashkent, 1957, page 50.

93. "Krasnoznamennyy Turkestanskiy" [Red-Banner Turkestan], page 123.

94. "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii" [Sketches From the History of the Communist Party], Dushanbe, 1964, page 41.

95. See Krasnoznemennyy...," op. cit., page 127.

96. Border Troops Museum, Folder 16, File 5, Sheet 34.

97. Ibid., Sheet 51.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., sheets 55-56.

100. Ibid., Sheet 47.

101. Ibid., Sheet 44.

102. Ibid., Folder 130, File 3, Sheet 3.

103. Ibid., Folder 16, File 5, Sheet 71.

104. Ibid., Sheet 88.

105. Ibid., Sheet 109.

106. Ibid., Sheet 88.

107. Ibid., Sheet 109.

108. Ibid., Sheet 18.

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109. Ibid.

110. In the summer of 1926 the Turkestan Front was redesignated the Central Asian Military District. See "Krasnoznamennyy...," op. cit., pp 128, 409.

111. Ibid., page 129.

112. Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Fund 62, List 1, File 81, Sheet 228. Cited in "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., page 650.

113. Ibid., page 651.

114. Ibid., page 653.

115. See "Krasnoznamennyy...," op. cit., page 117.

116. Ibid., page 119.

117. See "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh...," op. cit., pp 657-658.

118. Ibid., page 91.

119. "Krasnoznamennyy...," op. cit., page 130.

120. Ibid., pp 131-132.

121. "Na strazhe mirnogo truda" [Guarding Peaceful Labor], page 91.

122. Skirmishes with Dzhunaid's detachments took place near Shakh-Murad-Yab, near the ruins of the fortress of Sakyz-Otlyk, in the vicinity of Lake Sarykamysh and Aty Kush Well. See ibid.

123. Ibid., page 92.

124. Border Troops Museum, Folder 16, File 5, Sheet 88.

125. Ibid., Folder 130, File 7, Sheet 3.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid. File 9, Sheet 14.

A Dying Enemy Is Dangerous

1. "Istoriya SSSR. Epokha sotsializma" [History of the USSR, Era of Socialism], Moscow, 1974, page 261.

2. These detachments were armed with staves, axes, scythes, knives, and fowling pieces.

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3. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 9, Sheet 27.

4. Ibid., Sheet 28.

5. Ibid., Sheet 27.

6. TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 12 February 1932. Cited in N. G. Gurdzhiyants and A. A. Yes'kov: "Kommunisticheskaya partiya (bol'shevikov) Turkmenistana -- organizator i rukovoditel' razgroma basmacheskoy avantyury 1931 g. -- V. I. Lenin i istoricheskiye sud'by turkmenskogo naroda" [The Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Turkmenistan -- Organizer and Leader of the Defeat of the Basmachi Adventure of 1931 -- V. I. Lenin and the Historic Destiny of the Turkmen People], Ashkhabad, 1976, page 78.

7. V. I. Lenin, "Greetings to the Hungarian Workers," "Poln. Sobr. Soch.,' op. cit., Vol 38, page 387.

8. Border Troops Museum, Folder 163, File 1, Sheet 53.

9. Ibid., sheets 57-59,

10. "Na strazhe mirnogo truda" [Guarding Peaceful Labor], op. cit., page 94.

11. Border Troops Museum, Folder 163, File 1, Sheet 49.

12. "Na strazhe...," op. cit., page 99.

13. Border Troops Museum, Folder 163, File 1, Sheet 49.

14. Ibid., Folder 20, File 2, sheets 1-5.

15. Ibid., Folder 25, File 3, Sheet 86.

16. "Na strazhe...," op. cit., pp 101-102.

17. ISTORIYA SSSR, No 2, 1972, pp 101-102.

18. Border Troops Museum, Folder 25, File 3, Sheet 36.

19. A total of 4000 households (22 auls), including 500 bai households, took part in this move.

20. "Na strazhe...," op. cit. page 103.

21. Border Troops Museum, Folder 25, File 3, Sheet 3.

22. "Na strazhe...," op. cit., page 104.

23. Ibid., page 107.

24. Ibid.

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25. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 3, sheets 1-2.

26. See Gurdzhiyants and Yes'kov, op. cit., page 85.

27. Ibid., page 86.

28. "Konets basmachestva" [End of the Basmachi], Moscow, 1976, page 161.

29. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 3, Sheet 23.

30. Ibid., Folder 25, File 11, sheets 1-11.

Conclusion

1. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army, Selection, List 2, File 836, sheets 286-318.

2. "Otchet TsK KPT c VI po VII s"yezd KPT" [KPT Central Committee Accountability Report from the 6th to 7th KPT Congress], Tashkent, 1923, page 12.

3. "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya s"yezdov Kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana. 1918-1924 gg." [Resolutions and Decrees of Turkestan Communist Party Congresses, 1918-1924], Tashkent, 1958, page 121.

4. SOLOVETSKIYE OSTROVA, No 5-6, 1926, page 36.

5. M. V. Frunze, "Na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny. Sb. dokumentov" On the Civil War Fronts. Collection of Documents], Moscow, 1941, page 308.

6. "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya II s"yezda KP(b)Uz" [Resolutions and Decrees of the 2d Congress of the Uzbekistan Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], Samarkand, 1925, page 47.

7. V. I. Lenin, "Will the Bolsheviks Be Able to Hold on to Government Power?" "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy," op. cit., Vol 34, page 299.

8. "Rezolyutsii i postanovleniya s"yezdov...," op. cit., page 121.

9. "Otchet TsK KPT...," op. cit., page 12.

10. M. Alyaviya, "Uzbekskiye narodnyye pesni" [Uzbek Folk Songs], in Uzbek, Tashkent, 1959, page 124. Translation by Yu. A. Polyakov.

11. Frunze, op. cit., page 308.

12. Border Troops Museum, Folder 23, File 15, Sheet 7.

13. Subsequently Aktyubinsk.

14. Alyaviya, op. cit., page 127.

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Appendix

1. There are no special historiographic studies on defeat of the basmachi. Separate aspects of this subject are reflected in the following books and articles: V. P. Sherstobitov, K. K. Orozaliyev, and D. F. Vinnik, "Ocherki istorii istoricheskoy nauki v Sovetskom Kirgizstane (1918-1960)" [Sketches on the History of Historical Science in Soviet Kirghizstan (1918-1960)], Frunze, 1961; A. I. Zevelev, "Istoriografiya Sovetskogo Turkestana (istoriografiya i istochniki po istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v Turkestane)" [Historiography of Soviet Turkestan (Historiography and Sources on History of the Civil War in Turkestan)], Tashkent, 1968; Kh. Sh. Inoyatov and L. M. Landa, Introductions to Volumes 1 and 2 of "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane" [History of the Civil War in Uzbekistan], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1964, pp 5-22; Vol 2, Tashkent, 1970, pp 3-13; S. Narmetov, "The Civil War in Khorezm (Survey of the Literature)," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 3, 1970, pp 137-146; Kh. Sh. Inoyatov, "Some Results of Study of the History of the Military Intervention and Civil War in Central Asia," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 6, 1974; Kh. Sh. Inoyatov, "Kratkaya istoriografiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Sredney Azii" [Concise Historiography of the Civil War in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1974; R. M. Masov, "Some Results of Study of the History of the October Revolution and Civil War in Tajikistan," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 4, 1977; Masov, "Istoriografiya Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana" [Historiography of Soviet Tajikistan], Dushanbe, 1978.

2. Istpart divisions were formed after the national-state demarcation in Central Asia (1924) under the Communist parties of the national republics (for example, under the Central Committee of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of Turkmenistan). A Kazakh department of Istpart was established in 1922.

3. V. Kuvshinov, "The Fergana area"; M. Shklyar, "Travel Impressions of the Fergana," VOYENNAYA MYSL', Book 1, September 1920; T. Dervish (N. Tyurakulov), "The Fergana Problem," VOYENNAYA MYSL', Book 2, May-July 1920. See also: T. Dervish, "The Contemporary Basmachi," KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1922.

4. VOYENNAYA MYSL', Book 1, page 278.

5. Zevelev, "Iz istorii...," op. cit., page 456.

6. See VOYENNAYA MYSL', Book 2, page 118.

7. A. Vinogradova, "The Khorezm People's Soviet Republic," ZHIZN' NATSIONAL'NOSTEY, No 1, 1923, pp 181-194. See also Gumenyuk, "Bor'ba za Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Pyataya godovshchina Krasnoy Armii" [The Battle for Petro-Aleksandrovsk. Fifth Anniversary of the Red Army], Tashkent, 1923.

8. V. A. Gurko-Kryazhin, "British Intervention in the Transcaspian and Transcaucasia," ISTORIK-MARKSIST, Vol 2, 1926, pp 115-139.

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9. G. Safarov, "Kolonial'naya revolyutsiya (opyt Turkestana)" [The Colonial Revolution (The Experience of Turkestan)], Moscow, 1921.

10. For more detail see Zevelev, "Istoriografiya...," op. cit., pp 44-48.

11. N. Batmanov, "The Basmachi and the Struggle Against Them," KRASNAYA ARMIYA, No 9, 1921; G. Skalov, "The Social Nature of the Basmachi in Turkestan," ZHIZN' NATSIONAL'NOSTEY, 1923, books 3-4; S. Ginzburg, "The Basmachi in the Fergana," "Ocherki revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Sredney Azii" [Sketches on the Revolutionary Movement in Central Asia], Moscow, 1926; D. D. Zuyev, "The Fergana Basmachi," "Grazhdanskaya voyna" [The Civil War], Vol 3, Moscow, 1924; A. Syrkin, "Vostok v ogne" [The East in Flames], Leningrad, 1925.

12. N. Paskutskiy, "K istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v Turkestane" [On the History of of the Civil War in Turkestan], Tashkent, 1922; F. Khodzhayev, "Materialy k istorii revolyutsii v Bukhare" [Materials on History of the Revolution in Bukhara], Tajikistan-Samarkand-Tashkent, 1926; Khodzhayev, "Basmachestvo" [The Basmachi], Tashkent, 1927; Di-Mur, "The Civil War in Tajikistan," "Tadzhikistan. Sb. st." [Tajikistan. Collected Articles], Tashkent, 1925; S. Ayni, "Materialy po istorii Bukharskoy revolyutsii" [Materials on the History of the Bukhara Revolution], Moscow, 1926 (in Uzbek); P. Alekseyenkov, "Krest'yanskoye vosstaniye v Fergane" [Peasant Insurrection in the Fergana], Tashkent, 1927; Ye. Kozlovskiy, "Krasnaya Armiya v Sredney Azii" [The Red Army in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1928.

13. See F. Kasymov, "On History of the Study of the Bukhara People's Revolution in the First Period of Soviet Historical Science," "Materialy XXIV nauchnoy konferentsii professorsko-prepodavatel'skogo sostava SAMGU imeni Navoi" [Proceedings of the 24th Scientific Conference of Faculty of Samarkand State University imeni Alisher Navoi], Samarkand, 1967, page 46.

14. Di-Mur, "Grazhdanskaya voyna...," op. cit., page 283.

15. Ibid.

16. New history study centers were established at the end of the 1920's in Central Asian republics: the Institute of Turkmen Culture (1927), the Kirghiz Scientific Research Institute of Regional Studies (1928), the Society for Study of Tajikistan and Iranian Nationalities (1925), etc.

17. NOVYY VOSTOK, No 10-11, 1925; ZA PARTIYU, No 3-4, 9-10, 1929, etc.

18. NOVYY VOSTOK, No 2, 1922, No 10-11, 1924; "Revolyutsiya v Sredney Azii" [The Revolution in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1929; etc.

19. See "Tsentr istoriko-partiynoy nauki v Uzbekistane" [Center of Historical-Party Science in Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1972, No 43.

20. D. A. Furmanov, "Insurrection in Vernyy on 12-19 June 1920," PROLETARSKAYA REVOLYUTSIYA, No 11, 1923; S. Muraveyskiy (V. Lopukhov), "Ocherki po istorii revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Sredney Azii" [Sketches

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on the History of the Revolutionary Movement in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1922; A. Mel'kumov, "Materialy revolyutsionnogo dvizheniya v Turkmenii" [Materials on the Revolutionary Movement in Turkmenia], Tashkent, 1924; "Grazhdanskaya voyna 1918-1921 gg." [The Civil War, 1918-1921], in three volumes, edited by A. S. Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, and R. P. Eydeman, Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, 1930.

21. P. Alekseyenkov, "Chto takoye basmachestvo?" [Just What Is the Basmachestvo?], Tashkent, 1931.

22. Ibid., pp 6, 48.

23. Ibid., page 38.

24. Ibid., page 14.

25. P. Alekseyenkov, "Kokandskaya avtonomiya" [The Kokand Autonomy], Tashkent, 1931, page 64.

26. Alekseyenkov, "Chto takoye...," op. cit., page 64.

27. I. Kutyakov, "Krasnaya konnitsa i Vozdushnyy flot v pustyne v 1924 godu" [The Red Cavalry and Air Force in the Desert in 1924], N. Kakurin, editor, with foreword by S. M. Budennyy, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930.

28. "Vospominaniya uchastnikov Oktyabrya i grazhdanskoy voyny" [Reminiscences of Participants in the October Revolution and the Civil War], Issue 1, D. I. Manzhar, editor, Moscow-Tashkent, 1931, page 1.

29. See "Tsentr istoriko...," op. cit., pp 8-9.

30. Of the greatest interest among published collections of documents and materials were the following: "Materialy i dokumenty II s"yezda Kompartii Turkestana" [Materials and Documents of the 2d Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party], Moscow-Tashkent, 1934; "Voyna v peskakh. Materialy po istorii grazhdanskoy voyny" [War in the Sands. Materials on the History of the Civil War], Vol 12, edited by M. Gor'kiy, S. Ivanov, I, Mints, and F. Kolesov, Moscow 1935; "M. V. Frunze na frontakh grazhdanskoy voyny" [M. V. Frunze on the Civil War Fronts], Moscow 1941.

31. K. Zhitov and V. Nepomnin, "Ot kolonial'nogo rabstva k sotsializmu" [From Colonial Slavery to Socialism], Tashkent, 1939; B. Gafurov and N. M. Prokhorov, "Padeniye Bukharskogo emirata" [Fall of the Bukhara Emirate], Stalinabad, 1940.

32. S. P. Timoshkov, "Bor'ba s angliyskoy interventsiyey v Turkestane" [Struggle Against British Intervention in Turkestan], Moscow, 1941; Timoshkov, "Bor'ba s interventami, belogvardeytsami i basmachami v Sredney Azii" [Struggle Against the Interventionists, White Guard and Basmachi in Central Asia], VAF, 1941; A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, "Proval angliyskoy aggressivnoy politiki v Sredney Azii (1917-1920 gg.)" [Collapse of

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British Aggressive Policy in Central Asia (1917-1920)], Tashkent, 1955.

33. E. A. Voskoboynikov and A. I. Zevelev, "Turkkomissiya VTsIK and SNK RSFSR i Turkbyuro Ts RKP(b) v bor'be za ukrepleniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane" [The VTsIK and SNK RSFSR Turkkomissiya and RKP(b) Central Committee Turkbyuro in the Struggle for Consolidation of Soviet Power in Turkestan], Tashkent, 1951; Klych Kuliyev, "Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoy partii za uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti i osushchestvleniye natsional'noy politiki v Sredney Azii (1917-1925 gg.)" [The Struggle of the Communist Party to Consolidate Soviet Power and Implement Nationalities Policy in Central Asia (1917-1925)], Ashkhabad, 1956; V. Nikolayeva, "The Turkkomissiya — Plenipotentiary Agency of the RKP(b) Central Committee," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 2, 1958.

34. Aziz Niallo, "Ocherki istorii revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyny v Kirgizii i Sredney Azii" [Sketches on History of the Revolution and Civil War in Kirghizia and Central Asia], Frunze, 1941; V. Ye. Kutareva, "Osnovnyye etapy grazhdanskoy voyny v Kirgizii" [Principal Stages of the Civil War in Kirghizia], Frunze, 1947; P. P. Nikishov, "Bor'ba s basmachestvom na yuge Kirgizii" [Struggle Against the Basmachi in the Southern Part of Kirghizia], Frunze, 1957; D. K. Fan'yan and M. Zelinskaya, "Krasnaya Armiya — osvoboditel'nitsa tadzhikskogo naroda" [The Red Army — Liberator of the Tajik People], Stalinabad, 1943; G. Nepesov, "Pobeda sovetskogo stroya v Severnom Turkmenistane" [Victory of the Soviet System in Northern Turkmenistan], Ashkhabad, 1950.

35. See BOL'SHEVIK, No 23, 1951, pp 62-73.

36. A detailed analysis of the collected volume "Materialy po istorii tadzhikskogo naroda v sovetskiy period" [Materials on History of the Tajik People in the Soviet Period], which contains articles by the indicated authors, is given by R. M. Masov in the monograph "Istoriografiya Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana," op. cit. (pp 25-30).

37. M. Irkayev and Yu. Nikolayev, "V bor'be za Sovetskiy Tadzhikistan" [In the Struggle for Soviet Tajikistan], Stalinabad, 1956 (in Tajik); M. Irkayev, Yu. Nikolayev, and Ya. Sharapov, "Ocherk istorii Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana" [Historical Sketch of Soviet Tajikistan], Stalinabad, 1957.

38. "Oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya i grazhdanskaya voyna v Turkestane. Vospominaniya uchastnikov" [The October Socialist Revolution and Civil War in Turkestan. Reminiscences of Participants], Tashkent, 1957; "V boyakh za Sovetskuyu vlast' v Ferganskoy doline. Vospominaniya uchastnikov Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii i grazhdanskoy voyny (1917-1923 gg.)" [Fighting for Soviet Power in the Fergana Valley. Reminiscences of Participants in the October Revolution and Civil (1917-1923)], Tashkent, 1957; "Vospominaniya uchastnikov grazhdanskoy voyny v Andizhanskoy oblasti" [Reminiscences of Participants in the Civil War in Andizhanskaya Oblast], Andizhan, 1957; "Oktyabr'skaya sotsialisticheskaya revolyutsiya i grazhdanskaya voyna v Kirgizii (1917-1920)" [The October Socialist

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Revolution and Civil War in Kirghizia (1917-1920)], Frunze, 1957; "Turkmenistan v period inostrannoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny, 1918-1920" [Turkmenistan in the Period of Foreign Intervention and Civil War, 1918-1920], Ashkhabad, 1957; "Za Sovetskiy Turkestan" [For Soviet Turkestan], Tashkent, 1963; "Za Sovetskiy Turkmenistan" [For Soviet Turmenistan], Ashkhabad, 1963; "Za vlast' Sovetov v Tadzhikistane. Vospominaniya uchastnikov revolyutsii i bor'by s basmachestvom" [For Soviet Power in Tajikistan. Reminiscences of Participants in the Revolution and the Struggle Against the Basmachi], Stalinabad, 1958.

39. "Istoriya Kirgizii" [History of Kirghizia], Vol 2, Frunze, 1956, pp 68-111 (chapter author P. P. Nikishov); "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR" [History of the Uzbek SSR], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1957, pp 81-133 (chapter authors A. I. Zevelev and M. Kh. Nazarov); "Istoriya Turkmenskoy SSR" [History of the Turkmen SSR], Ashkhabad, 1957, pp 111-203 (chapter author O. K. Kuliyev); "Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR" [History of the Kazakh SSR], Vol 2. Era of Socialism, Alma-Ata, 1959, pp 75-161 (chapter author S. N. Pokrovskiy).

40. See "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR," op. cit., page 83.

41. M. Irkayev, Yu. Nikolayev, and Ya. Sharapov, "Ocherk istorii Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana (1917-1957 gg.)" [Historical Sketch of Soviet Tajikistan (1917-1957)], Stalinabad, 1957; Sh. Tashliyev, "Ustanovleniye i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Turkestane" [Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Power in Turkestan], Ashkhabad, 1957; M. Yazykova, "Bor'ba za ustanovleniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Zapadnom Turkmenistane" [The Struggle for Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Power in Western Turmenistan], Ashkhabad, 1957; A. Kokanbayev, "Bor'ba s basmachestvom i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Fergane" [The Struggle Against the Basmachi and Consolidation of Soviet Power in the Fergana], Tashkent, 1956; K. Malyshev, "Bor'ba za Sovety v Kirgizii i Turkestane" [The Struggle for the Soviets in Kirghizia and Turkestan], Frunze, 1958; G. Nepesov, "Velikiy Oktyabr' i narodnyye revolyutsii v 1920 g. v Severnom i Vostochnom Turkmenistane" [The Great October Revolution and Popular Revolutions in 1920 in Northern and Eastern Turkmenistan], Ashkhabad, 1958; T. Kh. Kel'diyev, "Razgrom interventsii v Ferganskoy i Samarkandskoy oblastyakh Turkestanskoy ASSR" [Defeat of the Intervention in Ferganskaya and Samarkandskaya Oblasts of the Turkestan ASSR], Tashkent, 1959.

42. Individual episodes in the struggle against the basmachi in the northern, central and southern areas of contemporary Tajikistan are also reflected in the following works: A. V. Makashov, "Utverzhdeniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Tsentral'nom i Yuzhnom Tadzhikistane" [Establishment of Soviet Power in Central and Southern Tajikistan], Stalinabad, 1957; V. M. Ionova, "Struggle of the Toiler Masses Under the Guidance of the Communist Party Against Intervention in the First Years of Soviet Rule (Employing Materials on Northern Tajikistan)," "Uch. zap. Leninabadskogo pedinstituta" [Scientific Notes of the Leninabad Pedagogic Institute], Issue 7, Leninabad, 1958; Ionova, "Political Work in the Masses During the Struggle Against the Basmachi in 1920-1923 (Based on Materials on Northern Tajikistan)," Ibid., Issue 9, Leninabad, 1960.

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43. S. N. Pokrovskiy, "Pobeda Sovetskoy vlasti v Semirech'ye" [Victory of Soviet Power in Semirech'ye], Alma-Ata, 1961.

44. M. Kh. Nazarov, "Turkestan v period interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny (1918-1920)" [Turkestan in the Period of Intervention and Civil War (1918-1920)], Tashkent, 1961 (in Uzbek).

45. "Boyevoy put' voysk Turkestanskogo voyennogo okruga" [Combat March of the Troops of the Turkestan Military District], Moscow, 1959.

46. See S. Narmetov, "The Civil War in Khorezm (Survey of the Literature)," ISTORIYA SSSR, No 3, 1970, page 143.

47. Sh. A. Shamagdiyev, "Ocherk istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v Ferganskoy doline" [Historical Sketch of the Civil War in the Fergana Valley], Tashkent, 1961.

48. V. Mineyev, "Conjecture in Place of Authenticity," PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 24 August 1961.

49. I. S. Sologubov, "Inostrannyye kommunisty v Turkestane (1918-1921 gg.)" [Foreign Communists in Turkestan (1918-1921)], Tashkent, 1961; A. M. Matveyev, "Foreign Communists in Turkestan," VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 3, 1962; Matveyev, "Foreign Internationalists on the Civil War Fronts in Central Asia," NOVAYA I NOVEYSHAYA ISTORII, No 4, 1961; Ya. M. Seryy, "Political Work in Red Army International Units in Turkestan (1918-1920)], "Trudy SAGU" [Works of Central Asian State University], Issue 170, Tashkent, 1960 (History of the CPSU); G. B. Nikol'skaya, "Some Materials on Immigrants from China in Turkestan After October 1917," "Trudy SAGU," Issue 151, Tashkent, 1959 (General History).

50. A. Kh. Babakhodzhayev, "Proval angliyskoy antisovetskoy politiki v Sredney Azii i na Srednem Vostoke v period priznaniya Sovetskogo gosudarstva de-fakto and de-yure (1921-1924 gg.)" [Collapse of British anti-Soviet Policy in Central Asia and the Middle East in the Period of De Facto and De Jure Recognition of the Soviet State (1921-1924)], Tashkent, 1957; Babakhodzhayev, "Proval angliyskoy politiki v Sredney Azii i na Srednem Vostoke (1918-1924 gg.)" [Failure of British Policy in Central Asia and the Near East (1918-1924)], Moscow, 1962.

51. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR" [History of the Civil War in the USSR], Vol 4, Moscow, 1959; Vol 5, Moscow, 1960.

52. M. Irkayev, "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane" [History of the Civil War in Tajikistan], Dushanbe, 1963, second, enlarged edition, Dushanbe, 1971.

53. Incidentally, he followed it in his preceding works.

54. In determining the chronological framework of the civil war in Tajikistan, M. Irkayev proceeded from the materials of the debate among social scientists (1956), during which a scheme of periodization of the history of Soviet society in Tajikistan was elaborated.

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55. M. Irkayev, "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane" [History of the Civil War in Tajikistan], Moscow, 1963, pp 255, 256.

56. Ibid., page 240.

57. Ibid., page 265.

58. G. Kh. Khaydarov, "Bor'ba za ustanovleniye i uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v Severnom Tadzhikistane (1917-1923 gg.)" [The Struggle for Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Power in Northern Tajikistan (1917-1923)], Dushanbe, 1966.

59. In counterbalance to the opinion of G. Kh. Khaydarov that basmachi appeared in the Matcha at the end of 1918, R. Abdulkhayev demonstrated that basmachi bands appeared here at the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919, following a counterrevolutionary insurrection and overthrow of Soviet rule (R. A. Abdulkhayev, "Uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti v rayonakh verkhov'yev Zeravshana" [Consolidation of Soviet Power on the Upper Reaches of the Zeravshan], Dushanbe, 1972). Questions pertaining to the civil war in Northern Tajikistan were also partially addressed in a monograph by T. R. Karimov entitled "Pobeda Velikoy Oktyabr'skoy sotsialisticheskoy revolyutsii v Severnom Tadzhikistane" [Victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Northern Tajikistan] (Stalinabad, 1957) and in other works by this author.

60. S. B. Zhantuarov, "Grazhdanskaya voyna v Kirgizskoy SSR" [The Civil War in the Kirghiz SSR], Frunze, 1963.

61. "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Turkestana" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Turkestan], Part III, "Kommunisticheskaya partiya Turkestana v period inostrannoy voyennoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny" [Turkestan Communist Party During Foreign Military Intervention and the Civil War], Tashkent, 1964.

62. "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Kazakhstana" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Kazakhstan], Alma-Ata, 1963 (P. M. Pakhmurnyy, author of the chapter on the civil war); "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Uzbekistana" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1964 (author -- M. Kh. Nazarov); Tashkent, 1974 (author -- R. A. Nurullin); "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Tadzhikistana" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Tajikistan], Dushanbe, 1964 (author -- M. I. Irkayev), second, enlarged edition, Dushanbe, 1969; "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Turkmenistana" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Turkmenistan], second edition, Ashkhabad, 1966 (author -- Sh. Tashliyev); "Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Kirgizii" [Historical Sketches on the Communist Party of Kirghizia], Frunze, 1966 (author -- P. P. Nikishov); Frunze, 1979; "Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR. Epokha sotsializma" [History of the Kazakh SSR. Era of Socialism], revised and enlarged edition, Alma-Ata, 1963; "Istoriya Kirgizii" [History of Kirghizia], Vol 2, Frunze, 1963; "Istoriya tadzhikskogo naroda" [History of the Tajik People], Vol 3, Book 1,

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Moscow, 1964; "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR" [History of the Uzbek SSR], Vol 3, Tashkent, 1967.

63. The following works have been published on Tajikistan, for example: I. Gafurova, "K istorii Kommunisticheskoy partii Tadzhikistana (1924-1929)" [On the History of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (1924-1929)], Dushanbe, 1963; A. V. Makashov, "Partiynaya organizatsiya Tadzhikistana v 1924-1926 gg." [The Tajikistan Party Organization in 1924-1926], Dushanbe, 1964; M. Nazorshoyev, "Partiynaya organizatsiya Pamira v bor'be za sotsializm i kommunizm" [The Pamir Party Organization in the Struggle for Socialism and Communism], Dushanbe, 1970.

64. R. M. Masov correctly noted that in this publication "there is certain embellishment... of the process of revolutionization of the indigenous inhabitants of prerevolutionary Tajikistan." The author pointed out that the book also contains other shortcomings. This does not, however, provide justification for a negative assessment of the work as a whole. The same applies to the group-authored monograph "Istoriya Tadzhikskoy SSR." See R. M. Masov, "Istoriografiya Sovetskogo Tadzhikistana," op. cit., pp 42-43.

65. See also: "Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney" [History of the Uzbek SSR From Ancient Times to the Present Day], Tashkent, 1974; "Istoriya Kara-Kalpakskoy ASSR" [History of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR], Vol 2, Tashkent, 1974.

66. "Inostrannaya voyennaya interventsiya i grazhdanskaya voyna v Sredney Azii i Kazakhstane. Dokumenty i materialy" [Foreign Military Intervention and the Civil War in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Documents and Materials], Vol 1. May 1918-September 1919, Alma-Ata, 1963; Vol 2, September 1919-December 1920, Alma-Ata, 1964.

67. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane," op. cit., Vol 1, Tashkent, 1964; Vol 2, Tashkent, 1970.

68. Ibid., Vol 1, pp 20-21. Our italics -- Auth.

69. Ibid., page 20.

70. Ibid., page 201.

71. Ibid., Part II, page 21.

72. "Obrazovaniye SSSR" [Formation of the USSR], Moscow-Leningrad, 1949, page 228.

73. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy Sredney Azii" [History of Communist Organizations of Central Asia], page 569.

74. "VII krayevaya konferentsiya KPT (Stenograficheskiy otchet)" [Seventh Regional Conference of the Turkestan Communist Party (Stenographic Record)],

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Tashkent, 1922; "Bulletin No 5 of the Seventh Regional Conference of the Turkestan Communist Party," page 25.

75. Ibid.

76. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v Uzbekistane," op. cit., Vol 1, page 184.

77. R. A. Nurullin, "Sovety Turkestanskoy ASSR v period inostrannoy voyennoy interventsii i grazhdanskoy voyny" [The Soviets of the Turkestan ASSR in the Period of Foreign Military Intervention and Civil War], Tashkent, 1965; G. Rashidov, "Tashkentskiy Sovet v bor'be za uprocheniye Sovetskoy vlasti" [The Tashkent Soviet in the Struggle for Consolidation of Soviet Power], Tashkent, 1960; "Istoriya sotsialisticheskogo Tashkenta" [History of Socialist Tashkent], Vol 1, Tashkent, 1965; T. Pulatov and G. Rashidov, "Tashkent v pervyye gody Sovetskoy vlasti" [Tashkent in the First Years of Soviet Rule], Tashkent, 1972.

78. "Istoriya kommunisticheskikh organizatsiy..." op. cit.

79. Ibid., page 277.

80. Ibid., page 278.

81. B. V. Lunin, "Lenin i narody Sredney Azii" [Lenin and the Peoples of Central Asia], Tashkent, 1967; Sh. Sh. Abdullayev, and A. I. Zevelev, "V. I. Lenin i istoricheskiye sud'by narodov Sredney Azii" [V. I. Lenin and the Historic Destinies of the Peoples of Central Asia], Moscow, 1968; same authors, "Lenin i narody Uzbekistana" [Lenin and the Peoples of Uzbekistan], Tashkent, 1970; K. Khasanov, "V. I. Lenin i Turkbyuro TsK RKP(b)" [V. I. Lenin and the RKP(b) Central Committee Turkbyuro], Tashkent, 1968; S. Beysembayev, "Lenin i Kazakhstan" [Lenin and Kazakhstan], Alma-Ata, 1968; G. F. Dakhshleyger, "V. I. Lenin i problemy Kazakhstanskoy istoriografii" [V. I. Lenin and Problems of Kazakhstan Historiography], Alma-Ata, 1973; P. U. Khamdamov, "Literatura o Sredney Azii v tvorchestve V. I. Lenina" [Literature on Central Asia in the Writings of V. I. Lenin], Tashkent, 1971; same author: "V. I. Lenin o Sredney Azii" [V. I. Lenin on Central Asia], Tashkent, 1974.

82. V. M. Ustinov, "Leninskaya politika partii na Vostoke" [The Party's Leninist Policy in the East], Frunze, 1963; same author, "Reshayushchiye usloviya sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva v Sredney Azii" [Decisive Conditions for Building Socialism in Central Asia], Ashkhabad, 1967; S. Nazarov, "Iz istorii deyatel'nosti Sredazbyuro Ts RKP(b) (1922-1924)" [From History of the Activities of the RKP(b) Central Committee Sredazbyuro (1922-1924)], Tashkent, 1965; M. F. Anderson, "Iz istorii partiynogo stroitel'stva v Sredney Azii" [From the History of Party Organizational Development in Central Asia], Dushanbe, 1966; K. Khasanov, "TsK VKP(b) v bor'be za postroyeniye sotsializma v Sredney Azii" [The VKP(b) Central Committee in the Struggle to Build Socialism in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1968; S. A. Nazarov, "Rukovodstvo TsK RKP(b) partiynym stroitel'stvom v Sredney Azii" [RKP(b) Central Committee Direction of Party Organizational Development in Central Asia], Tashkent, 1972; A. T. Azizkhanov,

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ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BSP = Bukhara Communist Party
SAMO = Central Asian Military District
ChON = Special Purpose Units
GPU = State Political Administration
IMEL = CPSU Central Committee Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute
KCP = Khorezm Communist Party
KPT = Turkestan Communist Party
Kraykom = regional or kray committee
Narkomnats = People's Commissariat for Nationalities
OGPU = Unified State Political Directorate
Orgbyuro = Organization Bureau
Politprosvetotryad = Political Education Detachment
revkom = revolutionary committee
Revvoyensovet = Revolutionary Military Council
RKKA = Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
RKP(b) = Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)
RKSM = Russian Young Communist League
RSDRP(b) = Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks)
Sel'sovet = village soviet
SNK, Sovnarkom = Council of People's Commissars
Sovdep = Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies
Sredazbyuro = Central Asian Bureau
Turkbyuro = Turkestan Bureau
Turkkomissiya = Turkestan Commission
TurkTsIK = Turkestan Central Executive Committee

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TsIK = Central Executive Committee
VKP(b) = All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)
VTsIK = All-Union Central Executive Committee

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